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Abstract 
In Western society, the point in a woman’s life when she routinely ceases having control over 
her person in a treatment context – if such a point in time arises – is pregnancy. The Assisted 
Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015 typifies this, providing that advance directives intended 
to apply in pregnancy be referred for High Court adjudication. The singling out of pregnant 
women for special treatment where their bodily integrity and self-determination are concerned 
did not suddenly start with this Act. Instead, impingement on the interests of pregnant women 
has existed in many domestic legal frameworks for decades. This research discusses the 
development of such laws and the underpinning moral issues to explain why the Irish 
legislature drafted the Act in this manner. In doing so, it highlights the many and varied issues 
– ethical and legal – with the position adopted. Perhaps obvious, but it is only by describing
the law applicable to non-pregnant individuals that the extent of these ‘pregnancy exceptions’
are fully articulated.
Aiding this exposition, is a discussion of the law in other jurisdictions, namely England and 
Wales and New York State (and the greater United States). The Irish legislature was 
undoubtedly guided by the now-repealed 8th Amendment to the Irish Constitution, which 
protected the right to life of the unborn, however, there is a wealth of international law 
demonstrating that in pregnancy, exceptions have always been made to the usual rules 
governing medical treatment. These exceptions can be explicit in laws prohibiting life-
sustaining treatment from being withdrawn from pregnant women, despite their wishes. Or, 
they can be more subtle in laws that allow, however inadvertently, for consent to treatment to 
be coerced. 
Spanning seven chapters, this thesis comprehensively discusses informed consent, end-of-life 
decision-making, advance directives and critically, how the law operates in these areas when 
the individual is pregnant. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The word ‘pregnant’ comes from the Latin words prae and gnasci, which literally translate to 
‘before’ and ‘be born’. From the outset, the origins of the term ‘pregnant’ relate entirely to the 
foetus. It is the entity that is before birth. The woman appears to be in a kind of facilitatory role 
regarding this entity before it is born, without even being referenced by the word itself. Perhaps 
that is unsurprising to an extent; ‘pregnant’ is an adjective, the purpose of which is to describe 
the woman. Naturally, the origins of ‘pregnancy’ are the same, entirely relating to the foetus and 
never encompassing the person experiencing the state. This research is certainly not suggesting 
replacing the word ‘pregnant’ with another word more reflective of the nature and social context 
of pregnancy; however, perhaps the origins of the term – the exclusive focus on the entity before 
birth and not the woman – illuminate a starting point for the legal and ethical issues that relate to 
the state of ‘being pregnant’. One such area of intense complexity is that of the medical 
treatment of pregnant women and closely related to that is the refusal of recommended 
intervention in pregnancy, whether contemporaneously or in advance. It is this often-unresolved 
legal tension, particularly in relation to advance refusals, that inspired this research. As with 
many matters of medical law and ethics, there is little agreement on the position of advance 
directives in pregnancy, nor what that position ought to be. Arguably, this legal uncertainty is 
exemplified by the approach that has been taken by the Irish legislature in the Assisted Decision-
Making (Capacity) Act 2015 in which specific provisions pertaining to the effect of advance 
directives in pregnancy have been included.1 
On the one hand, many jurisdictions make strong statements regarding the right of a competent 
adult to refuse medical treatment, contemporaneously and in advance. These protections are 
afforded in legislation, developed through common law precedent or interpretations of 
constitutional law; indeed, sometimes a mix of some, or all three. Yet, pregnancy often appears 
to create an exception, whether explicitly in that it is specified in legislation or interpreted by the 
courts in light of related legislation or jurisprudence, or whether more subtly or secretly in 
hospital policies or in the decisions of medical professionals involved in the care of pregnant 
women in practice. The various forms that this ‘exception’ takes will be considered extensively 
 
1 Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015, s 85(6).  
by this research; naturally, compelled interventions are the most obvious example of such 
exceptions in the law, but other, less obvious manifestations of this exception will also be 
considered, such as the questions of capacity that arise for women in labour. From the medical 
side, reports of the coercion of pregnant women where threats of arrest for a related or unrelated 
issue, or a complaint to child protective services, is leveraged in order to get consent to the 
recommended treatment are the most obvious examples. There are other, less obvious examples 
of the ‘pregnancy exception’ in healthcare, such as the tendency to treat pregnant women 
differently to their non-pregnant counterparts in terms of how the risks of particular interventions 
and treatments are conveyed and understood. For example, Anne Lyerly et al assert that there is 
an insidious and damaging dichotomy in the treatment of pregnant women:  
When treating pregnant women’s nonobstetrical medical needs (…) there is a tendency to 
notice the risks of intervening without adequately noting the risks of failing to intervene. 
In contrast, when we turn from management of pregnancy to management of birth, we 
note a tendency to intervene without due regard for the burdens to both fetus and woman 
that such interventions may bring. If risk perception is often distorted, the nature of the 
distortion changes markedly depending on the circumstance of a pregnant woman’s 
health needs.2 
The latter point is certainly borne out by the cases considered as part of Chapter 6. The former is 
arguably borne out by the anecdotal evidence coming not only from United States, where Dr 
Lyerly is based, but also Ireland.3 This idea of different treatment in pregnancy is one that will 
arise throughout this research, as it is argued that it is not just the explicit examples of different 
treatment but also the less obvious examples that are key to fully explaining the overall value of 
this work. 
Several research questions have been generated by this thesis; they can, however, be distilled 
down into two interrelated questions. The first core question is whether, from a legal perspective, 
an otherwise valid advance directive will likely be disregarded or overridden in Ireland if the 
 
2 Anne Lyerly and others, ‘Risk and the Pregnant Body’ (2009) 39 The Hastings Center Report 34, 35. 
3 Kate Campbell, ‘I needed surgery but because I was pregnant, I was left to rot’ Irish Times (Dublin, 19 May 2018) 
<https://www.irishtimes.com/life-and-style/health-family/i-needed-surgery-but-because-i-was-pregnant-i-was-left-to-rot-1.3500349> accessed 28 
August 2020. There are also anecdotal accounts of women, including Irish patients, using phrasing like ‘I was informed that I would be’ induced 
or given a Caesarean section or ‘I was told I was being booked in’ for induction / Caesarean and not that either was being presented as an option 
to the woman. In other words, there appeared to be no discussion of the alternatives and in the case of induction, there was sometimes no 
discussion of why this was being recommended. See also Irish Maternity Support Network ‘Report of the Irish Maternity Support Network to the 
UN Special Rapporteur on Women on Mistreatment and Violence against Women during Reproductive Health Care with a Focus on Childbirth’ 
(17 May 2019) available in Annex 1. For the United Kingdom, see Birthrights and Birth Companions, ‘Holding It All Together: Understanding 
How Far the Human Rights of Women Facing Disadvantage are Respected during Pregnancy, Birth and Postnatal Care’ (2019) 
<https://www.birthrights.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Holding-it-all-together-Full-report-FINAL-Action-Plan.pdf> accessed 16 October 
2020, 26-40. 
patient is pregnant when the decision ought to be given effect. Plainly, the second question is 
given that pregnancy may well invalidate an advance directive, should this be the case legally 
and ethically? Overall then, the core question is: what is the legal position of the pregnant 
advance directive holder in Ireland and what ought it to be? 
In order to answer this core question and the multitude of ancillary questions, this thesis takes a 
formulaic approach to the core issue of advance directives in pregnancy. It discusses the legal 
and ethical concepts underpinning advance directives, such as informed consent and end-of-life 
decision-making, first, articulating how these laws developed and critically, how they apply to 
non-pregnant people. Thus, the discussion in each chapter builds on the previous one(s), 
culminating in an exploration of not only the pregnancy exceptions found in many advance 
directive statutes from the US and in Ireland, but also compelled intervention in pregnancy. It is 
in that chapter that this thesis will have all of the salient information, as provided by the previous 
chapters, to answer the core research question, namely the validity of an advance directive in 
pregnancy in Ireland and the appropriateness of that legal position. 
In order to answer this question, particularly the second part, it was considered insufficient to 
examine the law in Ireland as though it were in a vacuum and independent of outside influences. 
Rather, it was deemed necessary to consider the approaches of other common law jurisdictions to 
the issue of advance refusals in pregnancy to support this research in its aim. Thus, this research 
will also look at aspects of the law in England and Wales and the US, particularly New York 
State. Furthermore, it was viewed as necessary to conduct ethical analysis in each chapter; 
considering the law as though it operates in ignorance of morals and ethics would do a disservice 
to a very complex question and fail to appreciate why individuals, lawmakers, physicians and 
judges find it so challenging to make these decisions. 
As this research progresses, one matter is worth highlighting briefly – that of the relationship 
between religion and the issue of refusal of medical intervention in pregnancy, whether in 
advance or contemporaneously. The relationship between the law and religion can be described 
as one of peaceful co-existence, until it is not. Perhaps emphasised by this quote from the 
judgment in Re Quinlan wherein the relationship between religion, law and medicine is 
discussed: 
The civil law is not expected to assert a belief in eternal life; nor (…) is it expected to 
ignore the right of the individual to profess it, and to form and pursue his conscience in 
accord with that belief. Medical science is not (…) expected to prevent [death] when it is 
inevitable and all hope of a return to an even partial exercise of human life is irreparably 
lost. Religion is not expected to define biological death; nor (…) is it expected to 
relinquish its responsibility to assist man in the formation and pursuit of a correct 
conscience as to the acceptance of natural death (…)4 
First, religion will feature heavily in the context of the decision of the woman to refuse medical 
treatment; often her own religious convictions prevent her from accepting a particular form of 
intervention. This theme will emerge most obviously in Chapter 6, which considers compelled 
intervention in pregnancy. Second, religion – or more accurately, religious lobbying – has 
affected the decisions of legislators in the United States vis-á-vis advance directive legislation 
and specifically where there are severe restrictions or complete nullification of advance 
directives in pregnancy.5 This facet of legislative decision-making is worth bearing in mind as 
this research progresses, as is the obvious tension created by it. On the one hand, the right to 
practice one’s religion receives significant support within the United States; on the other hand, it 
does not receive quite the same support where it may result in foetal injury. 
Finally, the issue of hospital patronage is worth examining briefly before progressing further 
with this research, considering the jurisdictions that will be discussed in the coming chapters. 
Ireland has a long-standing tradition of Catholic Church-founded and controlled hospitals and to 
this day, many hospitals in Ireland are still under the patronage of the Catholic Church, though, 
strictly speaking, none of these are maternity hospitals.6 With that said, concern was expressed in 
2016 when the intention to transfer the National Maternity Hospital to the campus at St 
Vincent’s hospital – owned by the Religious Sisters of Charity – was announced and such 
concern persists.7 In particular, Dr Peter Boylan, former Master of the NMH expressed concern 
in May 2020 that it would be ‘hard to see how such a report [obliged by St Vincent’s Holdings 
CLG becoming a public juridic person] could include the numbers of elective sterilisations, 
 
4 Re Quinlan 70 NJ 10 (1976); 32-33. 
5 See James M Hoefler and Brian E Kamoie, Deathright: Culture, Medicine, Politics, and the Right to Die (Westview Press 1994) 202-5 
regarding the influence of the Catholic lobby on pregnancy exclusions in advance directive legislation. 
6 For completeness, it is worth noting that the National Maternity Hospital (Holles Street) is owned by a private trust whose chair is the 
Archbishop of Dublin. This is distinguishable from the hospitals owed by the Catholic Church, however, as the Catholic Church appears to have 
no influence on hospital policy through this relationship, nor does it appear that it wishes to. It has been reported that the current Archbishop of 
Dublin, Dr Diarmuid Martin, has spoken with previous Ministers for Health regarding changing the organisational structure, so that the 
Archbishop of Dublin is not automatically appointed as chair. Cliodhna Russell, ‘Religion and health care: What role does the Catholic Church 
play in Irish hospitals?’ The Journal 30 April 2017 <https://www.thejournal.ie/religion-health-care-catholic-church-3360849-Apr2017/> accessed 
9 July 2020.  
abortions and artificial fertilisation procedures carried out in the hospital in the year, and 
continue to be approved by the Vatican’.8 While it is not certain that St Vincent’s Holdings CLG 
will become a public juridic person, Dr Boylan cites other Catholic orders, internationally and in 
Ireland, which have done so for their health organisations. Furthermore, this current lack of 
ownership of maternity hospitals by the Catholic Church does not mean that it has had no 
influence on matters with a reproductive health dynamic in the hospitals that it does own, or that 
influence is not exerted through individual physicians.9  
A similar dynamic exists in the US, where the Catholic Church is the largest provider of non-
profit healthcare in the nation.10 It perhaps goes without saying that these are vastly different 
situations to that in the UK. While it is not being suggested that this alone explains the 
jurisdictional differences in the treatment of pregnant women refusing intervention in hospitals, 
it is argued that it may go some way towards explaining it, particularly if there are penalties for a 
physician who fails to uphold the religious ethos of a hospital.11 A recent study carried out by the 
National Bureau of Economic Research in the US highlights the effect that religious ethos can 
have on the provision of services.12 It demonstrated that where mergers have taken place 
between a secular and Catholic hospital or group, there was a reduction of 31% in tubal ligations, 
with no corresponding decrease in other related procedures such as Caesarean sections.13 
Furthermore, women have been denied particular care because it contravenes the ethos of the 
 
7 See for example, Claire Hogan, ‘Catholic Church’s Influence over Irish Hospital Medicine Persists’ Irish Times (Dublin, 28 April 2016) 
<https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/catholic-church-s-influence-over-irish-hospital-medicine-persists-1.2626856> accessed 9 July 2020. 
8 Dr Peter Boylan, ‘National Maternity Hospital Concerns’ (Letters to the Editor) Irish Times (Dublin, 22 May 2020) 
<https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/letters/national-maternity-hospital-concerns-1.4259557> accessed 24 July 2020. This letter was written in 
reply to one from Prof Shane Higgin and others ‘The National Maternity Hospital Project’ (Letters to the Editor) Irish Times (Dublin, 21 May 
2020) <https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/letters/the-national-maternity-hospital-project-1.4258455> accessed 24 July 2020. 
9 For example, in 1983, a woman named Sheila Hodges was refused the continuation of her cancer treatment in Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital in 
Drogheda because she became pregnant. A termination of pregnancy, an early delivery of the baby and a Caesarean section were also all refused 
by the hospital. She and her premature daughter subsequently died; Kitty Holland, ‘Reasons For Women Not To Be Cheerful’ Irish Times 
(Dublin, 29 December 2012) < https://www.irishtimes.com/news/reasons-for-women-not-to-be-cheerful-1.5496> accessed 14 September 2020. In 
2005, the ethics committee of the Mater Hospital in Dublin deferred approval of the clinical trial of a potential lung cancer drug because the trial 
required participants to use contraception; ‘Clinical trial of cancer drug deferred’ Irish Times (Dublin, 3 October 2005) 
<https://www.irishtimes.com/news/clinical-trial-of-cancer-drug-deferred-1.500245> accessed on 24 July 2020. In 2010, a complaint was lodged 
with the Medical Council regarding a physician in Galway who refused to provide the infertility treatment NaPro Technology to an unmarried 
couple on the basis that he believed only married people should have children. Noel Baker, ‘Clinic Insists Couples Must be Married to Get 
Fertility Treatment’ Irish Examiner (Cork, 15 April 2010) <https://www.irishexaminer.com/news/arid-20117246.html> accessed 10 September 
2020.  
10 Rebecca J Cook and Bernard M Dickens, ‘Reproductive Health and the Law’ in Pamela R Ferguson and Graeme T Laurie (eds) Inspiring a 
Medico-Legal Revolution: Essays in Honour of Sheila McLean (2015 Ashgate) 13. See also the website of the Catholic Health Association of the 
United States <https://www.chausa.org/about/about> accessed 24 July 2020.  
11 Elizabeth Sepper recounts a story of a psychiatrist who lost his admitting privileges after the clinic where he worked merged with a Catholic 
hospital because he refused to agree to the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services (ERD) on the ground that they 
interfered with the rights of his patients: Elizabeth Sepper, ‘Taking Conscience Seriously’ (2012) 98 Va L Rev 1501, 1524. She also discusses the 
potential for the termination of the employment contracts of physicians who violate religiously motivated hospital policies [1526]. 
12 Elaine L Hill and others, ‘Reproductive Health Care in Catholic-Owned Hospitals’ (2017) National Bureau of Economic Research Research 
Paper 23768 <https://www.nber.org/papers/w23768.pdf> accessed 9 September 2020. 
13 ibid.  
hospitals.14 Religion, therefore, can be said to go to the core of why treatment in pregnancy can 
be a contentious issue for healthcare providers and as Rebecca Cook and Bernard Dickens argue, 
‘raises issues of service providers’ conscience’, which often carries legislative protection, not 
only where abortion is concerned.15 
Jurisdictions 
As discussed, this research explores how advance refusals in pregnancy are treated in England 
and Wales and New York – and the greater United States – in addition to considering the issue in 
light of Irish law and traditions. These jurisdictions form a very important part of this thesis. At 
various points in time, their approach serves as a lesson to Ireland either because they have 
achieved best practice and we ought to follow this approach or because they have made a 
legislative error – or no choice at all – and we ought to avoid such a course of action. There are 
marked differences in how these jurisdictions approach many of the broader legal issues, which 
form the ‘building blocks’ of the issue of advance refusals in pregnancy. The appeal of England 
and Wales as a jurisdiction is clear; first, both England and Wales and Ireland share a virtually 
identical legal system. As two jurisdictions with legal traditions grounded in the common law, 
the critical importance of precedent is shared and will be evidenced by many of the cases 
discussed throughout this research. Second, as Ireland’s nearest neighbour, English jurisprudence 
often serves as persuasive authority in the Irish Courts and its legislation as a source of 
inspiration to the Irish legislature. In fact, it is quite challenging to consider Irish law without 
concurrently considering English law because so many Irish judgments contain references to 
jurisprudence from England and Wales, certainly within medical law. Furthermore, though not 
identical, our courts systems are very similar, which means that equivalences and distinctions 
can be drawn with ease; in other words, courts of similar standing consider similar matters in 
 
14 For example, Tamesha Means was discharged from a Michigan hospital run by Mercy Health Partners twice while suffering from preterm 
premature rupture of membrane, which usually results in a stillbirth or the death of the baby soon after birth. Despite the gravity of her condition 
and the considerable risk to her health, Ms Means was discharged with pain medication and was neither informed of the risk to her health of 
infection nor that the foetus was unlikely to survive. Critically, she was not given the option of artificially completing the miscarriage or 
terminating the pregnancy. She returned to the hospital the next day with a fever, excruciating pain and bleeding, at which point she was still not 
given any additional treatment or options, even though a serious bacterial infection was suspected. She was again discharged when her fever 
abated. She returned for a third time with contractions and while preparations were being made to discharge her again, she delivered the baby, 
which died shortly afterwards. Ms Means was suffering from two acute bacterial infections when she gave birth; Means v United States 
Conference of Catholic Bishops 836 F 3d 643 (6th Cir 2016). See also Lori Freedman and others, ‘When There's a Heartbeat: Miscarriage 
Management in Catholic-owned Hospitals’ (2008) 98 Am J Public Health 1774. For a broader discussion of the impact of Catholic ownership of 
hospitals on the provision of healthcare - for example, in matters such as informed consent to treatment and the advice provided to HIV-positive 
patients and rape victims regarding contraceptives – see Elizabeth Sepper, ‘Taking Conscience Seriously’ (2012) 98 Va L Rev 1501, 1520-1523. 
15 Rebecca J Cook and Bernard M Dickens, ‘Reproductive Health and the Law’ in Pamela R Ferguson and Graeme T Laurie (eds) Inspiring a 
Medico-Legal Revolution: Essays in Honour of Sheila McLean (2015 Ashgate) 18. See Public Health Law § 2994-n (2) for conscientious 
objections in New York.  
both jurisdictions. Finally, and arguably most important for the purposes of this research, 
England and Wales has a rich body of jurisprudence pertaining to medical treatment in 
pregnancy. Despite not being restricted by a constitutional protection of the unborn or some 
other similar constraint, the courts in England and Wales have struggled with allowing a 
pregnant woman to refuse medical treatment that would likely harm her foetus. This 
jurisprudence will provide immeasurable value when core questions are being answered in 
Chapter 6. 
The appeal of New York is perhaps not as apparent from the outset, however, as a jurisdiction, it 
presents a fascinating picture. On the one hand, it would be legitimate to hold the belief that New 
York is a liberal ‘safe haven’, a jurisdiction wherein the rights of the individual, particularly the 
pregnant woman, would be paramount. After all, New York has had legal abortion up to the 24th 
week of pregnancy since 1970, before the US Supreme Court judgment in Roe v Wade.16 It is the 
home of one of the earliest informed consent cases in the United States, Schloendorff v New York 
Hospital.17 On the other hand, when the jurisprudence from New York is explored, a curious 
dichotomy can be found in relation to non-consensual medical treatment and informed consent. 
This dichotomy will become more apparent with each chapter. From a legal standpoint, its 
appeal as a jurisdiction rests on several factors; first, as was the case for England and Wales, it is 
a common law system. In the course of considering the case law, however, it will become clear 
that the effect of precedent may not be quite as strong as would be expected. Second and on a 
related note, the courts structure is quite different. Complex medico-legal matters are not heard 
in the High Court, Court of Protection or equivalent, as they are in England and Wales and 
Ireland, but instead in county courts, referred to as ‘Supreme Courts’. While this may be a 
feature of the sheer size of New York, it means that only those cases that are appealed more than 
once will reach its highest court – the Court of Appeals of the State of New York. Otherwise, the 
matter is heard in courts that also hear quite run-of-the-mill civil matters such as divorce, 
separation and annulment proceedings. With all due respect to the profession of judge, it is 
questionable if judges in courts of this level have sufficient experience to deal with such complex 
matters, certainly compared with their counterparts in Ireland and England and Wales. As will 
 
16 410 US 113 (1973).  
17 211 NY 125 (1914). 
also become apparent, this results in a confusing legal situation for many issues and leaves open 
the distinct possibility of multiple parallel lines of authority in New York.  
The next appeal of New York rests on the fact that it has recently overhauled its healthcare 
decision-making legislation, yet advance directives were not included in the new legislation; the 
new Act will be discussed at length as this research progresses.18 Third, as part of the United 
States, New York has a written constitution, which adds an additional dynamic to cases 
considering the refusal of medical treatment, just like it does in Ireland. Finally, there is a shared 
religious dynamic between New York and Ireland; while Ireland undoubtedly has less religious 
diversity than New York, it is still the case that both have quite a strong Roman Catholic 
presence, both amongst the population and within lobbying efforts. By assessing the legal 
position in Ireland with reference to the legal position in England and Wales and New York, it is 
felt that a more complete picture of the strengths and weaknesses of Irish law can be identified. 
Ethical Analysis 
With matters such as medical decision-making, it is almost impossible to ignore the role of 
ethics. Complex issues of this nature are often this challenging and uncertain because of the 
inseparable ethical dimension. In short, not everyone views right and wrong in the same way, nor 
do they view the same actions to be duties, rights or responsibilities. To consider this area of law 
without understanding the ethical challenges and justification for its very existence would be to 
fail to fully analyse the topic. The relationship between the law and moral theory, although long 
established, is also complex. In general, we expect that laws will reflect what society perceives to 
be ‘good’ or ‘bad’ behaviours. We expect the law to discourage or completely prohibit the bad 
and mandate or incentivise the good. Issues within the healthcare context are often quite divisive 
from a moral perspective, meaning that sometimes there may be no ‘right answers’, just ones that 
have better justification than the alternatives. Issues surrounding medical treatment such as 
abortion, assisted suicide, surrogacy and preimplantation genetic diagnosis have all garnered 
fierce ethical debate and disagreement. This should not mean that ethical issues in healthcare 
should not be considered; on the contrary, it is precisely why they should be. As Julian Savulescu 
et al argue in the next extract: 
 
18 The ‘new Act’ refers to the Family Health Care Decisions Act, which was introduced in 2010.  
The most profound questions that health professionals face are not scientific or technical, 
but ethical (…) Life can be prolonged at enormous cost, sometimes far beyond the point 
that the individual appears to be gaining a net benefit (…) Science can tell us how to 
achieve something, but it cannot tell us whether we should achieve that end—whether it 
is good. For that, we need ethics (…) Where there are no options, there are no ethical 
questions. However, once there are options, there arise pressing questions about whether 
to pursue them (…) We require values and principles to decide how to use medicine and 
science.19  
As Nils Hoppe and Jose Miola argue, it is not the job of the law ‘to enshrine all moral obligations 
we might care to think of’, rather it will ‘merely try to encompass those moral obligations that 
are considered most weighty, although this assessment can clearly be contentious’.20 In a way, 
this research attempts the same, namely consideration of the ‘most weighty’ moral issues in the 
context of advance decisions in pregnancy.  
The primary research question is not one single ethical issue, but instead multiple ethical 
questions, which build upon one another. Not only must the ethics of the right to refuse medical 
treatment be considered, but also the morality of refusing life-saving treatment. Do the ethical 
implications and considerations change when the refusal results in death? Ought they to? Is it 
right for an agent to act in a way that is likely to end her life? Should a distinction be made 
between those who are terminally ill and those who are otherwise healthy? Should those with 
dependents be held to a different standard to those who have minimal responsibility for others? 
What if the refusal is made in advance rather than contemporaneously; do new ethical concerns 
arise that are not present in the case of contemporaneous refusal? If so, how should they be 
resolved? What of pregnancy? Does that make unethical what would be ethical for a non-
pregnant person? Is it immoral for a physician to treat a pregnant woman differently to a non-
pregnant patient, or is it immoral for him21 to treat her the same? To confine this research to just 
the legal questions would be to miss the rich and complex discourse that exists outside of the law 
and to miss the inconsistent ways in which ethics and morals are discussed in jurisprudence.  
 
19 Julian Savulescu and others, ‘Philosophical Medical Ethics: More Necessary Than Ever’ (2018) 44 J Med Ethics 434. 
20 Nils Hoppe and José Miola, Medical Law and Medical Ethics (Cambridge University Press 2014) 2. 
21 For convenience and the avoidance of confusion, male pronouns (he/him/his) will be used to describe the physician and female pronounces 
(she/her) will be used to describe the patient save where the facts of a case or quote dictate otherwise. Furthermore, rather than using gender 
neutral terms, this research will make reference to ‘the pregnant woman’ or the ‘woman’. This is, in no way, an attempt to exclude transgender 
individuals who may be affected by the issue of advance directives in pregnancy, rather it is a reflection of common parlance on the topic and the 
fact that no cases concerning members of the transgender community have arisen during the course of this research. 
When this thesis speaks about rights, in general it is speaking about legal rights. Talk of rights in 
an ethical context, where there is no legal right, is a tricky business leading to blurring and 
confusion. While this research uses terms like self-determination and bodily integrity, these two 
are vulnerable to being bandied about. Thus, if they are to have the desired meaning and 
significance and carry weight in the arguments advanced, it is essential to define what they 
mean. Rosamund Scott explains an interest in self-determination as ‘concerning a person’s 
interest in reflectively making significant personal choices’, while interest in bodily integrity can 
be understood as ‘being able to decide what happens to one’s own body’, which she argues is 
important because ‘one’s own body is a central part of oneself and so of one’s sense of self’.22 
Indeed, as Judith Jarvis Thomson argues; ‘if a human being has any just, prior claim to anything 
at all, he has a just, prior claim to his own body’.23 
How the ‘just claim’ that a pregnant woman has to her own body co-exists with, or is 
subordinated to, any just claims of the foetus is clearly worthy of discussion. Furthermore, this is 
not to say that rights in respect of the interests in bodily integrity and self-determination have not 
been found by the courts, indeed the opposite is true. It is just to say that in the ethical context, 
particularly where pregnancy is concerned, speaking of interests gives greater clarity to the 
overall debate.  
The Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015 
Before outlining the structure of this thesis, it is necessary to give a brief introduction to the 
Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015 (‘ADM(C)A’), the relevant parts of which will 
be discussed in more detail throughout the chapters in this thesis. Though signed in 2015, this 
Act will not be commenced until 2022. Consequently, this necessitated a choice to be made 
between dedicating significant time to discussing the current system for dealing with 
incompetent individuals – wardship – or confining the discussion to the Act with the 
understanding that it has not yet been commenced. This research will focus on the Act, rather 
than the wardship system as it is thought that discussing wardship in any great detail would lead 
to quick obsolescence of a significant part of the research and it lacking real relevance within a 
short space of time. As will become apparent as this research progresses, that is not to suggest 
 
22 Rosamund Scott, Rights, Duties and the Body: Legal and Philosophical Reflections on Refusing Medical Treatment during Pregnancy (Hart 
2002) 61. 
that the historical development of the various issues – informed consent, end-of-life treatment 
and so forth – will not be discussed. Rather, the jurisprudence relating to each of these issues will 
be considered in detail. It is only the framework within which they will be considered that is 
different. 
The 2015 Act is an ambitious piece of legislation, arguably combining the strengths of the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 from England and Wales and new provisions, in order for Ireland to 
meet many, but not all, of its obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities. It provides for advance refusal of treatment through an advance 
directive, but also provides for the individual to appoint a Designated Healthcare Representative 
to make healthcare decisions on her behalf.24 Although the history of the Act and specific 
sections of relevance will be discussed in detail during the course of the research, for now, it is 
worth giving a brief overview of the guiding principles. The Act advocates for intervention only 
when essential; it requires that intervention be confined to situations where ‘it is necessary to do 
so having regard to the individual circumstances of the (…) person’.25 Capacity must be 
construed functionally according to section 3; it must be presumed and an individual shall not be 
considered incompetent to make the relevant decision merely because she has or will likely make 
an unwise decision and ‘unless all practicable steps have been taken, without success, to help 
(…) her’ make the decision.26 Any intervention must be ‘proportionate’ and:27 
(i) be made in a way that minimises the ‘restriction of the relevant person’s rights’ 
and her ‘freedom of action’;28 
(ii) be made with due regard for the ‘dignity, bodily integrity, privacy, autonomy’ of 
the individual and be as limited in duration as possible.29 
Insofar as is practicable, the person intervening must firstly encourage, facilitate and improve the 
participation of the individual in the intervention.30 Second, effect must be given ‘to the past and 
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24 This research is concerned with advance refusals of medical treatment through an advance healthcare directive; accordingly, no further analysis 
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25 Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015, s 8(5). 
26 ibid s 8(2), 8(4) and 8(3) respectively. 
27 ibid s 8(6)(c). 
28 ibid s 8(6)(a). 
29 ibid s 8(6)(b)(d). 
30 ibid s 8(7)(a). 
present will and preferences’ of the individual, if ascertainable.31 Third, the intervener must ‘take 
into account the beliefs and values of the relevant person (…) and any other factors which the 
relevant person would be likely to consider if he or she were able to do so’, if ascertainable.32 
Fourth, unless inappropriate or impracticable, the intervener should consider the views of ‘any 
person named by the relevant person as a person to be consulted’ and ‘any decision-making 
assistant, co-decision-maker, decision-making representative or attorney for the relevant 
person’.33 The intervener may consider the views of those caring for the relevant person, those 
with a bona fide interest in her welfare or healthcare professionals.34 Finally, regard must be had 
to the likelihood of the individual recovering decision-making capacity and ‘the urgency of 
making the intervention prior to such recovery’.35 
Clearly, the legislature has made great strides towards protecting individual autonomy and the 
interests of every individual in self-determination, particularly those who are at risk of loss or 
fluctuating capacity due to an intellectual disability or degenerative condition. While the 
legislation is certainly not perfect, it bears many of the hallmarks of a framework, which tries to 
keep the individual at the centre. How these aspirations regarding the individual and her 
autonomy may be said to change in respect of pregnant women will become apparent as this 
research progresses. 
The 8th Amendment 
In 1983, Bunreacht na hÉireann was amended on foot of a constitutional referendum and Article 
40.3.3 was inserted. This became known as ‘the 8th Amendment’ and the Article in question 
provided:  
The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal 
right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by 
its laws to defend and vindicate that right. 
In 2018, the 8th Amendment was repealed by constitutional referendum and the wording of 
Article 40.3.3 was changed to ‘[p]rovision may be made by law for the regulation of termination 
of pregnancy’. This brief explanation of the constitutional protection afforded to the ‘right to life 
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of the unborn’ is important for two of reasons. First, this ‘right to life’ has had a constant 
presence in Irish jurisprudence, not only where matters directly related to abortion have been 
considered but critically where other issues are before the court, including healthcare in 
pregnancy. The importance of the 8th Amendment will be clear during the analysis conducted in 
Chapter 6. Second, and more importantly from the perspective of this research, the 8th 
Amendment had not been repealed when the ADM(C)A 2015 was drafted or signed into law. 
Thus, it had not been repealed when the section that is the primary focus of this research, section 
85(6), was drafted.36 Consequently, questions arise as to the legal basis for this section, which 
will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
Original Contribution 
The preceding paragraphs should give an indication as to the original contribution of this thesis 
to scholarship, however, a clear statement of that contribution will undoubtedly be helpful. Not 
only does this thesis consider advance directives in general in Ireland in light of the ADM(C)A 
2015, which is an area that has not received significant analysis in and of itself, but also 
considers how an advance directive in pregnancy is likely to be treated under Irish law. Although 
there have been some academic contributions on the former,37 the most important contribution to 
scholarship rests on the second. Perhaps owing to the recency of the legislation, heretofore, there 
have been no other academic works that have considered advance directives in pregnancy in 
Ireland from a legal and ethical perspective.   
Thesis Structure 
This research is divided into five core chapters, an introduction and a conclusion. Chapter 2 
explores the meaning of ethics and morals and slowly builds to considering the relationship 
between medical ethics and law. In this way, this chapter underpins the ethical analysis in the 
 
36 Section 85(6) states: (a) Where a directive-maker lacks capacity and is pregnant, but her advance healthcare directive does not specifically state 
whether (…) she intended a specific refusal of treatment set out in the directive to apply if she were pregnant, and it is considered by the 
healthcare professional concerned that complying with the refusal of treatment would have a deleterious effect on the unborn, there shall be a 
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whether or not the refusal of treatment should apply. (c) In determining an application under paragraph (b), the High Court shall have regard to 
the following: (i) the potential impact of the refusal of treatment on the unborn; (ii) if the treatment that is refused were given to the directive-
maker, the invasiveness and duration of the treatment and the risk of harm to the directive-maker; (iii) any other matter which the High Court 
considers relevant to the application. 
37 See, for example, Mary Donnelly, ‘Developing a Legal Framework for Advance Healthcare Planning: Comparing England & Wales and 
Ireland” (2017) 24 European Journal of Health Law 67. 
subsequent chapters. In the beginning, the reader is introduced to some normative ethical 
frameworks, which are used in the resolution of complex ethical dilemmas both in the context of 
medical decision-making and outside of it. It then progresses to looking at medical ethics, its 
history and its relevance, in addition to discussing the primary method of resolving complex 
dilemmas within medical ethics, namely the Four Principles or Principlism – Autonomy, 
Beneficence, Non-Maleficence and Justice. It concludes by exploring some of the key criticisms 
of Principlism, while also justifying its prominence for the duration of the thesis. 
Chapter 3 focuses on informed consent to medical treatment. Not only does it consider the legal 
development of what is often termed ‘the doctrine of informed consent’, but also the ethical 
issues raised by it. The early part of Chapter 3 looks at the history of informed consent and 
discusses some major events – and the resulting societal shift – that preceded the doctrine. 
Scientific developments, in addition to scandals concerning members of the medical profession, 
are often thought to have been a precursor to the endorsement of the doctrine of informed 
consent by the courts. Using Principlism, the ethical justification for the duty to seek consent 
prior to intervening is explored. For informed consent to be given, the ‘giver’ must have capacity 
to make decisions of this nature and must do so voluntarily having received the information 
necessary to make the choice. Thus, the ethical analysis in this chapter looks at ethical 
considerations such as respect for autonomy and beneficence. The legal analysis of informed 
consent focuses primarily on two aspects; first, it focuses on the capacity to consent and how the 
law in Ireland, England and Wales and New York treats decision-making capacity. Second, it 
looks at how the law treats information disclosure and the duty placed on medical professionals 
in this regard. In addition to this more ‘generalist’ examination of informed consent, informed 
consent in pregnancy, or more accurately how pregnancy appears to shift and change the 
accepted norms of the law of informed consent, will also be considered.  
Building on the previous discussions, Chapter 4 looks at the issue of end-of-life decision-
making, exploring various end-of-life scenarios and detailing the legal development of the 
competent right to refuse life-sustaining treatment and its limitations. It also considers the legal 
position of patients with prolonged disorders of consciousness, who either left no instructions as 
to what treatment should not be administered or whose instructions, though left, were not legally 
binding. In looking at these complex legal situations, Chapter 4 also considers the underlying 
ethical issues. The four principles38 will be discussed in the context of life-sustaining treatment 
and the changing weight, scope, importance and applicability of the principles will become 
evident when competent and incompetent patients are discussed. Often, this research will 
contend that the best method of resolving the complexities association with the refusal, 
withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment is by giving due respect to the autonomy 
of the individual and her interests in self-determination and bodily integrity. This chapter 
examines how the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment has been constructed by the law, not 
solely as a right derived from common law, but rather a combination of sources including 
common law, legislation and constitutional law. 
In contrast to the approach in the previous chapter, the specific issues associated with pregnancy 
in end-of-life decision-making will not be discussed. These will be reserved for Chapter 6, 
wherein a complete discussion of compelled intervention in pregnancy will occur. This approach 
is deliberate, as arguably, it best highlights the glaring issues with medical treatment in 
pregnancy; first, that the life and health of the woman often becomes synonymous with the life 
and health of the foetus, often being treated as one. Her health often appears to garner no 
analysis or discussion in its own right in jurisprudence, almost as if to do so would be to admit 
that a particular course of action is being ordered in the interests of the foetus and not in the 
interests of the woman. Furthermore, to fully expose how differently pregnant women are 
treated, it is necessary to fully understand the response of the law to non-pregnant people who 
are making the same decisions. 
Chapter 5 explores the concept of ‘advance directives’, sometimes referred to as ‘living wills’ or 
‘advance decisions’. It details the history of their creation in law and the ethical justifications that 
underpin them. It also engages with the considerable criticism levelled at advance directives; 
amongst others that ‘the rewards of the campaign to promote living wills do not justify its costs 
[,] [n]or can any degree of tinkering ever make … [it] an effective instrument of social policy’.39 
Like Chapter 4, there is no discussion of pregnancy and advance directives, as this discussion is 
also reserved for Chapter 6. Accordingly, Chapter 5 then discusses the jurisprudence on advance 
directives to demonstrate how the law treats those patients who are not pregnant. 
 
38 Autonomy, Beneficence, Non-Maleficence and Justice. 
39 Angela Fagerlin and Carl E Schneider, ‘Enough: The Failure of the Living Will’ (2004) 34 Hastings Center Report 30.  
Finally, Chapter 6 brings together all of the legal and ethical analysis conducted in the previous 
chapters to look at the interrelated issues of compelled medical treatment in pregnancy and 
pregnancy exceptions in advance directive legislation. The Chapter examines the two issues – 
compelled treatment and pregnancy exclusions – together as a result of how the Irish legislation 
has been drafted. In order to theorise as to what criteria will be used by the Irish High Court in 
determining if an advance directive will be overridden in the interests of the foetus, it is 
necessary to establish the grounds on which the High Court has previously compelled 
treatment.40 In order to assess if Ireland has taken the appropriate route with its legislation, 
Chapter 6 builds upon the analysis that has been conducted in the previous chapters vis-á-vis the 
rights of non-pregnant people.  
Methodology 
From the outset, it should be stated that this thesis primarily uses the doctrinal legal method, or 
black-letterism. The value of the doctrinal legal method cannot be underestimated; without 
establishing what the law is, how can one critique it or conclude that it is an effective instrument 
of social policy? How can one establish what effect the law has on groups within society, if one 
does not know the law? Some of the strength of black-letterism rests on it being a system that 
‘emphasises coherence and unity’, or certainly one in which the researcher seeks coherence 
where that may be lacking.41 It is built upon ‘empirical and rational foundations’.42 As Shane 
Kilcommins argues: ‘It is loosely empirical in that lawyers work with the raw data of cases and 
other legal provisions. It is rationalist because it presupposes that the system is logical and 
internally coherent’.43 In view of its features, strength and purpose, it is considered to be the 
most suitable primary methodology to underpin this research.   
As Martin Dixon argues, however, ‘doctrinal scholarship in a vacuum loses much of its value’.44 
Thus, black-letterism serving as the primary method is not to say that the relationship between 
the law and wider society are excluded from analysis; indeed with matters such as healthcare, 
medical decision-making and pregnancy, it is impossible not to look at the wider implications 
 
40 Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015, s 85(6)(b)(c). 
41 Shane Kilcommins, ‘Doctrinal Legal Method (Black-Letterism): assumptions, commitments and shortcomings’ in Laura Cahillane and Jennifer 
Schweppe (eds) Legal Research Methods: Principles and Practicalities (Clarus Press 2016) 9. 
42 ibid. 
43 ibid. 
that the law has on society or specific groups therein. Rather, it is to say that it would be 
misleading to refer to this piece as utilising socio-legal methodology. The same is true for 
comparisons with the law in other jurisdictions; as should be evident from the brief discussion 
earlier in this chapter, such comparisons are included in the course of this thesis. Equally 
misleading, however, would be to refer to this as comparative work, or one using comparative 
methodology. Instead, as one of the many methods of establishing the current position of Irish 
law and assessing if the approach taken by the Irish legislature is the most appropriate under the 
circumstances, this research utilises doctrinal methodology whilst comparing and contrasting 
different features of and themes present in other jurisdictions with Irish law.  
While the doctrinal method has come in for its fair share of criticism, little time will be dedicated 
to defending it or its prevalence throughout this thesis; first, because this is a thesis about the 
legal position of a pregnant advance directive holder and not a thesis about legal methodology. 
Second, this adopts a similar approach to that taken by Martin Dixon towards research 
methodology in law – he argues ‘against the idea that one approach is to be preferred over 
another’45 – that is, that there is no one right method in legal research, but there is one best suited 
to the research being undertaken, the question being answered and the researcher undertaking 
that task. With that said, a brief consideration of the perceived issues with the doctrinal method is 
useful, as Shane Kilcommins describes as follows: 
On the face of it, the explanations [of doctrinal methodology] look thin, implicitly 
painting a picture of a method which is simplistic, thickly descriptive, and relatively 
unskilled, a join-the-dots, ‘taxonomic stock-taking’ exercise that could be undertaken by 
any adult with basic knowledge of the English language and some time on his or her 
hands. And yet, as lawyers, we know this is untrue.46 
Martin Dixon argues similarly: 
A doctrinal approach (…) is initially the search for what the law is, not what it should 
be… So, when a (…) lawyer engaged in doctrinal research talks of critical analysis, they 
mean a dissection of the law as is, examining it for consistency and coherence, as well as 
a critical appreciation of the law in terms of policy-compatibility and future development. 
Furthermore, while it is true that ‘simply’ stating the law looks more like rule-
identification rather than rule analysis, this often masks a much more complex task that is 
 
44 Martin Dixon, ‘A Doctrinal Approach to Property Law Scholarship: Who Cares and Why?’ (2014) 3 Prop L Rev 160. The version used by this 
research has been taken from the University of Cambridge Repository <https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/246249> accessed 13 
August 2020, thus the page numbering starts at 1. This page number for the above quote is 9. 
45 ibid 1. 
46 Shane Kilcommins, ‘Doctrinal Legal Method (Black-Letterism): assumptions, commitments and shortcomings’ in Laura Cahillane and Jennifer 
Schweppe (eds) Legal Research Methods: Principles and Practicalities (Clarus Press 2016) 2. 
easily undervalued (...) In many cases, the most difficult research question of all is ‘what 
is the law?’ (…)47 
That is certainly true of the first part of the primary research question in this thesis; what is the 
law in Ireland vis-á-vis a pregnant advance directive holder?48 
Conclusion  
The question to be answered by this thesis is no small feat. ‘What is the law here?’ is a 
deceptively simple question and one that cannot be answered in a sentence or two. Rather, the 
answer rests on establishing a range of interrelated legal positions; what does the law say about 
the ability of a competent adult to refuse treatment? What about when refusal leads to death? 
How is decision-making incompetence established? What about competent pregnant women? 
When the courts have not decided a matter before, upon what grounds will they decide it and 
what is the persuasive precedent? How does the repeal of the 8th Amendment affect the previous 
precedent on medical treatment in pregnancy? Without understanding the development of the 
law in these areas, one misses something critical; thus, each chapter will give a detailed analysis 
of both the position of the law and how that came to be. Before engaging with the first of the 
legal issues – consent to medical treatment – this research begins with an introduction to medical 
ethics and a more detailed explanation of the role that will be played by ethical analysis in the 
course of this research. 
 
47 Martin Dixon, ‘A Doctrinal Approach to Property Law Scholarship: Who Cares and Why?’ (2014) 3 Prop L Rev 160 
<https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/246249> accessed 13 August 2020, 2-3. 
48 ibid 7; he goes on to argue that any assumption that it is a straightforward matter to determine what the law actually is mistaken. He clarifies: ‘I 
do not mean by this that it is unclear how the known law might be applied to novel fact situations. That is the stuff of everyday legal practice (...) 
Rather, it is the recognition that ‘the law’ itself might be unclear, as where an apparently simply statutory phrase has no determined meaning, or 
case law is inconsistent’. 
Chapter 2 
Introduction 
As outlined previously, in order to understand the ethical considerations associated with the 
refusal of medical treatment in pregnancy, the role and development of medical ethics more 
generally must be understood. Therefore, this chapter delves into general ethical concepts and 
examines their relationship with medicine and the law, as ethical building blocks so to speak 
and explains and justifies the ethical framework that will be utilised from this chapter onwards 
– Principlism.1 Thus, while each chapter identifies the ethical conflicts relevant to the specific 
legal issues being examined, the purpose of this chapter is to introduce modern medical ethics 
and specifically ‘the Four Principles’, as devised by Tom Beauchamp and  James Childress.2 
In attempting to make medical ethics more practical, accessible and applicable to everyday 
medical dilemmas, Beauchamp and Childress devised these principles, namely (Respect for) 
Autonomy, Non-maleficence, Beneficence and Justice. Their aim was to aid medical 
professionals to identify and resolve the ethical issues arising in healthcare. The Principles have 
been described in positive terms as ‘a simple, accessible, and culturally neutral approach to 
thinking about ethical issues in health care’ by Ranaan Gillon.3 They have been criticised as 
‘an approach which if followed by the bioethics community as a whole would (…) lead to 
sterility and uniformity of approach of a quite mindbogglingly boring kind’ by John Harris.4 
Principlism, clearly, is not to everyone’s taste. Be that as it may, it is certainly a dominant 
approach within medical ethics and despite criticisms, which will be discussed in more detail 
later, it is favoured by this research as a method of looking at some of the complex ethical 
matters in healthcare. 
It must be stated at the outset that this chapter cannot go further than an examination and 
synopsis of the key points of relevance within moral theory and medical ethics owing to its 
vastness as a subject and the confines of space. This may sometimes result in certain 
assumptions being made or premises being accepted without rigorous justification. It is hoped, 
however, that the more detailed and specific ethical arguments (as they apply to the legal 
concepts) in subsequent chapters will be sufficient in this regard. Principlism has featured 
 
1 First articulated in Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (1st edn, OUP 1979), now in its eight edition.  
2 Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (1st edn, OUP 1979); Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, 
Principles of Biomedical Ethics (8th edn, OUP 2019) in ‘Part II: Moral Principles’. 
3 Ranaan Gillon, ‘Medical Ethics: Four Principles Plus Attention to Scope’ (1994) 309 BMJ 184. 
4 John Harris, ‘In Praise of Unprincipled Ethics’ (2003) 29 J Med Ethics 303; It is worth noting that his critique is aimed at Principlism being 
used by bioethicists and does not necessarily critique its use by medical or legal professionals, or indeed amateur ethicists, as he accepts that 
‘the four principles [may] constitute a useful “checklist” approach to bioethics for those new to the field, and possibly for ethics committees 
without substantial ethical expertise approaching new problems’. 
heavily in medical ethics discourse over the last 40 years; after it is explained and its limitations 
explored in this chapter, it will then be used as the primary ethical framework to consider the 
issues arising throughout the rest of this research, while also leaving scope for the use of other 
ethical analysis where the need arises.  
History of Bioethics and Medical Ethics 
The word ‘ethics’, originally coming from the Ancient Greek word ēthos and later the Greek 
words (hē) ēthikē (tekhnē), meaning ‘(the science of) morals’; it has come to mean a set of 
moral principles relating to a specified group, field or form of conduct. Normative ethics, to 
which this research refers, is the practice of creating and evaluating moral standards in order 
to discern what is right and wrong. Thus, ethics can be considered to be a reflective process 
used to decide the appropriate action based on moral obligations in a given situation.5 ‘Bio’ 
comes from the Greek word bios meaning ‘(the course of) human life’.6 ‘Bioethics’ therefore 
means a set of moral principles pertaining to the course of life. In practical terms, it is 
understood to mean recognition and resolution of moral conflict arising from biological 
sciences and advances in medical technology, ‘a meeting ground for a number of disciplines, 
discourses and organisations concerned with ethical, legal and social questions raised by 
advances in medicine, science and biotechnology’.7 
The term ‘bioethics’ is believed to date back to the 1920s, however, it appears that it did not 
come to prominence in the United States until the late 1960s and 1970s.8 Medical ethics, with 
‘medical’ coming from the Latin medicus meaning ‘physician’, is generally understood in two 
ways; the first is as the code of behaviour to be adhered to by members of the medical 
community, which is perhaps the more traditional and paternalistic interpretation. It was a set 
of rules for doctors, designed by doctors.9 While they may have been scant in the early days, 
ethical guidelines are now substantial, issued by organisations such as the Irish Medical 
Council, the General Medical Council (GMC), the British Medical Association (BMA) and the 
American Medical Association (AMA). Be that as it may, it is submitted that this brand of 
‘medical ethics’ is essentially still professionals writing guidelines for professionals. In that 
way, significant aspects of it operate in a similar fashion to the law, as quasi rules for physicians 
 
5 Nils Hoppe and José Miola, Medical Law and Medical Ethics (Cambridge University Press 2014) 3. 
6 Bios was subsequently considered just to refer to ‘life’. 
7 Onora O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics (Cambridge University Press 2002) 1. 
8 Ruth Chadwick and Duncan Wilson, ‘The Emergence and Development of Bioethics in the UK’ (2018) Med L Rev 183, 183-184; Tom 
Beauchamp and James Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (8th edn, OUP 2019) viii. 
9 See, for example, Onora O’Neill’s anecdote regarding an elderly doctor remarking ‘with mild nostalgia, that when he had studied medical 
ethics as a student, things had been easier: the curriculum had covered referrals, confidentiality – and billing’. Onora O’Neill, Autonomy and 
Trust in Bioethics (Cambridge University Press 2002) 1.  
to follow, with the potential for ‘punishment’ if the rules are not followed. It is submitted that 
while guidelines such as these are eminently useful in a legal context, it is not appropriate to 
view medical ethics as merely codes of professional ethics. 
The second meaning of medical ethics, favoured by this research, is the identification and 
resolution of ethical conflicts arising in the context of medicine and healthcare. Put a little 
crudely, there is little use in considering the ‘rules’, without considering why they exist and 
any disagreement in relation to them. While some matters of medical ethics are almost entirely 
settled – such as the right of terminally ill patients to choose palliative treatment rather than 
invasive medical treatment – others, such as the very topic of this research, are not. 
Furthermore, it is submitted that the narrower rules or ‘system of behaviour’ definition is 
encompassed by this broader interpretation. As such, this research will refer to medical ethics 
– to a lesser extent, bioethics – when discussing conflicts arising from healthcare and 
medicine.10 
One could contend that at least some of the impetus for the emergence of medical ethics as an 
area for consideration – as distinct from mere guidelines written by and for the use of medical 
professionals – came from two sources: first, advancements in science and healthcare and 
second, a lack of confidence in the tradition of self-regulation within the medical community. 
The former comprised of developments such as oral contraception, (live) organ transplantation 
and new or improved life-sustaining treatments.11 The latter – in other words distrust of the 
medical profession – stemmed from several high-profile abuses by some physicians and 
researchers including the Tuskegee Syphilis Study and the Willowbrook State School Hepatitis 
Study, at least where the United States is concerned.12 In both the United States and Europe, 
‘confidence in the beneficence of medical science had (…) been dented by disturbing reports 
of invasive medical research on human subjects without their consent’ in Nazi Germany.13 In 
short, those outside the medical profession, such as philosophers, lawyers and sociologists felt 
that they had an important role to play in identifying issues in medicine and assisting physicians 
 
10 It is worth noting that it is sometimes necessary to use the terms interchangeably, as this is the practice in some of the literature from the 
United States. Furthermore, while nursing ethics undoubtedly forms part of this overall field, this research will focus on the ethical issues 
arising between physicians and patient as it is argued that it is primarily within this relationship that the ethical issues surrounding refusals of 
treatment in pregnancy arise.   
11 Warren Reich, for example, identifies what he terms as ‘fertility control’ – encompassing issues such as contraception, sterilisation and 
abortion – as a major impetus in the development of bioethics; Warren Reich, ‘The Wider View: André Hellenger’s Passionate, Integrating 
Intellect and the Creation of Bioethics’ (1999) Kennedy Inst Ethics J 25, 37.  
12 These studies both involved human subject research and morally questionable practices from the medical professionals involved including 
negligent or deliberate exposure to disease and lack of informed consent. For a more comprehensive discussion of these events, see Chapter 
3 where they are discussed in the context of the history of informed consent. See Henry Beecher, ‘Ethics and Clinical Research’ (1966) 274 
New Eng J Med 1354 and Mary Donnelly, Consent: Bridging the Gap between Doctor and Patient (Cork University Press 2002) 8. 
13 Kenneth Boyd, ’Medical Ethics: Hippocratic and Democratic Ideals’ in Law’ in Sheila McClean (ed) First Do No Harm: Law, Ethics and 
Healthcare (Ashgate 2006) 30. 
in dealing with them, in addition to challenging previously held values and beliefs. Kenneth 
Boyd, however, refers to this as the ‘short view’ of the emergence of medical ethics into the 
medical arena.14 He contends that the development of medical ethics in this way can actually 
be traced back to ‘the problematic success of the Hippocratic ideals in medicine and of 
democratic ideals in society’.15 Debating the merits of Boyd’s contention, however, will have 
to be left for another day.  
As was discussed in the introduction, the 1970s saw bioethics coming to the fore in the United 
States. Independent bioethics institutes were formed, such as the Hastings Center, which had 
the goal of addressing ‘fundamental ethical and social issues in health care, science, and 
technology’.16 Universities, such as Georgetown, began establishing ‘centers’ for bioethics; the 
(now-titled) Kennedy Institute of Ethics was established in Georgetown in 1971, with the 
intention of dealing with ‘the most pressing ethical issues of our time’.17 Throughout the 1980s, 
other universities followed suit including Michigan State University, Stanford University and 
the University of Virginia.18 At the same time, bioethics organisations were being established 
at state level; in 1985, the New York State Task Force on Life and the Law was created to 
‘examine legal and ethical issues arising from medical advances and to develop policy 
recommendations’ and this organisation still endures today, having produced reports on 
surrogacy, medical decision-making for the developmentally disabled and guidelines for 
determining brain death in the last decade. Ruth Chadwick and Duncan Wilson opine that the 
United Kingdom was initially sceptical towards the emergence of bioethics in the United 
States, however, it soon appeared to follow suit, tentatively in the 1970s and to a greater extent 
in the 1980s and 1990s.19 As had been the trend in the United States, universities in the United 
Kingdom began to establish ‘centres’ for medical ethics and independent bioethics 
organisations such as the Nuffield Council on Bioethics and the Scottish Council on Human 
Bioethics were founded in 1991 and 1997 respectively.20 On an EU level, the European Group 
on Ethics in Science and New Technologies was formed in 1991; this independent body, more 
akin to a bioethical organisation than a purely medical ethics one, advises on all aspects of 
 
14 ibid 29-31. 
15 ibid 31. 
16 https://www.thehastingscenter.org/  
17 https://kennedyinstitute.georgetown.edu/about/mission/ 
18 Those universities established the Center for Ethics and Humanities in the Life Sciences, the Center for Biomedical Ethics and the Center 
for Biomedical Ethics and Humanities respectively 
19 Ruth Chadwick and Duncan Wilson, ‘The Emergence and Development of Bioethics in the UK’ (2018) Med L Rev 183, 186; amongst other 
examples, they refer to the labelling of bioethics as ‘an American trend’ by British Medical Journal in 1978. 
20 The first of its kind in the United Kingdom, King’s College London formed the Centre for Medical Law and Ethics in 1978, with universities 
like the University of Manchester and the University of Keele following the lead and establishing the Centre for Social Ethics and Policy and 
Centre for Contemporary Ethical Studies respectively in the 1980s; http://nuffieldbioethics.org/about; http://www.schb.org.uk/about/ 
Commission policies and legislation featuring an interaction between ethics and developments 
in science and technology. 
Ireland was somewhat slower in this regard, with the Irish Council for Bioethics only being 
formed in 2002 and then disbanded in 2010 due to a cut in funding; its function was to consider 
the ethical issues raised by developments in science and medicine.21 During its existence, the 
Council reported on a range of important ethical issues including stem cell research. Arguably, 
this leaves Ireland in a somewhat precarious position regarding ethical dilemmas in healthcare, 
such as termination of pregnancy and surrogacy, as it is without a statutory body to consider 
these issues.22  
Normative Ethics 
Broadly speaking, there are three competing approaches to normative ethical theory; 
teleological, deontological and virtue ethics.23 Nils Hoppe and Jose Miola argue: 
[T]he question of whether doing something is ‘right’ can be separated into 
considerations in relation to the action itself and of the type of person we should strive 
to be.24 
The former, they argue, encompasses teleological and deontological theories and the latter, 
virtue ethics. Teleology or teleological reasoning – in its most common form 
‘consequentialism’ – is focused on the goal of the outcome. Consequentialism, found in the 
works of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, broadly dictates that the rightness of the action 
can be found in its consequences. Deontology or deontological reasoning, popularised by the 
work of Immanuel Kant, is the belief that actions, in and of themselves, are either right or 
wrong, based on a system of rules or moral laws. Thus, deontology focuses on the act, as 
 
21 It was established with key input by the Royal Irish Academy, though independent from it, as an independent, autonomous, non-statutory 
body charged with considering the ethical issues raised by developments in science and medicine. Barry Lyons, ‘The Irish Council for 
Bioethics: An Unaffordable Luxury?’ (2012) 21 Camb Q Healthc Ethics 375. 
22 It is worth noting the following points however; the Irish Unit of the UNESCO Chair in Bioethics was established in 2016 and amongst its 
aims are to ‘collate state-of-the-art Irish research and coordinate research in topical bioethical issues’. 
https://unescobioethicsireland.eu/home/aims-objectives/. Furthermore, the National Advisory Committee on Bioethics (NACB) was 
established in 2012 with the task of advising the Minister for Health on the ethical and social implications of scientific developments in human 
medicine and healthcare. Perhaps a successor to the ICB, however, this committee has not met in recent years according to a Dáil debate in 
2019; Dáil Deb 28 March 2019, [14560/19] <https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/question/2019-03-28/107/> accessed 12 August 2020. The 
Royal Irish Academy has a Life and Medical Sciences Committee, an all-island multidisciplinary committee representing academia, industry, 
media, and other relevant stakeholders, which addresses issues of national and international through from lectures, expert statements, and so 
on. The Law Reform Commission considers ethical issues connected with proposals for law reform e.g. their legal and ethical analysis prior 
to the introduction of the Assisted Decision Making (Capacity) Act 2015, although this included participation from the Irish Council for 
Bioethics. Individual centres for ethics also exist is some Irish universities, such as the Institute of Ethics in Dublin City University and the 
Centre of Bioethical Research and Analysis at National University of Ireland Galway. Finally, multiple Research Ethics Committees (REC) 
exist within the Health Service Executive, however the function of these committees appears to be to regulate research involving human 
subjects, as opposed to providing guidance or adjudication on individual complex ethical dilemmas or ones which affect the nation more 
generally. 
23 For the purpose of this research, the traditional view of a competing or ‘rivalrous’ relationship between consequentialism and deontology 
(Kantianism) will be maintained, however, it is worth noting that some commentators, such as Derek Parfit reject this idea; Derek Parfit, On 
What Matters: Volume One (OUP 2011), in particular, Parts II and III. 
24 Nils Hoppe and José Miola, Medical Law and Medical Ethics (Cambridge University Press 2014) 11. 
distinct from its consequences, to establish its rightness. Virtue ethics, often credited to a 
significant degree to Aristotle, focuses on character of the actor, as distinct from either the act 
itself or its consequences.25 Crudely put, according to virtue ethics, an action is permissible if 
it is the act of a virtuous person, or person of good moral character. Virtue ethics requires the 
person to acquire good habits of character – for example, Plato’s virtues of wisdom, courage, 
temperance and justice – and once she has done so, she will act in a manner consistent with 
those good habits. In the following section, both teleology and deontology will be considered 
in more detail; however, while virtue ethics undoubtedly has value and a place within medical 
ethics, it is felt that its primary idea – honourable desires or motives will lead to the morally 
right decision – can be seen as supplementing deontology and utilitarianism, rather than 
necessarily offering an alternative to it.26 
Utilitarianism 
Perhaps the best-known formulation of consequentialist reasoning – utilitarianism – dictates 
that the right action will be the one that maximises ‘utility’. Therefore, whether an action is 
intuitively right or wrong is irrelevant; the morality of an action can only be judged on its 
outcome, which should be the maximisation of utility. One might naturally question what is 
meant be ‘utility’. Classic – or hedonistic – utilitarians such as Bentham considered utility to 
mean ‘pleasure’; he construed utility as ‘benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness’ or 
the prevention of ‘the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose 
interest is considered’.27 Therefore, utilitarian theory, at that time, generally decreed that the 
morally permissible action was the one which produces the most happiness (pleasure), or the 
least suffering, for the most amount of people: 
An action then may be said to conform to the principle of utility (…) when its tendency 
to increase the happiness of the community is greater than any tendency it has to lessen 
it.28 
 
25 For modern formulations of virtue ethics, see Elizabeth Anscombe, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ (1958) 33 Philosophy 1; Alasdair MacIntyre, 
After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (3rd edn, University of Notre Dame Press 2007) and the works of Phillipa Foot. 
26 Commentators such as David Misselbrook argue that virtue ethics should be used as the system of moral analysis within medical ethics in 
a two-part paper in the Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine. See David Misselbrook. ‘Virtue Ethics – An Ald Answer to a New Dilemma? 
Part 1. Problems with Contemporary Medical Ethics’ (2015) 108 J R Soc Med 53; David Misselbrook, ‘Virtue Ethics – An Old Answer to a 
New Dilemma? Part 2. The case for inclusive virtue ethics’ (2015) 108 J R Soc Med 89. For other proponents of virtue ethics within medical 
ethics, see P Gardiner, ‘A Virtue Ethics Approach to Moral Dilemmas in Medicine’ (2003) 29 J Med Ethics 297; David John Doukas, ‘Where 
is the virtue in professionalism?’ (2003) 12 Camb Q Healthc Ethics 147; David John Doukas, ‘Promoting Professionalism Through Virtue 
Ethics’ (2019) 19 Am J Bioeth. 37 (on the role of virtue ethics in matters such as committed wrongs upon patients by physicians, sexual 
misconduct, non-consensual procedures and drug abuse).   
27 Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789). 
28 ibid. 
Classic utilitarian theory advanced, first with Mill:29 though he was in agreement with Jeremey 
Bentham that that utility should be pursued, he spoke of ‘pleasure’ as ‘higher pleasures’ or 
those in line with one’s ‘higher faculties’.30 The key point for Mill was a distinction between 
quantity and quality; no amount of the former could be calculated against the latter. Thus, utility 
was more akin to the idea of overall happiness or social utility.31 He also advanced the idea 
that not all pleasures are equal.32  
Many modern commentators separated utilitarianism from both the pursuit of pleasure or 
happiness, though not without acknowledging that contemporary accounts of utilitarianism 
could not exist without their predecessors and not without pointing out that their theories were 
a product of their time: 
Though many details of the classical utilitarian position may be unacceptable to us 
today, we must not forget what the basic political and moral principles were they were 
fighting for (...) [T]hey fought for reason against mere tradition, dogmatism, and vested 
interests. In politics, they conceived the revolutionary idea of judging existing social 
institutions by an impartial rational test, that of social utility, and did not hesitate to 
announce it in clear and unmistakable terms if they felt that many of these institutions 
had definitely failed to pass this test. Likewise, in ethics, they proposed to subject all 
accepted moral rules to tests of rationality and social utility.33  
Contemporary utilitarians, such as John Finnis and John Harsanyi, then argued for a more 
refined theory of utilitarianism based on rational choices.34 Still, the basis of utilitarianism can 
be understood as individuals should undertake the action that results in the maximum utility. 
Instinctively, there are issues with adopting a consequences-driven approach to matters of 
moral conflict. First, the ability of individuals to predict the consequences of a particular action 
must vary; as a result, two strands within utilitarian theory emerged – the foreseeable 
consequence and actual consequence view. The former says that you must act in the way that 
expects to yield the most good or utility. The latter says you must act in the way that does yield 
the best consequences. As such, the same choice may be considered the right decision from the 
foreseeable consequence view and the wrong decision from the actual consequence view. In 
both the views, rescuing an individual from a burning building may initially be viewed as the 
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morally permissible action. If, however, that individual later went on to weaponize a deadly 
virus for profit or become a prolific serial killer, then the decision may be evaluated quite 
differently under the two views.  
The second issue with classic utilitarian theory is that the time required to ponder and speculate 
as to the consequences arising from every single action would be significant. This concern is 
represented in a second division within utilitarian theory – act-utilitarianism and rule-
utilitarianism.35 Act utilitarians assess actions on a case by case basis; the right action will be 
‘the one that, of all the actions open to the agent, has consequences that are better than, or at 
least no worse than, any other action open’.36 Rule utilitarians apply the principle of utility to 
a particular rule and then follow that rule if it would lead to the best overall consequences. For 
them, ‘the right action is the one that is in accordance with the rule that, if generally followed, 
would have consequences that are better than, or at least no worse than, any other rule that 
might be generally followed in the relevant situation’.37 Accordingly, with the same set of 
circumstances, act utilitarians and rule utilitarians may come to different decisions as to what 
the morally right action is. As Peter Singer explains: 
Rule-utilitarians will not accept [a] (…) rule without being persuaded that it will have 
better consequences than any other rule. Act-utilitarians will need to be assured that it 
will have the best consequences to follow the rule in every instance in which it applies.38 
Even aside from the challenges in ascertaining exactly how one can be a good utilitarian, a 
greater issue exists with the theory. If the primary – sometimes sole – focus is the outcome, 
then the needs of the many can outweigh the needs of the few; arguably, this leaves the door 
open to sacrifice one (or the few) for the benefit of others, if the overall balance of benefits 
over burdens is positive. There may be legitimacy in jailing innocent people in order to quell 
violent riots or in diverting a runaway train to hit one person instead of the five that it is on 
course to hit.39 
Deontology 
Coming from the Greek word deon, which means ‘that which is binding, duty’, deontological 
theory is a duty-based theory in that it dictates that the correctness of an action hinges on 
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whether or not the action itself is right or wrong according to a set of rules. Thus, there are 
rational duties and behaviours that ought to guide actors and the rightness of the action ‘lies in 
the path taken rather than the destination sought’.40 Perhaps the most well-known deontological 
theorist is German philosopher Kant, who devised the ‘Categorical Imperative’ during the 
1700s. It is an unconditional rule, which dictates that we respect the humanity in ourselves and 
others and act in accordance with moral law: ‘I ought never to act in such a way that I couldn’t 
also will that the maxim on which I act should be a universal law.’41 In the first formulation, 
Kant asks of individuals that they act only in a way that they would and could will everyone 
else to act: ‘Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the 
person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an 
end.’42 
Kant’s universality has been equated with ‘reciprocity’;43 that idea that you should not expect 
from others what you do not feel you have an obligation to do yourself. Or to put it another 
way, the idea that you should treat others as you would like to be treated.44 In the second 
formulation, Kant instructs that human beings have intrinsic value and accordingly, that they 
must be treated with respect and not treated as a ‘thing’ or only a means to achieve an end. 
Critical to Kant’s theory was moral autonomy, or the ability to consider matters and give 
oneself a moral law possessed by rational agents. In his view, autonomy did not mean being 
free from the constraints of laws, but instead by being subject to laws that are of the making of 
the individual. Autonomy – though not necessarily Kantian Autonomy – as will be apparent 
later, is often a central consideration in the resolution of conflicts within healthcare decision-
making. 
W.D. Ross, a more modern deontological theorist devised seven prima facie duties; fidelity 
(keeping a promise), reparation (compensating another for harm), gratitude, justice (prevention 
of the distribution of pleasure which is not based on merit), beneficence (improving the 
conditions of others), self-improvement (in the context of virtue and intelligence) and non-
maleficence.45 These duties form the criteria that indicate if an act is morally right in the 
circumstances. A particular decision may involve any number of these duties and in some 
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circumstances they may even conflict, however, some duties were more important than others, 
for example fidelity is more important than the duty to promote good according to Ross. 
Both consequentialist and deontological theory are appealing to ethicists, wishing to argue over 
complex theories and specific scenarios, but their usefulness as a means of assisting in the 
resolution of challenging ethical issues in healthcare is less clear. The rules inherent in 
deontology may not adapt sufficiently well to handle complex situations. On the face of it, 
‘thou shalt not kill’ seems clear, but how does it apply to a situation where a termination is 
requested? Leaving aside the law, does the deontologist never perform a termination? Or 
always, because the maxim is confined to the born? Does his response depend on how far the 
pregnancy has progressed? Does it depend on the impact of the pregnancy on the woman or 
the risk of that pregnancy causing death or grave harm? If we should, as Kant argued, never 
view the human body or a person as property, then can issues that concern the use of the human 
body or its parts, such as surrogacy or paid egg and sperm donation, be justified?46 With 
utilitarianism, the good outcome can depend on what kind of utilitarian he is. As described 
previously, the action believed to be the right one by a rule utilitarian will not always be the 
same as the one believed to be right by an act utilitarian; both are considered to have acted 
morally, but both decisions cannot avoid harm. Perhaps, ethicists will read this and the 
following paragraph and argue that it is an overly simplistic account of both deontology and 
utilitarianism. Perhaps, they would be right. Generally, however, neither doctors nor patients 
are accomplished philosophers; their ability to engage in a complex utilitarian debate about the 
merits of the therapeutic exception to informed consent at the bedside is non-existent, or at the 
very least, severely limited. To paraphrase Emily Jackson: it’s all very interesting, but how do 
these theories help one to make complex ethical decisions?47 
This should not be interpreted as implying that normative theories do not have a place in 
healthcare. Rather, if we look more closely, we can see examples of both deontological and 
utilitarian reasoning within common issues. Resource allocation and resource shortages, for 
example, often see the broad use of utilitarian reasoning. When allocating funding in 
healthcare, decision-makers generally attempt a broad utilitarian approach; funding is allocated 
in the way that is believed will positively affect the greatest number of people. Deontological 
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reasoning can also be seen in a number of areas in healthcare; opponents of the practices of 
physician assisted suicide and euthanasia often use deontological arguments to articulate why 
the practice is morally wrong. The taking of the life of an innocent human is contrary to moral 
law or intrinsically wrong, therefore physician assisted suicide and euthanasia are morally 
wrong. While that may be true for some physicians, the existence of physician assisted suicide 
and euthanasia in some countries demonstrates that it is not a universal moral truth for all 
physicians that to ‘kill’ his patient is wrong. 
Principlism 
As outlined previously, the Four Principles are; (Respect for) Autonomy, Non-maleficence, 
Beneficence and Justice.48 They should look quite familiar; as discussed, ‘autonomy’ featured 
quite heavily in the works of Kant and the other three principles were articulated by Ross in 
‘The Right and the Good’, amongst other philosophers. What is therefore interesting to note 
about both beneficence and non-maleficence is that, despite being ‘rules’ given by a 
deontologist, they are considered to be consequentialist principles, as they ‘require us to take 
into account possible benefits and harms’, in other words, the consequences of the action.49 
What is noteworthy in relation to autonomy, or at least autonomy in the contemporary sense, 
is that its development has sometimes been attributed to classic utilitarian John Stuart Mill.50 
Accordingly, it is neither possible nor desirable to escape the presence of the normative ethical 
frameworks discussed. Rather, what the Georgetown Mantra has achieved to some extent is 
the combination of Deontology and Utilitarianism into an accessible system, which is more 
readily applicable to the practice-based medical context. 
Autonomy 
‘Autonomy’, coming from the Greek words autos meaning ‘self’ and nomos meaning law 
essentially came to mean ‘self-rule’ or ‘having its own laws’ and initially the term applied to 
cities, as distinct from individuals. An autonomous person is often thought to be one who is 
capable of freely making important decisions about her own life. Being autonomous seems, 
therefore, to be a relatively simple concept – the state of ruling oneself – and yet there has been 
difficulty in pinning down what that means, both inside and outside of the healthcare sphere. 
Autonomy has been explained as having freedom to act51 in accordance with a self-chosen 
 
48 Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (8th edn, OUP 2019) in ‘Part II: Moral Principles’. 
49 Emily Jackson, Medical Law: Text, Cases and Materials (4th edn, OUP 2016) 17. 
50 Onora O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics (Cambridge University Press 2002) 30. 
51 For example, see John Harris, ‘Euthanasia and the Value of Life’ in John Keown (ed) Euthanasia Examined: Ethical, Clinical and Legal 
Perspectives (Cambridge University Press 1995) 11; he describes autonomy as ‘the ability and the freedom to make the choices that shape our 
plan,52 as having capacity for self-determination,53 as ‘a right to personal sovereignty’,54 as 
freedom of choice and as being independent.55 It has been explained as being a combination of 
some the above, as Joel Feinberg does: 
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In typifying this lack of a single coherent definition, Gerald Dworkin notes: 
It is used sometimes as an equivalent of liberty (…) sometimes as equivalent to self-
rule or sovereignty, sometimes as identical with freedom of will. It is equated with 
dignity, integrity, individuality, independence, responsibility, and self-knowledge. It is 
identified with qualities of self-assertion, with critical reflection, with freedom from 
obligation, with absence of external causation, with knowledge of one’s own interests.57 
He contends that almost the only commonalities between the various accounts is that autonomy 
relates to individuals (persons) and that it is viewed to have value.  
Autonomy has been described as standalone and as relational in nature, in the sense that it 
depends on an opposing force to exist.58 It has been assigned versions and given ‘rules’ or 
conditions to be present.59 John Coggon, for example, outlines three philosophical 
understandings of autonomy, or versions; (i) ideal desire autonomy (ii) best desire autonomy 
and (iii) current desire autonomy.60 Within medical ethics, autonomy has primacy in some 
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analysis, as the sole principle relevant to ethical decision-making in healthcare and a lesser 
importance in others, being described as one of a number of relevant considerations in modern 
medical ethics.61 Hoppe and Miola state: 
Autonomy is a paramount principle of law as a whole (…) We can find aspects of 
autonomy in every area of law that touches upon free will of individuals (…) It is one 
of the law’s foremost duties to protect and enable autonomous individuals and regulate 
the necessary trade-offs between autonomous actors.62 
Its primacy within medical law and ethics has been explored and questioned:  
[S]hould we place limits on patient autonomy in defence of broader community 
interests (whether these be about public health, allocation of resources of the sort of 
society in which we want to life) (…) what, for example, of the autonomy of the patient 
face-à-face the autonomy of others, such as her parents, relatives or, even, her doctor?63 
Autonomy has been heavily critiqued in some instances.64 It has been recognised as being 
fallible, susceptible to being diminished or reduced by particular circumstances.65 
Consequently, it is sometimes argued that ‘one of the problems with autonomy is that there are 
almost as many different conceptions as there are commentators writing on the subject’.66 This, 
Alasdair Maclean argues ‘does not mean that there is no single concept’ of autonomy.67 
Whether he is correct on that matter may be, to some extent, irrelevant. This research is neither 
going to propose a new understanding of autonomy, nor consider autonomy outside of the 
narrow circumstances of decision-making within healthcare. In that sense, autonomy can mean 
both freedom from interference and capacity for self-determination and choice, while always 
being viewed as valuable. 
In Life’s Dominion, Ronald Dworkin advances the most plausible account of autonomy (in his 
view) and in doing so, it is argued that he captures the essence of the importance of autonomy:  
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[It] emphasizes the integrity rather than the welfare of the choosing agent; the value of 
autonomy, on this view, derives from the capacity it protects: the capacity to express 
one’s own character – values, commitments, convictions, and critical as well as 
experiential interests – in the life one leads. Recognizing an individual right of 
autonomy makes self-creation possible. It allows each of us to be responsible for 
shaping our lives according to our own coherent or incoherent – but, in any case, 
distinctive – personality. It allows us to lead our lives rather than be led along them, so 
that each of us can be, to the extent a scheme of rights can make this possible, what we 
have made of ourselves.68 
It is this idea, the vision of the individual shaping her existence, her life and her future in 
accordance with her values and in line with what is important to her that captures why respect 
for autonomy is so important.  
In a healthcare context, autonomy is often synonymous with the ability of a competent adult to 
make decisions regarding her healthcare. In this context, it can be easily understood in line with 
its relationship to the potential for interference. As Bernadette Richards argues:  
Autonomy (…) is best served when the law is focusing on other rights such as bodily 
integrity, freedom from assault (…) and privacy (…) [these rights] can be framed within 
the broader discussion of autonomy but represent other interrelated, rights, duties and 
interests.69 
Perhaps a symptom of its many understandings and constructs, adhering to principle of respect 
for autonomy is open to a broader or narrower interpretation. Within healthcare, the law has 
tended to support a narrower construction of autonomy in healthcare, perhaps reflecting what 
is argued by some as upholding ‘the ethical minimum’.70 The ‘narrower’ construction 
manifests as the general requirement that a physician seek consent prior to treating a competent 
patient, to facilitate and then respect the informed decision of that patient, once made and to 
refrain from treating a patient without her consent, save in exceptional circumstances.71 This 
is as opposed to the law requiring the physician to provide a particular treatment at the request 
of the patient. While a patient can choose between the treatment options provided by the doctor, 
or choose no treatment, or request to have a second opinion or transfer of care if she believes 
that other options should be made available to her, she cannot force a physician to provide her 
with her desired treatment against his judgement.72 As Coggon opines: 
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‘Absolute’ rights of noninterference do not translate into absolute rights to claim, either 
against doctors in the face of contrary (and reasonable) professional judgment, or 
against the state in the face of lawful resource allocation decisions.73  
While this research would not necessarily accept the word ‘absolute’ in the context of the right 
to refuse treatment, his sentiment still stands. 
In Chapter 3, the relationship between informed consent and autonomy will be discussed in 
more detail. For now, it is worth noting that many accounts of autonomy refer to making 
choices and self-determination. Consequently, it can be suggested that the physician has a key 
role to play in decision-making in the sense of information provision. Without the relevant 
information, an individual is unlikely to be capable of autonomous choice. The same can be 
said in relation to incompetence and involuntariness; they likely render the individual incapable 
of autonomous choice. Thus, in this context, respect for autonomy not only requires medical 
professionals to refrain from dispensing with the autonomous decision of the individual, but 
also requires them to assist in this exercise by providing the patient with information. It requires 
them to provide this information in a way that can be understood by the patient, where possible, 
thereby avoiding a declaration of incapacity purely because the patient did not understand 
something that she otherwise could have, were the information simplified or given more fully. 
Again, however, a narrower interpretation of the law in this regard can be seen; physicians are 
not required to give every last scrap of information to the patient and in some cases, may be 
permitted to withhold information if they consider it to be necessary to prevent harm to that 
particular patient given the circumstances (‘therapeutic privilege’).74 
One could opine that autonomy does not only generate obligations for physicians, but also 
perhaps for the patient herself. A patient’s responsibility to exercise her autonomy could be 
said to stem from the idea that autonomy is what gives the individual the best chance of 
achieving her aims, which promotes her well-being.75 In that way, such responsibilities are 
ones towards oneself, or as Michael Meyer puts it ‘self-regarding obligations’.76 John Keown 
argues that we have a responsibility to choose in such a way as to promote our chosen values 
and goals, in other words ‘human flourishing’.77 Accordingly, if we do not act in a way 
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consistent with human well-being, then we are not exercising our autonomy ‘in accordance 
with a framework of sound moral values’ and as such, our exercise of autonomy does not merit 
respect.78 Whether or not one agrees with the idea that some decisions are undeserving of 
respect, there is certainly some merit to the idea that patients, too, have obligations, whether 
stemming from autonomy or from the idea that the physician-patient relationship is one of a 
contractual nature or from another concept altogether.79  
Heather Draper and Tom Sorrell, for example, argue that citizens may have a moral duty to 
follow measures designed to prevent serious illness or disease, not just to benefit themselves, 
but in order to limit demands on resources.80 Accordingly they argue for more onerous 
responsibilities on patients, rather than equating the mere fact that the decision has been made 
by the patient herself with it being ‘good’.81 The notion that patients have duties is also more 
common than some might expect in practice; Asim Sheikh points out that this notion is 
reflected in healthcare guidelines, for example, the Royal College of Surgeons of England 
confers an obligation on patients to undertake certain actions, such as to attend appointments 
on time and to take medication as instructed.82 Meyer argues that patients have a duty to 
communicate openly with healthcare professionals, to co-operate with them and engage in and 
make responsible decisions about their self-care, including the duty to have an active interest 
in their condition and to collect information on available treatments and side-effects.83 These 
duties, he argues, are ‘derivable from the idea which typically grounds the idea of patients’ 
rights [namely] patient autonomy’.84 Other commentators go further again to suggest that it is 
reasonable to impose a duty on patients to participate in clinical research in publicly-funded 
health systems.85 The idea of patient obligations and duties in the context of the pregnant 
patient will be considered as part of the analysis in Chapter 6. In any event, whether we think 
that patients have onerous or more moderate duties in respect of healthcare, it is fair to say that 
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to Veto Their Participation in Clinical Research?’ (2004) 30 J Med Ethics 198. 
83 Michael Meyer, ‘Patients’ Duties’ (1992) 17 J Med Philos 541, 551 
84 ibid 541; crudely put, he opines that the patient has willingly entered into a partnership with the healthcare worker with a shared goal of 
improving his health and as such, obligations and duties arise by virtue of this partnership.  
85 See H Martyn Evans, ‘Should Patients be Allowed to Veto Their Participation in Clinical Research?’ (2004) 30 J Med Ethics 198. 
where one wishes to exert some influence regarding one’s healthcare, then one does have 
corresponding moral duties, even if they are not often legally enforceable.  
As the research progress, the relationship between autonomy and the law, as it applies to the 
various medical decision-making scenarios, will be examined. On the one hand, broad 
conversations regarding autonomy are limited in how far they can go towards assisting the core 
question in this research, however, on the other hand, failing to look at autonomy and its many 
understandings would give an artificial idea that matters, such as the meaning and importance 
of autonomy, are settled. As should be evident from this section, there is a wealth of debate on 
autonomy; its meaning, its value and its role. It is argued, however, that these differences do 
not form a substantial part of the reason why the law, both the courts and legislature, can face 
challenges in the context of medical decision-making and specifically within the area of 
decision-making in pregnancy. Thus, by giving an overview of autonomy within healthcare 
and by contending that one single definition is not specifically necessary for autonomy to be 
both valuable and worthy of protection, this research can progress unencumbered by the 
responsibility of redefining the concept of autonomy and of justifying one single understanding 
of it. Instead, it can proceed with a higher-level – and perhaps less detailed – understanding of 
autonomy, appropriate to a predominantly legal thesis. 
Non-Maleficence 
Coming from the Latin words non meaning ‘not’ and maleficentia meaning ‘evildoing, 
mischievousness, injury’, non-maleficence in medical ethics is widely considered to be the duty 
of a physician to avoid acting in a way that causes harm. Often in discussions of moral theory 
or medical ethics, beneficence and non-maleficence are considered together and if a distinction 
is drawn between them, it is quite subtle.86 It is the position of this research, however, that the 
principles are distinct and must be treated as such. One justification for this is found in the 
nature of the two duties – positive and negative. Beneficence is the duty to act, in that one must 
act to promote good and prevent or remove harm, therefore it is a positive duty. Non-
maleficence, by contrast, is the duty to refrain from acting in a way which causes harm or 
 
86 William Frankena, for example considers the duty ‘not to inflict evil or harm’ i.e. non-maleficence to be the first principle of beneficence. 
The other three principles being; the duty ‘to prevent evil or harm’, the duty ‘to remove evil’ and the duty ‘to do or promote good’ i.e. 
beneficence. Willian Frankena, Ethics (2nd edn, Prentice-Hall 1973) 47. He was discussing the general duty of beneficence, as opposed to 
beneficence in the specific context of professional ethics, however his tendency to consider the two principles as one, or at least as two sides 
of the same coin, is not uncommon in medical ethics too. Jonathan Herring argues that the principle of non-maleficence is best understood as 
the treatment, overall, does not cause harm, which he goes on to assert means that ‘it appears to mirror the beneficence principle’ – Jonathan 
Herring, Medical Law and Ethics (7th edn, OUP 2018) 28. 
injury, thus it is a negative duty. Perhaps the difference between the two can be understood in 
the questions, which are generated for the physician by the two principles:  
- One could opine that ‘am I causing harm if I do X?’ is the pertinent question for the 
principle of non-maleficence; 
- Whereas, ‘am I achieving good if I do X?’ is more relevant for beneficence.87 
Often somewhat mistakenly attributed to the Hippocratic Oath, the maxim of Primum non 
nocere or ‘first do no harm’ could be considered to be an origin of the duty of non-
maleficence.88 There are various translations of the Hippocratic Oath, however, generally the 
reference to avoiding harm is considered to be encompassed in the statement that a doctor will 
‘prescribe [a] regimen for the good of [my] patients according to my ability and my judgment 
and never do harm to anyone’.89 According to Beauchamp and Childress, the Hippocratic oath 
creates an obligation of non-maleficence when, in the context of providing treatment to the 
sick, the oath states: ‘I will never use it to wrong or injure them’.90 
The principle of non-maleficence can be as stark and obvious as the duty of a physician not to 
intentionally kill one’s patients.91 It can be found in the duty of a physician not to administer 
unnecessary treatment for monetary gain. As Jonathan Herring points out, however, ‘[t]he 
principle of non-maleficence, if taken too literally, is absurd’ as the majority of medical 
treatment involves some physical harm.92 This is, perhaps, why commentators such as Gillon 
adopt a position of considering beneficence and  non-maleficence together, in an almost 
mathematical way, in order to yield more benefit than harm in total:  
Whenever we try to help others we inevitably risk harming them; health care workers 
(…) must therefore consider the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence 
together and aim at producing net benefit over harm.93  
In any event, in order to be consistent with the principle, a physician must refrain from medical 
intervention, which would cause harm overall, as distinct from looking at each action in 
insolation. Piercing the skin with a needle where the purpose is to stitch a wound could hardly 
 
87 It is acknowledged that if this formulation were taken in isolation, it may have negative effects for patients. Most every surgical intervention 
causes harm before they yield positive results. See the critique given by Jonathan Herring later in this section.  
88 The maxim ‘First Do No Harm’ can either be attributed to British surgeon, Thomas Inman – for further discussion, see Daniel K Sokol, 
‘First Do No Harm Revisited’ (2013) 347 BMJ 23 – or British physician Thomas Sydenham; see Cedric Smith, ‘Origin and Uses of Primum 
Non Nocere— Above All, Do No Harm!’ 45 J Clin Pharmacol 371. 
89 Mary Donnelly, Consent: Bridging the Gap between Doctor and Patient (Cork University Press 2002) 1. Another possible translation which 
may have inspired the maxim is ‘[a]s to diseases, make a habit of two things—to help, or at least to do no harm’; Cedric Smith, ‘Origin and 
Uses of Primum Non Nocere— Above All, Do No Harm!’ 45 J Clin Pharmacol 371, 371. 
90 Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (8th edn, OUP 2019) 155. 
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92 Jonathan Herring, Medical Law and Ethics (7th edn, OUP 2018) 28. 
93 Ranaan Gillon, ‘Medical Ethics: Four Principles Plus Attention to Scope’ (1994) 309 BMJ 184, 185. 
be considered maleficent. Piercing the skin to trial an experimental drug without telling the 
patient, on the other hand, could certainly be viewed as breaching the principle. 
The principle of non-maleficence is reflected in the law too, specifically the law of negligence, 
something which is discussed in more detail in the next chapter in the context of informed 
consent. In general medical negligence, the law obliges the physician to refrain from exposing 
his patients to the risk of harm, over and above the generally accepted risks associated with a 
particular treatment or refusal.94  
Beneficence 
Beneficence derives its meaning from the Latin word bene, which means ‘in the right way’ or 
‘good’ and came to be understood as the state of producing good. Although there is 
disagreement amongst philosophers as to whether a general obligation of beneficence exists, it 
is largely accepted that duty of beneficence is generated by specific roles, in this case, 
physicians.95 Indeed, not only does the principle of beneficence have a long standing 
association with the Hippocratic Oath but also with the aspirations of domestic and 
international medical associations.96 In professional and medical ethics, it is usually understood 
to mean the duty on a physician to act in a way that benefits his patients, whether by acting to 
prevent and remove harm or in a manner that maximises good or assists patients in achieving 
their legitimate interests. In other words, it can be explained as the dual obligations ‘to provide 
benefits and to balance benefits against risks’.97 Maclean observes: 
This duty, of acting to benefit the patient, is an important and reasonable duty that 
makes the healthcare professional-patient relationship a caring one and demands that 
the professional’s role is more than just salesman or technician.98 
The clash between autonomy and beneficence in situations where the patient desires something 
that is not in her best interests – for example, a Jehovah’s Witness wishes to refuse a life-saving 
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blood transfusion99 – has been acknowledged by many philosophers.100 The best interests of 
the individual, when assessed objectively, dictate that she should receive the blood transfusion; 
it will, in all likelihood, save her life and is generally a straightforward, safe and low risk 
procedure.101 Gillon, however, opines that in adhering to the principle of beneficence, a 
physician must respect the autonomy of the patient as ‘what constitutes benefit for one patient 
may be harm for another’.102 He explains that ‘the patient’s own assessment of harms and 
benefits for himself’ has lead him to conclude that ‘far more harm over benefit would result’ if 
he were given a life-saving blood transfusion, than if he were to die without it.103  
Ruth Macklin expands on this point as follows: 
According to the patient’s calculus of values, the harm resulting from receiving a 
transfusion (denial of eternal salvation) is greater than the harm caused by refusing the 
transfusion (…) Arguably, this is a rational calculation for anyone who believes in the 
metaphysical scheme of the Jehovah’s Witness faith (…) From the perspective of the 
Jehovah’s Witness, refusal of a blood transfusion has a favourable balance of benefits 
over harms.104 
Thus, the individual has weighed up the two competing interests, namely preserving life on 
earth and maximising his chance at ‘eternal life’, and has chosen eternal life.105 One difficulty 
with this analysis stems from an issue identified earlier in this research and as such, revisiting 
a core position is necessary; refraining from acting in a way which causes harm to a patient is 
more akin to the fulfilment of the duty of non-maleficence than the duty of beneficence. 
Administering a blood transfusion to a Jehovah’s Witness, who does not want it, would almost 
certainly breach the principle of non-maleficence, unless there was some other compelling 
justification for providing the treatment.106 In some circumstances, providing the treatment 
may well be an act of beneficence, in that it saves the life of the patient. This is because, as 
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106 Perhaps that the Jehovah’s Witness has been subjected to coercion or undue influence or that there is uncertainty as to the true wishes of 
the patient; for example, if he is unconscious and family members and / or a spouse are in disagreement as to his commitment to the faith. 
Such justifications would be examples of ‘weak paternalism’, which can be morally justifiable. For further discussion of weak and strong 
paternalism, see Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (8th edn OUP 2019) 233-243. 
outlined earlier, beneficence is a positive duty, in that it is an obligation to do something, such 
as promote good, remove or prevent harm. Accordingly, a more appropriate way to appraise 
that particular ethical dilemma – leaving aside any relevant legal framework – would be with 
reference to the principles of non-maleficence and autonomy. If the physician asks himself, am 
I causing harm if I administer this blood transfusion?, he will find that the answer is yes, as he 
is interfering with the autonomy of the patient and failing to give weight to the harm envisioned 
and his ‘calculus of values’.107 
One could opine that the principle of beneficence can be seen more clearly in something as 
simple as a physician informing a patient that she exhibits the early indicators of a disease and 
advising her on the best method of prevention. A patient suffering from high cholesterol and 
angina should be advised by her physician to reduce her cholesterol, control her blood pressure 
and maintain a healthy weight through diet and exercise. In giving this information and advice, 
the physician is fulfilling the duty generated by the principle of beneficence to avert harm by 
assisting the patient in the prevention of the development of heart disease. Now, should the 
patient decide to disregard the advice and subsequently go on to develop heart disease, then the 
principle of beneficence will go on to dictate that the physician treat the illness with medication 
or surgical intervention, thereby removing a present harm. Broadly speaking, the third 
obligation stemming from the principle of beneficence – the obligation to promote or maximise 
good for the individual patient – could be seen if the same patient and physician interacted 
during the patient’s teenage years and the physician spoke at length about the general benefits 
of a healthy diet and exercise without any specific concern that she may go on to develop heart 
disease.  
Justice 
The word justice comes from the Latin word jus meaning ‘law’ or ‘right’ and the Old English 
word iustise meaning the ‘administration of the law’ and has become synonymous with words 
like fairness, impartiality and egalitarianism. It has been identified as obligations of fairness in 
the distribution of benefits and risks.108 In a legal sense, it is often thought of in the context of 
the vindication of the rights of the individual or the punishment of wrongs. In society, we often 
think of it as reward for merit or work done, or the way that Aristotle viewed fairness, namely 
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equals should be treated equally and unequals unequally with respect to their relevant 
inequality. Or, as Maclean opines: 
[A]ll members of the relevant community should be treated as prima facie equals, which 
means that any different treatment of individuals must be justifiable on the basis of 
morally relevant differences between them. This also means that individuals should not 
be treated differently on the basis of morally irrelevant factors.109 
In other words, the principle gives individuals an entitlement to fair or proportionate 
treatment.110 Whether pregnancy is a morally relevant factor for differing treatment is certainly 
a matter worthy of debate.111  
The principle of justice can be seen at work across the law, not just in its obvious home – the 
criminal law – but also more broadly in matters such as equality protection and discrimination 
legislation and in constitutional articles guaranteeing that all persons are ‘equal before the 
law’.112 If the principle of justice permeates almost every facet of society, this must be true for 
healthcare, not just in the obvious places such as resource allocation and access to medical care 
but also in less readily identifiable places, as will become apparent as this research 
progresses.113 It is a concept that is fundamental in dealings between individuals, where 
prioritisation of interests is required, particularly in circumstances where there is an inequality 
in bargaining power.114 
Gillon subdivides justice in the healthcare context into three areas:  
(i) fair distribution of scarce resources, also known as ‘distributive justice’;  
(ii) respect for people's rights, also known as ‘rights based justice’; 
(iii) respect for morally acceptable laws, also referred to as ‘legal justice’.115 
In Western society, we view distributive justice as the spreading of rights and responsibilities 
and of benefits and burdens across society. We see it in matters such as taxation, education and 
social welfare. Distributive justice is considered, by some, to be essential in healthcare, as it is 
an area in which there are limited means to fund the system;116 were this not the case, then 
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United Kingdom – via the HSE and NHS respectively – than it has in the United States, where the system is dominated by free-market ideals.  
there would be no need to fear the possibility of inequality. Given this is the case, however, it 
is important that there is justice in the allocation of scarce resources. Accordingly, justice in 
this sense can be considered to mean ‘fair adjudication between completing claims’.117  
As was discussed previously, decisions on the allocation of scarce resources in healthcare are 
often broadly done in line with consequentialist principles. Resources are allocated to give the 
most benefit to the most people. However honourable the sentiment, in practice, such decisions 
are considerably more complex than ‘do the best for the most’. For example, is it better to 
restore the sight of ten people or save the life of one with an expensive experimental drug in 
light of resource scarcity? Upon what criteria does or should one make that decision? Does the 
answer change if the amount of lives that can be saved is increased to two or three? Gillon 
argues for the Aristotelian application of formal principles of justice.118 Even with that 
explanation of what is just, however, it still remains challenging to establish what criteria are 
relevant in assessing if an individual constitutes an equal or an unequal for the purpose of 
treatment. The answers to these questions can be viewed to depend on the particular theory of 
justice to which one subscribes.  
The example of HLA matching in kidney transplantation given by Beauchamp and Childress 
highlight the different outcomes for different theories of justice.119 On the one hand, the use of 
human lymphocyte antigen (HLA) matching for kidney donation is argued to lead to a better 
long-term transplant outcome, thereby making it a ‘better’ use of donations. On the other hand, 
HLA matching can put those who have been waiting longer and those who more urgently need 
a transplant lower on the transplant list than those who happen to have a higher degree of HLA 
match to the donor. Given that the majority of organ donors are white, the likelihood is high 
that a white individual will be a better HLA match than a person of another ethnicity; this is 
problematic when one considers that a higher rate of end-stage renal disease is found in non-
white individuals.120 Thus, such a system could be considered unjust in that it breaches the fair 
equality of opportunity or it could be considered just as it yields the best overall results for the 
most amount of people.121  
Criticisms of Principlism 
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The Principles can be used effectively in decision-making in healthcare to resolve complex 
ethical dilemmas, however, Principlism is not without its critics. Accurate or not, issues cited 
are that the principles often conflict with each other with no guide as to how to resolve these 
conflicts,122 they do not actually give the individual clear instructions as to what he should do 
and they are inadequate to help people resolve complex dilemmas.123 Perhaps the most well-
known critics of Principlism, K Danner Clouser and Bernhard Gert, describe conflicts between 
the principles as unresolvable, ‘since there is no unified moral theory from which they are all 
derived’.124 They argue that in discussing the principles, the reader merely gets ‘a description 
of several ways in which the authors think [the principle] is a relevant moral consideration’ but 
no ‘specific directive for action’.125 The concepts of beneficence and non-maleficence have 
been described as ‘problematic’, as it is unclear if ‘good’ and ‘bad’ are to be assessed 
objectively or subjectively.126 Furthermore, from whose perspective should they be assessed; 
should it be the patient or the doctor who assesses what is good or bad?127 Arguments like these 
go to the core of the contention that Principlism doesn’t really tell the individual what the right 
action is. 
Clouser and Gert also strongly criticise Principlism for its inclusion of beneficence as one of 
the principles – ‘duties’ as they argue – because they believe it ‘obscures the role that real 
duties play’.128 It is their position that taking a ‘moral ideal’ of helping others and including it 
with actual – or ‘genuine’ – duties leads to confusion. In their view, beneficence cannot be 
treated the same as duties which are morally required, in other words genuine duties, such as 
‘noninterference with the freedom of others’.129 This line of reasoning is somewhat 
unsurprising given that there is much debate as to whether a duty of beneficence exists, as was 
discussed earlier in this chapter. Irrespective, however, if one agrees or disagrees with the 
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of Principlism, as he opens the critique with ‘to some (…)’. 
123 Tom Walker, for example, argues that Principlism ‘must contain all the moral principles that are obligatory for us’ in order for it to be a 
framework, which helps individuals identify and resolve moral dilemmas. If it doesn’t contain all obligatory moral principles, then, he argues 
‘it will blinker us so that we don’t see moral problems that are there’. Tom Walker, ‘What Principlism misses’ (2009) 35 Journal of Medical 
Ethics 229, 230. David Misselbrook, ‘Virtue Ethics – An Old Answer to a New Dilemma? Part 2. The Case for Inclusive Virtue Ethics’ (2015) 
108 J R Soc Med 89; he argues that Principlism ‘may fail to capture the whole picture of the factors that are morally relevant’ in medical 
decisions and actions. See also Søren Holm, ‘Not Just Autonomy – The Principles of American Biomedical Ethics’ (1995) 21 J Med Ethics 
332. 
124 K Danner Clouser and Bernard Gert, ‘A Critique of Principlism’ (1990) 15 J Med Philos 219, 219. Throughout the article, the authors 
describe Principlism as ‘quite disparate moral matters, unrelated by systematic considerations’, as ‘important aspects of morality [which] 
function mainly as a check list of considerations’ and as both practically and theoretically misleading at pages 222, 222 and 227 respectively. 
125 ibid 222 
126 Tuija Takala, ‘What Is Wrong with Global Bioethics? On the Limitations of the Four Principles Approach’ (2001) 10 Camb Q Healthc 
Ethics 72, 73-4. 
127 ibid. 
128 K Danner Clouser and Bernard Gert, ‘A Critique of Principlism’ (1990) 15 J Med Philos 219, 229. 
129 ibid 229. 
criticisms of Principlism, it still remains the most widely used practical approach towards or 
framework for the identification and resolution of moral problems in healthcare.  
The criticism of Principlism that it does not really tell the agent what to do in circumstances, 
while valid, is not exclusive to Principlism. There are many accounts of ethicists coming from 
the same normative ethical framework arguing on ‘opposite sides’ of the debate on the same 
issue, for example, euthanasia or abortion. In such situations, it is also clearly not the normative 
ethical framework that one subscribes to that dictates whether the action is right or wrong. 
Perhaps the wide use of Principlism is the opposite side of one of the primary criticisms, that 
it is not underpinned by a unified or single moral theory. In a sense, Principlism is a type of 
magpie, which picks from different normative ethical frameworks to create a more accessible 
mechanism for resolving ethical dilemmas. Arguably, it is that fluidity, flexibility and 
simplicity that makes it workable within the complex world of healthcare; perhaps such 
flexibility and generality are both positive and unavoidable. Principlism can orientate 
individuals toward how to think ethically, in time constraints and practical situations inherent 
in the healthcare context. Thus, while the principles are drawn from the common morality, they 
are not owned by any specific moral perspective. They are practical and allow for the fact that 
a physician and patient cannot feasibly conduct a lengthy consequentialist or deontological 
discussion at the bedside. Perhaps, best summed up by Dave Archard: 
It would be lovely to think we can all be ethicists now. It would however diminish and 
misunderstand the project of bioethics to think that this can be achieved by denying 
what marks out ethics as a distinct discipline.130 
Arguably, it is a privilege of lawyers, scientists and medical professionals, indeed any role 
aside from ethicist, to choose the ethical framework that assists them in making a particular 
decision without the need to have completely subscribed to a particular normative framework 
and without the need fully understand every part of it. 
Dignity 
Although the predominant ethical framework throughout this thesis is Principlism, the concept 
of dignity is worthy of exploration, particularly in light of its position and prominence in 
legislation131, the preamble to the Constitution and case law.132 Dignity, however, much like 
130 Dave Archard, ‘The rise and fall and rise again of bioethics’ (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 19 November 2019) 
<https://nuffieldbioethics.org/blog/the-rise-and-fall-and-rise-again-of-bioethics> accessed 19 November 2019. Archard contends that the 
interdisciplinarity is what defines the work of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics in that it is ‘a Council ‘on’ bioethics but not of bioethicists’. 
That acknowledges that ethics is a separate discipline. 
131 Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015, s 8(6)(b); New York Public Health Law § 2994-d section 4(ii). 
132 See for example Simpson v The Governor of Mountjoy Prison [2019] IESC 81; ‘When both rights [privacy and autonomy] are read as they 
must be, which is in the light of the value of dignity espoused in the preamble to the Constitution, it is not difficult to understand why torture, 
autonomy presents challenges in ethical analysis because it often means different things to 
different people and is invoked in different ways. For example, proponents of euthanasia and 
physician assisted suicide appeal to the concept of dignity in arguing for its legalisation, 
however, so too do their opponents when they argue against it.133 Thus, human dignity appears 
to simultaneously justify and make abhorrent the same act. Furthermore, dignity is not 
universally considered to have value; far from being that which gives every human being her 
fundamental value and far from being possessed by every rational human being, some view 
dignity as meaningless or useless.134 
Roger Brownsword and Deryck Beyleveld explain the concept of human dignity as 
empowerment and as constraint and discuss the implications of those understandings.135 
Broadly speaking, dignity as empowerment can be seen as providing a basis for the recognition 
of rights and as the source of fundamental human freedoms; the concept of dignity as constraint 
is more akin to duty and a responsibility not to act in a way that compromises dignity. For 
example, when articulating how dignity as constraint might manifest, Herring gives the 
example of one selling one’s organs, conduct which would ‘demean the individual’s dignity as 
a human’.136 Arguably, when one considers these two constructions of dignity, it is not difficult 
to see how it could be used to argue for and against the same thing; if ending one’s life is 
considered a right, then dignity may be invoked in the ‘empowerment sense’. If one considers 
the ending of life as an affront to the sanctity of human life and its inherent dignity, then ending 
life becomes an act that compromises human dignity.  
Four competing concepts of dignity are outlined by Doris Schroeder, three of which form, to a 
greater or lesser extent, an appropriate basis for the discussion of dignity for the remainder of 
this research. These competing concepts are: Kantian Dignity, Comportment Dignity and 
Meritorious Dignity.137 The first, Kantian Dignity, is inalienable and can be explained as the 
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belief that all human beings possess dignity by virtue of their ability to separate good and bad, 
in other words, their capacity for reason.138 It centres on the belief that all rational human beings 
have intrinsic worth.139 Arguably, however, this cannot be the concept of dignity invoked in 
case law, as such judgments refer to upholding or protecting dignity. This presupposes that 
dignity is capable of being stripped or violated, which would not be possible if the concept of 
dignity being discussed was inviolable or inalienable. Indeed, the Preamble to the Irish 
Constitution refers to assuring the dignity of the individual.  
Comportment Dignity can be understood as the ‘dignity of appropriate and seemly 
comportment’,140 in other words dignity as ‘outward displays of appropriate behaviour (…) 
[in] adherence to social norms and expectations’.141 Schroeder argues that ‘[c]ertain outward 
signs of dignified behavior are expected in most societies from most human beings’.142 
Interestingly, Suzy Killmister reformulates Comportment Dignity as ‘upholding of one’s own 
standards and norms’, as opposed to those standards and norms being given by society.143 The 
ideas of social expectations or ones’ own standards being a kind of barometer for dignity is 
will be returned to in Chapter 6 in the context of the pregnant women.  
Finally, Meritorious Dignity can be understood as dignity, which is not automatic but instead 
deserved.144 The means by which one deserves dignity is through being honourable, 
particularly when faced with challenges or difficulties.  The competing concepts of dignity 
outlined above are certainly not exhaustive, however, they are viewed to have the most 
relevance to the topic of compelled medical treatment and advance decision-making. 
Accordingly, they will be revisited in relation to end-of-life decision-making and compelled 
obstetric interventions in Chapters 4 and 6.  
Conclusion 
To say that laws must reflect the morals and values of society is meaningless unless we can 
identify what those morals and values are. Furthermore, we must be capable of establishing 
where these morals and values, both individually held and society wide, have come from and 
how we use them, to decide what is the right decision in particular contexts. In order to do so, 
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this chapter gave an overview of two major normative ethical frameworks to demonstrate how 
they have contributed to more modern medical ethics. This chapter then introduced Principlism 
and highlighted why it is widely used as a system within complex medical decision-making. 
Despite its very vocal critics, Principlism will be used throughout this research to highlight and 
analyse some of the key ethical issues that arise in the context of life-sustaining treatment and 
advance decisions, particularly for pregnant women. 
This chapter has undoubtedly been a building block and each subsequent chapter will add to 
the concepts and explanations provided when conducting the ethical analysis of the four core 
topics – informed consent, refusal of life-sustaining treatment, advance directives and 
compelled obstetric intervention and pregnancy exceptions to advance directive legislation. As 
this research progresses what will become apparent is that medical ethics is not only relevant 
to law-making but also key to the interpretation of those laws by the courts. Frequently, we see 
references in judgments to the ‘protection of autonomy’ and the duty to refrain from causing 
harm, thus it was important to understand the origin of these concepts in healthcare. The 
discussion of how robustly such concepts are protected when the individual is pregnant will 
unfold as this research progresses; questions as to whether the autonomy of the woman is less 
worthy of respect in pregnancy and whether concepts of justice permit physicians and the law 
to treat pregnant women ‘unequally’ will be posed. Furthermore, the connection between 
autonomy and ‘patient duties’ is also important; thus, it is a theme that will be picked up in the 
context of decision-making in pregnancy. 
Chapter 3 
Introduction 
The conceptual basis for an advance refusal of treatment is the contemporaneous right to do 
so. Without the requirement that consent must be given before treatment is administered and 
the acceptance of the right of an individual to exercise her autonomy through medical decision-
making, there would be no foundation upon which to base advance directives. Thus, an 
examination of consent to medical treatment is the natural starting point for a discussion on 
advance directives, as they are the clear exercise of that right in advance of a future loss of 
capacity. As outlined previously, this research is not only concerned with advance directives 
in general, but rather advance directives in pregnancy; accordingly, informed consent in 
pregnancy will be considered in detail. By considering informed consent in a more general 
way, the basis for advance directives in general can be established; then, by examining the 
interaction between informed consent and pregnancy – and specifically labour – the idea of the 
‘pregnancy exception’ is first introduced. Furthermore, as Claire Murray argues; ‘by 
considering consent through the prism of labour we begin to identify shortcomings’ in the way 
that the law in constructed.1 
Medical professionals were not always duty bound to inform patients about their prognosis and 
treatment options. Furthermore, the duty to obtain consent from patients prior to treating them 
was not always enshrined in law. This chapter begins by exploring the impetus for the move 
away from the paternalism that traditionally defined the doctor-patient relationship, to a system 
that places informed consent and the will of the individual in a position of prominence. Logic 
dictates that if we are to discuss it, we should first seek to know what is meant by ‘consent’. 
As summarised by Ranaan Gillon, consent is ‘a voluntary, uncoerced decision, made by a 
sufficiently competent or autonomous person on the basis of adequate information and 
deliberation, to accept rather than reject some proposed course of action that will affect him or 
her’.2  
It is often argued that informed consent has three functions; a legal, a clinical and a moral 
function.3 Therefore, it is imperative that this chapter not confine itself to solely considering 
the law, but also consider the ethical justification for requiring consent to treatment. The legal 
function will be discussed later in this chapter, whereas the other two functions – the clinical 
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and the moral – will be discussed in the ethics section. After considering the ethical issues, this 
chapter progresses to examining the legal development of informed consent in Ireland, England 
and Wales and New York. It was held by the US Supreme Court that ‘[t]he logical corollary of 
the doctrine of informed consent is that the patient generally possesses the right not to consent, 
that is, to refuse treatment’;4 accordingly, this chapter discusses the elements which must be 
present in order to have a valid consent to, and by extension, refusal of medical treatment:  
(i) The patient must be informed as to what the treatment involves, although what 
constitutes ‘informed’ varies by jurisdiction and can be unclear; 
(ii) The consent must be voluntarily given by an individual with the capacity to consent 
to treatment.5 
As distinct from some of the other core areas of this thesis, pregnancy will be the lens through 
which the law and ethics of consent is viewed. Pregnancy presents some specific challenges 
and issues in informed consent, particularly in the context of capacity. These will be considered 
in this chapter, together with a more generalist legal and ethical examination of informed 
consent. 
Traditionally, healthcare and medical treatment were defined by paternalism and perhaps the 
view that patients were ‘objects to be mended’ by medical professionals.6 The mantras of ‘it’s 
for your own good’ and ‘doctor knows best’ reigned supreme. As was discussed in the previous 
chapter, beneficence in medical ethics can be understood as a physician’s obligation to act in a 
manner that benefits his patients, whether by acting for the good of the patient or the prevention 
or elimination of harm. Non-maleficence is the duty of the physician to refrain from acting in 
a way that harms the patient. It can be argued, as Tom Beauchamp and James Childress have, 
that both of these principles actually provided a basis for paternalism in medical care.7 William 
Cody explains paternalistic acts as ones ‘carried out intentionally on behalf of a person (…) 
against that person’s wishes or without consent, with the explicit purpose of doing good for, or 
avoiding harm to, that person’.8 It can be argued, therefore, that paternalism is a kind of 
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beneficence gone wrong. Or perhaps, as expressed in a more sophisticated manner by Alasdair 
Maclean: ‘beneficence is constrained by the beneficiary’s will, while paternalism is not’.9 
Medical professionals are individuals in positions of power, with considerably more knowledge 
than almost all patients; therefore, what they believed to be the right course of action should 
have been accepted as such. His duty to do good, combined with his superior knowledge, 
justified the physician making decisions for the patient, or at the very least, making strong 
suggestions as to the best course of action, perhaps without even mentioning alternatives. More 
recently, however, while it is viewed as an exercise of autonomy to ‘acknowledge and rely on 
the expertise of others where there is a good reason to do so’, it has also been argued that ‘it 
smacks of the arrogance of infallibility to claim that simply because healthcare professionals 
are recognised as experts they should be allowed to override the patient’s agency’.10 This 
expresses, in quite clear terms, the difficulty with paternalism and why its rejection is justified. 
In part, at least, it comes down to the differences between people and individual values; what 
is an acceptable side effect for one person, may not be acceptable for another. The risk, for 
example, of being unable to procreate might be intolerable to one person, but an entirely 
acceptable outcome for another. Equally, a small risk to one’s own life or one’s foetus may be 
acceptable if the alternative goes against a clear tenet of one’s faith. As Jonathan Herring 
eloquently argues:  
[I]t is the patient’s body, even if the doctor does know best. Anyway, even if we accept 
that a doctor has expertise in what works well in medicine generally, only the particular 
patient knows what is important to them and their body.11  
During the mid-late 20th century, a shift away from paternalism and towards patient autonomy 
began across Europe and the United States.12 Commentators attribute this general move away 
from traditional medical paternalism to multiple events, predominantly healthcare and human 
subject research scandals, historical events and scientific developments. Jessica Berg et al 
assert that scientific developments, such as technological advances in life-sustaining treatment, 
contributed to America’s changing attitudes.13 They opine that patients began to evaluate their 
wishes with respect to treatment, particularly regarding life-sustaining measures, because of 
advancements in technology that resulted in patients being kept alive with very poor quality of 
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life and prognosis.14 They also partly attribute the move in the US to the ‘atrocities revealed in 
the Nuremberg trial of Nazi doctors’, which they argue ‘called into question the trustworthiness 
of the medical profession’.15 Indeed, the cultural shift arising from the offences perpetrated by 
the Nazis was not unique to the US; the World Medical Association’s 1964 ‘Declaration of 
Helsinki’ demonstrated the approach of the international medical community to human subject 
research. Paramount in it was the right of each individual to safeguard his personal integrity 
and critically, the responsibility of the medical professional to seek free consent from the 
individual after he has been informed.16 Throughout the next four decades however, yet more 
events would shape the attitudes of individuals to informed consent.  
Mary Donnelly cites the Tuskegee Syphilis Study in the US as a further impetus for the desire 
to be more informed regarding to medical treatment.17 In the 1970s, it was discovered that the 
United States Public Health Service, in conjunction with Tuskegee University, had been 
involved in a study of African-Americans with untreated syphilis for 40 years.18 The study was 
unethical for a number of reasons, most notably because the researchers never offered 
penicillin, which was recognised as the approved treatment for syphilis during the study.19 
Furthermore, they never sought informed consent, as they never provided any information 
about the real nature and purpose of study, nor did they ever inform the participants that they 
were suffering from syphilis, thereby exposing others to contracting the disease.20 In an article 
in the New England Journal of Medicine, Dr Henry Beecher gave 22 accounts of human subject 
experiments with questionable or unethical practices, including instances where there was 
absence of informed consent.21 Most notable amongst the accounts was the Willowbrook State 
School studies of hepatitis, in which staff infected developmentally disabled children with viral 
hepatitis in order to study the development of the disease.22  
The 1980-90s saw multiple blood scandals hit Europe and the US. During the 1970s and 1980s, 
thousands of haemophiliacs globally received Factor VIII or Factor IX,23 which were 
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products in the knowledge that they may be contaminated with HIV, to recipients who were 
unaware.25 At the same time, the French government deliberately delayed the approval of a 
request by pharmaceutical company Abbott Laboratories to sell its HIV test, despite the being 
aware of the connection between contaminated blood products and contraction of HIV.26 In 
1991, the Blood Transfusion Service Board in Ireland was informed that a batch of anti-D27 
produced in 1977 may be contaminated with hepatitis.28 Despite the warning, the BTSB made 
no attempt to find and inform the recipients of the anti-D that they may have been exposed; as 
a result, the widespread infection of 1,200 women was not discovered until 1994.29 While all 
these scandals are seemingly unrelated incidents across different countries, a common thread 
links them; the possession of relevant medical information by states or individuals and the 
failure to impart that information to patients. It is posited that such failures could only serve to 
undermine the faith of patients in the healthcare industry and encourage patients to take a more 
active role in deciding what happens to their bodies. Although it is rare to find a reference to 
any of these historical events in the judgments of cases considering alleged lack of informed 
consent, they were certainly a driving force behind a change in perspective amongst the general 
public. The more aware people became about these morally questionable actions, the more 
patients’ rights advocates began to demand that the imbalance of power be rectified in favour 
of patients.30 
Informed Consent and Ethics 
This research favours describing the ‘clinical function’ and the ‘moral function’ as the ‘ethical 
functions’ of informed consent. As outlined earlier, the law on informed consent cannot be 
considered in a vacuum; it cannot be discussed without understanding the ethical justification 
for its existence. As discussed in Chapter 1, we generally expect that laws will reflect what we, 
as a society, perceive to be ‘good’ or ‘bad’ behaviours, but sometimes, there are no clear right 
answers from an ethical perspective. Be that as it may, it is important to consider informed 
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consent from both an ethical and legal perspective in order to get a full picture of the concept 
and its limitations.  
As will become apparent in the following paragraph, the ‘clinical function’ of informed consent 
fits squarely within the notion of beneficence as explained in Chapter 2. It achieves the goal of 
‘doing good’ through promoting the health and well-being of the patient, encouraging her 
compliance with medical advice and by contributing to a better diagnosis, prognosis and quality 
of care. It is supported by utilitarian reasoning; a patient who is informed about and has agreed 
to what is happening to her body, is unlikely to resist that treatment and any recommended 
aftercare; thus, she is more likely to benefit from the treatment and commit to the recommended 
aftercare.31 As Herring argues succinctly: ‘[f]orcing a treatment on an unwilling patient is likely 
to be counter-productive’, as at some point, the medical professional will not be able to compel 
the patient to behave in a certain manner, most likely when it comes to post-treatment 
recommendations.32 Thus, the act of seeking consent prior to administering treatment by 
adequately informing a patient as to the risks, benefits and alternatives leads to a positive 
outcome for the patient, hence the argument that it is an example of beneficence supported by 
utilitarian reasoning.  
The ‘moral function’ of informed consent can be explained as the underpinning belief that 
respecting the self-determination and bodily integrity of an individual is the ‘right’ thing to do, 
in and of itself.33 Or conversely, to interfere with them is the wrong thing to do and causes 
harm. In this sense, the moral function of informed consent sits within non-maleficence. Like 
the previous example, this principle is underpinned by normative ethical reasoning, in this case, 
deontology. Self-determination and bodily integrity are valuable concepts, which ought to be 
respected and promoted; this, in turn, generates a moral duty for the physician to refrain from 
interfering with or inhibiting them save in exceptional circumstances where there is a 
convincing and justifiable reason to do so. 
Autonomy 
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Principlism serves as a good framework upon which to consider ethical issues in healthcare.34 
Thus, an overview of the relationship between the principles and informed consent will be 
provided in this chapter. A natural starting point for an examination of the ethical justification 
for the requirement that medical professionals seek consent before administering treatment is 
autonomy. As outlined previously, autonomy encompasses the ability to freely make those 
important decisions that shape one’s life and existence; intrinsically linked to this are one’s 
interests in bodily integrity and self-determination. Without the ability to make autonomous 
choices and to be autonomous, we would move through life directed where to go by some other 
power. We would lose the ability to shape our own lives and have any say in its direction. 
Medical treatment clearly engages our interests in bodily integrity and self-determination. 
Furthermore, it is clearly an example of a context in which when we can shape our life in some 
way. An individual who battles cancer with aggressive treatment is shaping her life with an 
important choice; so too, is the individual who forgoes treatment in the belief that she will get 
the best from her remaining days by being free from the side effects of treatment. Critically, 
exercising one’s autonomy in this way is impossible without informed consent. We cannot 
freely choose if we do not know what we are choosing, or what the alternatives are. 
Thus, in supporting the decision-making of the individual by fulfilling the requirement to 
inform and to seek consent to treatment, the physician plays an active role in the exercise of 
patient autonomy.35 As Onora O’Neill notes: 
Respect for autonomy and for rights are often closely identified with medical practice 
that seeks individuals’ informed consent to all medical treatment (…) Medical practice 
has moved away from paternalistic traditions, in which professionals were seen as the 
proper judges of patients’ best interests. Increased recognition and respect for patients’ 
rights and insistence on the ethical importance of securing their consent are now viewed 
as standard and obligatory ways of securing respect for patients’ autonomy.36 
Sheila McLean argues that the purpose of having consent laws ‘is to permit the patient the 
continued exercise of self-determination or autonomy’.37 The corollary, it can be argued, is that 
an absence of (effective) rules on consent would deny patients the right to self-determination 
and autonomy. As was articulated in the opening paragraphs, two distinct aspects of the law on 
informed consent are relevant to this research: the consent must be informed and given by an 
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individual with the capacity to do so. Maclean explains the relationship between autonomy and 
information disclosure as part of the consent process as follows: 
[I]f patients require knowledge of the risks to make an ‘informed choice’ then they 
require that knowledge in order to maximise their autonomy. If the law of battery is to 
protect individual autonomy, at least in the liberal sense of rational self-determination, 
then it should require disclosure of those risks that are essential to informed choice.38 
As will be explained in more detail later in this chapter, informed consent cases are treated as 
matters coming within the scope of negligence and not battery. This does not mean, however, 
that the protection of autonomy is not an ethical justification for informed consent. Rather, it 
means that the law is doing a questionable job of protecting it; while the ‘theory of informed 
consent’ may be grounded in the ideal of autonomy, it is not adequately protected therein.39 
Thus, in order to truly respect the autonomy of the individual, the medical professional bears 
the responsibility, not only of seeking consent, but also of providing the information necessary 
to enable autonomous choices to be made.  
Where informed consent is not given or refusal disregarded, the autonomy of the individual 
may be severely compromised. To an extent, this highlights the relationship between autonomy 
and the other principles, in this case non-maleficence. To diminish or disregard one principle, 
autonomy, is to breach the other, non-maleficence. In summarising the potential for negative 
effect when a patient is treated despite a competent refusal, Ian Kennedy argues: 
[I]f the beliefs and values of the patient, though incomprehensible to others (…) have 
formed the basis for all the patient’s decisions about his life, there is a strong argument 
to suggest that the doctor should respect and give effect to a patient’s decision based on 
them (…) To argue otherwise would effectively be to rob the patient of his right to his 
own personality which may be far more serious and destructive than anything that could 
follow the patient’s decision as regards a particular proposed treatment.40   
While the quote appears to refer to the potential for damage in situations where the long-
standing beliefs and values of the patient have informed her attitude to treatment, that is not 
quite the position of this research. Rather, it is submitted that changes to the circumstances of 
the patient can be just as much of a rationale as long-standing beliefs for a particular decision 
and can provide just as much of a justification for adhering to that decision. For example, an 
individual who recently converted to a particular religion may have changed her perspective 
regarding specific medical treatments; the fact that she converted, as opposed to being raised 
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39 Bernadette J Richards, ‘Autonomy and the Law: Widely Used, Poorly Defined’ in David G Kirchhoffer and Bernadette J Richards Beyond 
Autonomy: Limited and Alternatives to Informed Consent in Research Ethics and Law (Cambridge University Press 2019) 25. 
40 Ian Kennedy, ‘Consent to Treatment: The Capable Person’ in Claire Dyer (ed)  Doctors Patients and the Law (Blackwell Science 1992) 56.   
as a member of that faith from childhood, should not make her decision any less worthy of 
respect nor should it render any disregard of that decision less damaging. Indeed, one could 
take the view that religious conversion is properly choice-based in a way that being raised in 
that faith may not be. Thus, it could be argued that conversion may be more, not less, worthy 
of respect. In any event, this research settles on equally worthy of respect. 
If we consider Tom Walker’s explanation of autonomy – ‘the capacity to think about what you 
want, to make decisions about what you want taking into account your aims and values, and 
then to act on those decisions’ – the doctor has an additional, vital role to play in the process, 
that of information provider.41 How this ‘vital role’ plays out in informed consent legislation 
and jurisprudence is inconsistent, as will be demonstrated in later sections. Either way, in order 
for a physician to discharge the moral duty he owes to seek informed consent prior to 
administering treatment, the patient must receive information; first, she must be informed as to 
what has led her to this point, in other words, the nature of her condition or illness. Second, she 
must be informed of her options, including likely recovery and success rates. Third, she must 
be informed of the risks associated with those options. To do anything less, may inhibit the 
ability of the individual to think and make decisions about what she wants, in other words the 
exercise of her autonomy.  
Capacity is also key part to this ethical analysis, something that will be picked up in greater 
detail when this research considers end-of-life decisions. Still, some ‘light coverage’ is 
necessary for now. The relationship between capacity and autonomy is unavoidable. John 
Devereux argues that the ethical function of competence, is ‘to operate as a guide to doctors as 
to whether the bioethical principle of autonomy or beneficence will be paramount’.42 
Accordingly, when a patient has capacity, respect for autonomy should be the dominant 
principle in the vast majority of cases.43 Where the patient is incompetent, the doctor should 
treat her in line with conferring the most benefit – whether this is based on best interests or 
previously expressed will and preference or some other method of assessment – in other words, 
 
41 Tom Walker, ‘If they can consent, why can’t they refuse?’ in Mary Donnelly and Claire Murray (eds) Ethical and Legal Debates in Irish 
Healthcare: Confronting Complexities (Manchester University Press 2016) 76. 
42 John Devereux, ‘Continuing Conundrums in Competency’ in Sheila McLean (ed) First Do No Harm: Law, Ethics and Healthcare (Ashgate 
2006) 236. From a legal perspective, he argues: ‘[C]ompetency is one of the determining factors as to whether a patient may give a valid 
consent (...) A valid consent to treatment is a defence to a battery action. Battery protects the physical inviolability of a patient. It ensures that 
a patient is only administered treatment to which he or she has given consent. It pays no heed to whether the treatment is in the best interests 
or will benefit the patient. It simply asks the questions – did this patient consent to this procedure?’ See also Tom Beauchamp and James 
Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (8th edn, OUP 2019) 112; they refer to capacity as having a ‘gatekeeping role’, in other words it 
distinguishes those decisions that should be accepted from those that should not. 
43 An exception to this could be a situation where failing to treat or isolate the individual would result in a grave risk to public health.  
the principle of beneficence.44 Were beneficence confined to just the health of the patient, then 
this construct may be problematic, however, as will be argued in more detail shortly, 
beneficence extends beyond mere health. Capacity also affects the interaction between the 
principles of autonomy and justice; to treat – in the general sense as opposed to the medical 
sense – incompetent individuals the same as their competent counterparts would result in 
incompetent individuals bearing the responsibility for the consequences of their decisions.45 
To treat competent individuals the same as their incompetent counterparts would also be unjust, 
as it would be to prevent individuals who have the ‘necessary ability to be rational’ and those 
who ‘are capable of making autonomous choices’ from doing so.46 After all, the freedom to 
make one’s own decisions comes with it the ‘obligation to answer for the consequences of 
those decisions’, as autonomy has a clear association with ‘the notion of individual 
responsibility’.47 
Arguably, what has emerged from the discussion of autonomy in the context of informed 
consent is three distinct interactions. First, the relationship between the duty to seek informed 
consent itself and autonomy was discussed. Second, autonomy was explored in the context of 
non-consensual treatment, in other words where the refusal of a patient has been disregarded 
and third, it was discussed in the context of information provision.  
Non-Maleficence 
The maxim Primum non nocere or ‘first, do no harm’, from which the principle of non-
maleficence can be derived, is widely considered to serve as moral guidance to physicians as 
to how to approach their relationship with their patients. Not only is it submitted that a failure 
to seek informed consent is wrong because it fails to respect the autonomy of the individual, 
but it is also wrong because of its failure to adhere to the principle of non-maleficence. Thus, 
two areas of the doctrine of informed consent will be considered through the lens of the duty 
of non-maleficence; first, non-consensual treatment and second, the provision of information. 
Separate to autonomy, it can be reasonably suggested that to treat a patient against her will is 
harmful because it has the potential to irreparably damage the physician-patient relationship, 
one in which trust and mutual respect is critical. As O’Neill argues: 
 
44 John Devereux, ‘Continuing Conundrums in Competency’ in Sheila McLean (ed) First Do No Harm: Law, Ethics and Healthcare (Ashgate 
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45 Alasdair Maclean, Autonomy, Informed Consent and Medical Law: A Relational Challenge (Cambridge University Press 2009) 59. 
46 ibid 60. 
47 Alexander Morgan Capron, ‘Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment’ (1974) 123 U Pa L Rev 340, 365. 
Trust is surely more important [than autonomy], and particularly so for any ethically 
adequate practice of medicine, science and technology. Trust – or rather loss of trust – 
is a constant concern in political and popular writing in all three areas.48  
Even if one does not accept that the breakdown of the physician-patient relationship is negative, 
in and of itself, it is also negative in terms of the consequences it generates. A breach of trust 
in the form of compelled treatment could well result in that patient not trusting the medical 
profession in the future, thereby leading to hesitance to seek medical care for related or different 
issues.49 Given that there are arguments that health events themselves such as cardiac arrest 
can traumatise patients, it seems intuitive that an invasion in the form of non-consensual 
treatment has the same potential.50 Thus, it can be argued that such treatment can expose the 
patient to a risk of developing PTSD or other mental health issues afterwards, a demonstrable 
harm. In a more general sense, if word emerges within particular communities or in the public 
domain of non-consensual treatment, others may shy away from seeking medical advice or care 
for fear of being compelled to receive treatment. 
A range of information must be provided by the physician to fulfil his moral duty to seek 
informed consent. Aside from the obvious impingement on her autonomy if she does not 
receive the necessary information, the principle of non-maleficence is also engaged when there 
is a failure to adequately disclose information. First, if a patient is not adequately informed 
about her condition, she may not appreciate the severity of the situation in which she is, or the 
importance of strictly following any aftercare plan. For example, if an individual is suffering 
from liver fibrosis – a pre-cursor to cirrhosis – and is not adequately informed of the seriousness 
and causes of her condition, then she may continue drinking alcohol under the mistaken 
impression that the prescribed drug treatment is sufficient to prevent further liver damage, 
assuming that she is even aware that fibrosis constitutes ‘damage’. If the patient does not 
receive sufficient information about her treatment options and the risks associated with those 
options, then she may undergo treatment that she will later regret either because a risk 
materialises or because the treatment is unsuccessful. While more information cannot prevent 
a risk materialising or treatment failing, it can assist individuals to avoid the harm caused by 
being totally unprepared for such an eventuality. 
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49 Alexander Capron, for example, makes a similar point; ‘the absence of such assurance [that the patient will not be forced into a decision 
that she does not want] would increase the inclination to delay seeking medical intervention even for serious conditions’; Alexander Morgan 
Capron, ‘Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment’ (1974) 123 U Pa L Rev 340, 365. 
50 Michelle Flaum Hall and Scott E Hall, Managing the Psychological Impact of Medical Trauma: A Guide for Mental Health and Health 
Care Professionals (Springer 2017) 19-21. See also the judgment in Barnsley Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v MSP [2020] EWCOP 26, 
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In summary, a physician avoids causing harm to the patient by seeking consent because he 
avoids administering a treatment that may be against the will, preference or interests of the 
individual and avoids violating her bodily integrity. The ‘harm’ to the individual may arise 
because of the failure of the physician to provide sufficient information; it may be the 
administration of a particular treatment carries unacceptable risk to that individual, such as 
severe pain, nerve damage, loss of one of the five senses or impotence. It may be that the 
proposed course of action is simply not what the individual wants and that the alternative is 
preferable given her personal situation. If she is unaware of important information, then the 
choice she makes may be the wrong one. ‘Harm’ is also present in compelled medical 
intervention; it could be the treatment of an individual against her religious beliefs, such as 
administering certain treatment to a Christian Scientist or blood products to a person of 
Jehovah’s Witness faith. As discussed, such treatment can have the effect of discouraging that 
person or members of that faith from attaining assistance in the future for fear of receiving 
unwanted treatment. The harm could be the treatment with aggressive chemotherapy of an 
individual with terminal cancer, when her wish for her remaining time is to be unencumbered 
by intervention.  
Beneficence 
If it is accepted that the undermining of autonomy and self-determination is unethical, then it 
should also be apparent that the maximisation of these rights and interests is the right choice, 
in other words the beneficent one. Indeed, as Maclean argues: 
Since the duty of beneficence subsumes the duty to prevent avoidable harm, and 
individual rights serve to protect the interests that all persons have, then the duty of 
beneficence requires the healthcare professional to protect and defend those rights.51  
Aside from its relationship to autonomy, however, the duty of beneficence is an important 
consideration in informed consent. It does not just encompass the prevention of harm, but the 
maximisation of the welfare of the patient. In other words, it can be considered a positive duty 
to provide benefit, as has been argued:  
As well as proscribing harmful interventions, the duty of beneficence also creates an 
obligation to provide benefit to the patient. This duty includes those interests that are 
protected by the patient’s rights and this requires healthcare professionals to act in a 
way that furthers those interests.52   
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52 ibid 49-50. 
This duty or obligation to confer benefit is not confined to mere health, rather, it extends beyond 
that. As Nils Hoppe and José Miola argue: 
The fundamental axiom of medicine is the welfare of the patient. The welfare of the 
patient does not necessarily mean (…) that the patient has to end up being well (in the 
sense of being better than before), but that his welfare (in the sense that his preferences 
are respected) is put first.53  
Welfare can certainly be seen to include health, but it should not be limited it to health. Rather, 
it should be thought to include other, less quantifiable, interests, such as ‘peace of mind’, 
privacy and wellbeing. Given that the maximisation of welfare is considered positive, then it 
can be considered to fit with a notion of beneficence that a physician generally treats a patient 
in the way that she wants. As Alexander Capron argues, the doctrine of informed consent 
‘assures the patient that in going to a physician he will not be trapped into decisions which he 
does not want’; this, he argues, promotes ‘trust and confidence between patient and physician’, 
which in turn ‘advance rational decisionmaking’.54 
If a physician fully embraces the concept of informed consent, as some commentators argue he 
should, rather than viewing it narrowly as a means of avoiding litigation, he can confer 
considerable benefit on the patient.55 Irrespective of how (in)frequent this is in practice, by 
viewing the requirement to give information more fully, as an integral part of medical care and 
treatment, the physician plays a key role in preparing a patient for what is ahead of her. For 
example, by being made aware of risks of complications, what those complications entail and 
of likely recovery times for various treatments, the patient is enabled and supported in making 
any necessary plans. Different patients, who happen to have the same likely recovery time, may 
require very different supports during recovery depending on their personal situation. The 
additional stress of having to call on others unexpectedly to fulfil caring responsibilities 
ordinarily held by the patient, or to provide care to the patient herself, may cause undue distress 
and impede her recovery. The same can be said for patients with differing employment 
situations; individuals with permanent positions and sick leave entitlements are in a very 
different position to those employed on a casual basis. By having a full and frank discussion 
about what is entailed in treatment and what is ahead in the aftermath, the medical professional 
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can play a significant role in preventing the avoidable harm in the form of increased anxiety, 
stress and worry.  
Justice 
Though most commonly associated with resource allocation and access to medical care within 
the healthcare sphere, the principle of justice does interact with informed consent. Justice is 
relevant to the rationale for why the decisions of individuals should or should not be respected 
and the limits that should legitimately be placed on this respect.56 As the requirement to seek 
consent prior to medical treatment is viewed as sufficiently important to garner legal protection, 
then the principle of justice – requiring that unequal treatment to be coherently and adequately 
justified – gives rise to the contention that the consent or refusal of every individual deserves 
equal respect, all other things being equal.57 Potential conflict with the principle arises when a 
policy dictates that the decisions of some individuals are to be respected but not the decisions 
of others and when that policy is not based on meaningful or morally relevant criteria.58 While 
the principle of justice surely ought to determine the criteria used to decide whose choices 
deserve respect and whose do not, that might not always be the case, leading to a violation of 
the principle. It remains the basic premise of the principle is that those being treated unequally 
must be unequal in some meaningful way.59 
Though generally outside the focus of this research, one can question if the principle of justice 
is being upheld by the law when minors are almost invariably excluded by the courts from the 
refusing life-sustaining medical treatment. English law has accepted that minors can make 
decisions regarding their medical care and treatment if certain conditions are met – Gillick 
competence.60 Time and time again, however, the courts have compelled the treatment of 
minors despite their refusal. In Re E, Ward J found the minor to be ‘a boy of sufficient 
intelligence to be able to take decisions about his own well-being’ capable of a ‘calm discussion 
of the implications’ of his refusal, yet he ruled that he did not have ‘a full understanding of the 
whole implication’ of what the refusal involved.61 One can legitimately question if the outcome 
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could have been the same if an adult displayed the capabilities that the minor did in this case, 
namely obvious intelligence and an ability to calmly discuss the consequences of his refusal. 
Given that a different outcome is highly likely in that case, there are legitimate questions as to 
the adherence to the principle of justice in this case and others. Thus, it could be argued that a 
different standard seems to be applied to minors wishing to refuse life-sustaining medical 
treatment, without the accompanying morally relevant justification that is required by the 
principle of justice given that these minors possess what would be competence, were it not for 
their age.62 Additionally, were they attempting to consent to treatment at their age, they may 
well be considered to have the competence to do so.  
Justice and fairness are also key to establishing who should bear the responsibility for the 
consequences of a decision.63 This explains why competence is fundamental to the ethical 
analysis of informed consent. As previously mentioned briefly, not only does adherence to the 
principle of justice dictate that we ought not to treat individuals differently in the absence of 
morally relevant reasons, it also dictates that we may have a duty to treat individuals differently 
when they do have morally relevant differences. Capacity is one such morally relevant 
difference. There is a longstanding recognition that incompetent individuals should be 
protected, in varying degrees, from making poor decisions and from the consequences of their 
actions, something that is reflected in society and the law. It is evidenced by laws that provide 
for the finances of incompetent individuals to be administered by another with court or judicial 
oversight, in the voiding of contracts if one of the parties is incompetent and in diminished 
capacity defences in criminal law, among countless others. As the New York State Task Force 
on Life and the Law summarised the matter in relation to healthcare: 
Society has a special duty to incapacitated patients — an obligation to respect them as 
individuals, to preserve their own religious and moral values in these intensely personal 
choices, and to promote their well-being by facilitating responsible decisions about 
their medical care.64 
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Thus, when one lacks decision-making capacity, to make them liable for the consequences of 
poor decisions seems patently unjust;65 rather, it is submitted that such individuals should be 
protected from such negative consequences. While it may be argued by some that this line of 
argument is subsumed by the autonomy principle itself, it is the position of this research that 
they are distinct and that justice has an important role to play within informed consent. After 
all, justice has been explained in line with fairness.  
Additionally, it is often argued that those with the requisite capacity should not be prohibited 
from making decisions and engaging in activities merely because they may be detrimental to 
life, health or well-being. Part of choice is bearing the responsibility for the consequences of 
that decision, both negative and positive. This is reflected in varying degrees across law and 
society. Mixed martial arts, boxing, car and motorcycle racing, the climbing of treacherous 
mountains and cliffs, sky diving and numerous other sports and recreational activities carry a 
risk to life and health. Yet, although sometimes regulated, they are not prohibited outright. Nor, 
for that matter, is holding a profession that carries a greater than typical risk. Nor are a 
multitude of other actions or activities that can affect life and health such as smoking, lack of 
compliance with medical advice66 and overconsumption of alcohol or sugar. Rather, the 
decision to engage in any of these actions and activities rests with the individual, with their 
own moral values left to guide them as to whether they should participate and with them bearing 
the consequences. 
Analysing informed consent in light of the four principles clearly demonstrates that seeking 
consent prior to treatment forms part of the ethical duty of the physician. In doing so, he has 
respected her autonomy, fulfilled his duties of beneficence and non-maleficence and adhered 
to the principle of justice. In other words, the principles do not conflict. The situations that lead 
to the greatest ethical challenges are not as clear cut, however; they are not the cases concerning 
an average adult patient with capacity. Instead, the challenging cases from the perspective of 
the physician often concern adults with borderline or fluctuating capacity, patients who have 
been unduly influenced or coerced or, directly relevant to this research, pregnant patients.  
To be clear, it is the position of this research that the obligation to seek informed consent from 
a patient does not change merely because the patient is pregnant, a contention which appears 
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to be strongly supported by various ethical guidelines.67 Unwanted and non-consensual 
treatment do not suddenly become more beneficent because a woman is pregnant. They do not 
suddenly maximise her welfare in a way that they would not have, prior to pregnancy. 
Unwanted treatment does not become less of a violation of bodily integrity, nor less of an 
interference with her interests in self-determination. Such treatment does not become less 
harmful nor maleficent because of pregnancy. Critically, the principle of justice does not sit 
unengaged because of pregnancy, rather non-consensual treatment in pregnancy goes to its 
very heart. The question the principle poses is whether pregnancy is a morally relevant reason 
to treat a woman differently. It is argued that it is not and the justification for this viewpoint 
will be explained throughout this research. Finally, neither the autonomy of the woman nor her 
dignity suddenly become less relevant or worthy of respect because she is pregnant, despite the 
potential for – though not guaranteed presence of – competing interests. As this research 
progresses, these contentions will be expanded and defended. For the time being, they are 
designed to indicate the position of this research towards compelled treatment and invalidating 
advance directives in pregnancy. 
The Law 
The ‘legal function’ of consent has a criminal and tortious facet;68 it is to convert into lawful 
contact what would, without consent, be unlawful physical contact. In other words, non-
consensual touching can amount to the crime of assault or battery depending on the domestic 
criminal statutes. When one considers major surgical procedures and even minor procedures 
such as taking blood, it is evident that were these actions to be committed outside of the 
physician-patient relationship, they would constitute assault within the meaning of 
jurisdictional criminal statutes.69 Criminal statutes, for example the Non-Fatal Offences 
Against the Person Act 1997 in Ireland, refer to a person committing the act ‘without lawful 
excuse’, therefore demonstrating the legal function of informed consent to medical treatment. 
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Both battery and assault are crimes under the law in England and Wales; the former is a common law offence with no statutory definition and 
the latter is governed by sections 20 and 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, which criminalise ‘assault occasioning bodily harm’ 
and ‘inflicting bodily injury, with or without a weapon’ respectively. New York: New York does not refer to battery in the context of the 
criminal law, however Penal Code § 120 – 120.15 covers offences such as ‘assault’, ‘reckless assault’, ‘aggravated assault’ and ‘menacing’. 
The intentional touching of another person without her consent can also amount to battery 
under the law of torts, as proof of injury or damage to the plaintiff is not necessary for a 
successful action thereunder. Rather, what is required is awareness on the part of the defendant 
that her actions were ‘objectionable’ in some way or beyond the bounds of generally accepted 
physical contact without lawful excuse.70 As will be evident as this chapter progresses, battery 
is generally not the action pursued against a medical professional when there is alleged lack of 
informed consent.71 Instead, such matters come within the remit of medical negligence, 
something which has been criticised.72 While some early informed consent jurisprudence 
treated the matter as coming within the scope of battery,73 there was a shift in approach as time 
passed, reflecting the reluctance of the judiciary to tar medical professionals with the same 
brush as criminals, or batterers.74 The purpose of the law of consent is often lauded as being 
the protection of individual autonomy, however, this belief has been challenged by informed 
consent cases sitting within medical negligence. Given that informed consent provides a 
defence to the tort of battery, the purpose of which, in turn, is to protect individual rights to 
bodily integrity, self-determination and autonomy, it seems inconsistent with the goal of 
protecting autonomy for informed consent cases to be treated as medical negligence. 
Accordingly, there is a school of thought that the law of informed consent ‘is not, despite 
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judicial assertions to the contrary, actually about [protection of] autonomy’ and instead is about 
‘professional standards of care’, logic which is difficult to dispute.75  
Furthermore, if the purpose of the law is to protect autonomy, then why is the materialisation 
of a known complication necessary for a successful action for lack of informed consent? The 
‘harm’ is non-consensual touching, or so dictates the law of battery. Emily Jackson argues: 
[A] successful action in battery will lead to compensation for the dignitary harm of 
being treated without consent. This more accurately protects the patient’s interest in 
self-determination, because it is the violation of the patient’s right to make an informed 
choice which is being compensated, rather than the materialisation – through nobody’s 
fault – of some remote risk (…)’76 
Indeed, the right to make an informed choice may have been compromised ‘regardless of 
whether she also happens to have suffered physical injury’.77 Arguably, the autonomy of the 
individual has already been compromised by treatment without informed consent, the lack of 
which has been caused by insufficient information. It is just a fact of life that some people are 
luckier than others and a risk will materialise for some but not others. Although a detailed 
analysis of this issue is outside the remit of this research, the discrepancy is certainly worth 
keeping in mind when intervention in pregnancy and labour is being considered later in this 
research, given the intimacy of the situation and substantial power imbalance. Alleged 
conceptual weaknesses of the law aside, it still remains that there is a requirement on medical 
professionals to seek consent prior to administering treatment, as to do otherwise may result in 
a successful action in battery. 
Capacity  
There are three distinct approaches to assessments of capacity; the functional approach, the 
status approach and the outcome approach.78 The functional approach is a subjective, issue-
specific and time-specific method of capacity assessment in that it relates to the decision-
making ability of a particular patient in relation to a particular decision at a specific point in 
time. Thus, this approach displays some appreciation of the fluidity of mental capacity; for 
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77 ibid. 
78 The outcome approach assesses the capacity of an individual based on an evaluation of the consequences of their choices. This means that 
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example, a patient suffering from dementia may alternate between incompetence and 
competence, therefore there are times when it is appropriate to treat her as a competent 
decision-maker and times when it is not. Equally, patients with learning difficulties may lack 
capacity to make certain large or significant decisions but may actively participate in other 
areas of their healthcare. In both instances, it would not demonstrate respect for the person, nor 
be in line with the law, to assume that she lacks capacity because she has a particular condition. 
Such an assumption would be an example of the ‘status approach’; this approach dictates that 
certain groups or statuses of patients en masse lack the capacity to consent to medical treatment. 
This can be by virtue of these individuals lacking certain characteristics or having certain 
conditions. 
On the face of it, pregnancy does not alter this view of capacity and there are no laws stating 
that pregnant women should be considered incapable of making decisions based on pregnancy. 
Nor are there any laws that states that women in labour are incompetent. Still, after the general 
overview of the jurisdictional approaches to capacity is given, a slew of cases will be discussed 
that seem to indicate that labour often results in questions as to capacity. 
England and Wales79 
As far back as the 1700s, the English common law recognised that consent must be sought 
before treatment was administered.80 In more recent times, this requirement was defined: 
[E]very person’s body is inviolate (…) the effect of this principle is that everybody is 
protected not only against physical injury but against any form of physical molestation 
(…) The general rule is that consent is necessary to render such [medical] treatment 
lawful. If such treatment administered without consent is not to be unlawful, it has to 
be justified on some other principle.81 
As explained in the introduction, consent is only valid if it is voluntarily given by a person with 
the requisite capacity to do so after being given sufficient information. In approaching capacity 
to consent to medical treatment, England and Wales utilises a layering of the ‘functional 
approach’ on top of a very basic ‘status approach’; this can be seen in the rebuttable 
presumptions that all adults have capacity to consent to medical treatment by virtue of their 
‘status’ as adults and that all minors below the age of 16 lack capacity by virtue of their ‘status’ 
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as children. Arguably, however, this may be more of a reflection that the law must have some 
starting point or constant, rather than an endorsement of the status approach. 
In stark contrast to Ireland, which will be discussed in due course, England and Wales has 
considerable case law pertaining to capacity to refuse medical treatment, both before and after 
the introduction of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (‘MCA 2005’). There is a rebuttable legal 
presumption that all adults have the capacity to consent to or refuse medical treatment;82 this 
is irrespective of the wisdom of or reasons behind their choice and notwithstanding the fact 
that negative consequences may flow from that decision.83 As Jackson J expressed in Heart of 
England NHS Foundation v JB: 
The temptation to base a judgement of a person’s capacity upon whether they seem to 
have made a good or bad decision, and (…) upon whether they have accepted or rejected 
medical advice, is absolutely to be avoided.84  
Or perhaps, more renowned are the words of Lord Donaldson in Re T;  
Prima facie every adult has the right and capacity to decide whether or not he will accept 
medical treatment (...) Furthermore, it matters not whether the reasons for the refusal 
were rational or irrational, unknown or even non-existent (...)85 
Lord Donaldson goes on to clarify, however, that the ‘presumption of capacity to decide, which 
stems from the fact that the patient is an adult, is rebuttable’.86 In other words, all adults are 
taken as having decision-making capacity, unless the contrary is demonstrated. It is important 
to note the distinction between a rebuttable presumption of capacity and a requirement to 
demonstrate capacity; the latter places the onus on the patient to prove that she has capacity to 
make medical decisions, whereas the former places the burden of demonstrating incapacity on 
the medical professionals. This point is important in the context of advance decisions, 
particularly where the directive-maker suffers from fluctuating capacity; this will be returned 
to in Chapter 5. 
In England and Wales, medical professionals have a common law duty to treat incompetent 
patients in their ‘best interests’, which was codified by the MCA 2005.87 It is accepted that a 
competent individual is best placed to judge whether a particular treatment is in her interests; 
where she is incompetent, she will be treated in line with her best interests. In this way, the law 
reflects Devereux’s contention that capacity dictates which ethical principle should receive 
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paramountcy.88 Previously determined, albeit it with limited analysis, by the common law, 
section 4 of the MCA 2005 details how the ‘best interests’ of the patient should be assessed.89 
Amongst several other relevant factors, it includes the requirement to consider the wishes, 
feelings, beliefs and values of the individual.90 As authors such as Jackson note, however, while 
‘the wishes, values and beliefs of P are important, they do not have primacy over other 
considerations’;91 this, she contends was ‘deliberate’ in order to avoid what the then 
government believed would ‘unnecessarily fetter’ the operation of the factors ‘in the many and 
varied circumstances’ in which they might require application.92 
What constitutes ‘best interests’ has led to debate over the years, however, the settled legal 
position is that it extends beyond and encompasses more than mere medical benefits.93 
Accordingly, the courts have interpreted the interests of the individual quite broadly; for 
example, in A NHS Trust v DE it was held to be in the best interests of a man with a learning 
disability to have a vasectomy for contraceptive purposes.94 After his girlfriend became 
pregnant, their relationship almost broke down and DE lost much of the independence that he 
had gained with the support of family and disability services. As he was clear that he did not 
want any more children, his parents felt that it was in his best interests to ensure that another 
pregnancy did not occur, thus they approached the Trust to carry out the procedure; the Trust, 
in turn, applied for a declaration as to DE’s capacity and for authorisation to carry out the 
vasectomy.95 The pre-MCA 2005 judgment in Re Y (Mental Patient: Bone Marrow Donation), 
which garnered considerable commentary and criticism, also demonstrated the willingness of 
the court to consider factors outside of medical benefit when authorising a procedure.96 In this 
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case, a bone marrow donation from a severely mentally disabled woman to her sister was 
ordered. The court found that if the woman’s sister was terminally ill, her mother would be too 
upset to visit her; thus, the basis for the order was the benefit to the disabled woman’s mother, 
which in turn would benefit the woman herself. 
Notwithstanding any challenges in identifying what amounts to ‘best interests’ in the case of a 
particular individual or more generally, for the purpose of this part of the research, the system 
of differentiating between those with and without capacity is most important.97 As should be 
apparent from the jurisprudence above, prior to the introduction of MCA 2005, it was the 
common law that guided physicians on how to treat incompetent patients. Upon its 
introduction, the MCA 2005 made a number of necessary reforms when read in concert with 
the Code of Practice associated with the Act. Both appeared to give doctors, patients and 
healthcare facilities at least some of the much-needed clarity in the area. While there is 
considerably more that could be said about the best interests standard, it is beyond the scope of 
this piece to get into a detailed debate about its merits and weaknesses;98 for current purposes, 
it should suffice to say that treating incompetent patients in line with best interests is the current 
legal position.99 
The MCA 2005 provides that an individual does not possess capacity if ‘at the material time 
he is unable to make a decision for himself in relation to the matter because of an impairment 
of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain’.100 Two separate considerations 
are clearly laid out in section 2; first, the presence of a disturbance or impairment and second 
a resulting inability to make a ‘decision for himself’. Merely possessing a disturbance or 
impairment does not in and of itself mean a patient lacks capacity, however, the presence of 
the disturbance or impairment may indicate that capacity is absent.101 The standard of proof 
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required in matters of mental capacity is the balance of probabilities, in others words the 
physician must show that it is more likely than not, that the patient is currently incompetent to 
make the decision in question.102 The original 3-stage test for assessing the capacity of an 
individual was devised by Thorpe J in the Re C case in the 1990s.103 It was refined by Butler-
Sloss LJ in Re MB – which will be discussed in more detail in a later section in the context of 
capacity in pregnancy – wherein she stated that the individual is unable to make a decision if 
she is: 
(i) unable to comprehend and retain the information which is material to the decision, 
especially as to the likely consequences of having or not having the treatment in 
question; 
(ii) unable to use the information and weigh it in the balance as part of the process of 
arriving at the decision.104 
Section 3 of the MCA 2005 codified the common law test providing that a person is unable to 
make a decision if she is unable to meet the following criteria: 
(i) to understand the information relevant to the decision;105 
(ii) to retain that information;106  
(iii) to use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the decision, or;107 
(iv) to communicate his decision (whether by talking using sign language or any other 
means).108 
It also states that patients must not be considered unable to make a decision if the information 
is not provided to them in a way that sufficiently facilitates their understanding, therefore the 
method of communication should be tailored to the needs of the individual.109 While this 
requires that a patient not be considered incompetent just because the information has not been 
provided in an accessible manner, it does not follow that a physician will have liability in 
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negligence if a patient misunderstands information and refuses treatment on foot of a 
misapprehension.110 Section 3(3) cautions that the ability to retain the relevant information for 
a short period of time only, does not render the patient unable to make the decision.111 
Paragraph 4.20 of the Code of Practice reaffirms this section and supports medical 
professionals utilising ‘items such as notebooks, photographs, posters, videos and voice 
recorders’ in order to help people record and retain the relevant information.112  
After the introduction of the MCA 2005, the meaning of ‘relevant to the decision’, in the 
context of the information to be understood, retained and assessed to reach a choice, was 
considered by the court. The relevant section of the Code of Practice states that the information 
must include the nature of the decision and the reason why the decision is necessary, together 
with the likely consequences of deciding one way or another or not deciding.113 In Heart of 
England NHS Foundation v JB, the court assessed the meaning of ‘information relevant to the 
decision’, wherein Jackson J found that a ‘broad, general understanding’ of the ‘nature, purpose 
and effects of the proposed treatment’ was sufficient.114 Furthermore, he opined that the 
respondent was ‘not required to understand every last piece of information about her situation 
and her options’, further emphasising that a general understanding was the legal 
requirement.115 
As was articulated previously, it is irrelevant if the decision being made by the person is unwise. 
In Heart of England NHS Trust v JB, Jackson J stated: 
[Medical] decisions are intensely personal (…) There are no right or wrong answers. 
The freedom to choose for oneself is a part of what it means to be a human being (…) 
anyone capable of making decisions has an absolute right to accept or refuse medical 
treatment, regardless of the wisdom or consequences of the decision. The decision does 
not have to be justified to anyone.116 
Perhaps the clearest rejection of the conflation of ‘unwise’ or ‘immoral’ decisions with 
incapacity on the part of the decision-maker was found in King’s College Hospital NHS 
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Foundation Trust v C.117  MacDonald J, in finding for a woman who wished to refuse dialysis, 
stated: 
To introduce into the assessment of capacity an assessment of the probity or efficacy 
of a decision to refuse life saving treatment would be to introduce elements which risk 
discriminating against the person making that decision by penalising individuality and 
demanding conformity at the expense of personal autonomy in the context of a diverse, 
plural society which tolerates a range of views.118 
Although C’s long-term prognosis was viewed to go from ‘cautiously optimistic’ to ‘excellent 
with survival fully anticipated’, she refused dialysis for a variety of reasons. She was concerned 
that she would be dependent on it for the rest of her life, but critically, did not view her life 
positively if it lacked socialising, drinking and partying with friends.119 Furthermore, she was 
concerned about the effect that dialysis and aging generally would have on her appearance.120 
Although it may be incomprehensible to many that an individual possessing what are 
objectively considered ‘good’ things in life – family, children, friends, a good prospect of 
recovery – would put minimal value on such a life, were it to be without socialising and 
partying and with aging and decreased material possessions, such a value system is not 
overridden by law. In affirming that C had capacity to refuse, MacDonald J stated: 
C was recorded (…) as being clear in her understanding that without dialysis (…) she 
would die and (…) fully understood the risk of refusing treatment (…) It is clear from 
the medical records that C appears (…) to have undertaken an exercise of using or 
weighing information as it is recorded that an hour was spent talking to C about her 
grave medical condition, her chances of recovery, and her prognosis for the future.121 
Consistent with the legislative interpretation above is the more recent judgment of MacDonald 
J in Cambridge University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v BF, wherein the learned judge 
found that the psychosis suffered by the respondent had resulted in incompetence.122 First, BF 
disbelieved that she had a tumour and thought that the scans were false and second, despite 
‘compelling evidence to the contrary’, she persisted in a view that she would not suffer any 
negative consequences by refusing surgery.123 Therefore, it is apparent that the law in England 
and Wales generally protects the interests in bodily integrity and self-determination of the 
individual, even when her decision may be unpalatable, unconventional or ill-advised.124  
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Ireland 
Medical treatment may not be given to an adult person of full capacity without his or 
her consent (…) This right arises out of civil, criminal and constitutional law. If medical 
treatment is given without consent it may be a trespass against the person in civil law, 
a battery in criminal law, and a breach of the individual’s constitutional rights. The 
consent which is given by an adult of full capacity is a matter of choice. It is not 
necessarily a decision based on medical considerations. Thus, medical treatment may 
be refused for other than medical reasons, or reasons most citizens would regard as 
rational, but the person of full age and capacity may make the decision for their own 
reasons.125 
The statement of Denham J in Re a Ward of Court is clear and unambiguous in theory, however 
when we delve deeper to ask what constitutes full capacity, or more accurately what constitutes 
incompetence, we must look to a mix of legislation and case law. It must be stated from the 
outset, however, that Irish jurisprudence is limited.  
Prior to the drafting of Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015, which will be discussed 
in more detail in the coming paragraphs, a small number of cases considered the issue of 
decision-making capacity in healthcare; Fitzpatrick v FK case (hereafter ‘the K case’) was one 
such case.126 It concerned a Congolese woman who had refused a post-partum blood 
transfusion, an order for which was granted in an ex tempore High Court hearing. In ex tempore 
judgment, Abbot J found that K was competent to refuse treatment but the ruled that the 
interests of her newborn child in not being abandoned outweighed her interests.127 After the 
transfusion was administered and K recovered, she alleged inter alia that the transfusion was 
unlawful and breached her constitutional rights. Laffoy J stated that ‘it could not be argued that 
a competent adult is not free to decline medical treatment’ and proceeded to endorse the 
approach taken to capacity assessment in the English case of Re C.128 In doing so, Laffoy J 
established the capacity test to be used in Ireland:  
(i) K must understand the information given to her regarding the necessity of a blood 
transfusion to preserve her life and retain it;  
(ii) she must believe it;  
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(iii) she must weigh that information in the balance, balancing the risk of death inherent 
in that decision against the availability of a blood transfusion.129  
The learned judge ruled, on the facts of the case, that K lacked capacity to refuse the blood 
transfusion.130 This test has now been codified by the ADM(C)A 2015.131 
The legal position was neatly summarised in Nolan v Carrick: 
[T]here is a presumption as to the capacity of an adult patient (…) but that presumption 
can be rebutted. The test in [the K] case was stated to be whether the patient’s cognitive 
ability has been impaired to the extent that (…) she does not sufficiently understand the 
nature, purpose and effect of the proffered treatment and the consequences of accepting 
or rejecting in the context of the choices available at the time the decision is made.132 
A similar approach to the assessment of capacity was taken by Baker J in Governor of X Prison 
v PMcD: 
Having heard the evidence (…) I am of the view that he has the capacity to make the 
decision he has (…) and that the decision was made by him in the full understanding of 
its consequences and of the alternatives, and that his decision-making capacity is not 
vitiated by any frailty arising from his current living conditions or from his personality 
traits. I consider that Mr. McD has fully and freely chosen his path (…) and that his 
decision has been fully informed.133 
In Ireland, capacity assessments for the purpose of medical treatment will be governed by the 
ADM(C)A 2015, once commenced. From the outset, the Act dictates that capacity must be 
presumed unless there is a reason to suspect its absence.134 It outlines how the issue of capacity 
should be approached; first, it states that capacity is to be assessed functionally and proceeds:135 
[A] person’s capacity shall be assessed on the basis of his or her ability to understand, 
at the time that a decision is to be made, the nature and consequences of the decision to 
be made by him or her in the context of the available choices at that time.136  
As discussed previously, the MCA 2005 dictates that a person lacks capacity if he is unable to 
make the relevant decision by virtue of a ‘mental impairment or disturbance in the functioning 
of the mind or brain’.137 The ADM(C)A 2015 attaches no such condition to incapacity, instead 
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the Act virtually mirrors section 3 of the MCA 2005 by stating that ‘a person lacks capacity to 
make a decision if he or she is unable— 
(a) to understand the information relevant to the decision; 
(b) to retain that information long enough to make a voluntary choice; 
(c) to use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the decision; or 
(d) to communicate his or her decision (whether by talking, writing, using sign language, 
assistive technology, or any other means) or, if the implementation of the decision 
requires the act of a third party, to communicate by any means with that third party.138 
In the same fashion as the MCA 2005, section 3(7) of the ADM(C)A 2015 explains 
‘information relevant to a decision’ as including information about the reasonably foreseeable 
consequences of the available options and of declining to make the decision. 
Insofar as possible, it appears that the legislation has attempted to protect the autonomy and 
self-determination of the individual. For example, there is an onus to explain the information 
to the individual ‘in a way that is appropriate to his or her circumstances (whether using clear 
language, visual aids or any other means)’, thereby requiring medical professionals to take all 
steps to ensure that they are communicating effectively with the patient.139 Furthermore, the 
mere fact that an individual can only retain the relevant information for a short time does not 
render her incompetent.140 The guiding principles make quite strong statements protecting 
individual interests of self-determination; as outlined in Chapter 1, this section requires that an 
individual not be considered to be unable to make a decision because the decision is, or a past 
decision was, unwise and it mandates that no intervention be made in respect of an individual 
unless necessary.141 It remains to be seen, however, if the Irish courts will interpret the 
legislation in a manner as supportive of autonomy and self-determination, as their counterparts 
in England and Wales have generally done. 
New York 
New York Public Health Law states that any adult, married person or parent ‘may give effective 
consent for medical, dental, health and hospital services’.142 This right is explicitly extended 
to pregnant women by virtue of  § 2504 section 3, however, the text of the section limits this 
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right to prenatal care, an issue that will be picked up again in Chapter 6. New York has a long 
tradition of supporting the right of competent adults to make decisions as to their medical care: 
In our system of a free government, where notions of individual autonomy and free 
choice are cherished, it is the individual who must have the final say in respect to 
decisions regarding his medical treatment in order to insure that the greatest possible 
protection is accorded his autonomy and freedom from unwanted interference with the 
furtherance of his own desires.143  
When Cardozo J stated that ‘[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to 
determine what shall be done to his body’, he enshrined in New York law, the right of a 
competent adult to consent to or refuse medical treatment.144 As a federalised system, New 
York law does not exist in a vacuum but rather local decisions and statute must exist 
harmoniously with federal law and judgments of the United States Supreme Court. Not only 
has the right of an individual to consent to or refuse treatment been vindicated by state 
judgments but also by the Supreme Court: 
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the 
right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all 
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law 
(…) The right to one’s person may be said to be a right of complete immunity: to be let 
alone.145  
Although this case concerned a determination that a court could not order a plaintiff involved 
in a personal injury action to submit to a pre-trial surgical examination, the sentiment expressed 
appears to be clear; although not absolute, there is an inviolability associated with the human 
body.146 
In Re Storar, Watchler J acknowledged the legitimate interest of the state in protecting the lives 
of its citizens and identified instances in which the state may step in and order treatment to be 
administered, for example, public health grounds. He stated, however, that there existed ‘no 
statute which prohibits a patient from declining necessary medical treatment or a doctor from 
honoring the patient’s decision’.147 Opining on the position of the legislation and case law 
regarding refusal of treatment, he stated: 
To the extent that existing statutory and decisional law manifests the State’s interest on 
this subject, they consistently support the right of the competent adult to make his own 
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decision by imposing civil liability on those who perform medical treatment without 
consent, although the treatment may be beneficial or even necessary to preserve the 
patient's life (…) The current law identifies the patient's right to determine the course 
of his own medical treatment as paramount (…)148 
Naturally, the capacity of the individual is critical to her ability to exercise this right. Rivers v 
Katz demonstrates the approach of the highest New York court when the competence of the 
adult is called into question.149 The respondents in the case, the Harlem Valley Psychiatric 
Center and Commissioner of the New York State Office of Mental Health, argued that the 
plaintiffs, who were involuntarily committed mental patients, are presumptively incompetent 
to make decisions and refuse medication.150 They argued this on the grounds that by virtue of 
ordering involuntary retention, the court has ‘implicitly determined that the patient’s illness 
has so impaired his judgment as to render him incapable of making decisions regarding 
treatment and care’.151 The Court of Appeals of the State of New York unanimously rejected 
this, with Alexander J stating:  
[N]either the fact that appellants are mentally ill nor that they have been involuntarily 
committed (…) constitutes a sufficient basis to conclude that they lack the mental 
capacity to comprehend the consequences of their decision to refuse medication.152 
Thus, Rivers established that in order for treatment to be compelled, a determination of the 
patient’s incompetence must be made by a court.153 The only exception to this general rule 
advanced by the court is if ‘the patient presents a danger to himself or other members of society 
or engages in dangerous or potentially destructive conduct within the institution’.154 Alexander 
J was unequivocal regarding the burden of proof in such cases, stating that the state ‘would 
bear the burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence the patient’s incapacity to 
make a treatment decision’. He continued: 
If, after duly considering the State’s proof, the evidence offered by the patient, and any 
independent psychiatric, psychological or medical evidence that the court may choose 
to procure (…) the court determines that the patient has the capability to make his own 
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If, after hearing the evidence, the court was of the view that the individual was incompetent, 
then it must determine if the treatment in question should to be administered. In order to do so, 
the court must consider the treatment in light of the liberty interest of the patient, her best 
interests and the benefits and side effects associated with the treatment and alternatives.156 
What Rivers did not establish, however, was what would constitute clear and convincing 
evidence of incapacity; in other words, no criteria for determining incapacity was given. Thus, 
a series of Appellate Court decisions appeared ‘to fill the blanks’, so to speak. In Re Harvey U, 
it was held that an individual must be capable of understanding the reality of his condition, 
which extends to its severity and the consequences of refusing treatment.157 Thus, Levine J 
found the individual in this case incompetent because he was ‘incapable of making an 
informed, rational decision on the basis of the risks and benefits of the surgery’ and of 
‘comprehending the seriousness of his condition and the consequences of not having the 
procedure performed’. 158 In short, the court viewed the patient’s lack of ‘any realistic insight 
into the nature of his condition or capability of understanding the risks and benefits of surgery 
or the consequences of his refusal to accept treatment’ as the decisive factor.159 Accordingly, 
evidence that the patient was in denial as to the severity of his condition and his belief that his 
condition would improve without intervention was sufficient to demonstrate incompetence.  
Subsequent cases appear to generally apply the criteria laid out in Re Harvey U; in S v 
Kingsboro Psychiatric Center, denial by a patient suffering from chronic paranoid 
schizophrenia that she needed medication and her belief that her condition was improving 
without treatment was sufficient to find her incompetent.160 A denial that medication was 
required to improve her condition was easily distinguishable from Rivers, in which no evidence 
of alleged incapacity, other than their involuntary admission to a psychiatric facility, was 
provided. Thus, broadly speaking, it can be said that in determining incapacity, the court should 
consider the ability of the individual to understand and accept her condition, including its 
reality and severity and her ability to appreciate the consequences of refusing treatment. 
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It is interesting to note the repeated requirement of ‘rational’ and ‘reasoned’, which is placed 
on healthcare decision-making by the New York courts in comparison with England and Wales 
and Ireland.161 As articulated previously, in Re T, Lord Donaldson stated that the reasons 
behind a particular decision may be ‘rational’, ‘irrational’ or ‘non-existent’.162 The ADM(C)A 
2015 provides that treatment may be refused even if the decision is ‘unwise’ or not grounded 
in ‘sound medical principles’.163 One could argue that the standard in New York equates 
‘rational’ or ‘reasoned’ decision-making with decision-making capacity; this, it is argued, is 
problematic. There are undoubtedly people who view religious beliefs to be lacking in logic or 
rationality, yet medical decision-making based on religious belief has been upheld by the New 
York courts.164 It is questionable if the pursuit of a particular course of action for religious 
reasons is any more rational or logical than for another reason.  
The Family Health Care Decisions Act, pending since 1994 and introduced in 2010, inserted 
Article 29-CC into New York Public Health Law and dictates inter alia how people without 
capacity should be treated and how capacity should be assessed. Somewhat emulating the 
common law position, capacity is defined as ‘the ability to understand and appreciate the nature 
and consequences of proposed health care, including the benefits and risks of and alternatives 
to proposed health care, and to reach an informed decision’.165 What is worthy of note is what 
is not required, namely an ability to reach a ‘rational’ or ‘reasoned’ decision. Despite this, some 
case law post-2010 seems to retain the requirement that the decision be ‘reasoned’, where 
capacity determinations are being made by the court.166  It is worth bearing in mind that such 
judgments are from the mid-level or county courts – as distinct from the Court of Appeal – 
meaning that they may still be bound by the ruling in Rivers. 
Similar to England and Wales and Ireland, the law in New York is that ‘every adult shall be 
presumed to have decision-making capacity unless determined otherwise’.167  In contrast to the 
aforementioned jurisdictions, however, New York law requires both an initial determination of 
incapacity and an independent concurring determination in hospital and residential health care 
facility settings, with both determinations including ‘an assessment of the cause and extent of 
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the patient’s incapacity and the likelihood that the patient will regain decision-making 
capacity’.168 The functional approach to capacity clearly favoured by New York, can also be 
seen in § 2994-c section 5; it states that a determination of incapacity cannot be interpreted to 
mean that the individual lacks capacity for other decisions. Decisions separate to the one for 
which the capacity assessment is being conducted require a confirmation of continued 
incapacity.169 
Section 6 of § 2994-c dictates that if an individual objects to the determination of incapacity, 
her objection should prevail unless a court has determined that the patient lacks capacity.170 
This is interesting, as it places a clear burden on the physician to get a declaration of incapacity, 
rather than exercising his judgment that the patient is incompetent and treating accordingly. 
Furthermore, section 6 states that should an individual disagree with the healthcare decision 
made on her behalf by a medical professional in accordance with § 2994-g, the decision of the 
individual should prevail unless a court declares her incompetent and authorises the treatment, 
or there exists another legal basis for overriding her decision.171 § 2994-g allow inter alia 
specified medical professionals172 to make routine decisions on behalf of incompetent patients 
where there is no surrogate decision-maker. These sections also allow major medical decisions 
to be made for a patient if the specified professional consults with the hospital staff involved 
in the patient’s care and another relevant medical professional concurs that the course of action 
is appropriate.  
Section 4 of § 2994-d dictates that medical professionals must treat the incompetent patient in 
accordance with her wishes, including religious and moral beliefs. Where those wishes and 
beliefs are not ascertainable, then the appropriate decision-making standard is ‘best 
interests’.173 Thus, New York and Ireland appear broadly in line on this point, with England 
and Wales occupying a different position, at least in theory.174 While wishes and religious 
beliefs often form part of an evaluation of patient ‘best interests’ in England and Wales, it 
appears that if known or ascertainable, wishes and beliefs are the only pertinent factor in 
decision-making in New York. Interestingly, however, ‘best interests’ is the applicable 
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standard in New York for healthcare decisions made by guardians on behalf of persons with 
long term incapacity, in other words those who never had decision-making capacity.175 For 
previously competent individuals, an assessment of ‘best interests’ only seems relevant if the 
wishes and beliefs of that individual, when competent, are unclear or incapable of 
determination.176 For what constitutes ‘best interests’ in the context of medical treatment, one 
can also look to § 2994-d: 
An assessment of the patient’s best interests shall include: consideration of the dignity 
and uniqueness of every person; the possibility and extent of preserving the patient’s 
life; the preservation, improvement or restoration of the patient’s health or 
functioning; the relief of the patient’s suffering; and any medical condition and such 
other concerns and values as a reasonable person in the patient’s circumstances would 
wish to consider.177 
Decision-Making Capacity in Pregnancy  
Where capacity is concerned, one could not be faulted for thinking that the situation of pregnant 
women should be no different to a non-pregnant individual. In general, however, disputes as to 
capacity frequently arise in pregnancy, particularly in labour, as will be evidenced by the 
following English cases. In Rochdale NHS v C, Ms C wished to refuse a Caesarean section 
having undergone one previously.178 As expressed during the emergency hearing, the view of 
the court was that the ‘throes of labour with all that is involved in terms of pain and emotional 
stress’ was sufficient to render Ms C incompetent to refuse.179 Critically, this was despite the 
fact that her obstetrician considered her to have decision-making capacity, an opinion not 
contradicted by a mental health professional.180 This factor is particularly noteworthy; the basis 
for compelled obstetric interventions is generally medical opinion, in other words, the 
obstetrician believes that without intervention, the foetus and / or the woman will be (fatally) 
harmed, or similar formulation.181 In this instance, the judge appears to simultaneously 
disregard medical opinion and enforce treatment on the basis of it. One could certainly question 
this rationale and indeed, as stated in Re MB: 
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One may question whether there was evidence before the court which enabled the judge 
to come to a conclusion contrary to the opinion of the obstetrician that she was 
competent. Nonetheless he made the declarations sought.182 
In assessing her competence, Johnson J concluded: 
[A] patient who could, in those circumstances [the pain and emotional stress associated 
with the throes of labour] speak in terms which seemed to accept the inevitability of her 
own death, was not a patient who was able properly to weigh-up the considerations (…) 
so as to make any valid decision.183 
A clear interpretation of this statement is that the learned judge concluded that a patient, who 
accepted that death may be a consequence of refusal, was not competent to refuse. Shaun 
Pattinson remarks that her ‘willingness to accept her own death over another caesarean was not 
regarded as evidence of the firmness and sincerity of her views, but of her failure to be able to 
weigh up the relevant considerations’.184 Furthermore, Samantha Halliday argues: 
If C was competent, and there was no evidence to suggest that she was not, her best 
interests were irrelevant and she was entitled to refuse (…) and to expect that refusal to 
be respected (…) There was no threat to her own life, but there was a threat to the foetus 
and so she was deemed to be incapable of weighing the information given to her on the 
basis of the reason she gave for refusing treatment (‘I’d rather die’) and because of the 
context in which she made the decision (during labour).185 
The judgment certainly seems to go against the earlier jurisprudence; Lord Donaldson states in 
Re T that the right to refuse must be respected ‘even if a refusal may risk permanent injury (…) 
or even lead to premature death’.186 Though Re MB occurred after Rochdale, it is also worth 
contrasting the judgment with the statement of Butler-Sloss LJ regarding understanding the 
information material to the decision, namely that one must comprehend information ‘especially 
as to the likely consequences of having or not having the treatment in question’.187 Arguably, 
it was a ‘no win’ situation for Ms C; her willingness to accept her death demonstrated 
incompetence, however, so too would any denial of or an unwillingness to accept that death 
was a consequence of her decision. Arguably, she was going to be found incompetent either 
way. Had she not accepted the consequences of her decision, she would most likely have been 
found incompetent on the basis that she did not understand or believe the information.188 As 
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an aside, Ms C changed her mind and did consent to the Caesarean, once again calling the 
finding of incapacity into question.189  
Norfolk and Norwich Healthcare (NHS) Trust v W presents somewhat of a confusing picture.190 
In that case, Johnson J commented that the ‘acute emotional stress and physical pain in the 
ordinary course of labour’ were exacerbated by the patient’s history of psychiatric history.191 
What is unclear, however, is whether this stress and pain rendered Ms W incompetent to refuse, 
or if there was another factor that eroded her capacity. This is because her incompetence is not 
attributed to anything in particular and certainly not labour. Perhaps a feature of an emergency 
hearing, but very little analysis was given to decision-making capacity; the psychiatrist opined 
that Ms W could not weigh up the considerations involved in the decision, however the basis 
for this conclusion was not explained. While the patient did deny she was pregnant despite 
being in labour – which could indicate incapacity in line with the Re C test –192 the psychiatrist 
could not state that her denial was due to a lack of understanding on her part. Therefore, a 
question remains as to what the ‘acute emotional stress and physical pain in the ordinary course 
of labour’ actually had to do with Ms W’s capacity. Assuming that it had nothing to do with 
her incompetence, then the reference in the judgment is inappropriate. If it was directly relevant 
to her incapacity, then it is argued that it could set quite a dangerous precedent regarding fairly 
routine occurrences in labour. 
Even Re T, which is lauded as one of the strongest vindications of the right of a competent 
person to refuse treatment, leaves uncertainty where the competence of a pregnant woman is 
to be assessed. Lord Donaldson stated that capacity to refuse is a rebuttable presumption and 
opined an otherwise competent individual could lose capacity when encountering the ‘effects 
of shock, severe fatigue, pain or drugs being used in their treatment’.193 Although the capacity 
of a pregnant woman has not been at issue in the Irish courts, a similar conclusion was reached 
by Laffoy J in Fitzpatrick v FK.194 The learned judge included ‘the effects of fatigue, stress, 
pain or drugs’ in the list of temporary factors, which may affect capacity.195 This position is 
echoed in the National Consent Policy with section 5.2 stating that individuals ‘may be able to 
make decisions at certain times but not at other times, because of (…) factors such as confusion, 
panic, shock, fatigue, pain or medication temporarily affect their ability to understand, retain 
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or weigh up information, or communicate their wishes’. Though such factors are not exclusive 
to labour, in that they can affect patients in a range of situations, they are very often present 
during in labour.      
In Re MB, a severe needle phobia was grounds to find the woman incompetent, as it rendered 
her ‘incapable of making a decision’.196 The woman in question consented to the Caesarean 
section a number of times but revoked consent once it came time to administer the anaesthetic. 
This coupled with the fact that there was no indication that she did not want her baby to be 
born, or that she wished to accept the risk to her foetus of not undergoing surgery, led to the 
conclusion that she could not consent by virtue of being paralysed by fear. In some sense, one 
can distinguish this from a situation where there is a clear attempt to circumvent the will of the 
woman, particularly in view of the strong pronouncements made as to the right of a competent 
pregnant woman to refuse.197 With that said, the reference by Bulter-Sloss LJ to the ability of 
Lord Donaldson’s ‘temporary factors’ in Re T – confusion, shock, fatigue, pain or drugs – to 
completely erode capacity is noteworthy, despite the higher bar set by her statement that such 
factors must be ‘operating to such a degree that the ability to decide is absent’.198 Re L had a 
similar fact pattern, in that the woman had a severe needle phobia, which resulted in her being 
judged incompetent.199 
A curious spin on the traditional compelled treatment situation can be found in Bolton 
Hospitals NHS Trust v O.200 Post-traumatic stress disorder, which manifested as 
‘overwhelming psychological fear and anxiety’ when it came time to undergo the Caesarean 
section was considered sufficient to find Ms O incompetent. It was accepted that she had 
decision-making capacity the majority of the time, however, her PTSD rendered her 
incompetent at the crucial moment. What is certainly noteworthy about Bolton is that Ms O did 
not oppose the order, rather it appeared that she was in favour of it. What Ms O almost appeared 
to seek was a kind of advance consent to treatment, which, like any other advance decision, 
would apply when she lost capacity in the future, irrespective of any behaviour on her part that 
could be considered contrary to it.201 
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Perhaps Murray sums up the difficulty with the current law best: 
The pain of labour is very real, but not necessarily incapacitating. Women in labour are 
both powerful and vulnerable. Because pregnancy and labour occupy a space like no 
other, when we consider the pregnant woman in labour, she may not always sit clearly 
within one or other side of the binaries which underpin the legal framework for consent 
(...) [B]ecause we are familiar with the existing binary model of consent it is difficult 
to concede that pain or pressure might have an impact on decision-making because to 
do so feels like defeat and appears to be accepting that pregnant women in labour are 
less autonomous than other subjects.202 
 
Thus, the challenge going forward for women is that precedent dictates that their competence 
may be called into question because of some very routine occurrences within labour, such as 
stress or pain. This is despite the strong pronouncement from Lady Hale in Montgomery that 
‘[g]one are the days when it was thought that, on becoming pregnant, a woman lost, not only 
her capacity, but also her right to act as a genuinely autonomous human being’.203 Either way, 
questions as to capacity are unlikely to arise in practice unless the woman wishes to go against 
medical advice and refuse intervention, irrespective of whether she has a general right to refuse 
in pregnancy. In New York, the additional persistence of the equation of ‘rational’ or 
‘reasoned’ with competence could indicate that the capacity of a woman refusing intervention 
in labour may be doubted by the courts. Perhaps then, the best way to ensure that a firm refusal 
will be honoured in labour is to have an advance directive to that effect; as will be discussed in 
Chapter 6, however, that may not be as straight forward as it appears.204 
Information Disclosure 
As was stated early in the introduction, in order for consent to or refusal to be valid it must be 
voluntarily given by a person with capacity after her or she has been informed as to what the 
treatment involves. At the outset, it may seem unusual to dedicate time to discussing 
information disclosure in a thesis primarily focused on advance refusals, however, the rules 
surrounding informed consent are important in this context. Primarily, this is because in 
Chapter 5, some of the arguments against advance directives are that individuals are 
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insufficiently informed when drafting them, meaning they acquire a ‘lower’ standard than 
contemporaneous refusal. This argument will be challenged at that point, however, before 
doing so, it is necessary to understand how the law operates in relation to information 
disclosure. What constitutes ‘informed’ for the purpose of giving or refusing consent to medical 
treatment is certainly a matter of debate. The Honourable Mr Justice Kirby, writing 
extrajudicially, provided an astute explanation:  
An informed consent is that consent which is obtained after the patient has been 
adequately instructed about the ratio of risk and benefit involved in the procedure as 
compared to alternative procedures or no treatment at all.205 
Even this explanation still leaves questions, primarily as to the meaning of ‘adequate’. As will 
be evident from this chapter, there have been challenges in answering this very question in 
Ireland and elsewhere. Despite these challenges, what does not appear to vary within or 
between the chosen jurisdictions is the extent of the requirement to provide information in 
pregnancy. In other words, there is no indication that a physician has less of a duty to disclose 
information in pregnancy than at any other time. 
Before progressing to the law on information disclosure in Ireland, it is worth making a note 
on summary judgments, which are often the type of judgments in jurisprudence from New 
York. Such judgments result in the defendant having ‘the initial burden of establishing that he 
or she did not depart from good and accepted practice, or if there was such a departure, that it 
was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries’ as distinct from the plaintiff bearing the 
burden of proof in a typical trial.206 These judgments often merely require that the plaintiff has 
a prima facie case, thus the defendant will not discharge his burden unless he demonstrates that 
he did not depart from accepted practice. Anything less will have the effect of a summary 
judgment denied to the defendant or in favour of the plaintiff.207 The effect of this is that the 
analysis coming from New York does not appear to be quite as detailed as that found in the 
cases coming from Ireland and England and Wales; naturally, if summary judgment is granted 
in favour of the plaintiff, settling rather than going to full trial would be preferable for the 
defendant. If granted in favour of the defendant, it may be preferable for the plaintiff not to 
pursue the action. 
Ireland 
 
205 Michael D Kirby, ‘Informed consent: what does it mean?’ (1983) 9 J Med Ethics 69. 
206 Dyckes v Stabile 153 AD 3d 783 (NY 2017) 784. 
207 This includes where conflicting evidence is produced as to whether the defendant(s) adhered to good or accepted practice. See Feinberg v 
Feit 23 AD 3d 517 (2005); Kovacic v Griffin 170 AD 3d 1143 (2019). 
In order to accurately trace the approach of the Irish courts to establishing the standard of care 
applicable to risk disclosure, one must start with examining the standard of care in cases of 
general medical negligence. The seminal Irish case in this regard is Dunne v National Maternity 
Hospital, wherein the Supreme Court favoured the ‘professional standard’. 208 In his judgment, 
Finlay CJ applied O’Donovan v Cork County Council209 and Daniels v Heskin210 holding: 
The true test for establishing negligence (…) on the part of a medical practitioner is 
whether he has been proved to be guilty of such failure as no medical practitioner of 
equal specialist or general status and skill would be guilty of if acting with ordinary 
care. If the allegation of negligence (…) is based on proof that he deviated from a 
general and approved practice, that will not establish negligence unless it is also proved 
that the course he did take was one which no medical practitioner of like specialisation 
and skill would have followed (…)211 
He further clarified that ‘an honest difference of opinion between doctors as to which is the 
better of two ways of treating a patient’ does not satisfy the criteria for negligence, thus the act 
of choosing the option that led to the unfortunate consequence alone, does make the medical 
practitioner negligent.212 It is worth noting however, that the learned judge stopped short of 
applying the Bolam test completely.213 He opined: 
If a medical practitioner charged with negligence defends his conduct by establishing 
that he followed a practice which was general, and which was approved of by his 
colleagues of similar specialisation and skill, he cannot escape liability if in reply the 
plaintiff establishes that such practice has inherent defects which ought to be obvious 
to any person giving the matter due consideration.214 
Thus, while a high burden of proof lies with the plaintiff, the Supreme Court was of the opinion 
that the required standard would not be met by the practitioner if he employed a practice, which 
would be considered patently defective on reflection.215 Accordingly, it can be seen that the 
standard of care for general negligence in Ireland is the ‘professional standard’ – also known 
as the ‘reasonable doctor’ test – and the plaintiff, in order to succeed in an action, must 
demonstrate that the defendant, by action or inaction, either failed to adhere to generally 
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accepted practice, or that the generally accepted practice within the medical community to 
which he adhered, is so flawed as to be obvious, were it given sufficient thought. 
It was not always clear how the Irish courts approached the standard of disclosure, that is, the 
information that must be given by the medical professional in order to ensure valid consent. 
There is a limited amount of early case law in Ireland which addressed the issue of risk 
disclosure; the 1954 Supreme Court decision in Daniels v Heskin considered whether the 
defendant owed a duty to disclose to a plaintiff that a broken part of a needle had been left in 
her body during stitching after childbirth.216 In this instance, the majority of the court found 
that there was no duty to disclose, however, as Deirdre Madden notes, the judgment is of 
‘limited value’ and was rarely referred to by the courts in subsequent cases.217 In any event, 
one could opine that this matter would be decided quite differently over 60 years on for a 
variety of reasons, most notably the advancement of the rights of women and patients in 
Ireland.218 
The first case in Ireland to give any real consideration to the question of ‘how much is enough’ 
in the context of risk disclosure, was that of Walsh v Family Planning Services.219 The plaintiff 
elected to have a vasectomy for contraceptive purposes and encountered a number of post-
operative issues, including severe pain and impotence, eventually culminating in the removal 
of one of his testicles. He subsequently brought an action against the defendants for negligence 
and assault. Although the Supreme Court found in favour of the defendants by a margin of 3:2, 
there was considerable disagreement amongst the judges as to the appropriate standard of care 
and whether it had been reached in this instance. Finlay CJ endorsed the professional standard 
approach applied in Dunne; 
I am satisfied (…) that the standard of care to be exercised by a medical practitioner in 
the giving of the warning of the consequences of proposed surgical procedures is not in 
principle any different from the standard of care to be exercised by medical practitioners 
in the giving of treatment or advice, and that there are not good grounds for suggesting 
that the issue of negligence arising under this heading is outside the general principles 
which have been enunciated by this Court (…)220 
 
216 Daniels v Heskin [1954] IR 73. 
217 Deirdre Madden, Medicine, Ethics and the Law (3rd edn, Bloomsbury Professional 2016) 462; she argues that the judgment by Lavery J 
that there is a duty to disclose risks where a ‘dangerous operation’ is concerned isn’t particularly useful as there is no clarity as to what a 
‘dangerous operation’ means.  It is worth noting however, that the dissenting judgment of Maguire CJ and the judgments of Lavery J and 
Kingsmill Moore J in Daniels v Heskin are referred to by McCarthy J in Walsh v Family Planning Services [1992] 1 IR 496. 
218 In light of the ‘Cervical Check controversy’ in 2018, for example, questions still persist as to whether there is full commitment within the 
Health Service Executive to making disclosures to patients. The ‘Cervical Check controversy’ refers to the failure of the Health Service 
Executive to inform women who had been diagnosed with cervical cancer of the findings of an audit, which revealed that the women had 
received incorrect results of earlier smear tests. See also Morrissey v Health Service Executive [2020] IESC 6 and the CervicalCheck Tribunal 
Act 2019. 
219 Walsh v Family Planning Services [1992] 1 IR 496. 
220 ibid 510. 
With that said, the learned judge did note that the standard of disclosure related to an elective 
procedure may be higher than the standard for a necessary one.221 Although McCarthy J refers 
to a ‘prudent medical doctor’ during his judgment, he adopts a patient-centred approach: 
In determining whether or not to have an operation (…) it seems to me that to supply 
the patient with the material facts is so obviously necessary to an informed choice on 
the part of the patient that no reasonably prudent medical doctor would fail to make it 
(…) This is not a question of merely determining that a particular outcome is so rare as 
not to warrant such disclosure that might upset a patient but, rather, that those concerned 
(…) if they knew of such a risk, however remote, had a duty to inform those so critically 
concerned with that risk (…) In my view it is inescapable that the defendants…were in 
breach of their duty to the plaintiff (…) for failing to identify the risk of impotence 
(…)222 
O’Flaherty J, endorsing the approach taken by the Supreme Court of Canada and remarking on 
the elective nature of the procedure in question, stated: 
[W]here there is a question of elective surgery (…), if there is a risk – however 
exceptional or remote – of grave consequences involving severe pain stretching for an 
appreciable time into the future and involving the possibility of further operative 
procedures, the exercise of the duty of care owed by the defendants requires that such 
possible consequences should be explained in the clearest language to the plaintiff.223  
Although lack of clarity as to the appropriate approach to information disclosure endured post-
Walsh, there was general agreement that there existed a requirement on a medical practitioner 
to give a warning of any material risk of a ‘known complication’ of a procedure.  
It is worth noting that an attribution of a higher standard of disclosure to elective procedures is 
not without criticism. Margaret Brazier argues that distinguishing between therapeutic and non-
therapeutic procedures, however ‘well-intentioned and designed to promote patient autonomy, 
is fraught with difficulty and uncertainty’.224 She further opines:  
Female sterilisation is itself a prime example of where drawing the line will be nigh on 
impossible in many cases. If a woman of 37 requests sterilisation after giving birth 
without complications to two healthy babies, will surgery on her be classified as 
therapeutic because of the increasing risk to mother and baby of pregnancy at that age 
(…) [or] (…) a convenient means of contraception and so non-therapeutic? Will the test 
be whether the initiative comes from the woman wanting no more children or the doctor 
judging that she should have no more children?225 
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Arguably, there are many procedures which could qualify as elective or non-elective, 
depending on the circumstances of the patient in question. Rhinoplasty is most commonly 
known as a cosmetic surgery procedure, however, it is also an appropriate surgical treatment 
for certain conditions such as vestibular stenosis.226 Amongst other symptoms, this condition 
often affects the appearance of the nose, thus there may be both medical and cosmetic reasons 
for the choice. In that instance, consideration of the patient’s motivation for having the 
treatment would be required in order to ascertain if the lower or higher standard of disclosure 
was required.227 It could certainly be suggested that the imposition of a requirement on 
physicians to thoroughly examine the motives of patient prior to treatment would constitute an 
undue burden, or at the least be considered somewhat arduous. 
It is also interesting to note the discrepancy within Irish law as to the meaning of ‘elective’. In 
Walsh, O’Flaherty J considered an elective procedure to be one which was ‘not essential to 
health or bodily well-being’. McCarthy J, however, defined it as: 
All surgery, in a sense, is elective although the election may have to be implied from 
the circumstances rather than determined as express. The gravely wounded, the gravely 
ill may be unconscious but in urgent need of surgery. A patient’s condition may be such 
as to demand surgical intervention as the only hope for survival. Such may be called 
non-elective surgery. The patient given the choice between enduring pain and having 
limb replacement surgery or fusion surgery may technically be electing as between the 
pain and the surgery but the election may be more apparent than real. An extreme of 
elective surgery would be what is purely cosmetic - simply to improve the natural 
appearance rather than to remedy the physical results of injury or disease.228 
In Bolton v Blackrock Clinic & Others, Hamilton CJ considered the treatment at the centre of 
the case to be elective ‘in the sense that it was a matter for the Appellant to decide whether or 
not she would undergo such an operation and to give or withhold her consent thereto’.229 Such 
an understanding of elective seems to mean that any treatment to which an individual freely 
consents is elective, even if that treatment is necessary for health or well-being. Arguably, this 
could suggest that anything other than emergency treatment is elective. Perhaps, it is worth 
stating that the lack of agreement as to what constitutes ‘elective’ lends further weight to the 
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criticism of the law distinguishing between it and essential treatment for the purposes of 
determining the relevant standard of care.230 
The uncertainty regarding the standard of disclosure required to produce informed consent 
continued for the best part of a decade, with the cases of Farrell v Varian231 and Bolton.232 The 
question of the appropriate standard of disclosure was laid to rest in Geoghegan v Harris, 
wherein Kearns J sharply departed from the professional standard.233 In applying the decision 
in Walsh, he held that there was an obligation to warn the patient of the remote risk of 
neuropathic pain, despite the fact that the medical experts were of the opinion that no warning 
was necessary.234 In advocating for the reasonable patient test, the learned judge stated: 
This approach, at the other end of the spectrum, concentrates on the patient’s right to 
determine what is to be done to his body. It requires full disclosure of all material risks 
incident to the proposed treatment, so that the patient, thus informed, rather than the 
doctor, makes the real choice as to whether treatment is to be carried out.235 
It could perhaps be discerned from this judgment that the self-determination of the patient and 
her right to bodily integrity rest on her knowledge of all material risks. Without those, her 
interests are compromised. The learned judge further expands his judgment to profess that the 
appropriate test to assess if the standard of disclosure has been met is the reasonable patient 
test: 
The application of the reasonable patient test seems more logical in respect of 
disclosure. This would establish the proposition that (…) the patient has the right to 
know and the practitioner a duty to advise of all material risks associated with a 
proposed form of treatment (…) ‘Materiality’ includes consideration of both (a) the 
severity of the consequences and (b) statistical frequency of the risk (…) Each case it 
seems to me should be considered in the light of its own particular facts, evidence and 
circumstances to see if the reasonable patient in the Plaintiff’s position would have 
required a warning of the particular risk.236 
The departure of the Irish Courts from the ‘professional standard’ approach was stated more 
vehemently by Kearns J in the case of Fitzpatrick v White: 
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I am thus fortified to express, in rather more vigorous terms than I did in Geoghegan v. 
Harris (…) my view that the patient centred test is preferable, and ultimately more 
satisfactory from the point of view of both doctor and patient alike, than any ‘doctor 
centred’ approach favoured by part of this Court in Walsh v. Family Planning 
Services.237 
In assessing the materiality, the Court was of the opinion that ‘a risk may be seen as material 
if, in the circumstances (…) a reasonable person in the patient’s position, if warned of the risk, 
would be likely to attach significance to it’.238 The question of the ‘validity’ of the risk 
disclosure arose due to the somewhat unusual progression of this case; in the High Court, the 
plaintiff claimed that he had not been warned of the material risk arising from eye surgery  
muscle slippage causing diplopia – and made his unsuccessful negligence claim on that basis. 
In the Supreme Court, the plaintiff accepted that he had been warned of the risk but argued that 
the timing of the warning rendered it invalid. This contention was based on the undisputed fact 
that the conversation between the plaintiff and his surgeon took place a mere 30 minutes before 
he was due to undergo surgery. Kearns J rejected the argument that the warning was invalid on 
the basis that there was no clear evidence that the plaintiff was actually disadvantaged by the 
lateness of the warning.239 
Therefore, the current law in Ireland is that information disclosure is to be approached from 
the perspective of the reasonable patient. As with any action in negligence, however, the 
plaintiff must also prove that had she known of the risk, she would not have undergone 
treatment, in other words causation. In order to be successful, the medical practitioner must fail 
to advise the plaintiff of a material risk associated with a proposed treatment and that risk must 
materialise. With that said, the National Consent Policy appears to endorse a more subjective 
approach to information disclosure. For example, according to the NPC, the volume of 
information that a patient will want and require varies ‘depending on their individual 
circumstances’; thus, discussions should be tailored insofar as possible according to ‘[t]heir 
needs, wishes and priorities, [t]heir level of knowledge about, and understanding of, their 
condition, prognosis and the treatment options, [t]heir ability to understand the information 
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provided/language used and [t]he nature of their condition’.240 Furthermore, the ‘amount of 
information about risk that staff should share (…) will depend on the individual (…) and what 
they want or need to know’.241 Therefore, ‘common, even if minor, side effects should be 
disclosed as should rare but serious adverse outcomes’.242 
Again, this appears to advocate for a more subjective approach towards information disclosure. 
Thus, it will be interesting to see how the apparently more onerous requirements contained in 
the NPC affect future court judgments on information disclosure, particularly in view of the 
recent legal shift in England and Wales, which will be discussed in the next section. The 
Medical Council also provides an extensive list of information that a patient may want or 
‘should know’ before they make a decision regarding a particular treatment.243 Interestingly, 
aside from fairly typical information such as the diagnosis and prognosis and treatment options, 
this list also includes ‘details of the procedures or therapies involved, including methods of 
pain relief’, ‘any lifestyle changes which may be caused or required by the treatment for each 
option’ and ‘a reminder that patients can change their minds (…) at any time’.244  
While there is no case that considers information disclosure specific to pregnancy, one can 
again look to the NPC for guidance on that particular issue. Should such a case arise, one can 
reasonably assume that a court would consider it to be quite persuasive. Section 3.5 provides 
that pregnant patients must receive ‘sufficient information in a manner that is comprehensible 
to them about the nature, purpose, benefits and risks of an intervention or lack thereof on their 
health and life’.  It also states: 
Service users who are pregnant will need to receive sufficient information about the 
benefits and risks of an intervention or lack thereof on the viability and health of a 
foetus (...) They will also need sufficient information on the benefits and risks of an 
intervention or failure to intervene on the viability and health of the child that will be 
delivered.245 
Thus, no lower standard of information disclosure is warranted where the patient is pregnant. 
By contrast, when read in conjunction with the previous sections, there are additional 
requirements where the patient is pregnant. Not only must she receive sufficient information 
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relating to the risks and benefits of the various interventions and of no intervention as they 
relate to her health but also as they relate to the foetus and the child, if born.   
England and Wales 
The approach of our ‘nearest neighbour’ to the standard of disclosure has been more complex 
and meandering than Ireland’s. The first English case of real significance in this area was that 
of Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee.246 In this case, the plaintiff was being 
voluntarily treated for depression and when undergoing electro-convulsive therapy (ECT)247 
without a muscle relaxant, suffered a fractured pelvis amongst other injuries. Mr Bolam alleged 
inter alia that the hospital was negligent in not properly informing him of the risks of the 
treatment.248 In directing the jury, McNair J stated that the issue before them was to consider 
if the practice employed by the doctor of ‘saying very little and waiting for questions from the 
patient’ had fallen below ‘a proper standard of competent professional opinion on this question 
of whether or not it is right to warn’.249 Thus, the Bolam test was born.  
Almost 30 years later, the House of Lords considered the relevance of the Bolam test in the 
case of Sidaway v Board of Governors of Bethlem Royal Hospital, which solely assessed the 
standard of risk disclosure for informed consent.250 A known risk of the surgery estimated to 
be at 1% materialised and Mrs Sidaway was left severely disabled. The majority of the bench 
held that a modified Bolam test was appropriate for risk disclosure cases, however, there was 
a complete lack of clarity as to how the test should be formulated. For example, Lord Bridge 
advocated for a seemingly modified Bolam test; this dictated that disclosure was predominantly 
a matter of clinical judgment, but in certain circumstances the courts may decide that a risk 
should have been disclosed, despite a body of responsible medical opinion indicating 
otherwise.251 He opined that where there was a ‘substantial risk of grave adverse 
consequences’, the court may find that a doctor owed a duty to disclose.252 Lord Templeman 
was of the view that a doctor should make a patient aware of dangers which are ‘special in kind 
 
246 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582. 
247 ECT is the passing of small electric currents through the brain to intentionally trigger a brief seizure, while the patient is under general 
anaesthetic. It is thought that ECT causes changes in brain chemistry, which can reverse the symptoms of certain mental illnesses. 
248 He also contended that the hospital has been negligent in not administering muscle relaxants and for failing to restrain him. 
249 [1957] 1 WLR 582, 590. 
250 Sidaway v Board of Governors of Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] 1 All ER 643. 
251 [1985] 1 All ER 643, 663: ‘[E]ven in a case where (…) no expert witness in the relevant medical field condemns the non-disclosure as 
being in conflict with accepted and responsible medical practice, I am of opinion that the judge might (…) come to the conclusion that 
disclosure of a particular risk was so obviously necessary to an informed choice on the part of the patient that no reasonably prudent medical 
man would fail to make it.’ 
252 He cited a 10% risk of stroke, as was the case in the Canadian case of Reibl v Hughes (1980) 114 DLR (3d) 1. One could view the choice 
of case by the learned Law Lord as somewhat ironic, given that the Supreme Court of Canada in Reibl endorsed the reasonable patient test. 
or magnitude or special to the patient’. As a consequence of the lack of clarity, the judgment 
garnered widespread criticism and has been described by Rachael Mulheron as ‘possibly the 
most confusing and unsatisfactory House of Lords decision in recent history’.253 Subsequent 
cases did little to clarify matters; the Court of Appeal in the case of Gold v Haringey Health 
Authority applied the Bolam test, as it was of the view that the Court in Sidaway had done the 
same.254 Furthermore, the distinction between elective and non-elective procedures was held 
to be incorrect and that the principle laid down in Bolam was the correct interpretation of the 
law.  
Arguably, cases in the late 1990s and early 2000s, such as Bolitho, Pearce and Wyatt, 
demonstrated a slow shift away from the classic paternalistic approach, a sort of gradual 
encroachment on the professional standard.255 Bolitho, though concerning general negligence 
as opposed to informed consent, established that the action of a medical professional must also 
be logically supportable in addition to being accepted practice.256 Though the Irish case of 
Dunne was not referenced in Bolitho, Lord Brown-Wilkinson appeared to approach his 
judgment in a similar fashion to Chief Justice Finlay, in that the court reserves the right to find 
that a medical professional has breached the standard of care in circumstances where the 
generally accepted practice fails to stand up to logical scrutiny.257 The judgment in Pearce 
exhibits somewhat of a contradiction; on the one hand Lord Woolf refers to a ‘significant risk 
which would affect the judgement of a reasonable patient’, implying that the significance of a 
risk should be assessed from the perspective of the reasonable patient.258 Later in the judgment, 
however, Lord Woolf defers to the opinion of the medical community as to the significance of 
the particular risk, in this case, stillbirth.259 As Jackson points out, however, given the trauma 
associated with a stillbirth, it is fair to say that many women in Ms Pearce’s situation would 
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have wanted to be informed of such a risk and would likely attach significance to it.260 The 
view of Lord Sedley in the Court of Appeal judgment in Wyatt was that the opinion of the 
patient as to the seriousness of a risk was relevant, thus an assessment of the gravity of a risk 
should be from that standpoint.261 It is unsurprising, therefore, that there was considerable 
ambiguity as to whether a particular risk would be assessed from the perspective of the patient 
or the doctor in a given case, with later cases doing little to clarify that matter.262  
Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board settled the near 40 year old question of whom, doctor 
or patient, should assess the significance of a particular risk, the court finding the latter to be 
the appropriate judge.263 As Montgomery concerned the failure of an obstetrician to inform Mrs 
Montgomery of the risk of her baby having shoulder dystocia264 – a condition suffered by 9-
10% of babies whose mothers suffer from diabetes – the case highlighted the issue of 
information disclosure through the lens of pregnancy and labour. If present, the condition 
carries numerous risks to the baby, including a broken shoulder, an avulsion of the brachial 
plexus,265 cerebral palsy and death, with the latter two arising from the umbilical cord 
becoming trapped against the pelvis causing the baby to suffer from prolonged hypoxia. 
Naturally, it also poses risks to the woman. Mrs Montgomery argued inter alia that, as an 
insulin dependent diabetic of small stature who had expressed concern about her ability to 
deliver vaginally, she should have been advised of the risk of her baby having shoulder dystocia 
and presented with the alternative, namely Caesarean section.  Both the Outer House and the 
Inner House of the Court of Session in Scotland found in favour of the defender, finding that 
Dr McLellan – and consequently the Lanarkshire Health Board – owed no duty to disclose the 
particular risk to the pursuer. Mrs Montgomery appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of 
the United Kingdom – meaning the judgment applies in both Scotland and England and Wales 
– where her claim was upheld. Lord Kerr and Lord Reed rejected the majority view in 
Sidaway opining:  
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[T]he analysis of the law by the majority in Sidaway is unsatisfactory, in so far as it 
treated the doctor’s duty to advise her patient of the risks of proposed treatment as 
falling within the scope of the Bolam test, subject to two qualifications of that general 
principle, neither of which is fundamentally consistent with that test.266  
While arguably a considerable shift from a legal standpoint, some commentators argue that 
Montgomery merely cemented a position that had been adopted in practice for some time.267 
Mark Campbell observes that the hesitance of the lower courts to continue applying Bolam to 
cases concerning information disclosure combined with the reasonable patient test being 
utilised in the majority of common law countries made the decision in Montgomery an almost 
fait accompli.268 In further distancing itself from the judgment in Sidaway, the Court remarked 
that it was ‘unsurprising that courts have found difficulty in the subsequent application 
of Sidaway, and that the courts (…) have in reality departed from it’.269 In fully endorsing 
patient-centred standard, they stated: 
An adult person of sound mind is entitled to decide which, if any, of the available forms 
of treatment to undergo, and her consent must be obtained before treatment (...) The 
doctor is therefore under a duty to take reasonable care to ensure that the patient is 
aware of any material risks involved (…) and of any reasonable alternative or variant 
treatments. The test of materiality is whether, in the circumstances of the particular 
case, a reasonable person in the patient’s position would be likely to attach significance 
to the risk, or the doctor is or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient 
would be likely to attach significance to it.270 
In rejecting the approach taken by the Court of Session, the Supreme Court found that the focus 
on the relatively small risk that the baby might suffer a grave injury, as distinct from the 
substantial risk of shoulder dystocia from which the more serious consequences flowed, was 
incorrect. In applying the ‘new’ standard to the facts before them, the judges were of the view 
that the exercise of reasonable care undoubtedly required that the risk of shoulder dystocia be 
disclosed: 
[A]part from the risk of injury to the baby (…) it is apparent (…) that shoulder dystocia 
is itself a major obstetric emergency, requiring procedures which may be traumatic for 
the mother, and involving significant risks to her health. No woman would, for example, 
be likely to face the possibility of a fourth degree tear (…) or a symphysiotomy with 
equanimity. The contrast of the risk involved in an elective caesarean section, for the 
mother extremely small and for the baby virtually non-existent, is stark and illustrates 
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clearly the need for Mrs Montgomery to be advised of the possibility, because of her 
particular circumstances, of shoulder dystocia.271 
The learned Law Lords further stated: 
[T]he ‘therapeutic exception’ is not intended to enable doctors to prevent their patients 
from taking an informed decision. Rather, it is the doctor’s responsibility to explain to 
her patient why she considers that one of the available treatment options is medically 
preferable to the others, having taken care to ensure that her patient is aware of the 
considerations for and against each of them.272 
Emma Cave summarises the effect of the Montgomery judgment as: 
Henceforth, unless patients do not want to be so informed, physicians must discuss the 
risks of treatment and make patients aware of alternatives. Gone is the single 
comprehensive legal standard that applied to both treatment and advice. Montgomery 
separates those aspects of medical decision-making that require expert knowledge (such 
as treatment) and those that do not (such as advice on the risks of treatment and its 
alternatives).273 
Arguably, the ‘pregnancy lens’ is highlighted most clearly in the judgment of Lady Hale, 
wherein she states that pregnancy is a ‘particularly powerful illustration’ of the fact that ‘it is 
not possible to consider a particular medical procedure in isolation from its alternatives’.274 
She continued:  
That is not necessarily to say that the doctors have to volunteer the pros and cons of 
each option [vaginal birth versus Caesarean section] in every case, but they clearly 
should do so in any case where either the mother or the child is at heightened risk from 
a vaginal delivery. In this day and age, we are not only concerned about risks to the 
baby. We are equally, if not more, concerned about risks to the mother. And those 
include the risks associated with giving birth, as well as any after-effects. One of the 
problems in this case was that for too long the focus was on the risks to the baby, 
without also taking into account what the mother might face in the process of giving 
birth.275 
Furthermore, the learned Law Lady was quite critical of Dr McLelland, stating that her limited 
testimony appeared to indicate that she had not made ‘a purely medical judgment’ on the 
desirability of a Caesarean section, but instead seemed to have made ‘a judgment that vaginal 
delivery is in some way morally preferable to a caesarean section’, which justified ‘depriving 
the pregnant woman of the information needed for her to make a free choice in the matter’.276 
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Thus, two things can be drawn from this judgment. First, the Court demonstrated, through the 
judgment of Lady Hale, the importance of information disclosure within pregnancy. Like 
Ireland, pregnancy does not lower the standard of care in information disclosure; if anything, 
increased responsibilities appear to come with it. Second, it condemned the ‘professional 
standard’ to the past, establishing that the legal test for materiality is whether a reasonable 
person in the patient’s position would likely attach significance to the particular risk, or 
critically, whether that particular patient would be likely to attach significance to the risk and 
the doctor is or ought to be aware of that.277 This is arguably an expansion past the ‘reasonable 
patient’ test to encompassing a subjective element, bringing the law on informed consent one 
step closer to maximising patient autonomy and protecting interests in self-determination. 
One step forward and one step back, perhaps; despite its existence, though rare use, in other 
common law countries, the retention of the therapeutic privilege – referred to as ‘therapeutic 
exception’ in Montgomery – has not gone without criticism, or at the very least, comment. For 
example, Cave argues that in comparison to the newly articulated test for materiality, ‘the TE 
has received much less attention, despite its seemingly incongruous place in a judgement that 
professes to adopt a patient-focused position intended to uphold autonomy rights’.278 She goes 
on to argue that therapeutic exception is ‘obfuscatory, unnecessary and unjustified’ given that 
neither of the justifications for its existence are present in England and Wales;279 these 
justifications are where the defence ‘mitigates the effects of a broadly objective test of 
materiality by enabling clinicians in exceptional circumstances to protect the autonomy 
interests of the particular patient’ and where ‘it protects those incapable of an autonomous 
decision from harm’.280 Mulheron contends that following on from Montgomery, ‘the defence 
of “therapeutic privilege” remains as unsettled and obscure as it has ever been in English 
jurisprudence’.281 She argues that not only have neither UK courts, nor other common law 
courts, adequately articulated the elements which underpin therapeutic privilege but also that 
there is a complete lack of clarity as to whether the defence ‘precludes a duty of care from 
arising altogether’ or ‘rebuts a patient's complete cause of action’.282 To have a full theoretical 
and practical discussion about therapeutic privilege is beyond the scope of this research, 
however, it is important to draw attention to the fact that, while England and Wales has adopted 
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a considerably more patient-centred approach in more recent years, it does not follow that it 
has completely abandoned all vestiges of paternalism.  
New York 
Historically, the 1914 case of Schloendorff v New York Hospital, is of critical importance as it 
acknowledged, for the first time, the existence and importance of consent to medical treatment 
in New York.283 In the words of Cardozo J:  
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall 
be done to his body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s  
consent, commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.284  
Logically, it must follow that an individual cannot determine what ‘shall be done with’ her 
body, if she is unaware of what is being proposed to be done to her body.285 Accordingly, she 
must be sufficiently informed. In contrast to Ireland and England and Wales, the standard of 
disclosure in New York State has been governed by statute for more than 40 years. Prior to its 
introduction, however, there appeared to be a tendency within the mid-level appellate courts 
towards the reasonable patient test. In Fogal v Genesee Hospital, it was acknowledged that the 
standard of care in the context of information disclosure had yet to be explored by the New 
York courts.286 Simons J cited the case of Canterbury v Spence with approval:  
We consider the Canterbury rule [the duty and scope of disclosure are not governed by 
the profession’s standards of due care but by the general standard of conduct reasonable 
under all the circumstances] preferable and hold that a doctor is obliged to divulge to 
his patient the risks which singly or in combination, tested by general considerations of 
reasonable disclosure under all the circumstances, will materially affect the patient’s 
decision whether to proceed with the treatment.287 
This approach to information disclosure was also taken in Zeleznik, where Martuscello J stated 
firmly: 
Risk disclosure is based on the patient’s right to determine what shall be done with his 
body (…) Such right should not be at the disposal of the medical community (…) The 
jury should not be bound by the conclusions of the medical community (...) Testimony 
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of a specific medical community standard as to the risks to be divulged is necessarily 
permeated with self-interest in its attempt to state as concrete what is so nebulous.288  
The clear condemnation of the professional standard by members of the judiciary was severely 
tempered by the introduction of the Medical Malpractice Act in 1975. This Act inserted section 
2805-d entitled ‘Limitation of medical malpractice action based on lack of informed consent’ 
into the New York Public Health Law. At that time, the United States was embroiled in a 
‘medical malpractice crisis’ – rapid increases in the number of medical malpractice cases, 
burgeoning cost of malpractice insurance, the reluctance of some insurance companies to 
provide malpractice insurance and substantial compensation being awarded in successful 
lawsuits – and commentators such as Zuckerman et al and Feagels et al argue that the 
legislation was passed as a reaction to this crisis.289 While the impetus for 1975 Act is generally 
discussed in the context of the United States as a whole, there were some distinct ‘New York’ 
reasons for the legislation; in 1974, the Argonaut Insurance Company, which provided 
malpractice insurance to approximately 80 percent of the physicians in New York announced 
it would be increasing its rates by 196.8%, however, before the increase became effective, the 
company announced that it was going to cease malpractice insurance altogether. It is widely 
viewed that faced with the possibility that physicians would simply leave the state and practice 
elsewhere and of severe service disruption, New York opted to legislate.290 
Th approach taken by the Act was way out of step with the common law position as evidenced 
by Fogal and Zeleznik.291 Additionally, the seminal case of Canterbury v Spence had been 
decided a mere 3 years previously, wherein the court clearly advocated for a patient-centred 
approach to risk disclosure and informed consent by stating that ‘the patient’s right of self-
decision shapes the boundaries of the duty to reveal’, a right that could only be ‘effectively 
exercised’ he possesses ‘enough information to enable an intelligent choice’.292 Therefore, the 
court held that ‘the test for determining whether a particular peril must be divulged is its 
materiality to the patient’s decision: all risks potentially affecting the decision must be 
unmasked’.293 
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The contrast is obvious, as lack of informed consent is clearly in line with the professional 
standard defined by the 1975 Act: 
 
[T]he failure of the person providing the professional treatment or diagnosis to disclose 
to the patient such alternatives thereto and the reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits 
involved as a reasonable medical, dental or podiatric practitioner under similar 
circumstances would have disclosed, in a manner permitting the patient to make a 
knowledgeable evaluation.294  
 
Thus, it is evident that full disclosure is not expected by the law; rather it is required that the 
physician discloses the reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits of the treatment and its 
alternatives. Thus, a determination that a physician has discharged his duty will often rest on a 
written record of the discussion with the patient and the relevant information given.295 The 
legislation further limits the ability of patients to recover damages to instances where the lack 
of informed consent relates to non-emergency treatment and diagnostic procedures that involve 
invasion of bodily integrity; thus, where a medical professional fails to properly disclose the 
risks associated with emergency medical treatment, the patient appears to be barred from 
pursuing for alleged lack of informed consent.296 While an action is not prohibited under the 
law in Ireland and England and Wales, a plaintiff is unlikely to succeed owing to the difficulty 
she would face in proving causation. The requirement that the diagnostic procedure involves 
invasion of bodily integrity is said to stem from the origins of the doctrine of informed consent, 
in other words, its root in battery and assault; 297 however, it is worth noting that it excludes 
the possibility of procedures such as mammograms from requiring informed consent, despite 
the risk of injury to the patient.298 
The statute expands further to state available defences; first, if the medical professional 
demonstrates that the risk he failed to disclose is commonly and universally known, then it may 
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warrant not disclosing that risk.299 Second, he may elect not to inform the patient of a particular 
risk if, after considering all of the facts and circumstances, he used reasonable discretion to 
conclude that such a disclosure would be expected to adversely and substantially affect the 
patient’s condition, in other words, therapeutic privilege.300  
 
Thus, despite its shortcomings, it is readily apparent that New York has advocated for the 
‘reasonable doctor’ standard in cases of informed consent for the last 45 years.301 As such, the 
patient will bear the burden of demonstrating that the information – whether volume or type 
thereof – provided by the physician was inconsistent with what a reasonable doctor would have 
disclosed in similar circumstances. Arguably, however, the language used – namely ‘permitting 
the patient to make a knowledgeable evaluation’ – suggests that the way in which the discussion 
is conducted should be of an accessible nature to the patient. Indeed, the American Medical 
Association Code of Ethics states that physicians should assess the patient’s ability to 
understand relevant information and implications and then present the relevant information 
accurately and sensitively.302 In section 2.1.3, it is stated that ‘information may be conveyed 
over time in keeping with the patient’s (…) ability to comprehend’.303  It is worth noting, 
however, that the AMA places a disclaimer at the beginning of that section of the Code: ‘The 
Opinions in this chapter are offered as ethics guidance for physicians and are not intended to 
establish standards of clinical practice or rules of law’.304  
This very issue was considered in Nisenholtz v Mount Sinai Hospital:305 in interpreting the 
requirement that disclosures be made ‘in a manner permitting the patient to make a 
knowledgeable evaluation’, Gammerman J acknowledged that, in some cases, a physician may 
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be required to do more than identify the risks and their statistical frequency in order to discharge 
his duty.306 He stated: 
Physicians have a duty to provide a reasonable explanation of the available alternatives 
and potential dangers of a medical procedure. When a plaintiff alleges that such an 
explanation was not reasonable, this question is an issue of fact to be determined by a 
jury (…) In assessing the reasonableness of the explanation provided by a physician, 
the issue is whether, under the facts and circumstances of a given case, the physician’s 
description of the risks and alternatives to the proposed procedure would enable a 
reasonably prudent patient to make a knowledgeable evaluation of whether to submit 
to that procedure.307 
He continued that while it may be that ‘merely identifying the risks and their likelihood of 
occurrence’ would be sufficient for a physician to discharge his duty, there undoubtedly existed 
cases which necessitated ‘a more detailed description of the causes of potential harm’.308 He 
continued that by ‘[u]nderstanding the mechanism by which a potential harm may occur’ a 
patient is provided with ‘a clearer view of the procedure being recommended, the nature of the 
risks, and the extent to which the risks are within the control of the physician’.309 The learned 
judge expressed that a patient ‘who was confident in the physician’s skills would quite 
reasonably want to know whether an undesired result of surgery was beyond the physician’s 
control or solely dependent upon the physician’s skills’.310 Thus, it was ‘[o]nly through 
receiving a more thorough explanation of the mechanisms by which a proposed procedure 
could result in undesired effects may (…) patients adequately evaluate whether (…) to undergo 
treatment’.311 It was the view of the learned judge that it would be ‘unwise to hold that a 
physician need never provide more information than a mere identification of the risk and its 
likelihood of occurrence’.312  
While this case resulted in a favourable outcome for the plaintiff, it hinged on the fact that there 
was expert medical testimony that the disclosure made by the defendant was inadequate.313 
Accordingly, patients in New York currently face a considerably tougher burden than their 
counterparts in Ireland, England and Wales and indeed, other US states. With that said, a Bill 
 




310 ibid 661-2. 
311 ibid 662. 
312 ibid. 
313 See also Retkwa v Orentreich 154 Misc 2d 164 (Sup Ct, NY County 1992); 169: ‘Here, plaintiff has made an offer of proof that an expert 
witness will testify that a doctor working with liquid silicone in the fields of dermatology and/or plastic surgery in 1982 or 1983 would, as a 
regular matter, have informed the patient that liquid silicone was not approved by the FDA. Such testimony, assuming it is given at trial, would 
make out a prima facie case of lack of informed consent’. 
drafted in 2019 that would change some aspects of New York informed consent law is currently 
making its way through the various stages; as of July 2020, it was sitting with the Assembly 
for approval having passed the Senate.314 Arguably, its predecessor was far more extensive; it 
provided for an entirely new article pertaining to informed consent to be inserted into New 
York Public Health Law, however, it was amended considerably before being presented to the 
Senate for approval.315 If passed, this amended Bill would require hospitals to adopt and 
publicise a statement on the rights of patients pertaining including: 
(i) the right ‘to receive all information necessary to give informed consent for any 
proposed procedure or treatment, and alternate treatment options including the 
possible risks and benefits of the procedure or treatment taking into consideration 
any known preconditions’;316 and  
(ii) the right to ‘be informed of the name, position and functions of any hospital staff 
including medical students and physicians exempt from New York State [education 
law], involved in a patient’s care and refuse their treatment, examination or 
observation’.317 
While these are undoubtedly helpful obligations for hospitals to bear, it remains to be seen 
what the practical and legal implications will be.  
Where informed consent in pregnancy is concerned, the Appellate Division of the Supreme 
Court of the State of New York has held that an independent cause of action exists on behalf 
of the foetus against a physician for failure to obtain informed consent from the woman.318 
Thus, the courts have imposed liability on a physician for injuries sustained by a foetus arising 
from the failure to disclose. Additionally, New York Public Health Law contains two sections 
relating to the informed consent of pregnant women; first, § 2503 requires pregnant women be 
informed of the drugs to be administered during pregnancy and birth and any related side 
effects for the foetus and woman. Second  is § 2504, which was discussed previously.319 Thus, 
it is argued that it would be challenging for a medical professional to demonstrate that a failure 
 
314 An Act to Amend the Public Health Law, in relation to the Provision of Informed Consent Senate Bill (2019) S1029A (hereafter ‘Informed 
Consent Senate Bill 2019). 
315 ibid: In the justification for the amendment, it is stated that the amended version of the bill ‘preserves those protections identified in the 
original bill, and clearly articulates those rights in the existing hospital patient's bill of rights’. 
316 Informed Consent Senate Bill 2019, s 1(g)(ii), which is proposed to amend Public Health Law § 2803 section 1(g). 
317 ibid s 1(g)(iii).  
318 Hughson v St. Francis Hospital 92 AD 2d 131 (NY 1983). 
319 ‘Any person who is pregnant may give effective consent for medical, dental, health and hospital services relating to prenatal care.’ 
to disclose risk because a patient is pregnant is generally accepted practice. Indeed, nothing in 
the law points to a lower standard for pregnant patients; if anything, the opposite is true. 
Conclusion 
Although a seemingly straightforward concept, informed consent has proved to be anything 
but in the common law. What constitutes competence and incompetence and sufficiently 
‘informed’ and the divergence between jurisdictions as to how incompetent individuals should 
be treated, demonstrates the complexity of this issue. Key to this chapter was contrasting how 
New York treats informed consent and how Ireland and England and Wales do; the fact that 
the New York judiciary appeared to make the move to a reasonable patient test far earlier than 
the other two, only to have it reversed by the legislature was worthy of note. For a variety of 
reasons, one would be forgiven for assuming that the same pro-patient tendencies seen in 
Ireland and England and Wales would be seen in New York. First, New York is often viewed 
as a bastion of human and individual rights; it is home to the headquarters of the United Nations 
and the American Civil Liberties Union, it legalised gay marriage prior to the Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA) being struck down by the United States Supreme Court.320 As discussed 
in Chapter 1, it had legal abortion prior to the decision in Roe v Wade321 and it was the location 
of one of the earliest cases establishing the doctrine of informed consent, Schloendorff.322 Yet 
clear paternalism can be seen, not only in the standard of disclosure required in informed 
consent cases but perhaps also in the requirement that individuals be capable of rational or 
reasoned decisions in order to have capacity, which has yet to be overturned. Highlighting this 
early difference between how refusal of medical intervention is generally treated in these 
jurisdictions will be built upon in the coming chapters, with the next considering end-of-life 
decision-making and the refusal of life sustaining treatment.  
Pregnancy, as outlined throughout this chapter, seems to be an outlier. On the one hand, it 
appears that the capacity of a woman going against medical advice can be more readily 
challenged in labour than in other healthcare contexts. On the other hand, information 
disclosure requirements appear to be as onerous, if not more so, in pregnancy. The relationship 
between these early differences and advance directives in pregnancy will be discussed in due 
course. 
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Chapter 4  
Introduction 
The right to a natural death is one outstanding area in which the disciplines of theology, 
medicine and law overlap; or, to put it another way, it is an area in which these three 
disciplines convene. 
Medicine with its combination of advanced technology and professional ethics is both able 
and inclined to prolong biological life. Law with its felt obligation to protect the life and 
freedom of the individual seeks to assure each person’s right to live out his human life until 
its natural and inevitable conclusion. Theology with its acknowledgment of man’s 
dissatisfaction with biological life as the ultimate source of joy … defends the sacredness 
of human life and defends it from all direct attacks.1 
The previous chapter considered informed consent at a more generalised level, focusing on its 
building blocks, so to speak.2 It progressed to considering whether those requirements varied or 
ought to vary if the decision-maker is pregnant. It did not, however, consider the ethical and legal 
challenges encountered by the court, legislature and healthcare professionals in the context of 
refusing life-sustaining medical treatment in any great detail. This aspect is important in the 
context of advance directives, as it is those advance decisions to decline life-sustaining 
intervention that are the most ethically challenging and those most likely to require court 
adjudication. It is worth stating, however, that this chapter will look at end-of-life decision-making 
generally, rather than in the context of pregnancy; that discussion will be conducted in Chapter 6 
wherein compelled intervention in pregnancy is examined. This is a deliberate decision, as it is felt 
that it highlights one of the key issues with medical intervention in pregnancy. End-of-life 
decision-making in pregnancy is almost never just about the pregnant woman, as it would be in 
the case of non-pregnant people. Rather, judgments often lack clarity as to what the risk is to the 
woman’s life and what it is to the foetus’ life; her life, health and wellbeing are often merged with 
that of the foetus, with little discussion of why this ought to be the case.3 Thus, it was felt that to 
discuss them fully, all interventions in pregnancy should be discussed together. Accordingly, this 
chapter and the next pertaining to Advance Directives serve as building blocks for Chapter 6.  
 
1 Hughes CJ in Re Quinlan 70 NJ 10 (1976); 32. 
2 Chapter 3 looked at the two primary criteria necessary to establish informed consent to or refusal of medical treatment, namely that the patient be 
competent and informed As discussed in the previous chapter, consent must also be voluntary, however, it is suggested in the medical context that 
the other two criteria are more likely to be at issue and consequently, worthy of more discussion.  
3 This will become evident when some of the blood transfusion cases are discussed in Chapter 6. 
Rosamond Scott neatly summarises the legal aspects of the refusal of life-sustaining medical 
treatment: 
In the early days of medical law, a patient’s right to refuse medical treatment was typically 
subject to four potentially countervailing state interests in: the preservation of life, the 
prevention of suicide, the protection of the ethical integrity of the medical profession, and 
the protection of innocent third parties. With the exception of the last, the strength of these 
has waned over time, so that in general a competent adult can now refuse any treatment for 
any reason.4 
As time progressed, greater respect was accorded to the self-determination of the individual and 
greater deference was shown to her choice; it was widely acknowledged that refusing life-
sustaining treatment was not equivalent to suicide.5 Norman Cantor argues succinctly that the 
‘main distinction is that suicide involves initiation of a self-destructive course’ whereas refusal of 
treatment allows ‘a fatal affliction follow its natural course’.6 It was widely accepted that respect 
for the sanctity of life should not prevail over respect for the decision of a competent person to 
refuse life-sustaining treatment, save in the most exceptional circumstances.7 The ethical integrity 
of the medical profession is generally no longer at issue, as guidance from the relevant professional 
bodies now advocates respecting patient choice and self-determination, even in life-saving 
situations.8 The protection of innocent third parties, however, remains a different matter and one 
that will be considered in more detail in Chapter 6 in the context of compelled obstetric 
interventions.  
It is important at this juncture to clarify what this chapter will not consider in the context of end-
of-life decision-making. While there is a body of law concerning euthanasia and assisted suicide, 
it will not be considered as part of this research.9 Rather, this research focuses on the individual’s 
pursuit of unassisted death on their own terms, referred to by some as ‘death with dignity’, ‘a 
 
4 Rosamund Scott, ‘The Pregnant Woman and the Good Samaritan: Can a Woman Have a Duty to Undergo a Caesarean Section?’ (2000) 20 Oxford 
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2 IR 79, 93-94 (‘Re Ward of Court’). Contrast with the judgment of Justice Scalia in Cruzan v Director, Missouri Department of Health 497 US 
261 (1990); 292-300. 
6 Norman L Cantor, ‘Twenty-Five Years After Quinlan: A Review of the Jurisprudence of Death and Dying’ (2001) 29 J L Med Ethics 182, 184. 
7 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821, 851-2; Re Conroy 98 NJ 321 (1985); 349. 
8 For example, the World Medical Association International Code of Medical Ethics signed in 1949 obliged physicians to ‘always bear in mind the 
obligation of preserving human life’; World Medical Association, ‘International Code of Medical Ethics’ (1949) <https://www.wma.net/wp-
content/uploads/2018/07/International-Code-of-Medical-Ethics-1949.pdf> accessed on 8 May 2020. The most recent version, signed in 2006, still 
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accept or refuse treatment’.  World Medical Association, ‘International Code of Medical Ethics’ (2006) 
<file:///C:/Users/afinnerty/Downloads/wma-international-code-of-medical-ethics.pdf> accessed on 8 May 2020. 
9 It is worth noting, however, that some of the ethical arguments made in relation to euthanasia and physician assisted suicide will be relevant and 
accordingly, included in this ethical analysis. 
natural death’ or a ‘good death’.10 This research accepts the distinction between acts undertaken 
with the intention of ending life and treatment that is withheld or withdrawn, which has the 
consequence of ending life.11 As this research ultimately focuses on advance healthcare directives, 
it is outside its scope to give a detailed account of why the distinction between withholding medical 
treatment and withdrawing treatment is accepted.12 In advance directives, both a rejection of 
treatment and the cessation of treatment already commenced can be articulated, therefore they 
apply to withholding and withdrawing. Upon making those distinctions, it is necessary to exclude 
a further subset of cases, namely those where failure to treat was either negligent or unlawful. 
Advance directives, by their nature, are exhibitions of the will of the individual; accordingly, there 
is little to be gained by considering cases where treatment was withheld unlawfully, against the 
will of the individual or in the absence of an appropriate justification. 
This chapter discusses how end-of-life matters are treated in Ireland, England and Wales and New 
York. In clear contrast to the previous chapter, there will be fuller discussion of the approach of 
other states in the United States to this issue. The law as it pertains to matters at the end of life can 
be sharply contrasted with informed consent, as the former sees significant and substantial 
variances in how the issue is treated from state to state, whereas the same cannot necessarily be 
said for the latter.13  
Disorders of Consciousness 
Before discussing the ethics of end-of-life decisions, it is important to discuss the terminology that 
will be used throughout this chapter and the reason why it may change at times. Persistent 
vegetative state14 (‘PVS’) is a term first coined by Fred Plum and Bryan Jennet to describe patients 
that had suffered brain injuries but not brain death; these patients presented with periods of 
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13 The primary difference in informed consent law from state to state is the standard of care used to determine breach of duty to disclose. New York, 
as discussed, legislated for the professional standard, whereas states such as California use the reasonable patient standard. 
14 For the avoidance of confusion, there are sometimes references to ‘Permanent Vegetative State’ also abbreviated to ‘PVS’. The difference between 
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whereas “permanent” implies irreversibility. Persistent vegetative state is a diagnosis; permanent vegetative state is a prognosis.’ Thus, despite the 
precise use of language by Jennett and Plum, who originally defined ‘persistent’ in the context of a vegetative state, confusion arose over the exact 
meaning of the term ‘persistent’. See The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, ‘Medical Aspects of the Persistent Vegetative State’ (1994) 330 N 
Engl J Med 1499, 1501. In 2018, the US guidelines replaced the term ‘permanent’ with ‘chronic’, as there was evidence that a small number of 
patients were showing some improvement after the point at which improvement was deemed ‘improbable’ thus rendering ‘permanent’ misleading. 
Joseph Giacino and others, ‘Practice Guideline Update Recommendations Summary: Disorders of Consciousness’ (2018) 91 Neurology 450.  
wakefulness with open eyes and movement, limited responsiveness and some reflex movements.15 
It subsequently became apparent that there were patients suffering from long term ‘severe 
alteration[s] in consciousness’ that could not be diagnosed as being in a persistent vegetative state, 
in other words, they did not meet the established diagnostic criteria; the term that was used in the 
case of such patients was a minimally conscious state (MCS).16 While ‘PVS’ has been utilised 
extensively in jurisprudence and in academic commentary for over four decades, it is used with 
considerably less frequency in medical circles today; in order avoid confusion between persistent 
and permanent vegetative states, the UK National Clinical Guidelines for Prolonged Disorders of 
Consciousness (PDOC) issued by Royal College of Physicians advised that ‘persistent’ be replaced 
with ‘continuing’ in 2013.17 A diagnosis of a permanent disorder of consciousness is still 
possible.18 It still remains, however, that much of the historical academic commentary and 
jurisprudence referred to ‘PVS’. While the term ‘MCS’ is still in used in medical circles, it is worth 
bearing in mind that both vegetative and minimally conscious states are collectively referred to as 
Prolonged Disorders of Consciousness (PDOC) or if the circumstances are present, Terminal 
Decline of Consciousness (TDOC).19 Accordingly, more modern jurisprudence and literature may 
simply refer to a ‘disorder of consciousness’, focusing on the symptoms of the disorder, the quality 
of life of the individual and their prospect for improvement, rather than diagnosing either 
vegetative or minimally conscious state.20 Arguably, such an approach brings jurisprudence more 
in line with the medical guidance, which describes consciousness as a continuum.21 
Ethical Issues in End-of-Life Decision-Making 
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The ethical issues underpinning end-of-life decision-making must be considered and teased out in 
order to understand the challenges faced by judges deciding matters of life and death and the 
challenges that legislators face when trying to coherently address such matters. It is a legitimate 
aim of society, the medical profession, the legislature and the courts to mitigate against the harm 
that can be caused to individuals by both undertreatment – the failure to provide needed beneficial 
treatment – and overtreatment – the provision of futile or harmful treatment. The assessment of 
whether a failure to treat is undertreatment or the administration of treatment is overtreatment is a 
challenging matter for the law, something that will be evidenced by the differing outcomes reached 
in cases with similar facts. Clearly, it is also challenging for members of the medical profession, 
as evidenced by the differing opinions contained in the medical testimony in such cases. The 
balance between treatment, overtreatment and undertreatment is critical to understanding whether 
treating an incompetent patient is an act of beneficence or maleficence on the part of the physician; 
in other words, is the provision of treatment beneficial or detrimental to her? Both overtreatment 
and undertreatment also concern matters of justice; for overtreatment, justice in the sense of 
scarcity of resources is a consideration and for undertreatment, justice in the sense of equality of 
access to healthcare has relevance. These issues will be considered in more detail in the succeeding 
paragraphs. 
In order to ascertain the ethical issues underpinning the refusal, withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining medical treatment, it is beneficial to return to Principlism; Autonomy, Beneficence, 
Non-Maleficence and Justice. While the ethical issues pertaining to consent to and refusal of 
treatment were analysed in Chapter 3, it is submitted that there are distinct ethical issues when the 
administration of treatment preserves the life of the individual. This research divides end-of-life 
situations in two; first, there are those end-of-life cases concerning individuals with capacity and 
second, those cases concerning individuals who are incapable of consenting to or refusing 
treatment. For the latter type of patient, there will be a further subdivision into those who never 
had capacity and those who had, but have lost it. Perhaps it goes without saying that the weight 
given to the principles must change where the patient is incompetent, thus while the ethical 
principles remain the same, the prominence given to one over another must vary in line with 
individual capacity. As was discussed in the previous chapter, society and the law reflect the idea 
that incompetent individuals must be protected in a variety of ways. Because of the differences 
between competent and incompetent persons, it is worth considering the four principles separately 
in both contexts, then further differentiating between lifelong incompetence and sudden but 
persistent incompetence caused by trauma or illness. 
The subdivision advanced in this chapter is not to suggest that there is no grey area within medical 
decision-making or that it is always clear that an individual is competent or incompetent. Naturally, 
there are cases everyday where individuals have fluctuations in capacity either because of 
degenerative diseases or because they are recovering from trauma or some other reason. Thus, 
rather than implying that capacity is a completely clear-cut matter, the format of the analysis is 
designed to highlight clear points on a spectrum of decision-making capacity. 
Autonomy  
While ‘autonomy’ is often referenced in the course of judgments considering refusals of treatment, 
its analysis and application by judges has sometimes been criticised.22 Despite this criticism – and 
what could be considered patchy application of the principle of respect for autonomy by the law – 
this research would be incomplete were it to consider the law without respect for autonomy from 
an ethical perspective. Where the death of the individual is a likely consequence of her competent 
refusal of medical treatment, what is the right action cannot be discerned until the ethical questions 
themselves are. Tom Beauchamp laid out the two competing premises:  
It is morally prohibited to risk death for a patient whose life threatening condition can be 
medically managed by suitable medical techniques. 
It is morally prohibited to disrespect a first party refusal of treatment.23 
He provided a caveat to the second point, namely ‘unless the refusal is non-autonomous and 
presents a significant danger to the patient’, which he argues has the ‘simple but powerful effect 
of informing medical officials (indeed, everyone) that all truly autonomous refusals of treatment 
must be respected, no matter the consequences’.24 Perhaps it goes without saying that a legal 
framework that protects the right of the individual to refuse unwanted life-sustaining medical 
treatment is one that respects the autonomy of the individual. While, as Ruth Faden and Tom 
Beauchamp point out, early court decisions may not have referred to terms such as ‘autonomy’ or 
 
22 See for example, Bernadette J Richards, ‘Autonomy and the Law: Widely Used, Poorly Defined’ in David G Kirchhoffer and Bernadette J 
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23 Tom Beauchamp, ‘Methods and principles in biomedical ethics’ (2003) 29 J Med Ethics 269, 270. 
24 ibid. 
‘self-determination’, they did refer to ideals such as ‘the free citizen’s … right to himself’, 
something which they argued was ‘functionally equivalent’.25  
In explaining the importance of autonomy and the right to decide for oneself in the context of end-
of-life matters, Chris Docker argues that it is ‘not difficult to recognise in each of us a desire to 
exercise control over our own destiny and to have a chance to finish our own “work of art” in the 
manner of our own choosing’.26 Or, as Nils Hoppe and José Miola argue: ‘everyone should be 
allowed to live the life they want, and die the death they want’.27 While this research does not 
make any statement about choosing one’s death in the sense of assisted dying, sometimes the 
autonomy arguments stemming from those issues can illuminate the debate in relation to refusing 
life-sustaining treatment. To adapt an argument made by Peter Singer: if one’s future life, if 
compelled to undergo life-sustaining treatment, ‘would hold more negative elements than positive 
ones – more unhappiness than happiness, more frustration of preferences than satisfaction of 
them’, then honouring the autonomous wish of that person to refuse treatment and exercise some 
control over their existence is morally justified.  
This kind of thinking is not unusual in healthcare. It seemed to start with more straightforward 
situations such as accepting the decisions of terminally ill patients to refuse life-lengthening 
treatments and progressed to more complicated ones, such as accepting the decision of otherwise 
healthy individuals to refuse medical treatment for religious reasons.28 Arguably however, if we 
are to accord the autonomy of the individual with the respect it deserves, then the measure of 
‘negative elements’ must not be objective, it must be subjective. It must be based on what the 
competent individual views as positive or negative and not on what members of the medical 
profession, other individuals or society perceive as positive or negative. This, we have also seen 
borne out in some jurisprudence with courts permitting individuals to refuse treatment even when 
their prognosis was good and their reasoning for refusal unconventional, in that it was not 
objectively logical or rational or based on religious reasons.29 After all, there is not necessarily any 
convincing reason why religious beliefs should garner more protection than any other kind of 
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conviction, whether moral, political, or aesthetic;30 as Julian Savulescu argues, religious values 
are one of several sets of values relevant within ethics.31 The rationale for granting religious belief 
a special level of protection in more recent history is more likely a reaction to our shared global 
history of religious persecution, a way of undoing the past wrongs committed in the name of 
religion, or at the very least, preventing their reoccurrence. Furthermore, some version of freedom 
of religion has a place in many domestic foundational rights documents and in international 
provisions, which makes it challenging to ‘ignore’ it in a medico-legal context.  
Thus, if an individual views their current or future existence with life-sustaining treatment as 
negative – even if objectively speaking, it could be considered positive – then it is the view of the 
individual that is paramount. Or to put it another way, the protection of the future autonomy of an 
individual does not justify overriding her autonomy in the here and now, irrespective of how 
honourable that aim may be. Emily Jackson notes that the priority given to autonomy has been 
criticized ‘on the grounds that it is an excessively individualistic value’.32 She continues: 
Giving the competent adult patient an absolute right to reject life-saving medical treatment 
ignores the impact that this might have upon other people, such as her dependent children. 
The principle of patient autonomy gives the individual a right to make decisions that could 
have a profoundly negative impact upon those close to her.33 
Clearly, the protection of children is a legitimate aim of any society and one that is pursued by the 
law, in the criminalisation of child abuse, the requirement that children be educated up to a certain 
age, prohibition on child labour and so forth. With that said, it is argued that preventing competent 
adults from refusing treatment for themselves in the interest of their children is an illegitimate 
interference. Any decision to accept treatment for the benefit of ‘those close to her’ must be 
because the individual feels that is her duty to do so, not because she is forced to do so by the law. 
Individuals are not prevented from having hazardous professions – fire and rescue services, police 
or armed forces – just because they are parents. While this may not be a completely fair comparison 
– the risk of death with refusal of treatment is more likely, if not almost certain, whereas the same 
cannot be said for having any of the aforementioned occupations – it remains that we do trust 
individuals to decide for themselves if they wish to continue working in these environments after 
they become parents. Arguably, this is because society recognises the value and importance of 
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these activities to individuals and collectively. The same argument can be made in relation to 
autonomy and individual choice. We may disagree with the decision of the individual and think it 
ethically questionable, but it does not follow that we should remove the choice for everyone, or a 
subset of society, such as parents.  
Shimon Glick, however, might disagree:  
[A]utonomy is of no value to a dead person. By permitting a patient to die avoidably, when 
it is virtually certain that were he saved against his present protest he would be grateful, 
one is granting that person his short term ‘autonomous’ wish while depriving him of his 
long term autonomy.34 
He argues that ‘stressed’ or ‘upset’ patients may not be fully autonomous and accordingly that 
their refusals should be assigned ‘less weight’.35 He goes on to argue in favour of the model of 
consent in Israel, which provides that a competent refusal may be overruled by a hospital ethics 
committee once the committee is satisfied that ‘the patient’s welfare demands a particular 
treatment, and that the patient, too, will subsequently be grateful for such intervention’. In other 
words, retroactive consent will subsequently be given.36 This is clearly premised on the patient 
being grateful for treatment after it is administered; arguably, that is a very high burden for a 
hospital to bear and one must question what criteria a hospital ethics board would use to predict 
subsequent patient gratitude. It is contended that the very existence of this clause is problematic, 
even if, as Glick concedes, that it ‘is not intended for frequent or routine use’ and even were it to 
have sound and consistent evaluation criteria.37 This is for two reasons: first, its presence tells 
patients within that society that their wishes may not be respected if a hospital board can be 
convinced of their future gratitude by their treatment team. To only honour choice that is 
considered right, is to permit no choice at all in a medical context. While one person may be 
grateful for the extension of her life, another may not; the view one has of one’s own life is unique. 
Were it not, we would all make the same decisions and pick the same option with the same set of 
circumstances. Time and time again, humans have shown this not to be the case. Therefore, it is 
argued that autonomy and the decision we wish to make for ourselves, though not absolute, should 
not be contingent on receiving the approval of medical professionals. Second, as will be discussed 
in more detail later in this chapter, where a patient goes against medical advice, there is nothing 
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stopping her physician from having a full and frank conversation with her about the matter; rather, 
he may even have a duty to have such a conversation. Where the patient persists in refusing, then 
that should be honoured and not overruled in the interest of future gratitude; consequently, Glick’s 
ideal is rejected for its interference with the autonomy of the individual. 
Autonomy: The Incompetent Patient  
As was articulated previously, considerations justifiably change when the patient is incompetent. 
Merely referring to ‘the incompetent patient’, however, is still insufficient to capture both the range 
of ethical issues and the appropriate balance that must be struck between those issues. Some 
patients never had decision-making capacity, nor will they ever attain it; others have capacity for 
some or most of their lives, only to lose it because of illness or trauma. To assume that the ethical 
considerations are the same for all incompetent patients would be to oversimplify the issue. 
Furthermore, an individual who has never had capacity is one who is unable to make an advance 
directive; as will be detailed further in the next chapter, the anticipatory refusal must be made by 
an individual with the requisite capacity to do so. In Chapter 3, it was argued that the relevance of 
decision-making capacity, at least in part, is that it indicates to the medical professionals which of 
the two principles, autonomy or beneficence, should be paramount in a given situation.38 
Beneficence having the paramount position, however, does not mean that autonomy is irrelevant 
or non-existent for all incompetent patients, though it has been argued that it is irrelevant for some. 
Nancy Rhoden contends: 
[T]o view incompetent patients as just like us – autonomous choosers ... helps (a bit) to 
mask the fact that in life or death decisions third parties are making quality of life 
judgments for incompetents. It is an approach that is ludicrous if the patient was never 
competent, and far from satisfactory if the patient was competent but never discussed the 
matter or at any rate never chose.39 
It is difficult to argue with her contention if one briefly returns to the understanding of autonomy 
advanced in Chapter 2 or failing that, most accepted constructs of autonomy. If an individual has 
never been competent in the sense that she has never possessed the capacity for self-determination, 
the ability to participate in deciding matters for herself or been independent in any meaningful 
way, then arguably, it may be a misrepresentation to speak of her autonomy and autonomous 
 
38 Chapter 3. See also John Devereux, ‘Continuing conundrums in competency’ in in Sheila McLean First Do No Harm: Law, Ethics and Healthcare 
(Ashgate 2006) 236. 
39  Nancy Rhoden, ‘How Should We View the Incompetent?’ (1989) 17 L Med & Health Care 264, 267. 
choice. This clearly applies to quite a specific subset of incompetent patients, however, namely 
those who have never been capable of making decisions about their health or life. It is the view of 
this research that it does not extend to those who have intermittent capacity or fluctuating decision-
making capabilities. Such individuals were at some point and may still be capable of autonomous 
choice, therefore they may be capable of choosing (or refusing) in advance. Where they have 
previously made an autonomous choice in relation to the circumstances in question, it is argued 
that such a choice should be respected. In doing so, the individual is being ‘regard[ed] as a person, 
rather than simply as an object of concern’.40  
Beneficence and Non-Maleficence 
Traditionally, perhaps it was understandable that administering life-sustaining treatment to 
patients was viewed as upholding the principle of beneficence and that failing to do so breached 
the principle of non-maleficence. This reflected a view that patients were, to some extent, things 
to be fixed and that the physician had the toolbox; indeed, the greatest ‘fixing’ of all was to prevent 
death. This ideal motivated scientific and medical developments and inspired researchers and 
medical professionals to invent life-sustaining treatments such as defibrillators and ventilators. In 
turn, such developments also created many of the ethical dilemmas inherent in healthcare; where 
once, one would be dead, now technology made death more of a choice. Arguably, these 
developments also reflected a failure to abide Ambroise Paré’s honourable ideal from the 16th 
Century that the role of a physician was ‘to cure sometimes, to relieve often, and to comfort 
always’.41 Or what has been defined in more modern times by Alasdair Maclean as the failure to 
‘distinguish between the individual as a biological being and the individual as a person’.42 As 
medicine modernised, the idea that the duties of beneficence and non-maleficence were restricted 
to just the health of the patient fell out of favour.43  
But what of the decision that seems to go against maximising the welfare of the patient, when 
outcomes would be negative for the patient and not positive? One may legitimately ask what a 
physician ought to do if the decision of the patient to refuse treatment seems destructive or 
 
40 Samantha Halliday and Lars Witteck, ‘Decision - Making At The End Of Life and The Incompetent Patient: A Comparative Approach’ (2003) 
22 Med & L 533, 540.  
41 This quote is generally attributed to Ambroise Paré, a French surgeon who lived in the 16th Century, however it is also attributed to Sir William 
Osler, a Canadian physician and one of the founding professors of Johns Hopkins Hospital.  
42 Alasdair Maclean, Autonomy, Informed Consent and Medical Law: A Relational Challenge (Cambridge University Press 2009) 50. 
43 As discussed in Chapter 3. 
irrational. What ought he do when the administration of treatment in such circumstances would 
preserve life, meaning it would, in his assessment, confer benefit? While the instinct of the 
physician may be to preserve a life capable of preservation, the administration of treatment may 
still compromise the welfare of the individual, not only failing to confer benefit but causing 
detriment. Shaping one’s death, insofar as that is possible, is a legitimate exercise in self-
determination. It can help an individual to be the person in death that she was in life, whether that 
has been shaped by her religious faith or her independence or her family situation. For some 
patients, it may be infinitely more beneficial to provide them with comfort care and respect for 
their wishes, than life-sustaining treatment. For others, the thought of death may be welcome when 
faced with choosing between persistent pain or lack of awareness caused by pain relief measures. 
Death may be a way of rescuing an individual with degenerative condition from the humiliation 
she foresees in her future existence. As was argued in the previous chapter, the prevention of 
avoidable harm, which is encompassed in the principle of beneficence, extends to the protection 
and vindication of the rights and interests of the individual.44 Refraining from causing harm, 
understood as the duty of non-maleficence, encompasses the duty to refrain from breaching such 
rights and interests.  
Overriding a seemingly irrational decision prevents the individual from being responsible for her 
actions and diminishes her to a level where she is only permitted to make decisions if she picks 
the right answer. Afterall, as was argued in relation to the Israeli model: to prohibit a person to 
make the choice that is considered wrong is really to permit no choice at all. Such action diminishes 
all patients to this level and spreads the message that individuals are not trusted to decide, 
potentially discouraging individuals from seeking assistance and increasing fear and anxiety 
amongst the ill. Again, it must be borne in mind that there is a substantial difference between 
overriding the decision of the individual and questioning and openly discussing it. Nothing in this 
research should be construed as arguing that the physician should not make an attempt to discuss 
the matter further with the patient if his professional judgment is at odds with her decision. Such 
a respectful conversation is not maleficent, rather it is beneficent in that it ensures that she has all 
the information that she may need to choose and ensures that the information she has received has 
 
44 Alasdair Maclean, Autonomy, Informed Consent and Medical Law: A Relational Challenge (Cambridge University Press 2009) 49. 
been comprehended. In other words, it eliminates any doubt that the course of action is really what 
the patient wants and eliminates a preventable harm, thereby benefitting the patient. 
Beneficence and Non-Maleficence: The Incompetent Patient 
In-keeping with the trend first started in the discussion of autonomy, incompetent patients provide 
a more challenging picture where beneficence and non-maleficence are concerned. The principle 
of beneficence takes centre stage for incompetent patients, as they lack the ability to make a 
contemporaneous decision; ‘[w]hen a patient is incompetent to exercise control over her medical 
care, the moral principle of beneficence instructs others to protect the patient’s well-being’.45 The 
way by which this ‘protection of well-being’ is given effect, its form so to speak, is the subject of 
much debate. What constitutes the beneficence should be – and generally is – assessed on a case 
by case basis; some jurisdictions advance the position that the right decision is the one that the 
patient would have made for herself, what is often referred to as ‘substituted judgment’. Other 
jurisdictions advocate for a ‘best interests’ standard, the beneficent decision is the one that is in 
the best interests of the patient in question taking all relevant factors, including what she would 
have wanted, into consideration. In relation to withdrawing treatment from patients in minimally 
conscious or vegetative states, several commentators have been unequivocal about the benefit, or 
lack thereof, that can be achieved by treating. Perhaps Ranaan Gillon summarises this most aptly 
in relation to clinically assisted hydration and nutrition (CAHN) for patients in PVS: 
[T]he moral obligation of the doctor is to provide care, which entails the intention and 
prospect of benefit, and the mere prolongation of unconscious life is not a benefit. The 
doctor therefore has no moral obligation to provide hydration and nutrition, and his or her 
partial role in causing the patient’s death is not of moral significance.46 
Rhoden argues: 
[I]n a significant sense, we are not stopping treatment for the good of the vegetative or 
barely conscious patient: such a patient is beyond caring. We are stopping because the 
treatment seems meaningless (as does the patient’s life), and because the family is wracked 
with anguish at the artificially prolonged death.47 
Arguably, if the treatment ‘seems meaningless’ as Rhoden contends, then it cannot be said that it 
is conferring any benefit on the individual, in other words, the principle of beneficence is not being 
pursued by such treatment. The continuation of treatment that is not conferring benefit has the 
 
45 Rebecca Dresser, ‘Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients: Conceptual Infirmities and Hidden Values in the Law’ (1986) 28 Ariz L Rev 373, 383. 
46 Raanan Gillon, ‘Patients in The Persistent Vegetative State: A Response to Dr. Andrews’ (1993) 306 BMJ 1602, 1603.  
47 Nancy Rhoden, ‘How Should We View the Incompetent?’ (1989) 17 L Med & Health Care 264, 266. (emphasis added) 
potential to cause harm in the case of some minimally conscious individuals – for example, pain 
or distress – thus the principle of non-maleficence must be a consideration. Joel Feinberg contends 
that in the absence of ‘awareness, expectation, belief, desire, aim, and purpose, a being can have 
no interests’ and further argues that ‘without interests, he cannot be benefited’.48 Thus, if the only 
life to be sustained is a one in complete lack of awareness, then harm to the incompetent individual 
is not being avoided in any real sense; he cannot sense life or death.49 Such patients cannot benefit, 
in any meaningful sense, from the treatment in question as medical opinion as to their condition 
has concluded that they will never regain consciousness. Though bleak in some senses, it is very 
difficult to disagree with this summary of the situation of the unconscious, brain-damaged 
individual with no prospect of improvement. To some extent, it makes the matter more clear-cut.  
Arguably, the greater challenge arises in relation to patients where their incompetence is not 
coupled with the lack of consciousness synonymous with disordered consciousness, but instead a 
considerably lower quality of life than they had previously, something that constitutes a 
considerable change in circumstances for them. Some commentators argue that decisions made by 
such patients when they were competent ought to be determinative, even if insufficiently formal 
to comply with advance directive requirements. Cantor argues that withholding of life-sustaining 
treatment should be permitted where it is clear that the patient would have so chosen in the 
circumstances: 
This approach correctly seeks to implement a competent person’s right of self-
determination, to the extent feasible, even after the patient has lost competence to make 
further determinations. Even if the patient is too insensate to appreciate the honoring of his 
choice, effectuation of that choice is important. American society values human dignity, 
and an essential component of that human dignity is the making of intimate decisions 
according to personal priorities and preferences.50 
 
One matter should be borne in mind in relation to Cantor’s argument; while it may be a reflection 
of the age of the piece, he treats the decision the person would have made (substituted judgment) 
as the same as the decision she did make (advance decision).51 Thus, the inclusion of the word 
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‘choice’ may be a little misleading, given the position adopted by this research in relation to the 
difference between substituted judgment and advance decisions. Accordingly, this research would 
replace ‘choice’ with ‘wish’ to give the quote the desired contextual meaning. Thus, his point 
stands; it is important to people and society as a whole to know that their wishes will be honoured. 
It is harmful for them to fear that they will not. Harm in the context of a physician overriding the 
competent wishes of a patient was discussed in Chapter 3 and it is fair to contend that similar, or 
graver, harm is caused when individuals receive the message that their competent choice will be 
honoured, but only if others agree with it at the relevant point in time.52 Furthermore, such a policy 
would clearly be at odds with the respect and position given to contemporaneous competent 
decisions – in other words, the respect afforded to competent persons. As was also argued 
previously, part of adhering to the principle of beneficence is supporting and respecting the 
autonomous decision of the person, whether wise or unwise. 
Other commentators, such as Rebecca Dresser, however, argue the opposite: 
Incompetent patients are no longer capable of valuing their prior exercise of these rights. 
As a result, they can receive no present benefit from treatment decisions in accord with 
their former preferences; indeed, they could now be burdened by such decisions.53 
 
While Dresser undoubtedly has a point about the benefit to the patient of adhering to their 
previously expressed wishes, there are some issues with her contention. First, it rests to a large 
extent on the idea that the competent person and the incompetent person are two different people.54 
While people’s views, preferences, desires and values may change over time, it is not accepted 
that this generates a ‘new person’, rather it is argued that the incompetent person is the competent 
person, just at a later stage of her life. Samantha Halliday notes this in the context of advance 
directives: 
 
The temporal and psychological distance that separates the anticipatory decision from the 
time at which it should be implemented differentiates anticipatory choices from 
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contemporaneous ones, and the asymmetries between such decisions will be particularly 
important where there has been a significant change in circumstances.55 
 
Thus, while changes in circumstances are hugely important in the context of decisions based on 
the wishes of the previously competent person, it is not accepted that the possibility of them 
occurring is a sufficient reason for ignoring such wishes outright.  
 
Second, it affords insufficient respect to the ‘future-oriented autonomous choice of competent 
persons’;56 the very premise of these kinds of conversations and conditional decisions is that they 
will have effect at a later point in time, otherwise they would be contemporaneous decisions. They 
are made in the knowledge that if certain circumstances arise at a future point in time, they will 
have effect. Rhoden questions this with the example of the hypothetical now incompetent pregnant 
woman with terminal cancer, who wanted, when competent, to give birth even if her life would be 
sacrificed: 
 
If this cherished goal must be discounted once she becomes incompetent and is viewed 
only in the present, something morally relevant has (…) been lost (...) Does protecting the 
now-incompetent person by excluding her former values compromise too severely the 
cherished goals of the formerly competent person?57  
Furthermore, given the gravity of end-of-life decisions, society demands considerable clarity in 
such situations; mere vague statements or musings are insufficient to authorise the cessation of 
treatment. This level of control, so to speak, is something that will become readily apparent from 
the jurisprudence discussed later in this chapter. 
 
Third, while the individual may receive ‘no present benefit from treatment decisions in accord 
with their former preferences’, it must be questioned if the corollary is accurate, namely that they 
would receive present benefit from treatment. Cases concerning the withdrawal or withholding of 
life-sustaining measures usually do not concern otherwise healthy but incompetent people.58 They 
concern seriously ill and debilitated individuals with some combination of terminal physical 
illness, limited life expectancy, poor quality of life, limited or no expectation of improvement, 
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poor awareness, poor communication or poor cognitive function. Preserving their life requires the 
administration of invasive treatment, which they neither have the capacity to understand and nor 
perhaps, the cognitive function to recognise is taking place. Thus, it is questionable what benefit 
is being conferred. Even if some benefit is conferred, it is debatable that it ought to be sufficient 
to override their prior competent wishes. Moreover, there is obvious potential for harm to be 
caused to the individual by continuing to administer treatment, as it may cause pain and distress 
given her limited capacity.   
 
Finally, it is submitted that the honouring of the competently expressed wishes of the individual 
demonstrates respect ‘not only for the patient as a sick person, but for the patient as a person 
integrally connected to (…) her previous healthy self — the goals, preferences, and beliefs by 
which the patient defined (…) herself’.59 To do otherwise would arguably be to allow a minor 
snapshot of the life of the individual to have a disproportionate role in shaping that life; without 
respect both for the patient as a sick person and as a previously healthy person, ‘patients are severed 
from their former lives, and stripped of the values and beliefs they had embraced’.60 Or as Rhoden 
opines, albeit in relation to advance directives, ‘elevating incompetents over competents’.61  
 
Justice 
It is accepted that resources within healthcare systems are scarce or at least, not infinite. While the 
notion that a resource shortage may have an impact on whether or not a decision to refuse life-
sustaining treatment should be honoured may be considered somewhat unsavoury, arguably, that 
does not stop it from being a legitimate factor, just perhaps a factor of lesser weight than the other 
principles.62 Put a little bluntly, is it the ethical decision to utilise limited resources on the person 
who has actively expressed a desire not to have such resources, when there are others experiencing 
challenges, in varying degrees, to accessing healthcare? During the Covid-19 outbreak in 2020, 
Suzanne Hoylaerts, a 90-year old Belgian woman, was lauded around the world for her decision 
to refuse ventilation on the grounds that she had ‘had a beautiful life’ and instead asked that it be 
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kept for younger patients.63 It is argued that the acceptance by both medical professionals and the 
international community of her refusal demonstrated the clear link between the refusal of life-
sustaining treatment and the principle of distributive justice.64  
It is worth saying that it is not only distributive justice that interacts with the refusal of life-
sustaining treatment, but other aspects of justice too. As was argued in the previous chapter, 
differing levels of respect for the wishes of individuals must be justified by morally relevant 
criteria. If we allow one to refuse life-sustaining treatment, then we must allow all unless there is 
a morally relevant reason not to. Yet, if we briefly look ahead to some of the case law that forms 
the basis of this chapter, it is argued that the principle of justice has been violated. This is because 
morally irrelevant criteria were used in deciding whether to honour the wishes of the patient. For 
example, in the O’Connor case, which will be discussed in more detail in this and the next chapter, 
the previously expressed wishes of an older person were summarily dismissed by the court as 
statements ‘that older people frequently, almost invariably make’.65 It is difficult to see how the 
age of the person who made the statements was a morally relevant criterion in assessing whether 
or not her wishes should be respected. It is worth saying that Mrs O’Connor was incompetent at 
the time of the court hearing, however, the quote taken from the judgment is to highlight the 
attitude of the court to the statements she made while competent. One would hope that the matter 
would be decided differently were she standing before the court competently making such 
statements.  
The Incompetent Patient 
 
It is generally considered unjust to treat a patient against his competently expressed wishes and 
furthermore, competent, autonomous individuals should be responsible for the consequences of 
their actions. Thus, conflict arises with the principle of justice arising when the previously 
expressed competent wish of the individual is overridden once she becomes incompetent, in order 
to protect her. While some might argue that such a position is subsumed within the principle of 
autonomy, the concept of justice advanced in previous chapters has a broader definition, thereby 
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encompassing this aspect of justice. Such interference clearly breaches the principle because it 
prohibits her from being responsible for her previously articulated autonomous choice. This is not 
to be confused with situations where a patient lacks decision-making capacity and attempts to 
make a bad decision; justice requires that she be protected from unfairly suffering the 
consequences of a decision that she was incompetent to make. In other words, there is a morally 
relevant reason for treating her differently.66 
 
This element of the principle of justice is particularly acute where the treatment advised is life-
sustaining and therefore the likely consequence of withholding or withdrawing that treatment is 
death. Arguably therefore, the relevance of this particular aspect of justice must rest on there being 
something significant to protect, as there would be in the case of an incompetent person making 
the wrong decision for herself. Perhaps this is one aspect of what makes end-of-life cases involving 
seriously ill or comatose patients, who cannot or have not decided for themselves, challenging; 
whose role is it and ought it to be to decide what is and is not deserving of preservation and 
protection? It will become apparent that the courts have occasionally struggled with this question. 
As outlined earlier, in relation to PVS patients, Gillon argues that there is no medio-moral 
obligation on a physician to provide treatment where intervention is unlikely to provide benefit 
and withholding or withdrawing treatment does not infringe the doctor’s duty.67 In other words, 
this function of justice, namely to protect incompetent people from bearing the responsibility of 
negative consequences of their ‘wrong’ decision is irrelevant in that context. The person has not 
made any decision, nor will they ever be capable of doing so. With this in mind, the dominant 
principle when deciding whether or not to treat the incompetent person should be beneficence and 
as discussed previously, treatment should be administered only if it benefits the patient. 
 
A further aspect of the principle of justice is relevant in cases involving the administration of 
nonbeneficial treatment of incompetent individuals, namely resource shortage. Gillon argues that 
there may actually be a moral obligation to withhold or cease treatment in such circumstances 
given the scarcity of resources within health systems.68 There can be a tendency in some circles to 
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conflate an obligation to withdraw treatment arising from resource shortage with a statement that 
certain lives cost ‘too much’ or they are not worth living. When Mrs Hoylaerts refused ventilation 
during the COVID-19 outbreak, her reasoning for doing so was that she had had a good life – not 
that her life was no longer worth living – and that somebody younger should be ventilated. In other 
words, she was aware of the scarcity of resources. Her decision was that of a living, conscious, 
competent person who had the possibility of extending her life; thus, she was someone who was 
capable of deriving benefit from such treatment. If her decision and reasoning can be accepted and 
celebrated, then it seems implicit that we should adopt the same reasoning in relation to patients 
who cannot derive benefit from treatment but who cannot express that. Nothing here should be 
construed as implying that elderly, gravely ill or mentally disabled patients should be denied 
treatment in order to efficiently use resources. Rather, when such a patient has no clear previously 
expressed wishes on treatment, the burden and particularly benefit of such treatment must be 
examined thoroughly, without the automatic assumption that continuing to live, in the biological 
sense, is positive. 
 
Law at the End-of-Life 
 
Courts have recognised that intrinsic to informed consent is informed refusal.69 Without the right 
to refuse treatment, the right to consent is virtually meaningless, however, that does not mean that 
end-of-life situations are devoid of challenges for the courts. As will be clear from the discussion 
of the jurisprudence, two veins of case law have tended to emerge under the umbrella heading of 
‘end-of-life decisions’; those concerning express refusal of life-saving treatment and those that 
concern incompetent individuals incapable of expressing consent or refusal at the relevant time. 
The former often rest on a finding as to the capacity of the individual. The latter are considerably 
more complex; in the first instance, it depends on the nature of the incompetence of the individual, 
in other words, whether the individual has always lacked capacity or whether the incompetence 
has been caused by a change in circumstances, such as an accident or illness. Where the person 
never had capacity or where their prior thoughts on end-of-life matters are not ascertainable, the 
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court will determine the best course of action for that person in line with the relevant domestic 
legal standard. Where the person had capacity at one time, the judgment sometimes rests on a 
determination as to if, while competent, she actually made the relevant decision. As will be evident 
as this chapter progresses, the rules applicable to determining if a decision has been made varies 
between jurisdictions and has been extensively developed.  
One might reasonably question why some of the cases being discussed are relevant to this research, 
as in many of these end-of-life cases, the person never had capacity, or they were competent at 
some point but never made the relevant decision. After all, the focus of the research is advance 
decisions, which clearly require the decision-maker to have capacity when the decision is being 
drafted. The purpose of considering such cases is two-fold; first, such cases give important context 
to the legal and ethical issues surrounding the refusal of life-saving medical treatment. In some 
jurisdictions, cases involving incompetent individuals established the right of the individual to 
decline life-sustaining medical treatment, despite the inability of the individual at the heart of the 
case to assert that right. Thus, they are of value in a historical sense but also in the sense of 
articulating what interests and rights the law was attempting to protect when ordering the cessation 
of treatment. Second, they highlight the alternative; in other words, they demonstrate how 
individuals are treated by the law in the absence of a valid advance decision. 
 
Finally, before considering the jurisprudence and statutes in the various jurisdictions, it is worth 
briefly bearing in mind the applicability of Articles 3 and 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights to medical decision-making in Ireland and England and Wales.70 Respect for the private 
life of the individual is guaranteed by Article 8 and it has been held inter alia that this right is 
engaged where the case concerns the refusal of medical intervention by a competent individual.71 
Thus, cases involving non-consensual medical treatment are solidly within its ambit. The 
relationship between Article 3 – prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment – and medical 
treatment is a little less clear. Degrading treatment is understood to mean conduct that ‘grossly 
humiliates [the individual] before others or drives him to act against his will or conscience’.72 
Thus, Article 3 may be applicable to compelled intervention depending on the circumstances and 
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severity of the case. Andrew Grubb et al posit that Article 3 may be engaged ‘where treatment 
humiliates or debases an individual showing a lack of respect for, or diminishing, his or her human 
dignity’, which it could be argued may occur in the context of certain unwanted medical 
intervention.73 Deirdre Madden argues, on the one hand, that ‘the emphasis on humiliation’ and 
the ‘leaning towards the protection of human dignity as opposed to the concept of autonomy’ may 
render non-consensual medical treatment outside the ambit of Article 3.74 On the other hand, she 
acknowledges that as ‘non-consensual medical treatment deprives a person of the freedom of 
choice over his own body, which is a fundamental part of individual dignity’, Article 3 may be 
engaged.75  
 
Once again, the concept of human dignity and specifically its protection has arisen. Though 
abstract, individual dignity has been in receipt of protection in the Irish courts under the 
Constitution (as distinct from the ECHR).76 In Chapter 2, various concepts of dignity were outlined 
and in the same chapter, some of the challenges associated with dignity as a concept were briefly 
discussed. Dignity, however, insofar as the case law has indicated, is both worthy of protection 
and capable of being diminished by external factors. In the legal context, it may be useful to view 
it as Roger Brownsword’s and Deryck Beyleveld’s empowerment or Suzy Killmister’s 
aspirational dignity, which is ‘the quality held by individuals who are living in accordance with 
their principles’.77 Such a concept of dignity is valuable but prone to attack and therefore worthy 
of protection. Accordingly, situations such as an individual being forced to manually empty human 
waste from his prison cell for a prolonged period of time and the life of an individual being 
artificially sustained with no prospect of meaningful recovery have been seen as affronts to human 
dignity.78 
Ireland 
Ireland is no different to the vast majority of jurisdictions in that a competent adult has a right to 
refuse medical treatment, even if that refusal will result in death, however there is comparatively 
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less case law coming from Ireland than the United Kingdom or United States. As Denham J stated 
in Re a Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No. 2) (‘Re a Ward of Court’): 
Medical treatment may not be given to an adult person of full capacity without his or her 
consent (…) This right arises out of civil, criminal and constitutional law (…) The consent 
which is given by an adult of full capacity is a matter of choice.79 
Even if Denham J had been less unequivocal, the very fact that medical negligence cases alleging 
a lack of informed consent, wherein the accepted method of demonstrating causation was to show 
that the plaintiff would not have undergone the treatment, existed, presupposed that informed 
consent to treatment was a legal requirement.80 Indeed, O’Flaherty J as much as makes this 
contention in the course of Re a Ward of Court, where he states:  
The next matter that is not in dispute is that consent to medical treatment is required in the 
case of a competent person (…) and, as a corollary, there is an absolute right in a competent 
person to refuse medical treatment even if it leads to death.81 
Although the use of the word ‘absolute’ is questionable in the context of the right to refuse medical 
treatment, the intention of this judgment in clear; generally speaking, a competent adult has the 
right to refuse unwanted life-sustaining medical intervention.  
Right to Refuse Treatment: The Constitution 
The right to refuse medical treatment is not only a right at common law but is also said to flow 
from various articles of the Irish Constitution. Both fundamental and unenumerated personal rights 
included in Bunreacht na hÉireann have been considered as the foundation of this right. 
Unenumerated rights such as the right to bodily integrity, as established in Ryan v Attorney 
General82 is a clear basis for the right to refuse treatment. As acknowledged in AB v CD: 
[O]rdering medical treatment and especially surgical treatment contrary to the wishes of 
an adult patient impinges upon the bodily integrity of the individual, so in the case of a 
patient of full age and capacity (…) it normally needs to be clear that the person does 
indeed lack such capacity.83 
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The unenumerated right to privacy has also be construed as encompassing the right to refuse 
medical treatment.84 In her judgment in Re a Ward of Court, Denham J acknowledged that part of 
the right to privacy, which is an unenumerated right under the Constitution, is ‘the giving or 
refusing of consent to medical treatment’.85 Furthermore, she added that ‘[a] constituent of the 
right of privacy is the right to die naturally, with dignity and with minimum suffering’.86  
It has also been accepted by the court that the autonomy to choose or refuse treatment is derived 
from the right to life, a fundamental right guaranteed by article 40.3 of Bunreacht na hÉireann. 
The consequence of this right is a correlating duty on the state to respect autonomous decisions, in 
order to protect that right.87 In Fleming v Ireland, it was stated by the High Court that:  
[O]ne necessary feature of the Constitution’s protection of the ‘person’ in art 40.3.2 is that 
the competent adult cannot be compelled to accept medical treatment and that our 
constitutional traditions have firmly set their face against the compulsion of the competent 
adult in matters of this kind.88 
This interpretation was also clear in the case of Governor of X Prison v PMcD, which concerned 
a man on hunger strike wished to refuse food and related medical assistance. In the words of Baker 
J: 
The sentence of imprisonment lawfully imposed upon Mr McD has of course deprived him 
of his right to personal liberty, but it (…) cannot be suggested as a matter of law, that he 
has thereby lost all of his constitutional rights including the right of personal autonomy, 
and the right of bodily integrity (...) A person has under the Constitution certain 
fundamental rights including the right to life, the right to personal autonomy, the right to 
bodily integrity, and the right to self-determination, the right to live one’s life as one wishes 
provided those wishes do not impact upon or harm others, and provided no conflict arises 
between that individual right and the interests of society.89 
This conclusion was also reached in Re a Ward of Court, where Hamilton CJ stated: 
As the process of dying is part, and an ultimate, inevitable consequence, of life, the right 
to life necessarily implies the right to have nature take its course and to die a natural death 
and, unless the individual concerned so wishes, not to have life artificially maintained.90 
Right to Refuse: Irish Jurisprudence 
 
84 McGee v Attorney General [1974] IR 284; Norris v Attorney General [1984] IR 36. 
85 Re a Ward of Court [1996] 2 IR 79, 162-3. 
86 ibid 163. 
87 Governor of X Prison v PMcD [2016] 1 ILRM 116, 118. 
88 Fleming v Ireland [2013] 131 BMLR 30, 54. 
89 Governor of X Prison v PMcD [2016] 1 ILRM 116, 142-3.  
90 [1996] 2 IR 79, 124. 
As was previously discussed, two veins of case law have emerged in Ireland under the broad 
heading of ‘end-of-life decisions’; where treatment is or has been refused or where individuals are 
unable to consent to or refuse treatment. The seminal Irish authority on the latter type of end-of-
life decision-making is Re a Ward of Court, in which the mother of a severely brain damaged 
woman petitioned the court to have artificial nutrition withdrawn.91 As distinct from many of the 
renowned early end-of-life cases – for example, Airedale NHS Trust v Bland92 and Cruzan v 
Director Missouri Department of Health93, which will be discussed later in this chapter – the 
woman was not in PVS, but was acknowledged to be quite close to it in the judgment. Although 
this case primarily focused on the right of the individual to refuse medical treatment as stemming 
from an exercise of constitutional rights, the common law right of the individual to refuse was 
recognised. Citing American law, O’Flaherty J stated that ‘it would be correct to describe the right 
in our law as founded both on common law as well as the constitutional rights of bodily integrity 
and privacy’.94 Denham J adopted a similar approach stating that medical treatment could not be 
given to a competent adult without consent, save in rare exceptions, a right which ‘arises out of 
civil, criminal and constitutional law’.95 
The court held that, whilst the right to life was a pre-eminent personal right, the requirement of the 
State to defend and vindicate that life is not absolute.96 One can appreciate why this interpretation 
was taken by the court given that the wording of Article 40.3.1 of the Constitution is ‘as far as 
practicable’ and not, ‘at all costs’ or equivalent.97 This is why, as Denham J explained, the state’s 
respect for the life of the individual ‘encompasses the right of the individual to (…) refuse a blood 
transfusion for religious reasons’; by recognising the autonomy of the individual, ‘life is 
respected’.98 In adopting an approach similar to jurisprudence in England and Wales, the court 
identified ‘best interests’ of the incompetent woman as the relevant test and ruled those to be 
paramount. In assessing her best interests, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the High 
Court and found that the continuation of ‘invasive’ medical treatment – as distinct from basic care 
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– and the accompanying ‘loss of bodily integrity and dignity’ with ‘no curative effect’ was not in 
her best interests.99  
It is worth explaining the focus that this research gives to the categorisation of CAHN as medical 
treatment, a theme which will be picked up again in more detail when the law from England and 
Wales is considered. That distinction is relevant for the purpose of this research, as there is a 
difference in how advance refusals of CAHN are treated in different jurisdictions, something that 
will be considered in more detail in the next chapter. In short, certain US states have opted to 
exclude it from being specified in an advance directive and others require that it is specifically 
stated in the advance directive that CAHN is to be refused.100 In Re a Ward of Court, Blayney J 
found that Lynch J in the High Court was entitled to find that artificial nutrition constituted medical 
treatment in view of judgments from other jurisdictions.101 Hamilton CJ stated that he had ‘no 
doubt but that the treatment being afforded to the ward, constituted “medical treatment” and not 
merely “medical care”’.102 Perhaps such conclusions reflects what Cantor describes as the 
acknowledgement that ‘the need for artificial nutrition and hydration is prompted by disease or 
other pathology and that the patient is entitled to control their provision just as with any other 
medical response to bodily dysfunction’.103 
Although Re a Ward of Court concerned withdrawing existing treatment, the rationale has been 
applied to cases concerning the withholding of future treatment. In HSE v JM, the court found that 
it was not in the best interests of a minimally conscious man to be resuscitated104 or for ventilator 
support to be increased beyond the level at which it was at the time of the hearing.105 Kelly J stated: 
The risks involved in [increased ventilator support] are substantial. No doctor supports the 
provision of the therapy. No improvement of his underlying condition will be effected. No 
lessening of the burden of J.M.'s illness will be brought about. No clear medical benefit 
will be achieved. The burden of the treatment outweighs such limited benefits as may 
accrue from it.106 
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The second type of case identified previously under the heading of end-of-life cases concern an 
express refusal of treatment, whether contemporaneously expressed or expressed in advance. JM 
v The Board of Management of Saint Vincent’s Hospital concerned the application of a man of 
Jehovah’s Witness faith to have a blood transfusion and liver transplant performed on his wife, 
who adopted his religion upon marriage.107 The evidence was the woman had consented to 
treatment, then refused to sign the consent form. Although the judgment refers to her being ‘visibly 
weaker’, ‘not as clear in speech’ and ‘not as clear of mind’ when she made the decision, Finnegan 
P appears not to focus on whether or not she had capacity to make a decision at the time. Instead, 
the judgment focuses on whether, prior to lapsing into a coma, she had made a decision at all. On 
this matter, he found that she ‘did not make a clear final decision to have, or not to have the 
treatment’ and attributed her apparent refusal to ‘her cultural background and her desire to please 
her husband and not offend his sensibilities’.108 Accordingly, an order was made to admit the 
woman to wardship and authorise the liver transplant and blood transfusion.  
Understandably, the judgment has been described by Madden as difficult to reconcile with legal 
principle.109 The woman had refused to sign the consent form for the procedures, thereby 
indicating a refusal to be treated, as it was not the case that she lost consciousness before she could 
sign the form. Thus, while she may have changed her mind about the procedures, it is argued that 
it was not accurate of the learned judge to say that she had not made ‘a final decision’. Arguably, 
the issue ought to have been decided on the principles of informed consent, which may well have 
yielded the same outcome but with different reasoning. Perhaps, the appropriate question ought to 
have been: was a voluntary decision made by a person with the capacity to do so having received 
the relevant information? Had the decision of the court been made in line with the precedent from 
England and Wales at the time, which was discussed in the previous chapter,110 or were it being 
made today, the same outcome may well have occurred. In any event, if there were any lack of 
clarity as to the law on refusing medical treatment arising from the judgment in JM, it has been 
clarified by Fitzpatrick and Another v K and Another, wherein Laffoy J applied Re a Ward of 
Court: 
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In the light of the decision of the Supreme Court (…) it could not be argued that a 
competent adult is not free to decline medical treatment. While that case concerned the 
withholding of medical treatment in the case of a person who had been found to be 
incompetent, the foundation of the ratio decidendi is the court’s exposition of the position 
of a competent adult.111  
The legal position regarding the ability of a competent adult to refuse medical treatment is now 
settled.112 The jurisprudence has been codified by the Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 
2015, with section 83(2) stating that a competent adult may refuse treatment for any reason 
irrespective of the life-threatening consequences.  
England and Wales 
Competent Individuals  
The right of a competent adult to refuse medical treatment has been embedded in English law for 
quite some time. As articulated by Lord Scarman in Sidaway: 
The right of ‘self-determination’, the description applied by some to what is no more and 
no less than the right of a patient to determine for himself whether he will (…) accept the 
doctor’s advice, is vividly illustrated where the treatment recommended is surgery (…) The 
existence of the patient’s right to make his own decision, which may be seen as a basic 
human right protected by the common law, is the reason why a doctrine embodying a right 
of the patient to be informed of the risks of surgical treatment has been developed (…) The 
profession (…) should not be judge in its own cause; or, less emotively but more correctly, 
the courts should not allow medical opinion as to what is best for the patient to override 
the patient’s right to decide (…) whether he will submit to the treatment offered him.113 
Somewhat inevitably, this right to refuse was extended to life-saving medical treatment, or in the 
words of Lord Donaldson, refusals which may even ‘lead to premature death’.114 As Lord Mustill 
opined in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland: 
If the patient is capable of making a decision (…) and decides not to permit it his choice 
must be obeyed, even if on any objective view it is contrary to his best interests. A doctor 
has no right to proceed in the face of objection, even if it is plain to all, including the patient, 
that adverse consequences and even death will or may ensue.115 
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Thus, the decision of a patient undergoing life-sustaining treatment ‘that it would be preferable to 
die’ must be honoured.116 The categorisation of end-of-life, described in the introductory 
paragraph on the law will be continued in this section, with the cases concerning express refusals 
being considered first.  
Re T concerned a woman who required a blood transfusion following a car accident and Caesarean 
section. Although she was brought up in accordance with the tenets of the Jehovah’s Witness faith, 
she never became a member. Prior to going into labour and while under the influence of narcotics, 
she stated to a nurse that she did not want a blood transfusion, that she had been a Jehovah’s 
Witness and retained some beliefs. Prior to undergoing the Caesarean section, Ms T again stated 
her opposition to a blood transfusion. Both refusals were expressed after Ms T had been alone with 
her mother, who was a practicing member of the faith. After being informed that transfusions were 
usually unnecessary and that other procedures were available, Ms T signed the hospital refusal 
form. Following the Caesarean section, her condition deteriorated to such an extent that a blood 
transfusion was necessary to preserve her life. Her father petitioned the court for an order 
permitting a blood transfusion, which was granted. At the subsequent hearing, however, the judge 
found that Ms T’s decision-making capacity was unimpaired. The Court of Appeal upheld the right 
of an individual to refuse life-saving medical treatment, but ‘for such a refusal to be effective his 
doctors had to be satisfied that (…) his capacity to decide had not been diminished by illness or 
medication or by false assumptions or misinformation’ and ‘that his will had not been overborne 
by another’s influence’.117 The court found on the facts that the refusal was invalid and that 
treatment was warranted. 
Lord Donaldson made a point of opining that Re T was not about the ‘right to die’, but instead 
about the ‘right to choose how to live’.118 While it contained a strong statement about the right of 
the individual to refuse life-saving medical treatment, it rested on whether Ms T had made a 
voluntary and valid decision at the relevant point in time. In explaining the balancing act between 
sanctity of life and individual self-determination, Lord Donaldson states:  
The patient’s interest consists of his right to self-determination – his right to live his own 
life how he wishes, even if it will damage his health or lead to his premature death. 
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Society’s interest is in upholding the concept that all human life is sacred and that it should 
be preserved if at all possible. It is well established that in the ultimate the right of the 
individual is paramount. But this merely shifts the problem where the conflict occurs and 
calls for a very careful examination of whether (…) the individual is exercising that right. 
In case of doubt, that doubt falls to be resolved in favour of the preservation of life for if 
the individual is to override the public interest, he must do so in clear terms.119 
Thus, this case enshrined the common law right of the competent person to refuse life-sustaining 
medical treatment, a position that has been reiterated on a number of occasions.120  
Re B concerned a woman who suffered an intramedullary cervical spine cavernoma, which led to 
paralysis below the neck and reliance on a ventilator.121 She wanted ventilation to be removed and 
gave instructions to the hospital to this effect. Prior to this, she had drawn the attention of staff to 
an advance directive, wherein she stated that she did not want to be ventilated; she was, however, 
informed at the time that it was insufficiently specific to permit her ventilation to be withdrawn. 
When her capacity was assessed initially, she was found to be competent, however, the 
psychiatrists subsequently amended their determinations. After she was prescribed anti-
depressants, Ms B said that she was relieved that the ventilator had not been switched off and 
agreed to attempt spinal rehabilitation. When her capacity was reassessed by the hospital 
psychiatrists in the months that followed, they were unable to determine her capacity, however, an 
independent reassessment at her request resulted in her being found to have decision-making 
capacity. Although Ms B was requesting that the ventilator be withdrawn, the hospital staff 
proposed to attempt the gradual reduction of ventilator support with the eventual aim of enabling 
her to breathe unassisted (‘weaning’). This suggestion was rejected by Ms B for a variety of 
reasons, including her fear that it would result in a ‘slow and painful death’ and result in her being 
‘robbed of a certain amount of dignity’, but critically because she viewed it as being devoid of 
benefit because of her level of disability.122 
Butler-Sloss LJ stated with clarity that ‘the right of the competent patient to request cessation of 
treatment must prevail over the natural desire of the medical and nursing profession to try to keep 
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her alive’.123 Arguably, it would have been patently inconsistent with the existing common law 
position for the court to rule any other way. The learned judge continued: 
One must allow for those as severely disabled as Ms B, for some of whom life in that 
condition may be worse than death. It is a question of values and (…) we have to try 
inadequately to put ourselves into the position of the gravely disabled person and respect 
the subjective character of experience. Unless the gravity of the illness has affected the 
patient’s capacity, a seriously disabled patient has the same rights (…) to respect for 
personal autonomy. There is a serious danger, exemplified in this case, of a benevolent 
paternalism which does not embrace recognition of the personal autonomy of the severely 
disabled patient.124  
Ms B was found to be competent to decide to have ventilation withdrawn, which was duly carried 
out after she was transferred to a different hospital. In doing so, the court seemed to strike a balance 
between Ms B’s autonomy and self-determination and the integrity of the medical professionals 
that had been treating her, who had clear reservations about withdrawing ventilation.125 
Furthermore, as Ms B was determined to have decision-making capacity from the point in time at 
which the independent assessment was conducted, the Trust was considered to have administered 
treatment unlawfully after this point. On this matter, however, Bulter-Sloss LJ added that it was 
important to distinguish between the duties of the team who cared for Ms B ‘to the highest 
standards of medical competence and with devotion’ and the duties of the Trust.126 The former, 
she found, received a request from Ms B, which although understandable ‘in a palliative care 
situation’, was ‘outside the experience of the intensive care unit in relation to a mentally-competent 
patient’; thus, it was ‘seen by some as killing the claimant or assisting her to die’, thereby breaching 
their ethical duties.127 Thus, the learned judge emphasised that it was the failure of the Trust to 
take steps to resolve the dilemma with the necessary urgency that was the reason behind the finding 
of unlawful treatment and not the actions of the treating professionals.128 Indeed, perhaps what 
made it more challenging for the staff in this case was the fact that Ms B was refusing a treatment 
not with mere acceptance that it may lead to her death, rather ‘[h]er expectation – indeed her hope 
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– was that she would subsequently die’.129 As Sheila McLean contends, she ‘chose, effectively, 
death over a quality of life she regarded as unacceptable’.130  
The law has, however, developed to protect individual choice and to mitigate against situations 
where individual choice gets overridden because it may go against ‘the norm’. John Coggon 
argues: 
[E]ven where medical law gives special value to continued life, medico-legal norms have 
developed to protect a system of value pluralism, where it is recognised that perspectives 
on a person’s moral, social, spiritual, and other interests legitimately vary. Respect should 
be given to the specific patient’s conception of her interests including when her life is at 
stake.131 
One could certainly argue that this case makes it abundantly clear that the refusal of treatment by 
a competent adult will almost invariably stand. Indeed, Butler-Sloss LJ stated as much in the course 
of the judgment when she said that ‘if (…) that patient, having been given the relevant information 
and offered the available options, chooses to refuse the treatment, that decision has to be respected 
by the doctors’.132 As will be discussed in Chapter 6, this also appears to be the case for competent 
pregnant patients, at least in principle, notwithstanding any increased scrutiny that their capacity 
may garner. 
Incompetent Individuals  
The second ‘type’ of case arising in the context of end-of-life decision-making are those when the 
individual cannot make the relevant decision, nor is it likely that they will be able to do so in the 
future. Perhaps the seminal case, or certainly one of the most well-known, on the withdrawal of 
life-saving medical treatment from an individual who was incapable of exercising his right to 
choose was Airedale NHS Trust v Bland.133 Anthony Bland suffered catastrophic injuries and was 
left in a permanent vegetative state (PVS) as a result of a crush at the Hillsborough football ground 
in Sheffield. He was capable of breathing and had some reflex responses to stimuli but was in ‘a 
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complete state of unawareness’ with no prospect of improvement or recovery of cognitive 
function:134 
He has no feeling, no awareness, nor can he experience anything relating to his 
surroundings. To his parents and family he is ‘dead’ (…) all that remains is the shell of his 
body. This is kept functioning as a biological unit by the artificial process of feeding 
through a mechanically operated nasogastric tube.135 
Airedale General Hospital, with the support of his parents, applied to the court to have artificial 
hydration and nutrition withdrawn and for authorisation to withhold antibiotics, when the need 
arose. Opposed to the initial application was the Official Solicitor, alleging that such withdrawal 
and withholding was ‘both a breach of the doctor’s duty to care for his patient, indefinitely if need 
be, and a criminal-act’.136 The decision of Sir Stephen Brown P, which permitted the lawful 
discontinuation of all life-sustaining treatment including hydration and nutrition, was subsequently 
appealed to the Court of Appeal and thereafter, the House of Lords.  
The issue of substance for the appeal courts was if a physician was obliged to continue treating a 
patient who was incapable of giving or refusing consent to treatment, irrespective of the 
circumstances or quality of that patient’s life.137 In the Court of Appeal, Sir Thomas Bingham MR 
was keen to emphasise what the case was and was not about, stressing that it was not about 
euthanasia – ‘the taking of positive action to cause death’ – nor was it about ‘putting down the old 
and infirm, the mentally defective or the physically imperfect’.138 Instead, the learned judge 
articulated that the case was about ‘whether artificial feeding and antibiotic drugs may lawfully be 
withheld from an insensate patient with no hope of recovery when it is known that if that is done 
the patient will shortly thereafter die’.139 The issue of criminal liability in circumstances such as 
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Anthony Bland’s had been somewhat sidestepped by the court of first instance.140 Both the House 
of Lords and the Court of Appeal were clear that no criminal liability should attach for the 
withdrawal of medical treatment in the circumstances.141 Bulter-Sloss LJ stated in the Court of 
Appeal: 
I do not consider that there remains a duty of care upon the doctors to continue the artificial 
feeding and (…) there is no actus reus and no unlawful act or omission. The issue of mens 
rea does not arise (…) My view is supported … by the decision of the Superior Court of 
the State of California (…) in Barber (...) The court held that the doctors’ omission to 
continue treatment though intentional and with knowledge that the patient would die was 
not unlawful failure to perform a legal duty.142 
Sir Thomas Bingham MR stated that inapplicability of the criminal liability was highlighted by 
the attempted analogy with R v Stone; in that case, the defendant convicted of manslaughter had 
failed to supply food to a conscious, elderly and infirm patient who was capable of feeding herself 
had food been supplied.143 Thus, that case was in no way comparable with that of Anthony Bland.  
An argument initially advanced on behalf of the Official Solicitor was that artificial hydration and 
nutrition (CAHN) formed basic care and did not amount to medical treatment. To the extent that 
it was actually relevant to do so, all three courts considered CAHN to constitute a form of ‘medical 
treatment’ or ‘medical care’.144 Some of the learned justices were also keen to point out the 
difficulty with drawing fine distinctions between medical care, basic care and medical treatment 
in this context.145 In the Court of Appeal, Sir Thomas Bingham MR stated: 
The overwhelming consensus of medical opinion (…) is that artificial feeding by 
nasogastric tube is also medical treatment (…) The insertion of the tube is a procedure 
calling for skill and knowledge, and the tube is invasive of the patient’s body to an extent 
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which feeding by spoon or cup is not. An intubated patient certainly looks as if he is 
undergoing treatment, and the mechanical pumping of food through the tube is a highly 
unnatural process. It does not, however, seem to me crucial whether this is regarded as 
medical treatment (…) since whether or not this is medical treatment[,] it forms part of the 
patient’s medical care and I cannot think the answer to this problem depends on fine 
definitional distinctions.146 
Butler-Sloss LJ opined that there was ‘overwhelming evidence upon which Sir Stephen Brown P 
was entitled to conclude’ that CAHN constituted medical treatment, however, similarly she stated: 
If we describe what is being done by the doctors and nurses for Anthony Bland (…) as 
medical care rather than treatment, it may to the layman make more sense and avoid the 
uncomfortable attempt to draw a line between different forms of feeding such as spoon-
feeding a helpless patient or inserting a tube through the nose or direct into the stomach.  
The definition of medical treatment does not, (…) resolve the problem. The underlying 
issue is whether, under the extreme circumstances of this case, there is a duty upon his 
doctor to continue to provide to Anthony Bland nutrition and hydration by an artificial 
method.147  
Particularly interesting in the context of legislative decisions to exclude CAHN from being refused 
in advance, Hoffmann LJ approached the matter differently in his judgment in the Court of Appeal. 
Rather than distinguishing between types of care and treatment, the learned judge tackled the 
question of whether it was ever ethical to ‘deny food to a patient’.148 He stated:  
It is of course hard to imagine a case in which it could be humane to deny food to a patient 
(…) To deny someone food is wrong because it causes suffering and death. But Anthony 
Bland cannot suffer and his condition is such that it is right that he should be allowed to 
die. His interest in the manner of his death (…) is that it should not be distressing or 
humiliating. If therefore, withdrawal of nourishment would produce distressing symptoms 
of which Anthony Bland was unconscious but which were visible to the nursing staff and 
family, this would be a good reason for allowing him to die in some other way. But the 
medical evidence is that suitable sedation can prevent any untoward symptoms and that 
withdrawal of nourishment is the most gentle and controlled way in which to allow him to 
die.149 
Noting the emotive language used by Counsel for the Official Solicitor – the Court of Appeal had 
considered it lawful for ‘a doctor to starve his patient to death’ – the learned judge opined that the 
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images evoked by that language - cruelty, suffering and unwelcome death – were false and 
inapplicable to the case of Anthony Bland. One could argue, perhaps, that such images do underpin 
the rationale for some legislatures in the United States prohibiting advance refusals of CAHN.150  
The House of Lords was unanimous in dismissing the appeal against Court of Appeal ruling, 
thereby permitting the withdrawal of treatment from Anthony Bland. In doing so, the Court found 
that prolonging his life in this manner was no longer in his best interests. This conclusion is 
interesting when it is juxtaposed with the view from the United States that the best interests 
standard is ‘unworkable’ where PVS patients are concerned.151 David English, for example, cites 
a series of cases where the court found it ‘impossible’ to apply the best interests standard to PVS 
patients.152 Post-Bland, other cases considered the circumstances in which life-sustaining 
treatment should be administered to (or withdrawn from) incompetent patients, using a ‘patient-
centred best interests standard’, which focused ‘on the values of the patient, and her global rather 
than just her medical interests.’153 In other words, Bland was a starting point and the current law 
has developed considerably since then. 
First, it became necessary to determine if the Human Rights Act 1998, which had not been in force 
at the time of Bland, now resulted in the withdrawal of CAHN from patients in PVS unlawful.154 
In NHS Trust A v M, NHS Trust B v H, the hospital trusts with the support of the families of two 
patients – Mrs M and Mrs H, who had been in PVS for 3 years and 9 months respectively – 
petitioned the court for a declaration that withdrawal of CAHN was compatible with the Act, which 
gave effect to Article 2.1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the protection 
of the right to life.155 
In finding that ceasing to treat a patient in PVS did not violate the Act, Butler-Sloss P eloquently 
stated: 
Although the intention in withdrawing artificial nutrition and hydration in PVS cases is to 
hasten death, in my judgment the phrase ‘deprivation of life’ must import a deliberate act, 
as opposed to an omission, by someone acting on behalf of the state, which results in death. 
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155 Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court 
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A responsible decision by a medical team not to provide treatment at the initial stage could 
not amount to intentional deprivation of life by the state. Such a decision based on clinical 
judgment is an omission to act. The death of the patient is the result of the illness or injury 
from which he suffered and that cannot be described as a deprivation. It may be relevant to 
look at the reasons for the clinical decision in the light of the positive obligation of the state 
to safeguard life, but, in my judgment, it cannot be regarded as falling within the negative 
obligation to refrain from taking life intentionally.156 
Furthermore, although pre-dating the Human Rights Act, Butler-Sloss P established the 
compatibility of the decision in Bland with Article 2.157 Consequently, the legal position regarding 
the treatment of patients in PVS could be summarised as follows: if a patient is in PVS with no 
prospect of recovery, then treatment will not be considered to be in his best interests. Sometimes, 
this is argued to be so because the patient has ‘no interests’, as was the contention made in St 
George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v P.158 Other times, it is argued that inherent in PVS is a lack of 
sentience and an absence of any prospect of recovery and accordingly, medical treatment cannot 
be of any benefit to patients in that state.159 Irrespective of the reasons why further treatment is 
determined not to be in the best interests of the patient, it remains the case that court orders 
approving the withdrawal or withholding of treatment from patients in PVS are almost automatic. 
As Baker J stated in Re M,  ‘the balance falls in one direction in every case—in favour of 
withdrawal’.160 Despite this, medical professionals still appeared to be prevented from exercising 
their judgement and withdrawing CAHN in PVS cases until recently. Instead, such cases had to be 
brought before the Court of Protection, a rule which has been criticised as ‘an expensive rubber-
stamping exercise’.161 As Alex Ruck Keene and Annabel Lee comment, decisions to withdraw 
CANH from a much larger group of patients, with diagnoses other than PVS and MCS, are made 
on a regular basis without the requirement for court approval, so the logic for such a requirement 
is questionable.162 
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Interestingly, in the 2017 case of Re M, the court found that it was unnecessary to bring the matter 
of withdrawal of CAHN from Ms M, a patient suffering from a disorder of consciousness as a 
result of Huntington’s Disease.163 Jackson J did so on two key grounds; first, he differentiated 
between the court rendering an act lawful and merely confirming that it is. Second, he highlighted 
the inconsistency of medical professionals and families being obliged to bring cases of withdrawal 
of CAHN to court, where there is no such requirement in other areas of medical decision-making; 
in short, he argued that medical professionals make decisions regarding life-sustaining treatment 
on a daily basis, with no court oversight. The opinion of the learned judge seems to strike a far 
better balance than requiring that all of these kinds of cases must be brought to court; it eliminates 
the costly and frankly unnecessary ‘automatic’ approval process, but leaves ample room for a court 
application if there is a difference of opinion between the care team and the family or indeed within 
the care team itself or the wider facility.  
Aside from compliance with the HRA 1998, it also became necessary post-Bland to clarify the 
legal position of patients who were not in PVS. The jurisprudence suggests that treatment will be 
withheld or withdrawn from an incompetent individual when that treatment is considered futile,164 
overly burdensome or both.165 The withdrawal or cessation of treatment from incompetent patients 
has also been authorised on the basis of a previously articulated wish to refuse treatment, even if 
such a preference is not expressed in the form of a valid advance decision;166 it must be stated, 
however, that the courts have been clear that wishes and feelings are not determinative of best 
interests, though they may help to establish the best interests of the particular individual.167 As 
Lady Hale DP stated in relation to the wishes of the individual in Aintree University Hospital 
Foundation Trust v James: 
The purpose of the best interests test is to consider matters from the patient’s point of view. 
That is not to say that his wishes must prevail, any more than those of a fully capable patient 
must prevail (...) But insofar as it is possible to ascertain the patient’s wishes and feelings, 
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his beliefs and values or the things which were important to him, it is those which should 
be taken into account because they are a component in making the choice which is right 
for him as an individual human being.168 
Thus, as Jackson argues: 
Post-Aintree (…) if the patient’s wishes can be ascertained, they should be central to the 
decision as to what is in her best interests. And in cases that have followed Aintree, judges 
sitting in the Court of Protection have been emboldened to take P’s wishes very seriously 
indeed, even when they are contrary to an ‘objective’ view of what is in P’s clinical best 
interests. 
Since Aintree, it appears that the courts are taking a more active role in giving effect to the 
(precedent) autonomy of the individual and their interests in self-determination, provided that there 
is clear evidence that the course of action is what the patient would have wanted. Coggon, however, 
appears to argue that this is insufficient to some extent and contends that where ‘a patient’s 
reflectively endorsed view on her interests is known, legally this should hold equal weight 
regardless of whether she has capacity or not’.169 This research would agree, as to do otherwise in 
the face of reliable and credible evidence as to the prior wishes of the individual appears to treat 
incompetent individuals less favourably than their competent counterparts without justification, 
thus undermining their autonomy.  
Arguably, however, pregnancy may be an example of a situation where the views of the woman 
towards the cessation or withholding of treatment could be considered indiscernible by a court or 
appear to hold less weight. For her views to be considered clear by the court, the woman would 
almost certainly have had to express them during pregnancy or have factored pregnancy into the 
conversation.  Otherwise, the decision to continue the pregnancy170 and its circumstances may well 
be viewed as indicating a desire to give birth to a healthy chid – which in turn may be viewed as 
altering her previous views – unless there is cogent evidence to the contrary.171 Afterall, there is 
an expectation inherent within society that the woman will sacrifice herself for her pregnancy, 
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whether that is borne out in the expectation that she will abstain from cigarettes and alcohol, 172 or 
by labelling routine or prescription drugs as ‘not safe in pregnancy’173 or in the expectation that 
she will eat a particular diet.174 For example, Anne Lyerly et al assert: 
A second cup of coffee, the occasional beer, the medication that treats a woman’s severe 
allergies but brings a slight increase in the risk of cleft palate, the particular SSRI that best 
treats a woman’s severe recalcitrant anxiety disorder but brings a small chance of heart 
defects—all are off limits, or nearly so, to a ‘good mother’.175 
If expectations of this nature are casually levelled at women, then likely also would the expectation 
that she would want to sacrifice her wishes in respect of her interests in bodily integrity and self-
determination. It should be said, however, that this does not preclude the possibility of a court 
deciding that the withholding of (further) treatment is in the best interests of the patient in light of 
futility or burdensomeness, just that any prior opinions expressed by her may be considered 
unreliable unless expressed specifically in relation to pregnancy. In other words, it is possible that 
what would have been the wishes of the pregnant individual may be circumvented by the law 
pertaining to best interests. 
A corollary of Aintree and its progenies has also been the case, in other words, treatment may be 
continued (partly) on the basis of previously expressed wishes of the patient. It still remains that 
wishes and values cannot be determinative; indeed, as discussed in Chapter 2, although a patient 
has the right to refuse treatment, it does not follow that she has a corresponding right to demand it 
against the professional judgement of the physician.176 Accordingly, the benefit or futility of any 
treatment will be of considerable relevance in a court’s determination of whether it should be 
withdrawn, withheld or maintained. Treatment will not be continued or administered if it is futile, 
irrespective of the previously expressed wishes of the patient; arguably, futility in such instances 
will have a very high bar if there is strong evidence that the individual would have wanted 
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treatment to continue. In St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v P, for example, a combination of 
Mr P’s religious beliefs and his previously expressed opinions and wishes resulted in life-
preserving treatment being administered despite his ‘profound and prolonged disorder of 
consciousness’, effectively MCS.177 While acknowledging that many others would not consider 
the circumstances of Mr P’s life to be ‘worthwhile’, Newton J was of the opinion that Mr P, 
himself, would have: 
In the light of his previously expressed strong views, coupled with his strong religious 
beliefs, the weight of the evidence all falls heavily to one side which is that the preservation 
of any life would be considered by P to be of significant value. His present circumstances 
are a life which P would find worthwhile, even though I entirely accept many others would 
not (…)178 
It is axiomatic that the corollary must also be the case, in other words, it is not for others to say 
that a life that they would regard as tolerable and acceptable would be viewed the same by the 
individual in question.179 
In discussing the relevance of Mr P’s wishes and values, the learned judge stated: 
The quality of life should be judged not by the values of others but from the particular 
perspective of the patient. In considering what the patient himself might regard as 
worthwhile P’s prior statement and behaviours (…) his wishes, his beliefs, his feelings and 
his values are all relevant (...) the very strong available evidence from P’s family and 
friends is highly relevant (…) All those matters point strongly to P wishing to ensure that 
life preserving treatment should continue whatever may befall him.180 
In the course of the judgment, the court considered statements, beliefs and opinions – such as Mr 
P’s disagreement with assisted dying, his opinion that chronic disability or illness did not render a 
life any less valuable, his religious beliefs regarding predestination and God’s role in death and his 
desire to receive the best possible treatment for his kidney condition – to be relevant in determining 
his best interests.181 It should be emphasised, however, that Newton J did not find the treatment in 
question to be futile or overly burdensome, despite the fact that Mr P was suffering from a serious 
disorder of consciousness with poor prospects of functional recovery.182 It is worth observing the 
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specific distinction between no prospect of recovery and no prospect of returning to ‘good health’ 
that was made by the court; the former, it was argued, could not be equated with the latter.183 
It is interesting to contrast the decision in P with the one reached in the first MCS case in England 
and Wales some 4 years earlier, namely Re M.184 Although both decisions resulted in the 
preservation of life being favoured, the reasons for the decisions and specifically the weight 
attached to the evidence of family members as to the wishes of the individual varied significantly. 
Despite evidence from her family as to what Ms M would have wanted – or more accurately, what 
she would not have wanted – the court ruled that the continuation of treatment was in her best 
interests. In reaching this conclusion, Baker J used the ‘balance-sheet test’ advocated by Thorpe 
LJ in Re A; this amounted to the process of ‘setting out the actual benefits to be gained from the 
medical procedure and any “counterbalancing disbenefits”’.185 The facts of Re M were as follows: 
Ms M suffered extensive and irreparable brain damage as a result of contracting viral encephalitis 
and while it initially appeared that she was in PVS, it was subsequently accepted that Ms M was 
in MCS.186 As she was immobile and doubly incontinent, she was completely dependent on others 
or medical intervention for her care and the consensus was that she had ‘no realistic prospect’ of 
improvement.187 She could experience pain, distress and discomfort and did so on a regular basis.  
Although Baker J acknowledged that ‘the law rightly requires the court to take into account (…) 
wishes and feelings when determining (…) best interests’, he categorised the statements made by 
Ms M as ‘informal’.188 Furthermore, he stated: 
[W]hilst I take those statements into account, they are not binding and in all the 
circumstances I do not consider they carry substantial weight in my decision. The factor 
which does carry substantial weight, in my judgment, is the preservation of life. Although 
not an absolute rule, the law regards the preservation of life as a fundamental principle.189 
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Given the importance of the sanctity of life, and the fatal consequences of withdrawing 
treatment (…) it would be in my judgment be wrong to attach significant weight to those 
statements made prior to her collapse.190 
It is worth contrasting the above with a later statement made by the learned judge in which he 
opined that ‘[t]he proper assessment of best interests in this context requires great weight to be 
given to M’s wishes and feelings and those of her family, past and present’.191 
Consequently, one could not be criticised for being unsure as to what weight was being attached 
to the statements of Ms M’s regarding her wishes and beliefs and what weight ought to be. 
Consequently, it is worth bearing in mind that the court appears to distance itself somewhat from 
Re M in subsequent judgments.192 Perhaps in trying to reconcile his seemingly inconsistent views, 
Baker J later stated: 
It is important to note that, while any decision-maker, including a judge, is under an 
obligation to consider P’s wishes and feelings, and the beliefs, values and other factors that 
he would have taken into account if he had capacity, the decision must be based on P’s best 
interests and not on what P would have decided if he had capacity.193 
It is interesting to note the apparent conflict in this passage; patients with capacity are entitled to 
decide for themselves and that decision will almost invariably stand, yet what a patient would have 
decided for herself in particular circumstances cannot be considered determinative. 194 One could 
argue that the apparent mutual exclusivity of the two factors – best interests and what would have 
been decided – is problematic. It should not be beyond the realms of possibility that what an 
individual would have decided if competent, once clearly ascertainable by the court, should be 
treated as being in the best interests of that patient.195 This is not to be conflated with including the 
wishes and feelings of the patient as part of a best interests assessment, where it is unclear what a 
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patient would have decided if she had capacity.196 Furthermore, with all due respect to the learned 
judge, it is debateable if that passage is an accurate reflection of the law or its intent; if it were, it 
would be questionable what basis, if any, advance directives would have for being legally binding. 
They are, after all, a written representation of ‘what P would have decided if he had capacity’. 
Perhaps further emphasising a somewhat questionable interpretation of the law, Baker J goes on 
to distinguish advance decisions: 
[T]he crucial distinction between an advance decision (…) and other expressions of wishes 
and feelings is that an advance decision must address specifically the circumstances in 
which it will be binding and is made in the knowledge that it will be decisive if those 
circumstances arise. In other words, an adult who makes an advance decision knows that 
it will be decisive in the event that he or she becomes incapacitated and is unable to 
communicate their current wishes and feelings.197 
At the risk of overstating the point, ‘wishes and feelings’ are not the same as ‘what the patient 
would have decided if he had capacity’, though the former may aid a conclusion as to the latter. 
As part of the balancing exercise, Baker J considered the views of the family of Ms M. They argued 
that she had always said that ‘she would rather shorten her life by ten years rather than have 
someone look after her’ and ‘was fiercely independent and (…) would have hated to have been 
looked after’.198 This was in response to witnessing both her grandmother and father being cared 
for and in response to the Bland case. It was the view of her partner that Ms M ‘would be horrified 
that she was carrying on in this undignified manner’, stating that ‘she was a very proud person and 
very conscious of how she presented herself’.199 He added that ‘she wouldn’t want to continue 
with this burdensome life with a lack of dignity’.200 In refusing the application of the family, 
however, Baker J found that the life of Ms M was ‘not without positive elements’.201 He 
determined that that she had ‘positive experiences and that, although her life [was] extremely 
restricted, it [was] not without pleasures, albeit small ones’.202 
Jackson contends that more recent cases concerning patients with a disorder of consciousness have 
demonstrated a trend towards ‘considerable’ weight being attached to the opinion of the family as 
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to what the individual would have wanted.203 For example, in Cumbria Clinical Commissioning 
Group v S,  Hayden J in states: 
I cannot over-emphasise the importance of listening to the family who ultimately know the 
patient’s personality best. That is not to say that their wishes and views should be 
determinative, but it is extremely important that they are heard and their observations given 
appropriate weight.204 
Citing Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Local Health Board v RY, however, Herring argues 
that the court remains ‘wary of putting too much weight on the views of relatives’.205 In the context 
of this case, Mary Donnelly contends that it seems that family evidence ‘weighs more heavily 
when it accords with medical evidence’.206 In any event, this judgment has subsequently been 
described by the court as one where the evidence was ‘not sufficiently cogent to be relied on’.207 
In short, it can be suggested that the court appears to have struck an appropriate balance regarding 
the opinion of the family; it has demonstrated a willingness to listen to and consider the views of 
family as to the wishes of the individual but also requires that those views are adequately evidenced 
and balanced against other relevant factors. Arguably, as stated previously, where the law has not 
struck quite as good of a balance is where giving effect to the wishes and feelings of the individual 
is concerned. 
New York 
As with the majority of areas of law in New York, law at the end-of-life must be understood in the 
broader context of legal developments in the United States. In 1976, Joseph Quinlan petitioned the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey to be appointed guardian of his daughter Karen.208 Ms Quinlan was 
described as being in a ‘chronic persistent vegetative state’, having lapsed into a coma in the 
previous year.209 The court acknowledged the consensus of medical professionals to be that ‘[n]o 
form of treatment which can cure or improve that condition is known or available’ and with due 
regard for the ‘uncertainties characteristic of most medical science predictions’, Karen could 
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‘never be restored to cognitive or sapient life’.210 In view of her prognosis, Mr Quinlan sought, as 
part of being appointed guardian over his daughter, that he would receive express power to 
authorise the withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment, in this case, mechanical ventilation. 
In assessing Mr Quinlan’s appeal, the court was required to answer two key questions: 
- First, was the decision of the trial court to refuse the specific relief requested by Mr 
Quinlan – authorisation for termination of life-sustaining measures – correct? 
- Second, was the decision of court to refuse to appoint Mr Quinlan guardian correct?211  
In the view of the Court paramount in answering these questions, was the constitutional right of 
privacy established in Griswold v Connecticut.212 The court was of the view that the interest of the 
State weakened and the right of the individual to privacy grew ‘as the degree of bodily invasion 
increases and the prognosis dims’.213 In relation to Ms Quinlan, Hughes CJ, speaking on behalf of 
the court, stated: 
Ultimately there comes a point at which the individual’s rights overcome the State interest. 
It is for that reason that we believe Karen’s choice, if she were competent to make it, would 
be vindicated by the law.214 
The analysis undertaken by the learned judge is not without criticism, however; Alan Meisel and 
Kathy Cerminara comment: 
The Quinlan court’s balancing test did not do justice to the significance of the individual’s 
interests at stake. The problem might be seen as only a procedural one: the court began 
with the state’s interests and claimed that they weaken as the individual’s right grows. 
Standard analysis would begin with the individual’s interest, which is presumed to 
predominate unless overcome by a sufficient state interest. In other words, there should be 
a presumption of a right to refuse treatment that countervailing state interests might 
overcome, rather than a presumption that treatment must be administered that grows 
weaker as the patient’s interests grow stronger.215 
This argument certainly has appeal given the jurisprudence as far back as the early 1900s, which 
dictated, not that the state had an interest in administering treatment to all, but that ‘[e]very human 
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own 
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body’.216 This was then subject to certain state interests, which may be considered countervailing 
depending on the circumstances. In any event, the New Jersey Supreme Court appears to have 
clarified the issue of how this balancing should be approached in subsequent cases.217 
The court acknowledged that Ms Quinlan was unable to make a choice given her incapacity, 
however, it found that her right to privacy could be asserted on her behalf by her father, as 
guardian.218 In explaining how the court had reached its decision, Hughes CJ was unequivocal: 
We perceive no thread of logic distinguishing between such a choice on Karen’s part [no 
State interest could compel her to endure treatment, only to vegetate a few measurable 
months with no realistic possibility of meaningful recovery] and a similar choice which 
(…) could be made by a competent patient terminally ill, riddled by cancer and suffering 
great pain; such a patient would not be resuscitated or put on a respirator (…) and a fortiori 
would not be kept against his will on a respirator.219 
In addition to the two primary questions at the heart of the case, it was also necessary for the court 
to address the issue of criminal liability and what the Court termed ‘The Medical Factor’ – in other 
words, the assertion that the substantive legal basis upon which Mr Quinlan’s rights as Karen’s 
representative are predicated ‘unwarrantably offends prevailing medical standards’.220 On the 
former; the court was of the firm view that criminal liability would not attach in such circumstances 
because ‘the implementation of a patient’s constitutional entitlement to resist life-sustaining 
medical intervention could not be deemed unlawful homicide’.221 The latter contention of offence 
to prevailing medical standards was rejected in view of the recognition within medical ethics that 
individuals are entitled to choose their own course of treatment.222 
Accordingly, the judgment given by the court was that once Mr Quinlan and the relevant 
physicians agreed on there being no reasonable possibility of a meaningful recovery223 and that 
the life-sustaining treatment should be withdrawn, the matter should be referred to the hospital 
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Ethics Committee for determination. Provided the Committee concurred, then treatment could be 
withdrawn without any civil or criminal liability. After the judgment, ventilation was withdrawn 
from Ms Quinlan, however, she began breathing unaided and survived for a further 9 years, as her 
family neither sought the withdrawal of artificial hydration and nutrition (CAHN) from the care 
facility nor by court application.224  
New Jersey subsequently adjudicated the matter of withdrawal of CAHN from an 84-year-old 
incompetent woman with irreversible mental and physical ailments.225 In that case, however, the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey based its decision on the common law doctrine of informed consent 
and right to self-determination, though it did recognise that a federal right of privacy might also 
be relevant.226 Although Ms Conroy died before the Supreme Court judgement, it ruled in favour 
of withdrawing treatment and overturned the judgment of the Appellate Court. The Court was of 
the view that the right of self-determination was not lost just because the individual was not aware 
that wat is being violated, thus incompetent individuals have a right to refuse treatment; this right, 
it was held, could be exercised by a surrogate decisionmaker using a ‘subjective’ standard when 
there was clear evidence that the incompetent person would have exercised it. In the absence of 
such evidence, this right could still be invoked in certain circumstances under objective ‘best 
interest’ standards. Accordingly, if credible evidence existed that the individual would have 
wanted to refuse treatment or have it withdrawn and the burden of continuing treatment and 
prolonging life markedly outweighed its benefits, treatment could be terminated under a ‘limited-
objective’ standard. Where no credible evidence existed and the continuation of life-sustaining 
treatment was viewed to be inhumane, a ‘pure-objective’ standard could be used to terminate 
treatment. If none of the standards could be met, then the court must err on the side of preserving 
life.   
Other state courts, for example Indiana, California and Illinois, have answered the question of 
withdrawal of CAHN from incompetent patients, with Indiana deciding that the family of an 
incompetent patient could lawfully withdraw it on behalf of the patient in Lawrence.227 The Court 
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of Appeals of California ruled that California probate statute permitted the conservator228 of the 
patient to order the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment on behalf of that patient provided that 
the decision was made in good faith based on medical advice and in the best interests of the 
patient.229 Similarly, in Longeway, the Supreme Court of Illinois based the right to refuse treatment 
on the doctrine of informed consent and ruled that Illinois probate law permitted a guardian to 
exercise the right of the incompetent individual to refuse CAHN in the event that the patient was 
terminally ill and irreversibly comatose.230 
In 1981, the New York cases of Storar and Eichner were combined and heard as one, as both cases 
concerned patients with no reasonable chance of recovery, rendered incompetent because of 
profound mental disability (Storar) and PVS (Eichner) respectively.231 Their guardians were 
opposed to the continuation of life-sustaining treatment; in the case of Brother Fox, the patient in 
Eichner, that was ventilation and in the case of Mr Storar, that was blood transfusions after his 
diagnosis of terminal bladder cancer.232 Brother Fox was a member of a Catholic religious order, 
who had discussed the Quinlan case as part of his community work. At that time and in line with 
Catholic teachings on the matter, he expressed the firm view that he would not want extraordinary 
measures if he were in circumstances similar to Ms Quinlan, a view that he repeated several years 
later prior to hospital admission. Wachtler J delivering the majority opinion stated: 
[T]here is no statute which prohibits a patient from declining necessary medical treatment 
or a doctor from honoring the patient’s decision. To the extent that existing statutory and 
decisional law manifests the State’s interest on this subject, they consistently support the 
right of the competent adult to make his own decision by imposing civil liability on those 
who perform medical treatment without consent, although the treatment may be beneficial 
or even necessary to preserve the patient’s life (...) The current law identifies the patient’s 
right to determine the course of his own medical treatment as paramount to what might 
otherwise be the doctor’s obligation to provide needed medical care. A State which 
imposes civil liability on a doctor if he violates the patient’s right cannot also hold him 
criminally responsible if he respects that right. Thus a doctor cannot be held to have 
violated his legal or professional responsibilities when he honors the right of a competent 
adult patient to decline medical treatment.233 
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The court found that Brother Fox had made the decision to refuse prior to becoming incompetent 
through his statements and treatment was withdrawn.234 In coming to this conclusion Wachtler J 
upheld the determination made in the lower courts that the evidence provided as to the statements 
of Brother Fox combined with his incapacity and negligible chance of recovery satisfied the 
standard of being ‘clear and convincing’.235 This is the higher standard of proof utilised in 
‘exceptional civil matters’.236 
The learned judge continued: 
The finding that he carefully reflected on the subject, expressed his views and concluded 
not to have his life prolonged by medical means if there were no hope of recovery is 
supported by his religious beliefs and is not inconsistent with his life of unselfish religious 
devotion. These were obviously solemn pronouncements and not casual remarks made at 
some social gathering, nor can it be said that he was too young to realize or feel the 
consequences of his statements.237 
Mr Storar, by contrast, was profoundly mentally disabled from childhood. His mother was 
appointed his guardian in 1979 after his cancer diagnosis as the hospital were unwilling to treat 
him without the consent of a legal guardian. After a brief period in remission he was diagnosed 
with terminal cancer, which included considerable blood loss as a symptom. The hospital sought 
to administer blood transfusions in order to compensate for the loss of blood and petitioned the 
court for an order to do so, however, Mrs Storar cross-petitioned for an order prohibiting the 
transfusions. On the one hand, Mr Storar found the transfusions and their after-effects distressing; 
on the other hand, he was observed as having more energy after them and a much-improved ability 
to undertake his usual daily activities, such as feeding himself, bathing and exercising. In refusing 
the application by Mrs Storar, Wachtler J, on behalf of the majority, stated: 
Although we understand and respect his mother’s despair, as we respect the beliefs of those 
who oppose transfusions on religious grounds, a court should not in the circumstances of 
this case allow an incompetent patient to bleed to death because someone (…) feels that 
this is best for one with an incurable disease.238 
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In short, there was no clear and convincing proof that Mr Storar did not want the blood 
transfusions, as he did not have the capacity to contemplate such a decision at any time in his life.  
It was argued by some that the clear result of judgments such as Storar was that patients who were 
incapable of decision-making ‘would have to be sustained no matter how much suffering or 
debilitation was being endured’.239 In other words, it appeared that individuals with permanent or 
long-term incapacity could never have treatment withdrawn at the request of a family member. In 
that context, it is interesting to contrast Storar with the judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts in Saikewicz, in which life-prolonging chemotherapy was withheld from a severely 
mentally disabled man.240 Undoubtedly, the legal challenges in relation to the withdrawal of 
treatment from patients with long term incapacity was one of the impetuses for the change to New 
York law given effect by the Health Care Decisions Act for Persons With Mental Retardation 
(HCDA).241  
Returning briefly to the emotive language used by Wachtler J, namely allowing ‘an incompetent 
patient to bleed to death’, one could argue that it resonates with the emotive language seen in 
relation to withdrawal of CAHN, of allowing patients to starve to death. The Court seemed 
somewhat preoccupied with the blood loss that could be mitigated by the treatment and the 
resulting temporary improvement to his ability to undertake some tasks and less concerned with 
the fact that Mr Storar was terminally ill with no more than a few months to live. In his dissenting 
judgment, Jones J was persuaded by the combination of the incurable cancer, the short life 
expectancy and the negative effects of the blood transfusions – what could perhaps be described 
as the futility or burdensomeness of the treatment in question.242 In particular, he noted that the 
‘the transfusions did not serve to reduce John’s pain or to make him more comfortable’ nor did 
they ‘serve a curative purpose or offer a reasonable hope of benefit’ and therefore he viewed them 
to constitute ‘extraordinary treatments’, which could be ceased in the circumstances.243 
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Consequently, it could be argued that the approach of the learned justice seems to be more similar 
to the approach taken in England and Wales and Ireland than to that taken by his fellow justices. 
Although honourably intended and likely ‘grounded in the apprehension that helpless patients 
would otherwise be abused by insensitive quality-of-life decisions on the part of prejudiced or self-
interested decision-makers’,244 the challenges created by the ‘clear and convincing’ standard were 
highlighted in the subsequent case of O’Connor.245 This case will be examined in considerably 
more detail in the next chapter in light of its relevance to advance directives, however, for the 
purpose of this chapter, it set the test for withdrawal of treatment as ‘clear and convincing proof 
that the patient had made a firm and settled commitment, while competent, to decline this type of 
medical assistance’ under the particular circumstances.246 In the absence of such proof, it appeared 
that life-sustaining treatment could not be withdrawn. Thus, the standard effectively prevented 
termination of treatment unless the patient had made a living will or had the good fortune to make 
an oral statement open to no other interpretation.247 Indeed, John Regan argued that based on 
O’Connor ‘[i]f no advance directive exists and a DNR order is not at issue, the Court of Appeals 
has held that no one - neither family nor physician nor court - can authorize the withholding or 
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from an incapacitated patient’.248 In other words, the input 
of the family regarding the care of a loved one was limited to resuscitation,249 a legal position 
amended by the introduction of the Family Health Care Decision Act in 2010, which will be 
discussed in more detail later in this chapter.  
 
Despite evidence of several conversations where Mrs O’Connor had expressed her opposition to 
life-sustaining treatment, the court found that she had not made a ‘firm and settled commitment’ 
to refuse. Rather, her statements were viewed as a type of statement ‘that older people frequently, 
almost invariably make’ and as ‘immediate reactions to the unsettling experience of seeing (…) 
another’s unnecessarily prolonged death’.250 These were contrasted with the statements made by 
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Brother Fox regarding ventilation, which were viewed to amount to his ‘moral and personal views 
concerning the use of a respirator on persons in a vegetative state’ following careful reflection on 
the subject;251 thus, his decision was one that was grounded in his faith and consistent with the 
way he had lived his life in the view of the court. The restrictiveness of the ‘O’Connor standard’ 
is evident and can be contrasted sharply with cases from other states such as Conroy, which was 
discussed earlier. Indeed, as was contended by the New York State Task Force on Life and Law: 
 
[T]he clear and convincing evidence standard is often unworkable and inhumane. It is a 
legal standard that translates poorly at the bedside where families and health care 
professionals must confront the hard choices that incurable illness and medical advances 
present (…) It is simply unrealistic and unfair for the vast majority of the public.252  
 
English argues that patients who have satisfied restrictive standards like O’Connor have generally 
managed to do so because they ‘made their views known only following the onset of a terminal 
illness’ – as was the case in the Ohio case of Couture253 – or where the professional background 
of the individual added extra credibility to their statements – as was the situation in the Connecticut 
case of McConnell254 and indeed, Eichner.255 Samantha Halliday and Lars Witteck argue that a 
further problem with such high standards is that they may ‘simply encourage families to 
manufacture evidence of the patient’s view, for example, by recalling conversations where the 
patient purportedly said she would not wish a particular treatment to be given to her in the 
circumstances she now finds herself in’.256 Even if the family have not manufactured the evidence, 
it is entirely possible that their recollection of the conversation may be different to what really took 
place. Unconsciously, what they recall may be coloured by their own views on the matter, or they 
may have forgotten important contextual aspects of the conversation or they may simply put more 
weight on particular statements made by the patient, forgetting others.  
 
In 1990, the Supreme Court of the United States had its first opportunity to consider the withdrawal 
of life-sustaining measures from a patient in PVS. In 1983, Nancy Cruzan was involved in a car 
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accident; she was found face-down in a water-logged ditch with no detectable respiratory or 
cardiac function. Efforts to revive her at the scene were successful, in that cardiac function and 
spontaneous respiration were restored, however she did not regain consciousness and suffered 
severe and irreversible brain damage as a result of prolonged oxygen deprivation. She was 
subsequently diagnosed as being in a persistent vegetative state, namely ‘a condition in which a 
person exhibits motor reflexes but evinces no indications of significant cognitive function’.257 A 
number of efforts were made to rehabilitate her, however, they were unsuccessful. Among other 
results of the condition, Ms Cruzan was ‘oblivious to her environment except for reflexive 
responses to sound and perhaps painful stimuli’ and had ‘no cognitive or reflexive ability to 
swallow food or water to maintain her daily essential needs’, nor would she ever recover such 
ability.258 Some 5 years after the accident, Ms Cruzan’s parents requested that artificial hydration 
and nutrition be terminated by the hospital. The hospital employees refused to do so in the absence 
of a court order, so Mr and Mrs Cruzan sought a declaratory judgment to authorise the cessation 
of CAHN. The trial court made the order to remove the feeding tube from Ms Cruzan;259 the 
Supreme Court of Missouri, however, reversed the order in a split decision finding that the State 
had ‘expressed a strong policy favoring life’ meaning that the Court had to ‘err on the side of 
preserving life’.260 While the Court recognised a right to refuse treatment stemming from the 
common law doctrine of informed consent, it found that the right to refuse rested with the 
individual herself and that neither the formalities required under Missouri’s Living Will statute 
nor clear and convincing evidence of Ms Cruzan’s wishes were present.261 
The trial court found statements made by Ms Cruzan to her housemate that if she were ever sick 
or injured, she would not want to continue her life unless she could live ‘halfway normally’ were 
considered to indicate that she would not have wanted treatment to be continued in such 
circumstances. The Supreme Court of Missouri, however, viewed these statements to be 
unconvincing and ruled that the interest of the State in preserving life was paramount in this case: 
[T]he evidence (…) as to Nancy’s wishes is inherently unreliable and thus insufficient to 
support the co-guardian’s claim to exercise substituted judgment on Nancy’s behalf. The 
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burden of continuing the provision of food and water, while emotionally substantial for 
Nancy’s loved ones, is not substantial for Nancy. The State’s interest is in the preservation 
of life, not only Nancy’s life, but also the lives of persons similarly situated yet without the 
support of a loving family. This interest outweighs any rights invoked on Nancy’s behalf 
to terminate treatment in the face of the uncertainty of Nancy’s wishes and her own right 
to life.262 
Chief Justice Rehnquist summarised the question before the United States Supreme Court in 
Cruzan as whether the United States Constitution prohibited the state of Missouri from choosing 
the rule that it did, namely the ‘clear and convincing’ rule. In doing so, Rehnquist CJ stated that 
Cruzan was ‘the first case in which we have been squarely presented with the issue whether the 
United States Constitution grants what is in common parlance referred to as a “right to die”.’263 
The Supreme Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, which provides that 
no State shall ‘deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law’, could 
be interpreted as conferring a competent person with a constitutionally protected liberty interest in 
refusing unwanted medical treatment.264 As the Court noted, however, the inquiry did not end at 
‘determining that a person has a “liberty interest”’. 265 Rather, it must be established that one’s 
constitutional rights have been violated by balancing one’s liberty interests against the relevant 
state interests.266 In the context of this research, it is interesting to note that the Court did not view 
the right to refuse medical treatment as one grounded in the constitutional right to privacy – as it 
had done with reproductive healthcare matters such as abortion and contraception267 – opting 
instead to ground the right in a liberty interest. Anne Marie Gaudin suggests explanations for the 
Court veering away from the right to privacy: first, the Court ‘felt uncomfortable in giving the 
right to die the substantive protection of the right to privacy because the exercise of this right leads 
to death, whereas the typical exercise of the right to privacy does not have such extreme 
consequences’.268 Second and the ‘most probable possibility’ was, in her view, that ‘the 
conservative Court wanted to tighten the reins on the growing right to privacy’.269 
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In balancing the ‘liberty interests against the relevant state interests’, the Supreme Court found, by 
majority, that the procedural requirement in the state of Missouri that ‘clear and convincing’ 
evidence of the incompetent’s wishes as to the withdrawal of treatment be provided was not 
unconstitutional: 
The choice between life and death is a deeply personal decision of obvious and 
overwhelming finality. We believe Missouri may legitimately seek to safeguard the 
personal element of this choice through the imposition of heightened evidentiary 
requirements (…) we think a State may properly decline to make judgments about the 
‘quality’ of life that a particular individual may enjoy, and simply assert an unqualified 
interest in the preservation of human life to be weighed against the constitutionally 
protected interests of the individual (…) In our view, Missouri has permissibly sought to 
advance these interests through the adoption of a ‘clear and convincing’ standard of proof 
to govern such proceedings.270 
(…) Missouri may permissibly place an increased risk of an erroneous decision on those 
seeking to terminate an incompetent individual’s life-sustaining treatment. An erroneous 
decision not to terminate results in a maintenance of the status quo; the possibility of 
subsequent developments such as advancements in medical science (…) or simply the 
unexpected death of the patient (…) at least create the potential that a wrong decision will 
eventually be corrected or its impact mitigated. An erroneous decision (…) is not 
susceptible of correction.271 
For the reasons outlined previously in this chapter, it is interesting to note the apparent acceptance 
of the United States Supreme Court of CAHN as medical care or treatment.272  
Critically for New York, Cruzan solidified its entitlement to require ‘clear and convincing’ proof 
of a settled decision to refuse treatment, as it had done in O’Connor. Post-Cruzan, the US Supreme 
Court upheld the right of the individual to refuse life-sustaining treatment, however, this right 
could not be understood as a right to assisted suicide; in other words, it was not unconstitutional 
for Washington state to prohibit assisted suicide.273 Following on from the jurisprudence in New 
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York the 1980s, only one thing was clear, namely that a patient with decision-making capacity had 
the right to consent to or decline life-sustaining treatment in the state. The position of incompetent 
individuals was considerably more uncertain. Consequently, the New York Governor at the time, 
Mario Cuomo, identified the need for public discussion and consultation on end-of-life matters 
and advancements in medical technology and the associated ethical and legal considerations. 
Consequently, he convened the New York State Task Force on Life and Law in 1985, which was 
tasked with considering ‘the determination of death, the withdrawal and withholding of life-
sustaining treatment, organ transplantation, the treatment of disabled newborns and new 
technologies and practices to assist reproduction’ among other issues.274 In its 1992 report, ‘When 
Others Must Choose: Deciding for Patients Without Capacity’, the Task Force recognised that 
because of the ‘legal precedents established by the New York Court of Appeals, only the legislature 
can authorize family members and others close to [a] patient to decide about life-sustaining 
treatment’.275 In acknowledging the serious problems with New York law, the Task Force 
proposed a model of surrogate decision-making, which it hoped found a middle ground between 
the ‘medical model of informal decisions at the bedside and the judicial model with all its 
procedural and evidentiary requirements’.276 This framework for surrogate decision-making saw 
almost 20 years of debate, eventually being passed as the Family Health Care Decision Act in 
2010.277 
After its introduction, the FHCDA changed matters considerably in New York. It may be 
remembered that in the wake of O’Connor, it was argued by commentators that neither family nor 
physician had the power to authorise the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment 
from an incapacitated patient, save in very narrow circumstances.278 After its introduction, the 
FHCDA introduced a range of provisions to regulate medical decision-making for patients who 
have lost capacity and who do not have a guardian appointed.279 Broadly speaking, the FHCDA 
gives medical decision-making authority to people with a close relationship to the patient, such as 
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family or friends, when the patient is incompetent and should she not have another legal instrument 
to govern such a situation such as an advance decision, health care agent or guardian. The decision-
makers are known as ‘surrogates’. For the avoidance of confusion, it sets out the order of priority 
according to which decision-making authority should attach; for example, an adult child ranks 
higher than a parent.280 Should a person with higher priority on the list choose not to act as 
decision-maker on behalf of the individual, the person with the next highest priority has the right 
to act. It also establishes who may not have decision-making authority for the patient, for example, 
an employee of the hospital from which the patient was transferred.281 As was discussed in Chapter 
3, the decision-maker must make choices based on the wishes of the individual, including their 
religious and moral beliefs and if these are unknown and unascertainable, decisions must be based 
on best interests.282 Critically, it permits decisions to be made on behalf of the patient on the 
withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment. Such treatment can be discontinued or 
refused if it would constitute ‘an extraordinary burden to the patient’ and she is permanently 
unconscious, or likely to die within six months.283 Furthermore, treatment can be withdrawn or 
withheld if it would ‘involve such pain, suffering or other burden that it would reasonably be 
deemed inhumane or extraordinarily burdensome’ and the individual suffers from an ‘irreversible 
or incurable condition’.284 Perhaps, if this legislation had been in force when Mrs O’Connor’s 
daughters had attempted to refuse treatment for their mother, the outcome may have been different; 
on the other hand, it is possible that they would have been unable to demonstrate the ‘extraordinary 
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The FHCDA also creates a framework for medical professionals to make decisions on behalf of 
incompetent patients. Where the patient does not have a family member or friend to make decisions 
on his behalf, then a physician or nurse practitioner may make routine decisions on behalf of the 
patient and major decisions on his behalf, subject to certain additional requirements.287 Decisions 
to refuse or withdraw life-sustaining treatment can be made by physicians or nurse practitioners 
only if they determine that the treatment offers no medical benefit to the patient because she will 
die imminently even with treatment and the provision of the treatment in question would violate 
accepted medical standards.288 Such a decision must have independent concurrence of a second 
physician or nurse practitioner chosen by the hospital.289 
Conclusion 
Prior to understanding the legal and ethical complexities associated with advance directives and 
indeed their history, it was necessary to understand the complexities associated with end-of-life 
decisions and its legal development. This should not be surprising, as it is advance refusals of life-
sustaining treatment that garner the most debate and difficulty for those involved. This chapter 
discussed the ethical issues arising in the context of end-of-life matters and argued that where a 
clear decision has been made by a competent person, whether contemporaneously or in advance, 
that such a decision should be honoured. Giving effect to such a decision is consistent with the 
fundamental principles of medical ethics; respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and 
justice. How such a position is affected by pregnancy, however, will be considered in Chapter 6, 
when compelled treatment in pregnancy is explored. The law in Ireland, England and Wales and 
the United States has generally developed along the same lines – sometimes through legislation 
and other times through common law – permitting medical treatment to be withdrawn where it is 
best for the individual or where it is clear that withdrawal is what the individual would have 
wanted, or both. Although the ways in which this general rule manifests certainly does vary 
between jurisdictions, as was articulated above, the fundamental underpinnings are the same. It is 
this acceptance that the competent person can decide for himself, contemporaneously or in 
advance, that underpins the idea of advance directives, as will be expanded upon in the next 
chapter. 
 
287 For example, the physician or nurse practitioner must consult with other members of the patient’s care team and the decision must have approval 
of another physician or nurse practitioner chosen by the hospital per Public Health Law §2994-g section 4. 
288 Public Health Law §2994-d section 5(b). 
289 ibid. 
Chapter 5  
Introduction 
People, while still competent, care mightily whether their cherished values, including 
dignity, will ultimately be respected in the dying process. In recognition of the 
importance of this self-determination, virtually all jurisdictions provide that a person’s 
articulated wishes contained in an advance directive should be honored post-
competence, just as a person’s wishes about testamentary disposition of property are 
respected even though the dead person cannot sense violation of those wishes.1 
In the 1960s, a lawyer and the co-founder of Amnesty International, Luis Kutner, identified a 
considerable legal gap in the right of a patient to refuse medical treatment.2 He questioned how 
an individual could retain the right of privacy over his body and of self-determination, given 
that the law required him to be treated to preserve his life once he was in a condition that 
precluded consent from being given.3 This was despite the fact that the law also provided that 
a patient may not be subjected to treatment without his consent, namely the common law 
doctrine of informed consent.4 The requirement for the physician to presume that a patient 
wished to be treated to preserve his life led to situations where patients were being treated 
despite having no desire to be kept alive ‘in a state of indefinite vegetated animation’.5 
Furthermore, he identified the very difficult position in which the law placed the physician; 
any failure on his part to act fully to keep the patient alive in a particular instance may have 
resulted in liability for negligence.6 His solution was the ‘Living Will’: 
Where a patient undergoes surgery or other radical treatment, the surgeon or the 
hospital will require him to sign a legal statement indicating his consent to the 
treatment. The patient, however, while still retaining his mental faculties and the ability 
to convey his thoughts, could append to such a document a clause providing that, if his 
condition becomes incurable and his bodily state vegetative with no possibility that he 
could recover his complete faculties, his consent to further treatment would be 
terminated. The physician would then be precluded from prescribing further surgery, 
radiation, drugs or the running of resuscitating and other machinery, and the patient 
would be permitted to die by virtue of the physician's inaction.7 
Kutner went on to state that some patients may never have the opportunity to consent, as they 
may be admitted suddenly to hospital, as opposed to having prearranged treatment or surgery. 
In such a circumstance, his view was that the patient should be able to create a document where 
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he could indicate the extent to which he would consent to treatment, while still in possession 
of his mental faculties and the ability to express himself.8 This document, he stated, may be 
referred to as ‘a living will’.9 
Kutner went further to propose a legal model for his living will, drawing from the law of trusts. 
He advocated for the document to be notarised and witnessed by at least two people who would 
confirm the capacity of the directive maker and the voluntariness of the decision. He proposed 
that the individual carry a copy of the document on his person at all times, while another trusted 
individual such as his wife, physician or lawyer would retain the original. He considered the 
possibility of ambiguity, contending that ‘[s]tatements and actions subsequent to the writing of 
the document may indicate a contrary intent’ and proposed that ambiguity should be resolved 
in favour of treating the patient until clarity could be reached.10 He also proposed the possibility 
of revocation of the document.11 
Kutner proposed eligibility criteria for drafting a living will and identified features that would 
render it invalid or inapplicable. He stressed that a living will could only be made by individuals 
capable of giving consent to treatment and specifically ruled out minors and those who were 
adjudged incompetent.12 He expanded further that if an individual is adjudged incompetent 
after drafting a living will, then that will would be invalid except if the incompetence is the 
result of the medical condition necessitating the declaration in the first place. He proposed that 
a parent should not be able to make a living will on behalf of his child, nor should a guardian 
be permitted to make one on behalf of his ward, ensuring that one could only make a decision 
for oneself, thereby protecting vulnerable persons from having treatment withheld on the basis 
of the convictions of another.13 Because much of the basis of Kutner’s article was euthanasia, 
he specified that whilst a patient may determine the type of medical treatment he may receive, 
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he could not use a living will as a mechanism for active euthanasia – ‘as means for directing a 
doctor or another individual to act affirmatively to terminate his life’.14 It is fascinating that 
over 50 years later, the mechanism proposed by Kutner is by and large the model that is used 
across common law countries.  
Detailing and evaluating the law on the right of a pregnant woman to refuse medical 
intervention in advance is unachievable without first getting a clear picture of the law, which 
applies to advance decisions and its historical development. Thus, this chapter is of critical 
importance to this research as a whole and in particular to the next chapter, wherein compelled 
intervention in pregnancy and pregnancy exceptions to advance directive statues will be 
considered. Accordingly, this chapter will explore the law on advance directives in Ireland, 
England and Wales and New York State with reference to the United States more generally. 
To thoroughly examine the legal position in New York, it is necessary to consider the United 
States more broadly, as the ‘historical home’ of advance decisions. Inextricably linked to the 
law on advance directives, are the ethical issues underpinning them; accordingly, this chapter 
will also consider those in some detail. There is one key point to note about advance directives 
– certainly the legal aspect of them – as distinct from other areas of the law, there is relatively 
little applicable case law. Perhaps this is because it is ‘relatively uncommon’ for lay people to 
prepare advance directives, as Hayden J stated in NHS Cumbria CCG v Rushton.15 Or perhaps, 
as he also suggests, the lack of jurisprudence is a testament to their effectiveness.16 To some 
extent, both theories are supported by literature. Studies in the United States in the early 1990s 
demonstrated that although the vast majority of people would want minimal, if any, treatment 
were they to have a condition with no hope of recovery, the vast majority of them also had no 
advance directive.17 For example, as part of his argument that withdrawing or withholding life 
support measures should be the default setting and people should have to ‘opt out’ if they wish 
to receive more aggressive treatment, James Lindgren uses a range of sources to demonstrate 
that Americans of varying ages would not want life-sustaining measures in situations, such as 
irreversible coma and terminal illness, yet between 76% and 87% had no advance directive to 
that effect.18 Some more recent studies, however, point to an increasing number of Americans 
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– 29-36% – having advance directives, perhaps suggesting that there could be some accuracy 
in the Honourable Mr Justice Hayden’s second point.19 It has also been suggested that this 
figure is higher again amongst older persons.20 In any event, it is perhaps most likely that it is 
a combination of both their (under-) utilisation and their effectiveness that has resulted in the 
dearth of case law. 
Ethics of Advance Directives 
While much of the ethical issues surrounding advance directives have already been addressed 
– as they arise in the context of consent and refusal of medical treatment and of end-of-life 
decision-making – there are some important distinctions to make. While some end-of-life cases 
concerned the tension between prior wishes of the competent person and the current position 
of the incompetent person – or as Mary Donnelly describes it, ‘the relationship between a 
person’s past and present will and preferences’21 – all advance directives have this tension. 
Thus, the notion of precedent autonomy is worth specifically addressing. It is contended that 
advance directives maximise the autonomy of the individual; intuitively, this is an extension 
of the idea that one of the underpinning reasons for the legal and ethical duty to seek consent 
prior to administering treatment is respect for the autonomy of the person.22 It is also an 
extension of the idea that refraining from administering life-sustaining treatment in the face of 
a competent refusal maximises the autonomy of the person. It allows individuals who lose 
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for two reasons. First, it focuses on the number of geriatricians who had encountered an advance directive, not on the percentage of patients 
that had one; the surveyed medical professionals could have come into contact with one or dozens of advance directives over their career. 
Second, by surveying only geriatricians, the study will only interact with elderly patients, thereby giving no insight into the general population. 
These are not criticisms of the study, the limitations articulated merely reflect what was and was not the purpose of the study; Rebekah Schiff 
and others, ‘Living Wills and the Mental Capacity Act: A Postal Questionnaire Survey of UK Geriatricians’ (2006) 35 Age and Ageing 116.  
20 In 2008, the AARP found that 53% of the 3024 respondents to their ‘Caregiving and End-of-Life Issues’ survey in Florida had a living will. 
Terri Guengerich, ‘Caregiving and End-of-Life Issues: A Survey of AARP Members in Florida’ 2009 < 
https://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/il/fl_eol_08.pdf> accessed 16 January 2020.  
21 Mary Donnelly, ‘Deciding in Dementia: The Possibilities and Limits of Supported Decision-making’ (2019) 66 Int’l J L & Psychiatry 
101466, 3. 
22 For a full discussion of the relationship between consent to medical treatment and autonomy, see Chapter 3. 
capacity to have the same ability to make choices based on their wishes and preferences, as 
competent individuals. As Samantha Halliday argues: 
The principle of patient autonomy stresses respect for the patient as an individual, rather 
than as an object of concern, and attempts to promote precedent autonomy aim to extend 
that respect to those no longer capable of exercising autonomy and so to prioritise the 
patient's wishes over her welfare.23 
Thus, if one can decide to contemporaneously refuse treatment in line with one’s own priorities, 
perhaps objectively acting against one’s interests, why should one not be allowed to do so in 
advance?24 There are those who point out, however, that there may be conflict between one’s 
wishes for the future and one’s present interests once incompetent and that this calls into 
question the very justification for advance directives because they accord less respect to the 
interests of existing person than they do to the wishes of the ‘earlier’ person, who no longer 
exists.25 Ronald Dworkin accepts the idea that we think about the rights and interests of the 
person in two different ways; as an incompetent person or as a person who has become 
incompetent.26 He goes on to defend the idea of the interests of the previously competent person 
potentially outweighing the interests of the now incompetent person on the basis of the kinds 
of interests involved, namely ‘critical interests’ and ‘experiential interests’.27 The former 
concern critical value judgements and give meaning to our lives;28 thus, if such interests are 
satisfied, then one’s life will be more positive and if they are left unsatisfied, one’s life will be 
worse. Wishing to shape one’s death is a legitimate exercise of one’s critical interests in his 
view.29 So too is making an advance directive designed to apply when one becomes 
demented.30 Think, for example, of the woman who was fiercely independent her whole life 
only to end it completely dependent on others, demented or not. Such an ending, unless desired 
by the woman for some reason, would be out of character when the rest of her life is considered. 
‘Experiential interests’, by contrast, concern desirable and undesirable matters such as 
enjoyment or pain. He argues that there is a substantial difference between these interests and 
that critical interests ought to be determinative.  
 
23 Samantha Halliday, ‘Legislating to Give Effect to Precedent Autonomy: Comparative Reflections on Legislative Incompetence’ (2011) 11 
Med L Int’l 127, 128 (emphasis added). 
24 ibid 129: ‘Autonomy's central premise is that individuals should be permitted to make decisions for themselves, but the corollary to this 
must be that individuals must be able to make decisions contrary to their own best interests that they might later regret and that choosing to 
exercise autonomy in anticipation of incapacity involves accepting responsibility for that choice.’ See also Ronald Dworkin, Life’s Dominion: 
An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia and Individual Freedom (Harper Collins 1993) 224. 
25 Rebecca Dresser, ‘Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients: Conceptual Infirmities and Hidden Values in the Law’ (1986) 28 Ariz L Rev 373, 
379-81. This conflict is affected by a number of factors including the nature of the incompetent and its permanence.  
26 Ronald Dworkin, Life’s Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia and Individual Freedom (Harper Collins 1993) 221. The exact 
phrasing he uses is ‘the demented person’ and ‘a person who has become demented’. 
27 ibid 201-8. 
28 ibid. 
29 ibid; he gives the example of the person who can reject life-saving amputation. 
30 ibid 226. 
Irrespective of whether or not one subscribes to Dworkin’s particular categorisation of interests 
or concurs with his view on the degree to which critical interests should trump experiential 
ones, there is merit in his general line or argument.31 Where an individual has contemplated 
her future to the extent that she has a vision for it and critically, a vision of what she does not 
want it to be, then that is important and worthy of respect.32 In other words, the wishes of the 
now incompetent person ought not to outweigh those of the once competent individual. Thus, 
it is argued that advance directives can be viewed as extending the self-determination of the 
individual into the future.33 This is clearly based on the previously defended assumption that 
the maximisation of the autonomy of the individual is a legitimate aim. 
Advance directives also interact with the principles of non-maleficence and beneficence. As 
was articulated in the previous chapters, the treatment of a patient against her will, in the 
absence of a morally relevant justification, breaches the principle of non-maleficence; the 
corollary of this is that refraining from treating the patient and honouring her advance directive 
is the medical professional acting in a way consistent with the principles of non-maleficence 
and beneficence. Some challenges to these assertions will now be discussed in the context of 
criticism of advance directives.   
Criticisms of Advance Directives 
Advance directives are not without their criticisms.34 The following criticisms are not designed 
to form an exhaustive list, rather a selection of the most common criticisms, which are neither 
mechanical in nature, nor purely ethical.35 What then is meant by ‘mechanical’? In short, the 
criticisms that will be discussed attack the concept of the advance directive and not merely 
their legal framework. For example, the unavailability of an advance directive at the time of 
treatment, thereby rendering them pointless or ineffective, is not an issue with advance 
directives as a concept; rather, it is an issue that could be easily remedied by the law itself by 
 
31 He suggests that if a hypothetical woman with dementia made an advance directive to end her life, that her wishes should be honoured. This 
research would not advance that position for a variety of reasons, however, the idea that one should be able to hasten death by refusing specific 
intervention – in line with how the law on advance directives is generally constructed – when one has dementia is supported. For a strong 
criticism of Dworkin’s work, see Rebecca Dresser, ‘Dworkin on Dementia: Elegant Theory, Questionable Policy (1995) 25 Hastings Center 
Report 32. 
32 ibid 24: Rebecca Dresser argues that the low number of people who engage in end-of-life planning and who draft advance directives may 
‘indicate that issuing explicit instructions to govern the final chapter of one's life is not a major priority for most people’. This she argues 
raises questions about how ‘precious’, ‘valued’ and worthy of protection this freedom really is. 
33 Jochen Vollmann, ‘Advance Directives in Patients with Alzheimer’s disease; Ethical and Clinical Considerations’ (2001) 4 Med Health 
Care & Philos 161. 
34 Criticisms based on more ‘practical’ aspects of advance directives – such as them often being unavailable at the time of treatment, therefore 
rendering them pointless or ineffective – will not be considered, as often the practical issues with advance directives can easily be remedied 
by the law itself. For example, a central register of advance directives may limit individuals being treated against their preference where their 
advance directive has been stored with a family member or GP.  
35 That is not to say that the following criticisms will not have an ethical component to them, rather they are not solely ethical issues, as those 
have already been addressed. 
creating a central register of advance directives.36 Broadly speaking, these criticisms can be 
defined as: 
(i) The Failure to Maximise Autonomy 
(ii) Narrowness or Restrictiveness; 
(iii) The inability of individuals to make the correct advance decision for themselves; 
and 
(iv) The susceptibility of the individual to phrasing. 
Failure to Maximise Autonomy  
As alluded to briefly in the previous section, there are challenges to the argument that advance 
directives maximise autonomy; these, it is argued, are frequently based on the relationship, or 
lack thereof, between our current wishes for our ‘future self’ and the wishes that we have when 
that future point in time is reached.37 For example, George Loewenstein argues that ‘[p]atient 
autonomy is a wonderful thing if it means implementing choices that meet patients’ long-term 
preferences, but if patients change their preferences from moment to moment, then decisions 
are likely to have a large arbitrary component’.38 Christopher Ryan argues similarly that 
advance directives do not promote autonomy; in support of this, he argues that individuals are 
prohibited from making truly autonomous choices when they create advance directives because 
they are unaware of the ‘distinct possibility that their choices may be inaccurate’.39 If one is 
unaware of this, he argues, then one lacks a vital piece of information that enables an 
autonomous choice.40 When one views this challenge in light of the principle of non-
maleficence; if refusing treatment is not actually what the individual wants, then it is difficult 
to conclude that the physician is doing harm by treating her. 
Although Ryan restricts his criticism to advance directives that state that the individual ‘receive 
only conservative or palliative care (…) where that incompetence is potentially reversible’, his 
argument still causes difficulty. He contends that it is not an autonomous choice to refuse life-
prolonging treatment in advance, however, neither is a contemporaneous decision given that 
the person has lost capacity. Furthermore, his argument is based on the disparity between the 
attitudes of healthy people towards treatment in terminal illness and the attitudes of those with 
terminal illness, which he argues ‘strongly suggests that many people who, when healthy, 
 
36 Whether a centralised system of advance directives is desirable is not within the scope of this research. The example is used as a method of 
distinguishing ‘issues with the concept’ from ‘issues with the mechanics’.  
37 The argument that people are poor at predicting what they will want in the future is addressed in a later section.  
38 George Loewenstein, ‘Projection Bias in Medical Decision Making’ (2005) 25 Med Decis Making 96, 103-104. 
39 Christopher Ryan, ‘Betting your life: an argument against certain advance directives’ (1996) 22 J Med Ethics 95, 97. 
40 ibid. 
predict they would refuse treatment in the future, will change their mind when they develop a 
terminal illness’.41 Assuming that this is the case, it is contended that this argument would only 
have validity if the ability of the individual to change or revoke her advance directive was 
restricted or negated altogether. As advance directives can be revoked or amended at any point 
in time prior to a loss of capacity, then this argument appears to have minimal merit. If an 
individual chooses not to amend or revoke an advance directive, why would we assume that 
their will is not the same, particularly in the context Ryan has given, that of the onset of terminal 
illness? If the onset of a terminal illness does not focus the mind on end-of-life planning, what 
would? Also, it is worth contrasting his view of preferences during terminal illness with the 
view of other commentators, such as Norman Cantor, who paints a very different picture: 
The end may come hard for a chronic emphysema sufferer, unable to speak because of 
a tracheotomy and tortured by breathing difficulty or paroxysms of cough. For these 
(…) patients, the prospect of rejecting further nutrition, as well as other life-preserving 
measures, would seem to offer welcome relief. The principle may also be of benefit to 
sufferers of chronic degenerative diseases such as Alzheimer’s disease, Lou Gehrig’s 
disease, or Huntington’s chorea. Death normally comes to such persons after a tortuous 
process of deterioration, loss of faculties, and pain.42 
Furthermore, even if Ryan’s view is correct, often the provision of evidence that the individual 
acted in a way inconsistent with her advance directive renders it invalid. Accordingly, evidence 
that the individual spoke about her desire ‘to fight on’ or ‘be around as long as possible’ could 
result in the advance directive being invalid. 
Rebecca Dresser goes further to argue that the reliance on past preferences is actually 
problematic because ‘it grants prominence to values and beliefs that have no bearing on the 
incompetent patient’s actual interests’.43  She argues further: 
When competent people make judgments on the conditions under which they desire to 
live and die, their judgments reflect their existing capacities and the activities that make 
their present lives worth living. Decisions about the future health care that will advance 
their interests are inextricably intertwined with their current conceptions of the good.44 
Furthermore, why should a patient who is now a different person be burdened by a 
treatment decision consistent with the former person’s preferences? Compelling 
justification is lacking for according greater respect to the wishes of the earlier person 
(no longer in existence) than to the interests of the existing one.45 
 
41 ibid 96. 
42 Norman L Cantor, ‘Conroy, Best Interests, and the Handling of Dying Patients’ (1985) 37 Rutgers L Rev 543, 553. 
43 Rebecca Dresser, ‘Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients: Conceptual Infirmities and Hidden Values in the Law’ (1986) 28 Ariz L Rev 373, 
374. 
44 ibid 379. 
45 ibid 381. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, this notion rests to a substantial extent on the premise that we are 
not the same person throughout our lives, but rather that we are different people along the lines 
of Derek Parfit’s theory.46 While there is undoubtedly merit in her arguments, one is left 
questioning what is the superior alternative? If the individual is not best placed to decide for 
herself, then who is? As will be discussed in the coming paragraphs, the answer to that question 
is easily reached; all decision makers are prone to letting other factors and their own 
experiences influence their choices on behalf of others. The question of who decides is 
particularly acute when we consider the position of the individual who can regain competence; 
how ought it be explained to her that her prior wishes were disregarded in the very 
circumstances in which she wanted them to have effect because they were not in her interests 
at the time?47 This point has particular relevance in the context of pregnant women, as they are 
unlikely to suffer from degenerative conditions such as dementia, but instead are more likely 
to lose capacity as a result of mental illness or a trauma of some description, both of which 
come with the possibility of regaining capacity.  
Narrowness  
In essence, the description of advance directives as overly restrictive or too narrow stems from 
the idea that because it is challenging to foresee the myriad of situations that might arise for an 
individual, an advance directive may be too narrow to cover the possible situations or too broad 
to give clear direction to the relevant medical personnel and thus is ineffective to achieve the 
aims or wishes of the patient.48 They simply do not give the individual the scope to express her 
wishes fully and therefore, they are not a sufficient tool to promote her autonomy. Whilst this 
argument is not devoid of merit, it could certainly be counterargued that this criticism relates 
less to advance directives themselves and more to how the relevant courts adjudicate cases 
involving insufficiently specific advance directives. If one considers the jurisprudence from 
England and Wales, then despite the advance directive being either invalid or inapplicable to 
the situation, the court still ordered that the treatments concerned be withdrawn.49 For example, 
in Re D, which will be discussed in more detail later, the wishes expressed in writing in an 
invalid advance were still taken as evidence as part of the best interests assessment.50 More 
 
46 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (OUP 1984).  
47 It is worth noting that in both her critiques, Rebecca Dresser appears to deal with individuals with irreversible incompetence, rather than 
with those whose competence may return. 
48 James Lindgren, ‘Death by Default’ (1993) 56(3) L Contemp Probl 185, 211; See also Rebecca Dresser, ‘Life, Death, and Incompetent 
Patients: Conceptual Infirmities and Hidden Values in the Law’ (1986) 28 Ariz L Rev 373; Norman L Cantor, ‘Conroy, Best Interests, and 
the Handling of Dying Patients’ 37 Rutgers L Rev 543.  
49 [2012] EWCOP 885. See also X Primary Care Trust v XB [2012] EWHC 1390 (Fam) – questions regarding the validity of the advance 
directive as an ‘end date’ was on the pro forma documentation – and NHS Cumbria CCG v Rushton [2018] EWCOP 41. 
50 Re D (withdrawal of treatment) [2012] EWCOP 885 (‘Re D’). 
recently, in Barnsley Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v MSP, Hayden J found that while the 
document produced was not a valid advance decision, it did represent ‘a clear and eloquent 
expression of MSP’s wishes and feelings’.51 In both instances, therefore, the advance decision, 
though invalid from a legal standpoint, was sufficient to protect individual autonomy.  
Furthermore, it could be contended that a certain amount of rigidity is justified where a decision 
may hasten death or end a life. While there may be no circumstances in which a member of the 
Jehovah’s Witness faith would accept a blood transfusion, the preference for treatment of an 
individual without religious convictions would likely vary depending on the circumstances. It 
is the narrowness that protects people and serves as a defence to many of the other critiques 
levelled at advance directives, in other words, Ryan’s contention that people make inaccurate 
choices or choices based on misunderstanding. For example, the likelihood of a meaningful 
recovery would almost certainly be a factor in an advance decision to refuse ventilation. Were 
the makers of advance directives not obliged to be detailed about the circumstances in which 
their advance refusal is to apply, then a situation may arise where the individual would have 
wanted treatment but an insufficiently clear advance directive leads the physician to think that 
she would not.52 
Inability to Decide for Oneself 
As described above, the third concern relates to the ability of the individual to correctly identify 
in advance the treatment she will not want in the future. While on the one hand, this forms part 
of the argument that advance directives do not promote autonomy, this argument, in its own 
right, also alleges that advance directives are a ‘bad thing’. To clarify the difference between 
the two arguments; the former argues that advance directives do not fulfil one of their core 
aims – protection of autonomy – and the latter alleges that they are undesirable in and of 
themselves. Loewenstein, for example, cautions against what he terms ‘projection bias’ – that 
is the projection of one’s current preferences onto points in the future when those preferences 
should be irrelevant – in medical decision making.53 As he argues, the ‘failure to accurately 
predict one’s own future preferences undermines the quality of many types of decisions, but it 
creates special problems for medical decisions’. Citing a 1990 study conducted by Slevin et al, 
 
51 Barnsley Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v MSP [2020] EWCOP 26, para 41. 
52 For example, an individual may not want to be placed on a ventilator in circumstances when recovery is uncertain but may be in favour of 
ventilation if it appears to be a short-term treatment. 
53 George Loewenstein, ‘Projection Bias in Medical Decision Making’ (2005) 25 Med Decis Making 96, 98. He explains projection bias with 
reference to shopping for food when one is hungry: ‘Projection bias is well illustrated by the phenomenon of shopping on an empty stomach. 
Normatively, how hungry one is when one enters the supermarket should not affect the amount of food one buys for the next several days, but 
several studies support the folkwisdom that shopping on an empty stomach leads to overshopping.’ 
Loewenstein emphasises the difference between the attitudes of cancer patients and the general 
public to chemotherapy.54 The study found that patients with cancer were considerably more 
likely to consent to a hypothetical radical treatment with minimal chance of benefit than people 
who did not have cancer: 42% versus 10% respectively would submit to invasive treatment for 
their lives to be prolonged by 3 months and 53% versus 19% respectively would submit to 
invasive treatment on the chance that it would cure them.55 He also suggests that the average 
healthy person is unable to imagine what it would be like to have this kind of sickness and 
therefore appreciate a situation like cancer, until they are in it, which in turn affects their 
decision making.56  
The argument is certainly not without strength; arguably, however, the mere potential for or 
existence of projection bias within advance decision making is not a justification for preventing 
it. Moreover, as Loewenstein himself points out in the course of his article; medical 
professionals and the average person are also prone to projection bias.57 Following this logic, 
nobody is capable of making these kinds of decisions; the individual cannot make the decision, 
nor can those who would typically be called upon to act as surrogate decision makers.58 Even 
Chief Justice Wachtler, who presided over the O’Connor case, spoke in a subsequent interview 
about how his personal circumstances and the illness of his own mother influenced his 
judgment.59 Indeed, as Nancy Rhoden argues in relation to family members deciding on behalf 
of incompetent individuals: 
Family members are probably at once the best and the worst decisionmakers. Ideally, 
they knew the patient best and loved her most. But they also have the most to gain or 
lose from these choices. Family members might overemphasize their own concerns 
and/or the patient’s concern for their fiscal wellbeing, thinking she would never have 
wanted her fortune used up in caring for her in her dotage, and not recognizing that in 
the face of desperate illness, even the selfless become far more self-concerned.60 
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Loewenstein, ‘Projection Bias in Medical Decision Making’ (2005) 25 Med Decis Making 96, 102. 
57 ibid 103: Loewenstein uses the example of projection bias in physicians who are managing patients’ pain; projection bias can cause 
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Schneider, ‘Enough: The Failure of the Living Will’ (2004) 34(2) Hastings Center Report 30, 39. Contrast also with Nancy Rhoden, ‘How 
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59 72 NY 2d 517 (1988). See Lisa Belkin, ‘New York Rule Compounds Dilemma Over Life Support’ New York Times  (New York, 12 May 
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and Carl E Schneider, ‘Enough: The Failure of the Living Will’ (2004) 34(2) Hastings Center Report 30, 39. See also the previous chapter 
Additionally, how should one discern if a current influence should not affect a future decision? 
Perhaps a current experience merely reinforces a previously held belief, rather than swaying 
the decision-maker. Conversely, perhaps it highlights something to the decision-maker that 
they had previously overlooked or considered unimportant. Then, rather than being an 
argument against advance decisions, perhaps the potential for projection bias ought to be 
considered a caution against making an advance directive in isolation and never returning to it 
to reconsider and re-evaluate its content in light of changes to one’s life, thereby perhaps 
alleviating the concern expressed by Dresser that ‘a person’s interests can change radically 
over time, so radically that in some cases it could be said that a different person exists by the 
time the life and death treatment situation arises’.61 Arguably, reconsidering one’s advance 
directive could also mitigate against the alleged failure of ‘the personal preferences expressed 
in an advance directive [to] (…) incorporate the up-to-date information on therapy and 
prognosis available’ at the time when the advance directive should become effective.62  
Other commentators attribute this inability of the individual to make the ‘correct’ decision to a 
lack of information: 
The conventional—legal and ethical wisdom—insists that candidates for even a flu shot 
give ‘informed consent’. And that wisdom has increasingly raised the standards for 
disclosure. If we applied those standards to the information patients have before making 
the astonishing catalog of momentous choices living wills can embody, the 
conventional wisdom would be left shivering with indignation. Not only do people 
regularly know too little when they sign a living will, but often (…) they analyze their 
choices only superficially before placing them in the time capsule.63 
Searing criticism, indeed; however, if one examines the interaction between the two aspects of 
informed consent to medical treatment, namely standard of disclosure and capacity to consent, 
perhaps this argument loses a little of its strength. The former is a legal standard that must be 
reached for a physician to discharge his duty, the other is a legal standard which must be met 
for an individual to have capacity to make a specific decision. Perhaps, a justification for the 
difference between the information that must be given and that, which must be understood, is 
the protection of patients and their interest in self-determination. Arguably, a ‘high’ standard 
for information disclosure combined with a ‘low’ or ‘easily attainable’ standard for 
understanding maximises the number of individuals enabled by the law to make a healthcare 
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63  Angela Fagerlin and Carl E Schneider, ‘Enough: The Failure of the Living Will’ (2004) 34 Hastings Center Report 30, 33. 
decision. Patients with varying levels of understanding receive the information that they require 
and desire in order to choose, whether they understand the specific detail or the broad, general 
information. As stated previously, a ‘broad, general understanding of the kind that is expected 
from the population at large’ of the ‘nature, purpose and effects of the proposed treatment’ was 
sufficient to meet the standard for decision making competence in England and Wales.64 
Moreover, an individual is ‘not required to understand every last piece of information about 
her situation and her options’ in order to have capacity.65 In Ireland, the common law standard 
is that the individual understands ‘the nature, purpose and effect of the proffered treatment and 
the consequences of accepting or rejecting it in the context of the choices available (…) at the 
time the decision is made’.66 The legislative provisions define this standard similarly.67 
Therefore, in order to have capacity to make a contemporaneous decision, one must generally 
understand the nature of the treatment and its risks and benefits. To require a higher level of 
understanding than this would almost certainly make the ability to make medical decisions a 
privilege of the few and exclude those individuals that legislators and campaigners have sought 
to bring within the remit of medical decision-making.68 Furthermore, if an advance directive is 
drafted by an individual who does not understand the nature of the treatment she is refusing 
and the consequences arising from its refusal, then the advance directive may be invalid, as it 
has been made by an individual with questionable capacity. The question arising from the point 
made by Angela Fagerlin and Carl Schneider is why a legislature would require a higher 
standard for advance decisions, if it is not required for contemporaneous refusal.  
Perhaps their idea of an ‘astonishing catalog of momentous choices’ relates to an advance 
directive where the individual is laying out more than an advance refusal of specific medical 
treatments in specific circumstances. Perhaps they were envisaging living wills where the 
patient dictated the many treatments that they would and would not want in multiple situations, 
in which case, their argument may have more validity. That is, however, not the way advance 
decisions are viewed by the law in Ireland, England and Wales or New York. They are 
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construed narrowly as time, treatment and condition specific refusals. Additionally, as Cantor 
argues: 
While declarants may be unable to anticipate the precise scenario they will face when 
dying, they may have well developed and enduring notions of dignity, religion, and 
consideration for loved ones, which they want reflected in their future medical 
handling.69 
To support their point, they note that individuals can execute a living will ‘without even 
consulting a doctor’. While this is true, failure to consult a medical or medico-legal professional 
could easily result in the creation of an invalid or inapplicable advance directive; first, because 
the advance directive may be insufficiently clear to be applicable, in other words, she has used 
overly broad terms such as ‘extraordinary measures’ or ‘invasive treatment’ without 
clarification, thus they lack clear meaning. Second, the individual has not clearly specified the 
circumstances in which the advance directive should apply; namely, she used terms such as ‘no 
prospect of recovery’ without clarification, which would be a very high standard to achieve 
and difficult for a medical professional to confirm because ‘recovery’ may not mean the same 
thing to everyone.70 
Furthermore, while it may be considered inadvisable not to consult with a doctor when making 
such decisions, the law – certainly the jurisprudence from England and Wales and legislation 
from Ireland – suggests that a risk of an individual making an unwise decision is insufficient 
justification to intervene and stop her making the decision.71 Finally, it is respectfully submitted 
that Fagerlin and Schneider’s final point, which states that individuals analyse their choices 
‘only superficially before placing them in the time capsule’, has been addressed already. That 
criticism is more applicable to the practice of drafting an advance directive without routine re-
evaluation, than to the concept of advance directives. That statement is undermined, however, 
by evidence from Fagerlin and Schneider that, not only are personal preferences liable to 
change but that individuals ‘have trouble recognizing that their views have changed’.72 On that 
point this research must concede defeat, aside from to say that perhaps it highlights the 
importance of regular open conversations about end-of-life care and the necessity of a societal 
shift towards that aim. Operating under a misapprehension as to the effect that particular 
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condition would have on their lives in the long term may also affect the ability of individuals 
to correctly decide matters of healthcare for themselves.73  
Susceptibility of the individual to phrasing 
It has been alleged that people can be highly reactive to the way in which information is 
phrased. This means that the same medical treatment may be accepted or refused by the same 
person depending on the way the treatment is explained. Fagerlin and Schneider state that 
‘preferences about treatments are influenced by factors like whether success or failure rates are 
used, the level of detail employed, and whether long or short-term consequences are explained 
first’.74 First, this presupposes a conversation between the individual and a medical 
professional, which arguably weakens their contention that people are insufficiently informed 
to make decisions in advance. Aside from that, they go on to cite a study which demonstrated 
that the percentage of people who consented to intervention increased from 12% to 18% and 
then to 30% depending on how the information was presented i.e. negatively, as it was phrased 
in the advance directive and positively.75 Presumably, however, this would be as true for 
contemporaneous decision making as it is for advance directives. In other words, if people’s 
decisions change relative to the way that information is provided, then that would apply to all 
decision-making. Consequently, their argument serves more as a warning to medical 
professionals about the relationship between how information is presented and decision 
outcomes than as an argument against advance directives. However, if this is truly a criticism 
applicable to advance decisions, then it is as much an issue for durable power of attorney, which 
Fagerlin and Schneider advocate.76 If the patient is highly susceptible to being influenced by 
how information is presented, then surely, so too must individuals who are making decisions 
on behalf of loved ones.  
Perhaps what has to be taken from the above is that there is no one right method of decision-
making; family deciding on behalf of the incompetent person, advance directives, decision-
making on the basis of the best interests all have strengths and weaknesses. Thus, while there 
are legitimate ethical and conceptual arguments against advance directives, it is the position of 
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this research that none are sufficient to negate their benefits, both to the individual and to the 
medical professional. Arguably, this is particularly the case if the individual has taken the step 
of creating one on the expectation that it will be honoured. 
Advance Directives: The Law 
New York 
The United States is considered to be the home of advance directives and with good reason; 
after Kutner’s legal framework to empower patients to refuse treatment in advance of losing 
capacity and the ability to communicate, attempts were made to legislate for such a 
framework.77 In the 1970s, California became the first state to legislate for advance directives; 
Barry Keene, a California State Assemblyman and later State Senator, sponsored a Bill that 
introduced advance healthcare directives. The Natural Death Act was passed in 1976 and 
amongst other provisions, it provided for any adult to ‘execute a directive directing the 
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures in a terminal condition’.78 Seven more 
states followed suit in the next year including Nevada, Oregon, North Carolina and Texas.79 
The inclusion of a reference to ‘terminal condition’ in the California statute was and is 
interesting, as it appears to confine the use of advance directives to patients with a terminal 
condition, particularly as this type of terminology persists to this day.80 James Hoefler, 
however, argues:  
[S]tates typically add the disclaimer that rights expressed within the laws are 
cumulative. That is, rights codified by the legislature add to the rights an individual 
enjoys outside the statute (in common law, in the case law, or as a matter of 
constitutional law) (…) codification is not meant to infringe on, impair, or otherwise 
circumscribe the unstated rights and liberties of individuals under state jurisdiction.81 
In other words, if a Jehovah’s Witness has a common law right to refuse a blood transfusion in 
advance, then references to incurable conditions and terminal illnesses in the statutes of that 
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state should not impinge on their ability to do so. As Hoefler argues, ‘State statutes should be 
considered a place to start when divining what rights an individual has regarding (…) life-
sustaining procedures, but the statues are no place to end such an inquiry’.82 The situation is 
not the same, however, should the state laws expressly prohibit what has been established by 
the courts. 
New York, however, is in the minority; despite the vast majority of the states following 
California’s lead and passing legislation on advance directives, New York opted not to do so. 
Even in the in the wake of Cruzan, which is considered to be the US Supreme Court recognition 
of living wills, New York did not legislate in this manner.83 Instead, it relies on a combination 
of other instruments – Do Not Resuscitate Orders, surrogate decision-making and Medical 
Order for Life Sustaining Treatment forms – to protect the interests of patients, perhaps with 
questionable efficacy. This specific change in terminology from ‘advance directives’ to ‘living 
wills’ is deliberate and warrants explanation. New York does have ‘advance directives’, but 
they do not carry the same meaning as elsewhere. An ‘advance directive’ in New York and 
some other US states refers to a legal document, in which provisions are made in relation to 
the future health care decisions of an individual.84 Therefore, an advance directive in New York 
can refer to a Healthcare Proxy form, a DNR Order, a Medical Order for Life Sustaining 
Treatment (MOLST) Form or a Living Will – the first three are covered by legislation.85 These 
mechanisms will be considered in more detail towards the end of this section.  
Since 1988, New York common law has recognised living wills. The criterion is that the living 
will must provide ‘clear and convincing proof that the patient had made a firm and settled 
commitment, while competent, to decline this type of medical assistance under circumstances 
such as these’, established in O'Connor.86 It has been argued that this standard was extremely 
difficult to meet and confirms ‘New York’s place as one of the most restrictive states’.87 Mrs 
O’Connor had suffered a series of strokes resulting in incompetence and an inability to obtain 
food or drink without medical assistance. The hospital sought permission to insert a nasogastric 
 
82 ibid. 
83 497 US 261 (1990); Cruzan was discussed in detail in Chapter 4 in the context of end-of-life decision-making.  
84 New York State Office of the Attorney General (2017) ‘Advance Directives: Making Your Wishes Known And Honored’ 
<https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/advancedirectives.pdf> accessed 6 December 2019. 
85 DNRs are currently governed by Public Health Law § 2964. The appointment of a health care agent (proxy form) is governed by Public 
Health Law § 2981 section 2. MOLSTs are not governed by law per se, but instead have been issued by the New York Department of Health 
to complement traditional advance directives. 
86 Re Westchester County Medical Center [O'Connor] 72 NY 2d 517 (1988). See also Grace Plaza v Elbaum 82 NY 2d 10 (1993); 16: ‘[W]e 
have required the families of hopelessly ill patients who are unable to express their wishes with respect to continuing care to establish by clear 
and convincing evidence that the patient when sentient expressed a clear and settled wish that care should not be continued under the 
circumstances’. See also Fosmire v Nicoleau 75 NY 2d 218 (1990); 225: Where ‘the patient is not presently competent the court must 
determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence that the patient, when competent, made a firm resolve to decline treatment’.  
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tube. Her daughters, who were both nurses, objected on the grounds that the tube would be 
contrary to her ‘expressed wishes’.88 Although Mrs O’Connor’s daughters accepted that that 
they did not know if their mother would have specifically wanted to decline a feeding tube 
under the circumstances, particularly if it would result in a painful death, they had submitted a 
signed document for inclusion in her medical file at the care facility. It stated that Mrs 
O’Connor had expressed the wish in many conversations that ‘no artificial life support be 
started or maintained in order to continue to sustain her life’.89 She had, while competent, made 
several statements that indicated that she would not want to be kept alive by artificial means if 
she were unable to care for herself. These statements were corroborated by numerous witnesses 
and it was accepted that her views were likely to have been the result of witnessing family 
members at the end of life, including her husband and two brothers. 
Citing the judgments in Storar and Eichner, Wachtler CJ opined that the requirement for ‘clear 
and convincing evidence (…) forbids relief whenever the evidence is loose, equivocal or 
contradictory’.90 The learned judge found that the patient in Eichner, a member of a religious 
order, had ‘conscientiously discussed his moral and personal views concerning the use of a 
respirator on persons in a vegetative state’ leading the court to find ‘clear and convincing’ 
evidence as to his wishes.91 Regarding Mrs O’Connor, however, Wachtler J stated: 
Every person has a right to life, and no one should be denied essential medical care 
unless the evidence clearly and convincingly shows that the patient intended to decline 
the treatment under some particular circumstances (...) This is a demanding standard, 
the most rigorous burden of proof in civil cases (...) It is appropriate here because if an 
error occurs it should be made on the side of life.92 
Despite the acknowledgement that the court must ‘always remain open to applications (…) 
which are based upon the repeated oral expressions of the patient’ the learned judge found in 
favour of the hospital and approved treatment, stating:  
Although Mrs O'Connor’s statements about her desire to decline life-saving treatments 
were repeated over a number of years, there is nothing, other than speculation, to 
persuade the fact finder that her expressions were more than immediate reactions to the 
unsettling experience of seeing or hearing of another’s unnecessarily prolonged death.93 
How this statement tallies with the stated intention of the court not to suggest that ‘to be 
effective, a patient’s expressed desire to decline treatment must specify a precise condition and 
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a particular treatment’ is unclear.94 It may be reasonable to ask what more Mrs O’Connor 
needed to do to give effect to her wishes and to satisfy the clear and convincing standard given 
that it was neither a requirement to put her wishes in writing, nor was it one to specify particular 
treatments in the course of such conversations.95 It appears that at least some of the justification 
given by the court for viewing her statements as insufficiently clear and convincing was that 
Mrs O’Connor’s statements ‘were generally prompted by her experience with persons suffering 
terminal illnesses’, which was not her situation; instead the court categorised her as ‘simply an 
elderly person who as a result of several strokes suffers certain disabilities’.96  
The challenge for New Yorkers is clear: on the one hand, oral statements regarding how they 
would wish to be cared for in certain situations are sufficient to create an advance directive. 
On the other, despite evidence of countless statements by Mrs O’Connor to family and friends 
to the effect that she would not want to be kept alive artificially, her expressions were not 
considered to be sufficient to withdraw treatment in her particular situation. Given that there is 
no legislation on living wills, any case where the patient expressed prior desires to have 
treatment withdrawn or withheld in certain circumstances can be considered to be an attempt 
at an advance directive, albeit an oral one. The effect given to such statements will be a matter 
of opinion and uncertainty. 
During the course of the O’Connor judgment, Wachtler CJ appeared to endorse written 
advance directives: 
The ideal situation is one in which the patient’s wishes were expressed in some form of 
a writing, perhaps a ‘living will’, while (…) still competent. The existence of a writing 
suggests the author’s seriousness of purpose and ensures that the court is not being 
asked to make a life-or-death decision based upon casual remarks.97 
Furthermore, he opined that where the individual expresses her  preference in writing, she is 
more likely to also put any subsequent changes of heart in writing or at a minimum, express 
them to relevant parties. This was not the case for people who expressed their wishes orally, in 
the opinion of the learned Chief Justice. 
Thus, despite the cues to legislate for living wills, written or oral, the New York legislature 
opted not to; instead as discussed earlier, New York relies on a system of healthcare agents, 
surrogate decision-making, DNR Orders and MOLST Forms. Accordingly, there are points 
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worth making in relation to the law in New York, or more accurately, gaps in that law identified 
by this research. DNRs enable a competent person to refuse resuscitation during or before 
hospital admission once certain conditions are met;98 in hospital, the decision may be expressed 
orally in the presence of at least two adult witnesses, one of whom is a physician or nurse 
practitioner affiliated with that hospital.99 Prior to hospitalisation, the decision must be 
expressed in writing, dated and signed in the presence of at least two adult witnesses.100 DNRs, 
however, only apply to cardiopulmonary resuscitation, thus they are of limited value in the 
context of this research. Naturally, healthcare agents and surrogate decision-making require 
others to make decisions on behalf of the patient, which is equally separate to the focus of this 
research, which is concerned with the specific decision of the individual herself. Finally, 
MOLST forms, although relevant to intervention other than CPR – such as intubation, 
artificially administered fluids and nutrition and antibiotics – are drafted by the medical 
professional after consultation with the patient, as opposed to being drafted by the patient 
herself.101 Thus, somewhat ironically, they fail to alleviate the very problem with the law 
identified by Kutner in the 1960s; if an individual is rushed to hospital with cardiac arrest, 
stroke or head trauma from which they may not regain consciousness, they have no opportunity 
to discuss their wishes and complete these forms. Furthermore, the MOLST form is ‘generally 
for patients with serious health conditions’, thus it is not clear how, if at all, this would be 
applicable to a woman wishing to refuse a Caesarean section, for example. The form itself 
identifies those patients who want ‘to avoid or receive any or all life-sustaining treatment’, who 
reside in a long-term care facility or require long-term care services and who ‘might die within 
the next year’ as those who should work with the relevant medical professionals in this 
regard.102 It is unclear from the form if it is an ‘and’ or an ‘or’ situation; in other words, it is 
unclear if the patient should satisfy all of these criteria, or some. In any event, a pregnant 
woman who wishes to refuse treatment that is being advised for the benefit of the foetus will 
meet none of these criteria. In this regard, the fundamental flaws in New York law, which apply 
to both pregnant and non-pregnant patients, are abundantly clear.  
 
98 Public Health Law § 2964 section 2. 
99 Public Health Law § 2964 section 2(a). 
100 Public Health Law § 2964 section 2(b). 
101 New York State Department of Health, Medical Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment (MOLST) Form 
<https://www.health.ny.gov/forms/doh-5003.pdf>.  
102 ibid. 
There was one curious addition to the law in New York by the Family Health Care Decision 
Act. Public Health Law § 2994-d(3) provides that a health care provider need not seek consent 
to treat from a surrogate decision-maker if the patient has:  
[A]lready made a decision about the proposed health care, expressed orally or in writing 
or, with respect to a decision to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment 
expressed either orally during hospitalization in the presence of two witnesses eighteen 
years of age or older (…) or in writing. 
This is noteworthy for several reasons; first, in contrast to a DNR, life-sustaining treatment is 
‘any medical treatment or procedure without which the patient will die within a relatively short 
time, as determined by an attending physician to a reasonable degree of medical certainty’.103 
Second, ‘proposed health care’ applies to any treatment, not just those that are life-sustaining. 
Therefore, this has the potential to apply to treatment that is not necessary to sustain the life of 
a pregnant patient, but instead necessary to benefit the foetus. Arguably, this is, in all but name, 
an advance directive as understood in Irish and English law. It is limited, however, in that it 
only functions to absolve the medical professional of the responsibility to seek consent from 
the surrogate decision-maker for the same treatment. Furthermore, the same requirement is 
absent via-à-vis medical professionals who are acting as decision-maker on behalf of the 
patient, which is the case when they have no surrogate. With that said, it is submitted that such 
an advance decision would serve as a clear indication to the medical professional of the wishes 
of the patient, in line with which decisions should be made on their behalf. Still, however, how 
the decisiveness of the wishes of the individual would play out in pregnancy is unclear.104 
Ireland 
In Ireland, advance healthcare directives will be governed by Part 8 of the Assisted Decision-
Making (Capacity) Act, 2015, once commenced.105 Prior to the Act, however, there was a 
recognition of advance directives at common law. In Governor of X Prison v PMcD the validity 
of a written refusal of treatment in anticipation of the patient losing capacity as a result of 
lapsing into a coma was considered.106 Mr McD was a hunger striker refusing food 
contemporaneously and artificial nutrition in advance should he lapse into a coma. In the course 
of his written statement, Mr McD stated his understanding that refusing food would likely lead 
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to organ failure and death but wished to persist in his refusal nonetheless.107 He stated his 
awareness that his health was in decline as a result of the hunger strike; still, he was emphatic 
in his refusal of food in any form.108 In assessing the lawfulness of such an advance statement, 
Baker J was clear: 
I consider that as a matter of law, and finding the above statements persuasive, that a 
person may make a freely stated wish in regard to their future care and that this ought 
to be, and can in an appropriate case be, respected by those with care of that person.109 
Accordingly, the learned judge made a declaration that the direction given by Mr McD should 
remain operative should he lose capacity to make the decision to accept such treatment and a 
declaration that the prison was entitled to give effect to those wishes of Mr McD to refuse 
nutrition and medical assistance.110 At the time of the judgment, the Assisted Decision-Making 
Capacity Bill had not yet been passed by the Oireachtas, therefore it was referred to only in the 
context of what it was likely to do in the future.111  
It may be somewhat unsurprising that the Assisted Decision Making (Capacity) Act 2015 has 
its roots as far back as the mid-2000s; in 2003, Inclusion Ireland published a paper entitled 
‘Who Decides & How? People with Intellectual Disabilities - Legal Capacity & Decision 
Making’, which called for the abolition of the wardship system.112 Within the same timeframe, 
the Law Reform Commission published a consultation paper making the same call.113 In 2006, 
the Law Reform Commission published the Report on Vulnerable Adults and the Law, which 
had two primary recommendations; first, the enactment of a new law to establish clear rules on 
when a person has the legal capacity to make decisions, including commercial and healthcare 
decisions and second, the replacement of wardship with a guardianship system.114 In 2007, the 
Mental Capacity and Guardianship Bill was introduced to the Seanad by Senators Dr Mary 
Henry and Joe O’Toole via a private members motion.115 The Bill was based entirely on the 
Law Reform Commission recommendations and its draft scheme for a Bill.116 Although, the 
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Bill garnered considerable praise and support within the Seanad, it lapsed with the dissolution 
of the Seanad and Dáil in 2007.117   
In 2008, the Government issued the Scheme of the Mental Capacity Bill 2008; although the 
2008 Bill formed the basis of the Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013, it contained 
no reference to advance directives. Nor, for that matter, did the 2007 Bill presented to the 
Seanad. Also in 2008, the Law Reform Commission published a consultation paper Bioethics: 
Advance Care Directives and in 2009 published a Report by the same name.118 Consequently 
in 2012, the Advance Healthcare Decisions Bill 2012 was proposed and debated in the Dáil; it 
was subsequently withdrawn when it became apparent that advance directives would form part 
of the ADM(C) Bill.119 In 2015, the Bill was presented to both houses, having undergone 
significant changes including, critically, a rejection of ‘best interests’ in favour of ‘will’ and 
‘preference’.120 As outlined in Chapter 3, the former was the common law position in Ireland; 
where an individual lacked capacity, decisions to administer or withhold treatment were to be 
made in line with her ‘best interests’.121 The latter has come from the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), which Ireland signed in 2007 
and ratified in 2018: 
State parties have an obligation to provide persons with disabilities with access to 
support in the exercise of their legal capacity. (…) Support in the exercise of legal 
capacity must respect the rights, will and preferences of persons with disabilities and 
should never amount to substitute decision-making. 122 
‘Legal capacity’ is defined by the CRPD as ‘indispensable for the exercise of civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights’ and as acquiring ‘a special significance for persons with 
disabilities when they have to make fundamental decisions regarding their health, education 
and work’.123 In the absence of a court determination to the contrary, ‘will’ in Ireland is 
understood to mean ‘a person’s longterm [sic] vision of what constitutes a “good life” and 
fulfilling life for them’.124 ‘Preference’ is understood to mean the ‘greater liking for one 
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alternative or another over others which can be, or has been, demonstrated by words or 
behaviour or both’.125 
An advance directive is defined by section 82(a) of the ADM(C)A 2015 as ‘an advance 
expression made by the person (…) of his or her will and preferences concerning treatment 
decisions that may arise (…) if he or she subsequently lacks capacity’.126 As illustrated above, 
Ireland provides for advance directives to be made by the adult patient him or herself, but also 
provides for a designated healthcare representative to do so.127 Albeit in relation to the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005, Rob Heywood is somewhat critical of the legal requirement that the patient 
have capacity at the time when the advance directive is drafted without a corresponding 
requirement that a capacity assessment be conducted at the same time: 
Amid the range of formalities that were included in the (…) [Act], what mechanisms 
are in place within the legislation to ensure that a patient is competent at the time they 
actually draft their advance decision? The answer is, quite simply, none. A case can be 
made that the legislation should have included more robust requirements in terms of 
the assessment of capacity at this crucial point.128 
While he recognises that this lack of regulation may have its reasons and uses, it can be 
problematic if ‘the law allows a judge to override the presumption in favour of capacity too 
easily, based on an ill-defined measure of doubt’.129 He explains this as the law undoing a lot 
of the work it has done in seeking to ensure accessibility of advance directives to all competent 
individuals, including those with a ‘history of mental illness (…) [or] suicidal tendencies’.130  
He suggests that one of the reasons for the lack of requirement to assess capacity at the time of 
giving the advance decision is the presumption of capacity, which is central to the MCA 2005, 
so too the Irish Act. He argues that requiring a capacity assessment reverses the presumption 
of capacity and instead ‘works from the starting position that patients are incapable of 
exercising their right of choice before someone else confirms they are capable of doing so’.131 
While perhaps an honourable intention on the part of the legislature not to undermine the 
presumption of capacity, if the effect is that those with fluctuating capacity may have their 
advance directives disregarded, then perhaps it does more to jeopardise than vindicate the 
 
and to prepare the Code of Practice for the Act, one can reasonably assume that the Code will reflect this definition 
<https://www.hse.ie/eng/about/who/qid/resourcespublications/qitalktime-presentation-adm-may-19.pdf> accessed 22 November 2019. 
125 As above.  
126 Section 82(a) pertains to ‘a person who has capacity’. Section 84, referred to in section 82(a), lays out the steps to be taken in order to 
create an advance directive. 
127 Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015, s 82(b). 
128 Rob Heywood, ‘Revisiting Advance Decision Making Under the Mental Capacity Act 2005: A Tale of Mixed Messages’ (2015) 23 Med 




individual autonomy.132 Heywood argues that adding a requirement to assess capacity at the 
time of creating an advance directive may be justified given the rarity of advance directives: 
[T]hose patients who do take the time and make the effort to create an advance decision 
would be unlikely to object to the additional requirement of an assessment of capacity 
at the time it is made (…) because, having taken the conscious decision to make an 
advance decision in the first place, the aim of most patients will be to make it as difficult 
as possible to overturn.133 
In order to mitigate against the possibility of an advance directive being overturned for 
suspected incompetence, Emily Jackson suggests that those suffering from a condition which 
affects capacity ‘would therefore be well advised not to rely upon the presumption of capacity, 
but instead to ensure that a doctor specifically certifies that they have capacity when they make 
their AD’;134 an effective solution, if not simultaneously an onerous responsibility to put on the 
decision-maker.  
Section 83 of the ADM(C)A 2015 articulates the two purposes of Part 8, namely to enable 
patients to be ‘treated according to their will and preferences’ and to provide healthcare 
professionals with information relevant to patient treatment choices.135 Critically, it embeds in 
statute what has been established by jurisprudence, that is, the right of a competent person to 
refuse life-saving treatment irrespective of the reasons.136 Section 84 is the most detailed 
section in Part 8 and lays out the conditions which need to be fulfilled by the adult advance 
directive-maker in order to create a valid directive, namely, that the treatment and the 
circumstances in which it should be refused must be clearly specified in writing and that the 
directive-maker lacks capacity at the time when the treatment is required.137 Revocation of or 
amendments to an advance directive can be made in writing by the directive-maker once she 
has capacity and in the case of amendments, fulfils the conditions laid out for drafting a valid 
advance directive. An interesting aspect of the Irish legislation is that while a request for 
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treatment contained in an advance directive is not legally binding, the healthcare professional 
is required to take it into consideration in the decision-making process and required to make a 
note of why the request was refused, if applicable.138 It could certainly be suggested that this 
section demonstrates considerable respect for self-determination and autonomy. Furthermore, 
it could be argued that the requirement for a healthcare professional to explain why he has not 
acquiesced to the request of the patient creates an extra layer of responsibility; while the 
medical professional will have his reasons for the decision, arguably the requirement to justify, 
and not merely make, the decision forces that professional to give more thought to the matter. 
Over and above failing to adhere to the criteria for creating a valid advance directive, section 
85 establishes specific situations or actions that invalidate an advance directive, including 
where the directive-maker does anything ‘clearly inconsistent’ with the directive while she has 
capacity.139 For example, as was the situation in the pre-MCA English case of HE v A Hospital 
NHS Trust, a female Jehovah’s Witness getting engaged to a person of Muslim faith was 
sufficient to amount to a change in circumstances for the purposes of making an order to 
administer treatment.140 The inclusion of the requirement that the patient have capacity while 
acting inconsistently with the directive is noteworthy. The MCA 2005 lacks this requirement, 
so too does the Code of Practice; interestingly, the Code of Practice states that a withdrawal of 
the advance decision by the person ‘while they still had capacity to do so’ would render the 
advance decision invalid, however, competence is not a requirement for the other ground, 
namely that ‘the person has done something that clearly goes against the advance decision 
which suggests that they have changed their mind’.141 This omission has been criticised on the 
grounds that it may be possible for a patient to invalidate his own advance decision by acting 
inconsistently with it at a time when he lacks capacity.142 Furthermore, the Court of Protection 
has yet to rule on this matter, at least exclusively. Charles J in Briggs v Briggs merely stated 
that the section ‘does not specify whether to qualify the inconsistent act must take place when 
the person has capacity’.143 The learned judge did, however, go on to state:  
An interpretation of these safety nets [25(2)(c) and s. 25(3)] based on the sanctity of 
life or anything else (…) that sets a low threshold to rendering an advance decision 
invalid or inapplicable would run counter to the enabling intention of ss. 24 to 26 of the 
MCA.144 
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In A Local Authority v E, Jackson J opined that an instruction contained in the advance decision 
to disregard any behaviour seeming to be inconsistent with it could not be binding in light of 
the relevant section of the Act.145 As the learned judge determined that Ms E did not have 
capacity when she drafted the advance decision containing the proviso – ‘If I exhibit behaviour 
seemingly contrary to this advanced directive this should not be viewed as a change of decision’ 
– it was not necessary to determine if she had actually behaved inconsistently.146 
It is possible, therefore, that the court would view the actions of an incompetent person, which 
appear to be contrary to his advance decision, to be insufficient to justify a declaration of 
invalidity or inapplicability. In practice, however, the circumstances of the individual case may 
dictate the ease with which (in)competence at the time of the inconsistence can be established. 
For example, where the person suffers periods of lucidity and incompetence as part of a 
particular condition, it may be difficult to retrospectively establish if they had capacity at 
particular points in time. It is almost certain that the court would err on the side of the 
preservation of life in such situations. 
In order to be valid in the case of life-saving treatment, the refusal must be ‘substantiated by a 
statement (…) by the directive-maker (…) that the directive is to apply to that treatment even 
if his or her life is at risk’.147 This is a key difference between contemporaneous and advance 
refusals. While it may be the case that a patient must understand that her life is risked by her 
decision to refuse treatment – as a failure to do so may be an indication of incompetence – a 
patient is not required to sign any document stating that she understands the risk to life.148 In 
the case of ambiguity, the healthcare professional should consult with the designated healthcare 
representative, if relevant, or the directive-maker’s family and friends and seek a second 
medical opinion.149 If the ambiguity persists, then the healthcare professional shall ‘resolve the 
ambiguity in favour of the preservation of the directive-maker’s life’.150 According to section 
85(4), an advance directive cannot apply to basic care including warmth, shelter and oral 
hydration and nutrition. In line with the jurisprudence, artificial hydration and nutrition is not 
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considered ‘basic care’, so can be refused.151 Although the inclusion of AHN is hardly 
surprising given the jurisprudence that predates the legislation, it is interesting to briefly return 
to the United Sates and to contrast this choice with some state legislation. As the common law 
largely dictates the legal position of advance refusals of AHN in New York, information 
regarding the legislation in other states is beneficial from a comparative perspective.152 
In Wisconsin, it is expressly prohibited to withhold or withdraw AHN in an advance 
directive.153 Missouri has a similar prohibition; in light of the fact that it was the home of the 
Cruzan case, which centred around whether AHN should be withdrawn from Ms Cruzan – 
which it eventually was after further evidence was presented to the Missouri officials 
subsequent to the Supreme Court judgment – this irony has not been lost on commentators.154 
The Illinois Living Will Act, prohibits the inclusion of AHN in an advance directive, if it would 
be the cause of death.155 The conservative approach taken by some states seems patently 
inconsistent with the general approach of the courts in the so-called ‘right to die’ cases in the 
US, which were discussed in the previous chapter. Perhaps, however, such hesitance to permit 
death to be the result of the withdrawal of AHN reflects an unease about the idea of allowing 
somebody to ‘starve to death’ or ‘die from thirst’, even if the mechanism for delivering 
hydration and nutrition is mechanical. In any event, it is contended that Ireland has adopted the 
appropriate approach with the 2015 Act in making a clear distinction between oral and 
mechanically delivered hydration and nutrition and in not excluding the latter from being 
specified in an advance directive. 
Section 86 of the ADM(C)A lays out exemptions from criminal and civil liability enjoyed by 
healthcare professionals in particular situations, for example, a healthcare professional will be 
exempt from liability where (s)he complies with an advance healthcare directive on the 
reasonable belief that it was valid and applicable.156 In section 89, the role of the courts in cases 
involving advance directives is explained; the Circuit Court has jurisdiction to decide the 
validity and applicability of an advance directive, where the directive does not apply to life-
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sustaining treatment.157 The High Court has jurisdiction to decide the validity and applicability 
of advance directives specifying a refusal of life-sustaining treatment.158 While the matter is 
being adjudicated by the High Court, the healthcare professionals should provide life-
sustaining treatment and/or act in such a way as to prevent ‘a serious deterioration in the health 
of the directive-maker’.159 
A noteworthy feature of the Irish legislation is the provisions relating to criminal sanctions 
contained in section 90. Section 90(1) criminalises the use of fraud, coercion or undue influence 
to force the directive-maker to make, alter or revoke his advance directive.160 Coercion or 
undue influence in this case includes ‘where a person’s access to, or continued stay in, a 
designated centre or mental health facility is contingent (…) on the person having to, or being 
led to believe that he or she has to, make, alter or revoke an advance healthcare directive’.161 
Section 90 also criminalises the creation or alteration, without consent, of an advance 
healthcare directive on behalf of an individual; falsification of or purporting to revoke an 
advance directive is also an offence.162 It could be suggested that such an approach stemmed 
from general concerns that legislating for advance directives could expose elderly or vulnerable 
people to abuse or exploitation. 
One aspect which has not been addressed in any detail in the preceding paragraphs and which 
is clearly the focus of this research is the content of section 85(6) of the ADM(C)A; that is, the 
validity of advance directives during pregnancy. This section will be discussed in the requisite 
detail in the next chapter. For now, it should suffice to say that no other group of adults within 
Irish society has been singled out for ‘special treatment’ by the legislation aside from pregnant 
women. Indeed, if we look back to the guiding principles that were discussed in Chapter 1, 
interventions163 are to be made in a way that minimises ‘the restriction of the relevant person’s 
rights, and the restriction of the relevant person’s freedom of action’.164 Critically, they must 
be made with ‘due regard to the need to respect the right of the relevant person to dignity, 
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bodily integrity, privacy [and] autonomy’.165 The next chapter will discuss the degree to which 
this aim will likely be achieved where pregnant patients are concerned.  
England and Wales 
In contrast to Ireland, the law on advance directives in England and Wales has been settled for 
some time. Prior to the introduction of the relevant legislation, there was a common law 
recognition of advance directives, evidenced by the judgment in Bland: 
[T] he right to reject treatment extends to deciding not to accept treatment in the future 
by way of advance directive or ‘living will’. A well-known example of advance 
directive is provided by those subscribing to the tenets of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, who 
make it clear that they will not accept blood transfusions.166  
In the majority of cases where the American courts have sanctioned the withdrawal of 
life-supporting medical care they have done so by developing the rule that informed 
consent can release the doctor from his duty to treat (…) It is perhaps sufficient to say 
that it takes two forms. In the first, the court looks for the making of an antecedent 
choice by a patient who can no longer make one, or communicate one, by the time that 
the question of termination has arisen. What is often called a ‘living will’ has been held 
sufficient for this purpose.167 
Re AK concerned a 19-year old man suffering from advanced Motor Neurone Disease.168 He 
wished to have ventilation withdrawn once he lost the ability to communicate, which was 
limited to eye movements at the time that he drafted the advance directive. Hughes J held: 
It is (…) clearly the law that the doctors are not entitled (…) [to administer treatment 
in an emergency where the person cannot communicate] if it is known that the patient, 
provided he was of sound mind and full capacity, has let it be known that he does not 
consent and that such treatment is against his wishes. To this extent an advance 
indication of the wishes of a patient of full capacity and sound mind are effective.169 
During the 1990s, the Law Commission published a series of consultation papers on decision 
making, incapacity and vulnerable adults.170 In its consultation paper entitled ‘Mentally 
Incapacitated Adults and Decision-Making: An Overview’, the Law Commission described an 
advance directive along the lines of the American definition, as: 
The purpose of an advance directive is to enable a competent person to give instructions 
about what he wishes to be done, or who he wishes to make decisions for him, if he 
should subsequently lose the capacity to decide for himself (...) It can give the person 
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concerned the assurance that his expressed wishes will be followed and his autonomy 
respected to the highest possible degree.171 
The ‘living will’ was described in the same consultation paper as: 
[E]ssentially a formal declaration by a competent adult expressing the wish that if he 
becomes so (…) ill that there is no prospect of recovery, any procedures designed to 
prolong life should be withheld. The object is to rebut any presumption that the patient 
has consented to treatment which may be administered under the doctrine of necessity, 
and to give the patient power to direct in advance the treatment, or lack of treatment, 
that he wishes to receive at the end of his life should he lose the ability to do so at the 
time.172 
In its subsequent consultation paper entitled ‘Mentally Incapacitated Adults and Decision-
Making: Medical Treatment and Research’, the Law Commission proposed a type of 
framework for advance decision. In short, the Law Commission proposed legislation that 
provided for the scope, legal effect and conditions necessary to create a valid anticipatory 
decision, including specifying that a clearly established anticipatory decision should be as 
effective as a contemporaneous decision would be in the same circumstances,173 that a signed 
and witnessed anticipatory decision in writing should be presumed to be an established advance 
decision and that revocation of an anticipatory decision orally or in writing by a competent 
individual should be possible at any time.174 The Commission further suggested that 
anticipatory decisions should not be effective where pertaining to pain relief or ‘basic care’, 
including nursing care and spoon-feeding. Furthermore, it was proposed that medical 
professional should have no criminal or civil liability for abiding by an apparently valid 
advance unless there was bad faith or lack of reasonable care and that criminal liability should 
attach to any person who falsifies or forges an advance directive or revocation, or who conceals, 
alters or destroys a directive or revocation without the authority of the decision-maker. Finally, 
the Commission suggested that the relevant statutory authority should not permit treatment 
contrary to an advance decision before the court makes a determination unless that treatment 
is essential to prevent death or irreversible damage to the health of the individual. 
The Law Commission subsequently made recommendations in the form of a Report and Draft 
Bill, which became the basis for the Mental Capacity Act 2005.175 Accordingly, advance 
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directives, or advance decisions, as they are termed, are governed by sections 24 – 26.176 Under 
section 24 an advance decision is defined as: 
[A] decision made by a person (“P”), after he has reached 18 and when he has capacity to 
do so, that if — 
(a) at a later time and in such circumstances as he may specify, a specified treatment 
is proposed to be carried out or continued (…) and 
(b) at that time he lacks capacity to consent to the carrying out or continuation of the 
treatment, the specified treatment is not to be carried out or continued.177 
The specific reference to continuation of treatment contained in the MCA 2005 has obvious 
importance in that it appears to make it explicit that even if a treatment has commenced, it 
should be withdrawn if the circumstances, which the individual specifies, occur. For example, 
it is common practice for an individual, who is unresponsive following a head injury, to be 
ventilated quickly while medical professionals determine the level of brain damage, a process 
which can take quite some time. Thus, for example, ventilation can be withdrawn if it becomes 
apparent that the individual is suffering from a disorder of consciousness, provided the 
diagnosis and treatment were both specified in an advance directive.178 Irish legislation, by 
contrast, is less specific in that it refers to ‘treatment decisions that may arise’. It is submitted, 
however, that ‘treatment decisions’ should logically encompass both a refusal of treatment 
prior to commencement and a withdrawal of treatment.179 Frankly, it would be bizarre for the 
Irish legislature to deliberately exclude withdrawal of treatment in view of the case law.180  
It is submitted that the first critical difference between the situation in England and Wales and 
in Ireland is the requirement to have the advance directive in writing. As briefly stated earlier, 
all advance directives in Ireland must be in writing in order to be valid.181 By contrast, only 
advance decisions pertaining to life-sustaining treatment must be in writing in England and 
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Wales; advance decisions expressed verbally are valid for all other treatments.182 Accordingly, 
withdrawals and amendments expressed verbally are valid, unless the amendment falls within 
the scope of section 25(5), in other words, life-sustaining treatment. The requirements for valid 
refusal of life-sustaining treatment in advance in England and Wales are broadly similar to the 
requirements in Ireland, as articulated above. The refusal must be signed by the directive-
maker, in the presence of a witness, who in turn must sign the directive in the presence of the 
directive-maker.183 Finally, it must also be stated that the directive-maker intends the refusal 
to have effect in the event that it poses a risk to life.184  
The MCA 2005 contains similar exemptions for medical professionals who treat, or withhold 
treatment, based on the reasonable belief that there was, respectively, an invalid or valid 
advance decision.185 The phrasing of the exemptions for individuals complying with an 
advance directive that they reasonably believe is valid and applicable is slightly different in the 
two jurisdictions. In England and Wales, the ‘person’ – as distinct from ‘healthcare 
professional’ in the Irish legislation – will not incur liability for providing treatment unless ‘he 
is satisfied that an advance decision exists which is valid and applicable to the treatment’.186 In 
Ireland, the healthcare professional will not be liable for failure to comply with an advance 
healthcare directive if, at the time in question, he had reasonable grounds to believe that the 
advance healthcare directive was invalid or inapplicable.187 It can be suggested, however, that 
the effect of the two statutes would be quite similar and the difference lies merely in the detail 
provided in the Acts; Ireland has a later section that exempts healthcare professionals from 
liability if they have no grounds for believing that the directive exists or if they know it exists 
but they have no access to its contents and there is an urgency associated with the provision of 
treatment.188 Arguably, section 26(3) of the MCA 2005 would encompass both of these 
situations as the professional would not be ‘satisfied that an advance decision exists which is 
valid and applicable to the treatment’ under the circumstances. 
There is no specific direction in the legislation as to how healthcare professionals should handle 
ambiguity, however, the Code of Practice for the MCA gives guidance as to how 
disagreements, as opposed to ambiguity, should be approached. Section 9.64 states that 
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responsibility for deciding if there is a valid and applicable advance decision rests with the 
healthcare professional responsible for the care of the person at the time when treatment is 
required. In the event of disagreement about an advance decision between healthcare 
professionals, or between healthcare professionals and family members or others close to the 
person, the senior clinician must consider all the available evidence and should garner the views 
of staff involved in the care of the person.189 Section 9.66 of the COP states that where the 
senior clinician has a ‘reasonable belief’ that the advance decision is valid and applicable, then 
it should be adhered to. Should the doubt as to the advance directive persist, then section 26(4) 
of the MCA 2005, which states that the court may make a declaration as to whether an advance 
decision exists, is valid and is applicable to a treatment, should apply. As discussed previously, 
there is a provision in the Irish legislation which permits a healthcare professional to resolve 
ambiguity in favour of the preservation of life, if all other attempts at resolution have been 
unsuccessful.190 This appears to give medical professionals in Ireland more discretion than their 
counterparts in England and Wales, or more accurately, more discretion to favour the 
preservation of life in ambiguous cases. One could opine, however, that it is unlikely that a 
situation involving ambiguity would not be referred to the court for adjudication, given the 
novelty of the legislation. 
Section 26(5) of the MCA 2005 provides that, while the validity and/or applicability of an 
advance decision is being considered by the court, the directive-maker should be provided with 
life-sustaining treatment and/or treated in order to prevent ‘a serious deterioration’ in her 
condition. This section likely provided inspiration for the Irish legislature, as it is almost 
identical to section 89(3) of the ADM(C)A 2015.191 The interpretation of the advance decision 
provisions in the MCA 2005 is restrictive and – in the opinion of Jackson J in Re D – 
understandably so.192 Re D concerned a man who had put his wishes regarding treatment in 
writing, however, his letter that specifically refused a feeding tube did not comply with the 
requirements in the MCA 2005.193 Accordingly, it was not a valid advance decision, however, 
the letter was taken as an indication of his wishes and the case was decided on the basis of his 
best interests. A similar conclusion was reached more recently in Barnsley Hospital NHS 
Foundation Trust v MSP;194 Mr MSP’s advance decision did not comply with the statutory 
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requirements, however, when taken together with the ‘choate and consistent evidence’ given 
by his family and the evidence of three consultants who had treated him previously, the 
document was treated as clearly indicating his wishes and feelings, which in turn informed his 
best interests assessment.195  
In X Primary Care Trust v XB, the matter before Theis LJ was whether a valid advance decision 
had been drafted by an individual with the necessary capacity to do so and if so, whether that 
decision was valid and applicable at the time of the judgment.196 XB had been unable to 
communicate verbally for some time prior to allegedly executing the advance directive. 
Accordingly, he communicated his comprehension of conversation and (dis)agreement to 
statements through eye movement. One such conversation was alleged to be the one when the 
advance decision was drafted, however, there was evidence to suggest that he had discussed 
declining treatment with his family and GP on a number of prior occasions.197 The question as 
to XB’s competent agreement with the advance decision arose because a member of staff 
responsible for his care expressed doubt that he had agreed to the advance decision. The judge, 
however, found on the evidence that the advance decision had been competently made by XB 
and that, while the staff member may have been present on other occasions, she was not present 
on the date when it was drafted. The second issue – the validity and applicability of the advance 
decision at the time of the hearing – arose because a ‘ready-made’ advance directive form was 
used, as opposed to one specifically drafted with XB in mind. Consequently, it contained a 
specific ‘end date’, something which is not required in an advance directive under the law in 
England and Wales. The learned judge took the opportunity to highlight the difficulty caused 
by internet forms and to caution their use:  
One of the difficulties in this case was the inclusion in the pro forma of a ‘valid until’ 
date. Those organisations that have such terms in their pro formas may want to look 
again at the necessity for that being in the pro forma form. It is clearly in the interests 
of the person who has made the advance decision, his or her family, and those who have 
responsibility for providing or withholding treatment that there is clarity in relation to 
what the terms of the advance decision are.198 
She was, however, satisfied on the evidence that XB did not intend his advance decision to 
expire and that he was unaware of the inclusion of an ‘end date’ on the form. Accordingly, she 
made the requested declaration of validity under the MCA. 
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In Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Trust v RC, the court was faced with two questions in 
relation to an advance refusal of treatment by a man suffering from a severe personality 
disorder.199 First, it was asked to decide if the written advance decision of RC was valid and 
applicable to the treatment in question in line with the MCA 2005. Second, because the patient 
was compulsorily detained under the Mental Health Act 1983 (‘MHA 1983’), the question 
arose as to whether section 63 of that Act permitted RC to be treated despite his advance 
decision.200 On the first question, the Court found that the advance decision satisfied the 
requirements of the MCA 2005 and it was valid.201 The second question was considerably more 
difficult to decide. Although the Court engaged in some analysis of the issue, Holman J 
declined to make the order requested and instead ordered a further hearing on the matter to take 
place in the days that followed. Interestingly, the learned judge stated the following regarding 
the role of the court in ethical matters: 
I must stress at once that it is never the business of a court in these sorts of situations to 
make any kind of ethical decision. That is a matter for doctors alone, applying such 
guidance, if any, as they can obtain from their professional medical bodies.202 
It is argued by some that it is unsatisfactory for the important ethical issues to be merely 
sidestepped.203 It is interesting to contrast the hesitance to consider ethical issues with the view 
of some US courts that the consideration of moral matters is not only within the remit of the 
court, but its responsibility: 
Such notions as to the distribution of responsibility [to physicians], heretofore generally 
entertained, should however neither impede this Court in deciding matters clearly 
justiciable nor preclude a re-examination by the Court as to underlying human values 
and rights. Determinations as to these must, in the ultimate, be responsive not only to 
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the concepts of medicine but also to the common moral judgment of the community at 
large. In the latter respect the Court has a non-delegable judicial responsibility.204 
It is also interesting to contrast that statement with the judgment Mostyn J, who refers to the 
work of John Stuart Mill in exploring the right to refuse medical treatment and to harm oneself, 
in the subsequent hearing of Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Trust v RC, which took place 
less than a week after the first.205 While the court did consider if RC had capacity to make an 
advance decision and the validity of that advance decision, these aspects garnered significantly 
less scrutiny than the primary issue of whether a blood transfusion amounted to treatment, 
which prevented the worsening of a symptom or manifestation of the patient’s mental disorder 
or one which treated a consequence of the disorder. This distinction is critical to establish if 
section 63 applies to the particular case and consequently, if the consent of the patient is 
necessary or if the physician can dispense with consent and where relevant, circumvent an 
advance decision. On the matter of capacity, the independent psychiatrist considered it difficult 
to describe that the ability of RC to weigh the risks of refusing blood against his religious 
beliefs because those beliefs effectively created ‘an absolute prohibition on blood products’. 
Mostyn J was unequivocal in accepting RC’s capacity to refuse blood products, however, 
stating that ‘it would be an extreme example of the application of the law of unintended 
consequences were an iron tenet of an accepted religion to give rise to questions of capacity 
under the MCA’.206 As had been found in the previous hearing, the advance decision was ruled 
to be valid and applicable, as further evidence was provided that supported that the document 
was signed by the maker in the presence of the witness and vice versa.207 
The distinction between a symptom or manifestation of the patient’s mental disorder, or a 
consequence of the disorder, was key as treatment of the latter does not come within section 
63 of the MHA 1983, whereas the former does.208 The already challenging matter for the court 
was made more difficult by a difference of opinion amongst the psychiatrists as to whether the 
treatment was of a symptom or manifestation of, or a consequence of the disorder.209 Mostyn 
J, however, found that the cutting of the brachial artery by the patient was a symptom or 
manifestation of the underlying personality disorder and therefore treatment of that wound, 
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such as suturing or the administration of antibiotics, would be to treat the manifestation or 
symptom of the underlying disorder. If the bleeding led to lowered haemoglobin levels, then 
treatment of this with a blood transfusion would also equate to treatment of a symptom or 
manifestation of the disorder. Accordingly, the blood transfusion came within the scope of 
section 63 of the MHA 1983. Somewhat unusually, the court was actually being asked to 
declare that the treating physician (Dr S) could lawfully withhold treatment from RC, rather 
than choose to treat under section 63. She expressed serious ethical concern about treating RC 
against his competent wishes, when he would have a valid refusal in other circumstances.210  
Speaking about these kinds of case, Mostyn J stated:  
[W]here the approved clinician makes a decision not to impose treatment under section 
63, and where the consequences of that decision may prove to be life-threatening, then 
the NHS trust in question would be well advised, as it has here, to apply to the High 
Court for declaratory relief. The hearing will necessarily involve a ‘full merits review’ 
of the initial decision. It would be truly bizarre if such a full merits review were held 
where a positive decision was made under section 63, but not where there was a 
negative one, especially where one considers that the negative decision may have far 
more momentous consequences (i.e. death) than the positive one. 
Notwithstanding the power under section 63, Mostyn J held that Dr S was correct in her 
decision not to treat and instead to respect the advance decision. 
In NHS Cumbria CCG v Rushton, the matter before the court was the withdrawal of clinically 
assisted hydration and nutrition.211 Judgments concerning the withdrawal of AHN are generally 
made on the grounds of best interests and futility, as a court hearing almost always presupposes 
that a valid advance decision does not exist. The facts of Rushton, however, were that Mrs 
Rushton did have an advance decision, which she lodged with her GP. The hospital, unaware 
of the advance decision, inserted a nasogastric tube, an act referred to by Hayden J as one ‘done 
instinctively by conscientious medical staff, whose every instinct would have been to promote 
her welfare’.212 When her condition improved the hospital staff replaced the NG tube with a 
percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG). The insertion of the PEG, however, was carried 
out subsequent to a conversation between Mrs Rushton’s GP and hospital staff, where the GP 
was recorded as stating that ‘the only ADR (Advance Directive) in place is in regards to do not 
resuscitate’.213 Consequently, it appears that the contents of Mrs Rushton’s advance decision 
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were incorrectly interpreted or communicated.214 In deciding whether to approve the 
withdrawal of AHN, Hayden J stated: 
I must say, I have heard sufficient [evidence] to be clear, that Mrs Rushton would have 
hoped that her wishes in her advance decision would have applied to her present 
situation. I cannot easily contemplate circumstances in which the views of an adult with 
this degree of disorder of consciousness could be communicated more volubly or 
unambiguously.215 
As Mrs Rushton’s advance decision had already been contravened, however inadvertently, 
Hayden J reverted to best interests to make his decision and as was the case with Re D, the 
written wishes of Mrs Rushton were viewed as clear guidance as to what she would have 
wanted in the circumstances.216 One could opine, however, that making the decision to 
withdraw treatment on the basis of best interests was curious; as articulated earlier, the MCA 
2005 provides for advance decisions to apply to both the refusal of treatment before it begins 
and the refusal of continued treatment.217 One could argue, therefore, that Hayden J ought to 
have made a determination on the validity and applicability of the advance decision to the 
refusal of the continued administration of AHN before progressing to assess Mrs Rushton’s 
best interests. After all, when commenting on her advance decision in the course of the 
judgment, he stated that the ‘document (…) complied with the [legal] provisions 
fastidiously’.218 
As her advance decision stated that she was ‘refusing all treatment’ if certain events were to 
transpire – which they did – and if Mrs Rushton’s advance decision complied ‘fastidiously’ 
with the law, then why was there a need to utilise the best interests test? Ought ‘on collapse, I 
do not wish to be resuscitated by any means (…) I am refusing all treatment’ not be understood 
as a directive to cease all treatment once the directive was discovered? If not, it seems to render 
any advance directive that has been inadvertently contravened void, even if the treatment in 
question can be ceased after the directive is discovered. Moreover, if the advance decision was 
invalid or inapplicable for some reason and a best interests test was required, then the reason 
for this ought to have been explained.  Furthermore, this decision may disproportionately affect 
pregnant women; as pregnancy is clearly a finite state, there may be scope for an advance 
decision to be inadvertently contravened but for that position to be maintained until a hearing 
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on best interests can be undertaken. This in turn may have the effect of delaying the withdrawal 
of medical treatment until a more desirable stage of foetal development, despite the 
administration of treatment being clearly against the previously expressed wishes of the 
woman. 
Conclusion 
Initially, advance directives were seen as a method of filling a gap that had appeared in medical 
decision-making. It was viewed as a method of ensuring that people who had no opportunity 
to discuss their consent to or refusal of treatment with their physicians in advance had a method 
of making their wishes known. Kutner, however, was not armed with the various studies, which 
purport to demonstrate that individuals can seldom be trusted with making decisions in 
advance. Rather, he arguably viewed his legal framework as a means of solving what he saw 
as a large inconsistency within the law. It is the position of this paper that, despite the criticisms 
levelled at advance directives, they are still a valuable tool to indicate the treatment preferences 
of patients and a necessary and effective mechanism to maximise the autonomy of those who 
choose to use them. It is also the position of this paper that they are the best mechanism of 
achieving that aim as it is the individual and not family nor friends nor strangers, with whom 
there has been no consultation, that are best placed to make these important decisions. This 
does not preclude a situation where an individual chooses to appoint somebody to make these 
decisions on their behalf, nor does it undermine their decision to do so. Rather, it is the opposite; 
if the individual chooses to put their trust and faith into another person to make medical 
decisions on their behalf, having discussed their beliefs and values with them, then they too are 
exercising their autonomy. What is most important is that the individual has a choice in this 
regard and not that one or other decision-making framework is foisted upon her.  
It is almost impossible to evaluate the law regarding the right of a pregnant woman to refuse 
medical treatment in advance without first establishing the law applicable to advance decisions 
and how that law came to be. Thus, this chapter fulfils a very necessary role within this thesis 
as a whole, however, as suggested in Chapter 1, it is best to consider the issues of compelled 
treatment in pregnancy and ‘pregnancy exceptions’ to advance directive laws together, 
separately to this chapter, in the interest of clarity and coherence. It appears to this research 
that the law in New York is deficient, as it fails to provide a suitable legal framework for an 
individual to create an advance refusal of treatment and consequently leaves those with written 
advance refusals in a state of uncertainty. Until recently, Ireland was in a similar situation in 
that there was a common law recognition of advance directives, but no corresponding 
legislation. This has been changed for the better by the ADM(C)A 2015; indeed, until its 
commencement, one can reasonably presume that its provisions would serve as clear guidance 
to the High Court as to what constitutes a valid advance directive, should a case on the matter 
arise. England and Wales clearly has the most advanced framework by far from a legislative 
and common law perspective, however, that is not to say that there are no issues with its law. 
Of particular concern to this research was the judgment in Rushton and the consequences for 
future individuals whose advance decisions are accidentally contravened, particularly pregnant 
patients. This research now turns to a specific discussion of advance directives in pregnancy, 
while simultaneously considering compelled obstetric interventions. 
Chapter 6 
Introduction 
Arguably, few areas within healthcare garner as much publicity, discussion and often vitriolic 
debate than pregnancy. Even leaving aside the issue of termination of pregnancy, what was at 
some point in time a private matter between woman, partner and physician, namely pregnancy, 
is now ‘a political matter’.1 It is important to say that not all of this politicisation has been 
negative for women or their infants. Rather, some of it has resulted in campaigning on behalf 
of women, to further or protect their rights and has led to the drafting and signing of 
transnational conventions2 and government commitments to improve maternal, foetal and 
infant outcomes in pregnancy and to some extent, thereafter.3 Some has resulted in  
improvements in maternity and paternity leave.4 Still, it remains that this area of healthcare has 
been opened up as a public matter and often, legislative proposals pertaining to pregnancy and 
those cases involving it, garner a special kind of interest.  
Thus far, discussions of medical treatment in pregnancy have focused on the patient herself, 
without referring to the foetus. This has been deliberate so that this conversation could take 
place in this chapter alongside the legal analysis of compelled interventions in pregnancy. Both 
the ‘abortion debate’ and the ‘compelled treatment debate’ are often framed in terms of the 
rights of the woman versus the rights of the foetus, or as ‘maternal-foetal conflict’. It is argued, 
however, that this framing is unhelpful if the end goal is to resolve very complex ethical issues 
arising in practice. As will become apparent, the vision of a woman and foetus ‘battling it out’ 
is hardly reflective of the situation occurring when a woman wishes to refuse a Caesarean 
section or blood transfusion. Indeed, as Samantha Halliday argues, a woman refusing 
intervention in pregnancy is not doing so in order to harm the foetus;5 rather, she is doing so 
because she disagrees with medical opinion as to the best course of action for her, just as any 
other patient might. Jane Mair has described the term ‘maternal-foetal conflict’ as ‘a violent 
image which disrupts the coexistence of mother and foetus’ and ‘an emotive phrase which 
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suggests unmotherly feelings and a grotesque perception of the struggling foetus’.6 It is argued 
that these should not be the descriptions that come to mind when a woman is refusing medical 
treatment in pregnancy.  
In relation to the idea of competing rights, Emily Jackson astutely argues that a ‘debate’ framed 
in this manner can never be conclusively ‘won’ because neither side ‘accepts the other’s 
foundational moral premises’.7 Furthermore, such debates are of limited value in reality; it is 
argued that they almost never grapple with or acknowledge the very real challenges faced by 
the women and physicians involved. Rather, they can one-dimensionally portray the woman as 
an uncaring or selfish individual, unconcerned with the welfare of her child, simultaneously 
thinking she knows ‘better’ than her medical team. The physician can be portrayed as viewing 
his patient as little more than a ‘foetal container’, an object whose aims and values are irrelevant 
provided she maintains this ‘other patient’. In reality, situations involving the refusal of medical 
treatment in pregnancy are multi-faceted and reducing them to a basic hero versus villain 
situation, as these debates often do, does a disservice to all parties. Consequently, it is essential 
to devise another way of analysing situations in which the medically indicated treatment is 
being refused in pregnancy.  
The previous chapter outlined the law pertaining to advance healthcare directives in Ireland, 
England and Wales, New York State and the greater United States. Chapter 4 explored the 
ethical justification and legal basis for the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment in 
those jurisdictions. How this right is limited, or is likely to be limited, if the patient is pregnant 
varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and indeed from state from state within the United 
States; those limits will be discussed in considerable detail in this chapter. As such, this chapter 
considers the right of pregnant women to contemporaneously refuse medical treatment in 
Ireland, England and Wales and New York (including the greater US) in order to discern the 
legal position regarding refusals expressed in advance, where there is no ‘pregnancy exception’ 
to the advance directive legislation. It also discusses legislation that prevents the advance 
directives of pregnant women from being honoured.  
Analytical Framework 
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As argued previously, an alternative to the woman versus foetus framework is necessary to 
attempt to resolve the issues arising from the refusal of medical treatment in pregnancy. Though 
more nuanced and sophisticated arguments are neither unavailable nor remain unmade by 
either side of this debate, it is contended that many of the arguments – perhaps, regrettably the 
most widespread ones – are simplified down to the point of being completely unhelpful. Often 
the ‘pro-life’8 side of the debate advance foetal rights and interests in the context of a separate 
‘person’. Such arguments are often supported by examples of this separateness, such as the 
foetus’ unique DNA and fingerprints and its sometimes-different blood type. Images from 
ultrasound technology are used to further bolster this argument.9 Furthermore, as Rosamund 
Scott argues, the potential to treat the foetus in utero can have the effect of conferring upon it 
‘the status of a patient with rights’.10 However, as she also argues, law and ethics, not science, 
ought to determine if the foetus has the status of patient and any accompanying rights that it 
should have.11 Arguments of separate entities refer to the foetus as ‘the (unborn) baby’ or the 
‘child not yet born’. Sometimes, these arguments draw on the similarities between a foetus and 
a neonate with the line of argument that it is not permissible to kill a newly born baby, so why 
is it permissible to kill a foetus? What is so significant about birth that it allows one to be killed 
but not the other? Reduced to its most basic form, on the pro-choice side, arguments that ‘it’s 
the woman’s body, the end(!)’ or that the foetus is akin to a body part, are advanced. 
As should be apparent, these two viewpoints are so divergent that a meaningful debate is almost 
impossible. Their starting points are simply too far apart. It is also advanced that neither of 
these positions properly reflect the nature of the foetus or the pregnant woman, nor their 
relationship. The foetus is neither a body part nor a separate person, at least not entirely. The 
body part comparison, while clearly accurate in the sense that the foetus is ‘contained’ within 
the body of the woman, is problematic because it denies the distinctiveness of the foetus and 
indeed, runs contrary to physiology.12 A foetus is not functional like a kidney and the woman 
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(1991) 100 Yale L J 1281, 1314: ‘The body part analogy derives some of its credibility from the intricate and intimate connection between 
the fetus and woman (… ) From before viability until fully completed live birth, the fetus is within the person of the woman and at one with 
is not dependent on it for survival like she is with many organs.13 No body part or organ has 
the potential to be independent or live its own life one day.14 Furthermore, the ‘body part’ 
understanding can preclude or severely limit action being taken on behalf of a harmed foetus;15 
this should not be the case where the foetus is harmed by the conduct of another, such as when 
a pregnant woman is attacked, where the negligence of another person has caused a car accident 
or where there is lack of informed consent arising from insufficient disclosure of risks pertinent 
to the foetus and said risk has materialised.16 As John Seymour argues, ‘it is unsatisfactory to 
answer all questions relating to the appropriateness of legal intervention to protect a fetus by 
denying that it exists and has intrinsic value’.17 
It has been posited that in recognising the distinctiveness of the foetus, a legal system can 
sometimes benefit women;18 it does not follow, however, that the separate foetal person 
construct is preferable to the ‘body part’ one. Rather, it is also problematic. Irrespective of 
biological differences between the woman and the foetus, it is not independent of her body 
during pregnancy. Until birth, it is part of her and decreasingly dependent on her for its survival 
as time passes. The foetus cannot be reached except through the woman and the separate entity 
argument ignores this. The foetus cannot leave the pregnant woman to return at a later date. 
Just as the body part analysis fails to recognise the difference and uniqueness of the foetus, so 
too does the separate entities model fail to recognise the unique state of, and role being played 
by, the pregnant woman. The foetus is carried inside her and cared for and nourished 
exclusively by her body; nobody else has this role aside from the woman. The American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) also expresses concern about this model:  
When the pregnant woman and fetus are conceptualized as separate patients, the 
pregnant woman and her medical interests, health needs, and rights can become 
secondary to those of the fetus. At the extreme, construing the fetus as a patient 
sometimes can lead to the pregnant woman being seen as a ‘fetal container’ rather than 
as an autonomous agent.19 
Furthermore, as Halliday argues, this model fails to reflect the view of pregnancy held by many 
pregnant women themselves, thereby ‘neglecting (…) the social relational context of 
 
her bodily systems’. Eike-Henner Kluge, ‘When Caesarian Section Operations Imposed by a Court Are Justified’ (1988) 14 J Med Ethics 206, 
208. 
13 See Catherine A MacKinnon, ‘Reflections on Sex Equality under Law’ (1991) 100 Yale L J 1281, 1314. 
14 Samantha Halliday, Autonomy and Pregnancy: A Comparative Analysis of Compelled Obstetric Intervention (Routledge 2016) 180. 
15 John Seymour, Childbirth and the Law (OUP 2000) 194. 
16 See for example, the New York cases of Hughson v St. Francis Hospital 92 AD 2d 131 (NY 1983). See clarification to the position regarding 
general medical negligence in Albala v City of New York 54 NY 2d 269 (1981) wherein the Court of Appeals of the State of New York found 
that a defendant could not be liable for harm to the foetus, which was caused prior to conception.   
17 ibid 189. 
18 ibid 194. 
19 ACOG Committee on Ethics, Refusal of Medically Recommended Treatment During Pregnancy (Number 664, 2016) 3. 
pregnancy’.20 Plainly, while it is distinguishable from her in a variety of ways, the foetus is not 
separate. As Catherine MacKinnon summarises:  
Sometimes there are no adequate analogies. As it is, the fetus has no concept of its own, 
but must be like something men have or are: a body part to the Left, a person to the 
Right. Nowhere in law is the fetus a fetus.21 
Thus, instead of adopting one or other extreme, the response of the law to the foetus can be 
determined by the context in which it is being invoked, thereby negating the need for it to 
(artificially) characterise the foetus.22 This research, therefore, advocates for the ‘Not-One-
But-Two’ model when considering the refusal of medical treatment during pregnancy. It is 
argued that this model neither reduces the woman to a maternal environment nor ‘inanimate 
machine to be tinkered with to produce the best product’.23 It does not ignore or disregard the 
uniqueness and distinctiveness of the foetus for fear of causing a corresponding decline in the 
rights of the pregnant woman. Its strength, as identified by Halliday, is that ‘it recognises the 
organic value of the woman and the foetus, circumventing the potential for “maternal”/foetal 
conflict, while still enabling the state to protect the foetus from third parties’.24 
Ethics and Compelled Treatment in Pregnancy 
The ethical issues connected to advance directives and end-of-life decision-making were 
considered in the previous chapters enabling this chapter to specifically focus on advance 
refusal of and compelled treatment in pregnancy. The role of autonomy in healthcare decision-
making has already been discussed, however as Halliday summarises: 
The principle of patient autonomy stresses respect for the patient as an individual rather 
than as an object of concern, and attempts to promote precedent autonomy aim to extend 
that respect to those no longer capable of exercising autonomy and thereby to prioritise 
the patient’s wishes over her welfare.25 
Yet, when we turn to advance directives in pregnancy, we often see a hesitance or refusal to 
honour the wishes of the woman. What is shared between the chosen jurisdictions is the 
underpinning ethical issues connected to medical treatment in pregnancy. What is not shared, 
as will become apparent, is how relevant courts and legislatures – and indeed physicians – 
resolve these ethical dilemmas. To understand the variances at a domestic level and on 
occasion, inconsistencies within the same jurisdictions, it is key to explore both legal and 
 
20 Samantha Halliday, Autonomy and Pregnancy: A Comparative Analysis of Compelled Obstetric Intervention (Routledge 2016) 181. 
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22 John Seymour, Childbirth and the Law (OUP 2000) 193. 
23 Samantha Halliday, Autonomy and Pregnancy: A Comparative Analysis of Compelled Obstetric Intervention (Routledge 2016)  174. 
24 ibid 184. 
25 ibid 30. 
ethical issues. It is simply impossible to look at the law in this area in a vacuum, as though it 
is independent of medical ethics – rather, ethics must fill in the blanks left by what have been 
described, in varying degrees, as the failure of the law in this area.26 MacKinnon, for example, 
argues: 
The legal system has not adequately conceptualized pregnancy, hence the relationship 
between the fetus and the pregnant woman. This may be because the interests, 
perceptions, and experiences that have shaped the law have not included those of 
women. The social conception of pregnancy that has formed the basis for  its legal 
treatment has not been from the point of view of the pregnant woman, but rather from 
the point of view of the observing outsider (…)27 
Some commentators attribute much of the development of the discipline of bioethics itself to 
reproductive matters or ‘fertility control’, as Warren Reich has termed it.28 Thus, there is one 
inescapable reality when treatment is being sought against the will of the pregnant woman and 
that is that the pregnancy has complicated the matter, ethically and in many jurisdictions, 
legally. Even if one takes the view that medical treatment ought never to be compelled in 
pregnancy, that does not result in pregnancy not being a consideration for the medical 
professionals, the hospital, the legal representatives and the courts. Were this research simply 
examining the law on a competent refusal of treatment by a non-pregnant person, then there 
would be very little to discuss. The matter is, for all intents and purposes, settled from a legal 
perspective with competent individuals having ‘a broad legal prerogative to decide how to 
respond to fatal afflictions – how much to struggle, how much to suffer, how much bodily 
invasion to tolerate, and how much helplessness and indignity to endure’.29 They can refuse 
even if ‘the personal values underlying the choice seem idiosyncratic or foolish’.30 
There may be situations where the morally right decision is to submit to treatment, either to 
preserve one’s own life or the life of another. But this duty will rarely, if ever, translate to a 
legal one. The morally right decision may be to donate a kidney or bone marrow for the benefit 
of another, but the law will almost certainly decline to compel it.31 The morally right decision 
 
26 For example, John Seymour, Childbirth and the Law (OUP 2000) Chapters 8 and 9; Rosamund Scott argues: ‘[B]oth legally and morally, 
reliance upon the fetus' lack of personhood (…) is unsatisfactory: the question of fetal harm or death needs, so far as possible, to be justified, 
not just excused’. Rosamund Scott, ‘The Pregnant Woman and the Good Samaritan: Can a Woman Have a Duty to Undergo a Caesarean 
Section?’ (2000) 20 Oxford J Legal Stud 407, 410. 
27 Catherine A MacKinnon, ‘Reflections on Sex Equality under Law’ (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 1281, 1309.  
28 Warren Reich, ‘The Wider View: André Hellenger’s Passionate, Integrating Intellect and the Creation of Bioethics’ (1999) Kennedy Institute 
of Ethics Journal 25, 37; Kenneth Boyd, ’Medical Ethics: Hippocratic and Democratic Ideals’ in Law’ in Sheila McClean (ed) First Do No 
Harm: Law, Ethics and Healthcare (Ashgate 2006) 29-30. 
29 Norman L Cantor, ‘Twenty-Five Years After Quinlan: A Review of the Jurisprudence of Death and Dying’ (2001) 29 J L Med Ethics 182. 
30 ibid. 
31 See McFall v Shimp 10 Pa D & C 3d 90 (1978) 91: The court declined to compel David Shimp to donate bone marrow to save the life of 
his cousin, who was suffering from aplastic anaemia. While the court viewed Shimp’s refusal to donate as ‘morally indefensible’, it noted that 
the ‘decision rest[ed] with the defendant’ and that to ‘compel defendant to submit to an intrusion of his body would change every concept and 
principle upon which our society is founded’ and ‘defeat the sanctity of the individual’. In this context, it is interesting to look at the case of 
Re Y (Adult Patient: Transplant: Bone Marrow) [1997] 2 FCR 172 from England and Wales as discussed in Chapter 4. In this case, an order 
for a parent may be to consent to life-saving treatment, perhaps because being a parent demands 
some level of sacrifice.32 Yet, the courts are loathe to compel treatment on this basis, at least 
in more recent times.33 Instead, ‘a woman does not forfeit her fundamental rights to liberty and 
privacy by becoming a mother’.34 The question of whether she forfeits these rights on 
becoming an expectant ‘mother’ and whether she ought to, will be examined. 
The ethical analysis in this chapter will be split into two parts; first, this section will consider 
the idea of  the pregnant woman having a duty to submit to medical treatment in the interest of 
her foetus, while simultaneously looking at how her interests – self-determination, bodily 
integrity – are directly affected by the intervention, just as the interests of any patient would 
be.35 Although the duty that a non-pregnant patient may have to submit to treatment only 
received scant attention in the previous chapters, it is submitted that in order to fully engage 
with the ethics of refusal of treatment in pregnancy, this research must venture outside 
Principlism and explore the idea of the pregnant woman owing a duty to accept treatment. 
Second, this section will consider the role and duties of the physician in respect of the pregnant 
patient and suggest the conduct that most fulfils his ethical obligations to her.  
As the refusal of medical treatment has already been explored from a Principlist perspective, it 
serves little purpose to tread over that ground once more, as, all things being equal, the 
autonomy of the competent person should be respected. Pregnancy, however, appears not to be 
an ‘all things being equal’ situation. While we may arrive at the same outcome – that all 
competently expressed valid advance decisions ought to be respected, pregnancy aside – the 
ethical analysis cannot ignore the difference between a pregnant and non-pregnant person. To 
do so, ignores the ethical challenges faced by lawmakers, physicians and the patient herself. 
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Accordingly, the analysis focuses on moral issues specific to pregnancy, with inclusions of and 
some expansion past discussions of the four principles.36 
Before progressing to the discussion of duties in respect of the foetus, it is useful to briefly 
outline its moral status as understood by this research. Extensive literature exists on foetal 
moral status, however, it is beyond the scope of this research to engage in any more than a 
cursory fashion with this debate.37 Rather, this research largely looks at the matter of 
intervention in pregnancy from the perspective of the patient, as it did with informed consent 
and end-of-life decisions. This enables an enquiry into the sometimes strong moral duties that 
may be held by the woman in respect of the foetus – neither body part nor separate – and 
advocates the position, once again, that discussion of pitting maternal and foetal rights against 
one another is both unhelpful and inaccurate.38 It is felt that the ‘gradualist approach’ to the 
foetus most reflects its true nature. This approach identifies that neither the idea that a right39 
to life exists immediately from conception, nor the idea that a nearly born foetus has no right 
to life, are satisfactory; in other words, that it is difficult to accept that a foetus has no rights at 
one moment, but suddenly gains them at another.40 As John Harris put it: 
What do people think has happened in the passage down the birth canal to make it okay 
to kill the foetus at one end of the birth canal but not the other.41 
Though a little blunt, he has captured some of what is wrong with the idea that a foetus acquires 
claims or rights solely upon birth. It is an equally unsatisfactory view for the foetus to have full 
‘rights’ from conception: 
We are asked to notice that the development of a human being from conception through 
birth into childhood is continuous; then it is said that (…) to choose a point in this 
development and say ‘before this point the thing is not a person, after this point it is a 
person’ is to make an arbitrary choice, a choice for which in the nature of things no 
good reason can be given. It is concluded that the fetus is, or anyway that we had better 
say it is, a person from the moment of conception. But this conclusion does not follow 
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(…) A newly fertilized ovum, a newly implanted clump of cells, is no more a person 
than an acorn is an oak tree.42 
Instead, the gradualist approach recognises that as the foetus develops, the reasons against 
destroying it gain strength. If there are persuasive countervailing reasons for not recognising 
the claims of the foetus, then they may be disregarded. Thus, the woman may be ‘justified in 
refusing medical treatment where she has a serious reason proportionate to the fetus’ stage of 
development’.43 Accordingly, the morality of the decision in question – abortion, refusal of 
treatment, drug use – is not dependent on foetal ‘rights’, rather the potential personhood of the 
foetus, or respect for the value of foetal life, acts as a reason against destroying it, or a 
responsibility not to.44 Therefore, a stronger reason or justification on the part of the woman 
for the harmful choice is required.45  
It is also argued that the gradualist approach most accurately reflects the foetus within the 
maternal-foetal relationship as something ‘on a distinctively finite journey of development 
within the womb which comes ever closer to its end as it nears parturition (…) anything but a 
static being’.46 In that way: 
[T]he strength of the fetus’s (…) interests, at least so far as they are in conflict with its 
mother’s, are always tempered to some degree by its location inside her body, given 
that through its medical needs it is likely to call upon her interests in bodily integrity or 
self-determination or both.47 
The Pregnant Woman’s Duty 
The provision of unwanted medical treatment to any patient is a violation of her interest in 
bodily integrity, or self-determination, or both. The severity or nature of this infringement may 
vary with the type of intervention and with the nature of her beliefs or reasons, if any, that 
precipitate the refusal. As outlined in Chapter 1, bodily integrity can be understood as the 
ability to decide what happens to and with one’s body, thus a violation of bodily integrity is an 
interference with this ability. Self-determination, by contrast, extends past the body to personal 
choices and the process by which one shapes her life. When the ‘duty’ to the foetus is discussed 
in jurisprudence, it is rarely in the context of it being a legally enforceable duty.48 Indeed, as 
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Heather Draper argues, ‘it is one thing to show what a woman ought do in relation to her unborn 
child and quite another to say that this obligation ought to be enforced’.49 The duties of the 
pregnant woman in respect of the foetus have been described in a variety of ways; some 
accounts view the duty to be of a special nature, generated by the pregnancy itself. For example, 
it has been opined that the woman may owe a duty to the foetus in view of her choice to 
continue the pregnancy.50 Thus, by opting not to terminate pregnancy, she has accepted a 
‘special set of responsibilities’ to the foetus that go hand in hand with that choice.51 Or as Eike-
Henner Kluge has argued: 
[B]y voluntarily allowing the fetus to become a person (…) the mother has de facto 
accepted the conditions accompanying that action – (…) since she was aware of the 
dependent nature of fetuses (…) (or ought to have been thus aware) she has, through 
her action, voluntarily accepted the responsibilities attendant on the fact of such 
dependence and thereby has de facto subordinated her right to otherwise unhindered 
autonomy to the right to life of the fetus and to the conditions that follow from it.52 
Though this research would not accept the categorisation of the foetus as ‘a person’ for a variety 
of other reasons, the general thrust of the argument is worth stating: through her choice to be 
pregnant, the woman has knowingly accepted the responsibilities that accompany that choice, 
one of which is that her interests and rights may need to submit to the interests of the foetus. 
This argument will be challenged in subsequent paragraphs, as it is not accepted that the woman 
always has a duty to give primacy to the interests of the foetus. Equally, it is not necessarily 
accepted that she may never have such a duty.   
The duty of the woman to the foetus may not be exclusive to pregnancy, but instead may be a 
version of the general duty to rescue; namely, the moral duty on an individual to prevent serious 
harm to another, if there is minimal cost to herself in doing so.53 Whether medical or surgical 
intervention could be considered a ‘minimal cost’ is certainly a matter to be debated. In any 
event, as Scott argues: although rescue attempts regularly involve a degree of physical exertion 
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or risk, they do not ‘seriously invade the body in the special sense of a duty that is (…) to be 
realised through the body’.54 Thus, while the theory of the pregnant woman having the role of 
general rescuer has some appeal, it does not really reflect the reality of the situation. 
Some argue that the responsibility to have particular medical treatment, such as a Caesarean 
section, for the benefit of the foetus may arise from it being the ‘minimally decent’ thing to 
do:55  
Whilst the cost to a woman of saving a life by having a caesarean section is not 
insignificant, it is not sufficiently high to justify a refusal of consent because the gain 
to the fetus – the saving of his life – is so great.56  
Or to combine this proposition and Kluge’s view; by virtue of her choice to continue the 
pregnancy and as Caesarean sections are not an exceptional or even uncommon method of 
giving birth, the woman is aware that her role in bringing her child into the world may extend 
to this procedure. It is not as if there are a multitude of ways in which birth can occur, not 
currently at any rate; rather, there are two.57 Two points arise in relation to this; first, it is 
obvious that the ‘cost’ of undergoing a Caesarean section is not the same for every woman, just 
as the ‘cost’ of undergoing a particular medical procedure is not universal for every non-
pregnant person. If it were, we would all choose the same options in the same circumstances 
and have the same reactions following the same events. Therefore, in-keeping with the 
gradualist account of the foetus, the reason why the woman wishes to refuse is relevant to the 
morality of the decision. Second, such a contention rests on the Caesarean section being 
medically necessary, whether by virtue of the risk to the woman or the foetus or both.58  
On the first point, where a decision to refuse is for religious reasons, it may be argued by some, 
particularly those who do not subscribe to a religious faith, that a belief of this nature ‘cannot 
be so important that it would justify or excuse the fetus’s death (…)’.59 It may be questioned 
 
54 Rosamund Scott, Rights, Duties and the Body: Law and Ethics of Maternal-Fetal Conflict (Hart Publishing 2002) 103: she contends this as 
a response to John Finnis’ categorisation of continuing a pregnancy as part of the ‘ordinary neighbourly’ duties of a woman.  
55 This is adapted from Judith Jarvis Thomson’s ‘Minimally Decent Samaritanism’ argument in relation to abortion: ‘There may well be cases 
in which carrying the child to term requires only Minimally Decent Samaritanism of the mother, and this is a standard we must not fall below’. 
Judith Jarvis Thomson, ‘A Defense of Abortion’ in D Kelly Weisberg Applications Of Feminist Legal Theory (Temple University Press 1996) 
983. 
56 Heather Draper, ‘Women, Forced Caesareans and Antenatal Responsibilities’ (1996) 22 J Med Ethics 327, 328. She does subsequently go 
on to exempt two groups of women from this obligation: ‘[T]hose who have either not willingly become pregnant or who have not willingly 
continued with their pregnancy; and those who have willingly continued their pregnancy, but have done so only to preserve the life of a baby 
which they have no intention of parenting’ [330]. 
57 For these purposes, assisted vaginal births are considered the same as unassisted. Contrast with later in Draper’s argument later in the same 
paper: ‘If pregnant women are unsure about which therapies it is unacceptable to refuse on religious grounds, we should not be surprised. But 
if such confusion exists, we cannot also argue that women who continue with their pregnancies understand what they are letting themselves 
in for by so doing’ [ibid, 332]. Contrast also Rosamund Scott’s discussion of the social context of pregnancy and the difference between risks 
being inherent in pregnancy and being part of a woman’s duty. Rosamund Scott, Rights, Duties and the Body: Law and Ethics of Maternal-
Fetal Conflict (Hart Publishing 2002) 96-103. 
58 Heather Draper also makes this point herself; Heather Draper, ‘Women, Forced Caesareans and Antenatal Responsibilities’ (1996) 22 J 
Med Ethics 327, 331. 
59 Rosamund Scott, Rights, Duties and the Body: Law and Ethics of Maternal-Fetal Conflict (Hart Publishing 2002) 67. 
why a woman should have ‘“the right to sacrifice” the fetus in the interests of her religious 
faith’.60 The practice of religion is, however, an exercise in self-determination; it is one of the 
many processes by which an individual shapes her existence. Self-determination has been 
clearly identified as valuable and an interest therein has been identified as worthy of protection. 
Religion often focuses on consequences and the idea that if one behaves the ‘right’ way 
throughout her lifetime, then she will enjoy the rewards of afterlife. As Scott argues: 
[W]here a pregnant woman for whom religious faith has a valid purpose wishes to 
refuse caesarean delivery with the likely consequence that the fetus will die (…) her 
religious faith is clearly a fundamental, indeed central, aspect of her life and its 
meaning. So, by recognising the important role religion plays in her deliberations about 
how to live, we can accord significant weight to the question of religion in moral 
argument.61 
Thus, even with similar physical outcomes, the ‘cost’ to a Christian Scientist of submitting to 
a Caesarean section can hardly be considered the same as a person of a different or no religious 
faith, even if that person has a strong non-religious reason for refusing. Though she may have 
strong justification for refusing, the non-religious person will not fear that her opportunity at 
an afterlife has disintegrated nor fear negation of all of her prior ‘good deeds’, whatever logic 
one may see as lacking in that fear. 
Not only can compelled medical treatment in pregnancy been viewed as compromising the 
autonomy, bodily integrity and interests that a woman has in self-determination, it has also 
been viewed by the courts as an affront to her dignity.62 During the course of the legal analysis, 
it will become apparent that dignity is referred to in case law and its protection has been 
considered to come within the remit of the court.63 For example, the performance of a 
Caesarean section despite competent refusal was viewed to be a violation of the dignity of the 
woman.64 Arguably, the concept of dignity being protected in such situations is dignity in the 
empowerment or aspirational sense. Given that it was a competent refusal, one could argue that 
dignity as a basis for the recognition of a right, in other words the right to refuse unwanted 
medical treatment, is being protected. The dignity being protected could also be interpreted as 
aspirational in that it enables the woman to live in accordance with her own standards. It may 
be remembered, however, that in her discussion of Comportment Dignity, Doris Schroeder 
specifically referred to behaviour that adhered to social norms and expectations and not one’s 
 
60 ibid. 
61 ibid 70. 
62 See for example, HSE v B [2017] 1 ILRM 54, 61.  
63 See PP v Health Service Executive [2015] 1 ILRM 324; HSE v B [2017] 1 ILRM 54.  
64 HSE v B [2017] 1 ILRM 54. 
one norms and expectations. With that in mind, such refusal could be seen as going against 
norms and expectations and therefore, as failing to uphold dignity. Indeed, as has already been 
argued in this research, there are expectations amongst much of society that pregnant women 
will make sacrifices for their future children and that harming or failing to prevent the foetus 
from being harmed is morally impermissible conduct.  
On the second point raised, namely medical necessity, a specific point somewhat outside of 
moral theory needs to be made: there is some evidence to suggest that Caesarean sections are 
being performed despite not being medically necessary. The WHO states ‘the ideal rate for 
caesarean sections to be between 10% and 15%’ and furthermore, that there is evidence to 
suggest that rates of over 20% do not improve perinatal or neonatal outcomes.65 Yet, the 
jurisdictions that will be discussed in the context of this research have a higher rate than both 
the WHO optimal rate and the upper level of demonstrable benefit. It is estimated that 13% of 
Caesarean sections performed in the United States are not medically necessary.66 In Ireland, 
the figures for Caesarean section births reported by the Health Service Executive are similarly 
high – 32.1% and 33.8% in 2017 and 2018 respectively – thereby indicating that in excess of 
12% may not have been medically necessary.67 The situation is similar in England, Caesarean 
sections accounted for 28% of the total births in 2017-18.68 It is absolutely the case that the 
performance of a Caesarean section is the medically necessary and appropriate method of 
delivery in certain circumstances – hence the optimal percentage of between 10% and 15% set 
by the international medical community – however, the potential for in excess of 10% of 
Caesarean sections to be performed unnecessarily presents considerable ethical issues.69 
First, it is questionable if the women undergoing Caesarean sections are aware that the surgery 
may not be medically necessary but may instead be desirable. If not, a legitimate question as 
to whether the consent was informed arises. In Chapter 3, the essential criteria for informed 
consent were discussed; informed consent must be given freely by someone with the requisite 
 
65 See Ties Boerma and others, ‘Global epidemiology of use of and disparities in caesarean sections’ (2018) 392 The Lancet 1341. See also 
World Health Organization, Statement on Caesarean Section Rates (2015) 
<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/161442/WHO_RHR_15.02_eng.pdf;jsessionid=25C9CB8E680887F5C8D83BBF2CB522
21?sequence=1> accessed 12 February 2020. It is worth bearing in mind that some authors disagree that consensus has been reached regarding 
the optimum level of Caesarean sections; Ana Pilar Betrán and others, ‘Interventions to Reduce Unnecessary Caesarean Sections in Healthy 
Women and Babies’ (2018) 392 The Lancet 1358. 
66 Thaddeus Mason Pope, ‘Legal Briefing: Unwanted Caesareans and Obstetric Violence” (2017) 28 The Journal of Clinical Ethics 163. This 
is based on Caesarean sections amounting to approximately 32% of births in the United States and the level of demonstrable benefit, per the 
WHO, sitting at 20%.  
67 Health Service Executive, Irish Maternity Indicator System National Report 2018 (2019) <https://www.hse.ie/eng/about/who/acute-
hospitals-division/woman-infants/national-reports-on-womens-health/imis-national-report-2018.pdf> accessed 12 February 2020. 
68 National Health Service, NHS Maternity Statistics, England 2017-18 (2018) < https://files.digital.nhs.uk/C3/47466E/hosp-epis-stat-mat-
summary-report%202017-18.pdf> accessed 12 February 2020. 
69 The following paragraphs are not intended to relate to elective Caesarean sections at the request of the woman. In such cases, the woman is 
aware that the Caesarean is are not necessarily required on medical grounds but is requesting its performance for other reasons.  
capacity to do so, after attaining the necessary information. If the woman is under the mistaken 
impression that the Caesarean section is medically necessary then her consent may not be valid, 
primarily because she may not receive information about the risks associated with Caesarean 
sections, or alternatives. There may also be questions as to her ability to weigh the information 
as part of the decision-making process given her mistaken belief that the procedure is medically 
necessary. The relationship between informed consent and autonomy, which was also 
discussed in Chapter 3, therefore arises in this context; it is legitimate to question if the 
autonomy of the woman is being respected if she is being misinformed about the intervention.  
The Role of the Physician 
A further question arises in the context of medically (un)necessary Caesarean sections, that is 
whether the obstetrician has breached his ethical duties of beneficence and non-maleficence, 
first, in terms of his reasons for recommending a Caesarean section in the circumstances. There 
is a considerable body of research in the area of what has been termed ‘defensive Caesarean 
sections’, in other words, performance in order to minimise the risk of litigation against the 
physician.70 It is questionable, to put it mildly, if such conduct fulfils the duties of beneficence 
and non-maleficence if the intention is to protect the physician from liability and not to confer 
the most benefit on his patient. Though these two things are certainly not mutually exclusive, 
the maximisation of the welfare of the patient must take primacy if the doctor is to fulfil his 
ethical obligations. Furthermore, as outlined above, the autonomy of the woman is unlikely to 
receive the respect it deserves with such a practice. The possibility that some physicians are 
utilising Caesarean sections ‘for convenience’ or in order to allow ‘for private work to be 
reconciled with public duties’ has also been suggested.71 It goes without saying that such 
motivation is contrary to the ethical obligations of the physician. 
Second, it is accepted that Caesarean sections can lead to an increased risk of complications, 
both post-birth and in future births. There is a higher rate of maternal morbidity associated with 
Caesarean section than vaginal birth and they carry an increased risk of ectopic pregnancy, 
stillbirth, and preterm births.72 They typically carry a longer or more difficult recovery than 
 
70 Dale A Tussing and Martha Wojtowycz, ‘Malpractice, Defensive Medicine, and Obstetric Behavior’ (1997) 35 Med Care 172; Ana Pilar 
Betrán and others, ‘Interventions to Reduce Unnecessary Caesarean Sections in Healthy Women and Babies’ (2018) 392 The Lancet 1358; 
Cringu Antoniu Ionescu and others, ‘Defensive Caesarean Section: A Reality and a Recommended Health Care Improvement for Romanian 
Obstetrics’ (2019) 25 J Eval Clin Pract 111. Ana Pilar Betrán et al in particular note that ‘practitioners are more likely to be sued for 
complications during vaginal delivery than for unnecessary CS, even if there is no evidence of error’; accordingly, they may push for a 
Caesarean section ‘for professional protection, rather than to benefit the mother and the baby’ [1360]. 
71 Ana Pilar Betrán and others, ‘Interventions to Reduce Unnecessary Caesarean Sections in Healthy Women and Babies’ (2018) 392 The 
Lancet 1358, 1360. The authors cite a number of sources in support of this contention; sources are from Chile, Brazil, Hungary, Cambodia 
and Tanzania.  
72 Jane Sandall and others, ‘Short-term and Long-term Effects of Caesarean Section on the Health of Women and Children’ (2018) 392 The 
Lancet 1349. 
vaginal birth, or both. Thus, the woman who undergoes an unnecessary Caesarean section may 
be exposed to these negatives consequences unnecessarily and unjustifiably. Given that the 
duty to prevent avoidable harm is subsumed within the duty of beneficence, a physician who 
recommends a Caesarean section should only do so where he is satisfied that it is medically 
indicated.73  
Furthermore, there is a tendency to conflate a ‘good outcome’ with the physician fulfilling his 
duties of beneficence and non-maleficence, however, this idea that the survival of woman and 
child equates to a ‘good outcome’ is highly problematic and goes against what has been argued 
previously in relation to beneficence.74 Halliday argues: 
It may well be that both [the woman] and her baby can be reported to be doing well 
after the intervention, but that does not negate the harm she suffered at the hands of the 
state. By treating her in a way that a non-pregnant person would not be treated, the 
woman is reduced to a uterine environment, a patient who must follow medical 
advice.75  
It may be recalled that it was argued that ‘doing good’ for patients extends beyond preserving 
their physical health, instead it relates to maximising their overall welfare. This kind of ‘good 
outcome’ conclusion likely fails to accord sufficient importance to the effect that a traumatic 
birth can have on the physical and mental health of a woman76 and fails to appreciate the link 
between Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and a traumatic birth experience.77 Furthermore, as 
was argued more generally in relation to non-consensual medical treatment, not only does such 
conduct breach trust within the individual patient-physician relationship, but potentially 
damages the reputation of that physician, that hospital or birth centre and the medical 
 
73 This comment is not intended to apply to a Caesarean section that is not medically indicated but is carried out at the request and preference 
of the woman. 
74 This has been recognised by the English courts in Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426, 438:  
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consideration (…) The mother may indeed later regret the outcome [if treatment is not compelled], but the alternative would be an unwarranted 
invasion of the right of the woman to make the decision. 
75 Samantha Halliday, Autonomy and Pregnancy: A Comparative Analysis of Compelled Obstetric Intervention (Routledge 2016) 213.  
76 Rakime Elmir and others, ‘Women’s Perceptions and Experiences of a Traumatic Birth: A Meta-ethnography’ (2010) 66 J Adv Nurs 2142, 
2143: ‘A traumatic birth experience (…) is associated with negative outcomes, such psychological distress and ongoing physical pain (…) 
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PTSD related to childbirth report that they feared for their lives or the lives of their babies, or that they would experience physical damage 
during the birth’. See also Hans Skari and others, ‘Comparative Levels of Psychological Distress, Stress Symptoms, Depression and Anxiety 
after Childbirth — A Prospective Population‐based Study of Mothers and Fathers’ (2002) 109 BJOG 1154, 1159-60: ‘Women who had a 
previous history of a subjective a traumatic birth were at significantly increased risk of developing clinically important psychological distress 
(…) The consequences of negative birth experiences have been further investigated in a recent Swedish study, which showed that a negative 
birth experience is related to a reduced probability of having a subsequent child’. 
77 Rosamund Scott, Rights, Duties and the Body: Law and Ethics of Maternal-Fetal Conflict (Hart Publishing 2002) 92.  See also Debra K 
Creedy and others, ‘Childbirth and the Development of Acute Trauma Symptoms: Incidence and Contributing Factors’ (2000) 27 Birth 104; 
Jo Czarnocka  and Pauline Slade, ‘Prevalence and Predictors of Posttraumatic Stress Symptoms following Childbirth’ (2000) 39 Br J Clin 
Psychol 35. More generally, for the link between ‘medical trauma’ and mental and physical health with some coverage of obstetric trauma, 
see Michelle Flaum Hall and Scott E Hall, Managing the Psychological Impact of Medical Trauma: A Guide for Mental Health and Health 
Care Professionals (Springer 2017).  
profession as a whole in the eyes of some pregnant women. After all, if they seek prenatal care 
and a hospital birth, they may be forced to undergo unwanted treatment. An argument put 
forward by Draper, albeit in relation to reluctant consent, ties the ‘good outcome’ and medical 
necessity points together: 
If a woman does reluctantly consent to a caesarean section, there is no way of 
discovering whether it was actually necessary. Who, in any case, is likely to complain 
or be taken seriously if the baby is born safe and well?78 
Indeed, should the woman not just be content with her healthy baby? Surely the coerced or 
questionable consent to a procedure that may or may not have been necessary should have now 
disappeared from her mind because the child has been born. This research would argue not.  
It is unsurprising that if one views the obstetrician as having two patients and not one, as Scott 
argues is not uncommon amongst obstetricians, then fulfilling the duty of beneficence is 
complex:79 
In obstetrics the problem of caring for two patients, mother and baby, creates the 
concern that to do what the mother desires might harm her baby, and to do what a doctor 
considered to be in the best interests of the baby might harm the mother.80  
The primary purpose of adopting the ‘Not-One-But-Two’ framework was to appreciate the 
difficulty encountered, not just by courts, but by physicians who experience the challenge of 
treatment refusal in pregnancy. In proposing what is essentially this model, the ACOG states:  
This ethical approach recognizes that the obstetrician–gynecologist’s primary duty is 
to the pregnant woman. This duty most often also benefits the fetus. However, 
circumstances may arise during pregnancy in which the interests of the pregnant woman 
and those of the fetus diverge. These circumstances demonstrate the primacy of the 
obstetrician–gynecologist’s duties to the pregnant woman.81  
The College goes on to opine that the obligation of beneficence is owed by the physician to the 
woman, whereas the physician should be thought of as having ‘beneficence-based motivations 
toward the fetus’.82 
Perhaps then Ranaan Gillon best summarises the duty of the medical professional:  
The central moral objective of medicine (…) is to produce net medical benefit for the 
patient with as benefit for the patient with as little harm as possible. Today we may add 
to that Hippocratic objective the moral qualifications that we should pursue it in a way 
 
78 See Heather Draper, ‘Women, Forced Caesareans and Antenatal Responsibilities’ (1996) 22 J Med Ethics 327; Kristina Stern, ‘Court-
Ordered Caesarian Sections: In Whose Interests?‘ (1993) 56 MLR 238, 332. 
79 Rosamund Scott, Rights, Duties and the Body: Law and Ethics of Maternal-Fetal Conflict (Hart Publishing 2002) 26. 
80 Vivienne Harpwood, Legal Issues in Obstetrics (Dartmouth 1996) 16. 
81 ACOG Committee on Ethics, Refusal of Medically Recommended Treatment During Pregnancy (Number 664, 2016) 3. 
82 ibid (emphasis added). 
that respects people’s deliberated choices for themselves and that is just or fair to others 
(whether in the context of distribution of scarce resources, respect for people’s rights, 
or respect for morally acceptable laws).83 
It is argued that anything short of that represents a failure by the physician to discharge his 
ethical duties.  
The Law: Compelled Treatment in Pregnancy 
While discussing the ethical issues that arise when a pregnant woman wishes to refuse medical 
treatment, the idea of the woman owing an ethical duty to her foetus in various contexts was 
considered. As was outlined, however, this ethical duty does not necessarily translate to a legal 
one. While a woman may have a moral duty to refrain from engaging in risky behaviour, there 
is scant law under which to prosecute her, provided such behaviour is not unlawful in and of 
itself.84 Even where that conduct is unlawful, the legal precedent for prosecuting the woman 
where there is a negative outcome for the foetus is uncertain.85 In New York, where the 
pregnant woman has acted unlawfully, the law has been interpreted as holding her criminally 
responsible for conduct that is undertaken with the intention of harming the foetus.86 The Court 
of Appeal has been quite clear that any broader interpretation was outside of its purview: 
The imposition of criminal liability [for such acts] (…) should be clearly defined by the 
legislature, not the courts. It should also not be left to the whim of the prosecutor. 
Conceivably, one could find it ‘reckless’ for a pregnant woman to disregard her 
obstetrician’s specific orders concerning bed rest; take prescription and/or illicit drugs; 
shovel a walkway; engage in a contact sport; carry groceries; or disregard dietary 
restrictions. Such conduct, if it resulted in premature birth and subsequent death of the 
child, could result in criminal liability for the mother. At present, such conduct (…)  
would not result in criminal prosecution of the mother if the fetus died in utero.87 
Legal enforceability of the moral duty owed by a pregnant woman to her foetus is most 
commonly seen in two ways; first, unsurprisingly in the enforced medical treatment of the 
woman in the interests of the foetus. As will become apparent, ‘[d]espite common law and (…) 
constitutional law principles recognizing and protecting the right to refuse medical treatment, 
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following a car accident involving Ms Jorgensen and another vehicle. At the time of the accident, Ms Jorgensen had been driving over the 
speed limit, without a seatbelt and while under the influence of prescription drugs and alcohol. It was noted that the prosecution accepted that 
had Ms Jorgensen’s child died in utero, as opposed to 6 days after birth, she would not have been prosecuted [91]. 
87 ibid 92. 
pregnancy is often viewed as a special case by courts’.88 The second manifestation is seen most 
commonly in so-called ‘cocaine mom’ laws; in other words, when the use of drugs or alcohol 
during pregnancy can result in the compulsory administration of treatment (civil confinement) 
or the woman being taken into custody.89 While there are no US states that specifically 
criminalise drug use in pregnancy,90 there have been several instances where pregnant women 
have been prosecuted using a generous interpretation of existing statutes such as child abuse,91 
child endangerment92 and naturally, drug offences. In South Carolina, for example, pregnant 
women admitted to the Medical University of South Carolina who met one of nine criteria – 
which included abruptio placentae and quite routine occurrences such as late or incomplete 
prenatal care – were tested for cocaine use. Upon a positive test, the hospital contacted the 
Charleston Police Department exposing the women to being charged with drug possession, 
drug possession and distribution to a person under 18 (the foetus) or unlawful neglect of a child, 
once born.93 Such laws have been described as setting ‘the outer limits of what the community 
regards as morally tolerable’.94 These laws are also, quite evidently, an example of the state 
exercising its interest in protecting the foetus, with questionable legitimacy.95 While drug-use 
may pose a risk in pregnancy, so too do other factors such as poor nutrition and exposure to 
environmental toxins;96 if it is a legitimate use of state power to pursue pregnant women for 
drug use during pregnancy, then ought it not also be a corresponding responsibility of the state 
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to ensure that poverty does not deny pregnant women adequate nutrition and a safe 
environment?97 
Ireland: Advance Directives in Pregnancy 
The core question in this research is whether the likely effect of Irish law is that an otherwise 
valid advance directive will be overridden if the decision-maker is pregnant when the directive 
should have effect. Plainly, the second question is if pregnancy does nullify or invalidate an 
advance directive, ought this to be the case from a legal and ethical standpoint? These questions 
arise as a result of the specific provisions within the Assisted Decision-Making Capacity Act 
2015 pertaining to advance decisions and pregnancy. Operating prior to the repeal of the 8th 
Amendment, the legislature inserted specific exceptions for pregnant directive holders to the 
general rules on the validity of advance directives.98 Section 85(6)(a) of the ACM(C)A 2015 
makes it possible to override the otherwise valid advance directive of a pregnant woman if the 
failure to treat would have a ‘deleterious effect on the unborn’, provided she has not specified 
that the directive should apply in pregnancy.99 Bearing in mind the former role of Article 40.3.3 
as a ‘protector of the unborn’ and not merely as a ‘preventer of abortion’, one could see the 
logic behind section 85(6)(a) and the attempt to strike a fair balance between protecting the 
bodily integrity of the pregnant woman and her autonomy and the right to life of the unborn. 
Leaving aside the ethical issues with such an approach,100 even with the repeal of the 8th 
Amendment, one could see how it may be reasonable to have a rebuttable presumption that 
treatment should be administered where an advance directive does not specify that the refusal 
should apply in pregnancy. Pregnancy can be an entirely unforeseen situation for a variety of 
reasons, such as a mistaken diagnosis of infertility or a failed sterilisation attempt.101 Because 
of this unforeseen change in circumstances, her attitude towards that particular treatment may 
also have changed, even if only for the duration of her pregnancy. Furthermore, the refusal of 
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treatment may depend on the stage of gestation and the likelihood of her child surviving. Even 
if it were possible for these factors to be accurately documented in an advance directive, they 
will not be if a pregnancy is completely unexpected. Furthermore, if an individual has gone to 
the trouble of drafting a valid advance directive and is steadfast in her opposition to particular 
treatment, pregnant or not, then one could question why she would not state that it should apply 
in all circumstances ‘including pregnancy’? 
Either way, it can be argued that a significant amount of the legal rationale for the exceptional 
treatment of pregnant women is no longer that law in Ireland. Yet, there appears to have been 
no move made to remove this section from the Act, not so far at any rate. Thus, on the one hand 
Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution now states that provision may be made for the termination of 
pregnancy and the National Consent Policy states that the consent of the pregnant woman ‘is 
required for all health and social care interventions in pregnancy’ in accordance with the rules 
that apply to non-pregnant people.102 On the other hand, the right to life of the unborn was not 
protected exclusively by the 8th Amendment prior to repeal. Rather, as Hamilton P stated in AG 
(SPUC) v Open Door Counselling, Irish law recognises the right to life of the unborn through 
‘common law; by statute law; as one of the unenumerated personal rights which the State 
guaranteed by its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, to defend and vindicate’.103 Indeed, 
as Andrea Mulligan argues, ‘[t]he original right to life of the unborn, if it existed, was an 
unenumerated right’.104 Therefore, it bears a certain similarity in origin to other unenumerated 
rights, which still exist under the Irish Constitution such as bodily integrity and the right to 
work. As Mairead Enright and others argued prior to its repeal, it is conceivable that the right 
to life of the unborn, albeit a weaker right than that guaranteed by Article 40.3.3, may still 
exist.105 
It is the position of this research that the Act becomes highly problematic at section 85(6)(b), 
which provides that an advance directive with the stated intention to apply in pregnancy should 
be referred to the High Court for adjudication. The only criterion for referral is that the 
healthcare professional considers the failure to treat harmful to the unborn.106 Furthermore, the 
legislation specifies that the matter ‘shall’ be referred to the High Court, thereby seeming to 
prevent the medical professional from exercising his own judgment on the matter and obliging 
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him not to honour the refusal. When making a determination on the matter, the High Court 
must consider the impact of failing to treat on the unborn and ‘the invasiveness and duration 
of the treatment and the risk of harm to the directive-maker’, should the advance directive be 
overridden.107 Essentially, the Court appears to be required to enter into a kind of balancing 
exercise; the interests of the pregnant woman and the interests of the foetus. Accordingly, the 
effect of advance directive on the foetus may be grounds for the High Court to overturn it. 
From a legal perspective, the subsection is particularly problematic for three reasons; first, 
much, if not all, of the constitutional basis for such a power is no longer the law, as was 
discussed above. Consequently, the basis for the continued existence of this section is 
questionable, to say the least. Furthermore, a concern of considerable magnitude in relation to 
the 8th Amendment pertained to its pervasiveness in issues separate to abortion. This presence 
will be abundantly clear when the relevant Irish jurisprudence is discussed in the next section. 
Despite being repealed, advance directives appear to be one area of Irish law in which the 
spectre of the 8th Amendment is still present. With that said, it is necessary to reflect on the 
wording of Article 40.3.3, which is that ‘[p]rovision may be made by law for the regulation of 
termination of pregnancy’. Plainly, it does not read that the unborn must not be protected by 
law or constitute a consideration in legislation pertaining to other areas of healthcare. This, 
combined with the 12-week time limit applicable to most terminations in Ireland108 could 
suggest that an advance directive may be invalidated in pregnancy; if not in all cases, then 
particularly in more advanced pregnancies. As will be demonstrated, however, Ireland is not 
alone in providing for different rules for advance directives during pregnancy despite a 
questionable basis for doing so. 
Second, there appears to be scant guidance or precedent as to how this balancing of the 
predicted impact on the unborn with the invasiveness and predicted risk of the treatment to the 
woman should be done. All relevant jurisprudence is pre-repeal, thus the constitutional right to 
life of the unborn is the main focus. One could imagine that likely factual scenarios for referrals 
under the Act would be blood transfusions, life-sustaining treatment and Caesarean sections; 
judgments pertaining to the latter two interventions were handed down in 2014 and 2016 
respectively, though not in relation to advance directives.109  
 
107 Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015, s 85(6)(c). 
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protect the health or life of the woman or if there is a diagnosis of fatal foetal abnormality; Health (Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy) 
Act 2018, ss 9-12. 
109 There have also been instances where the High Court has ordered a Caesarean section to be performed on a patient who lacked capacity, 
for example; Mary Carolan, ‘Mentally Ill Woman Can be Given Caesarean, Court Rules’ Irish Times (Dublin, 13 March 2017) 
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Third, Deirdre Madden argues: 
[I]t might be the case that if the refusal by a pregnant woman is contemporaneous rather 
than contained in an advance directive, the spirit of s 85(6)(b) would be considered to 
be an appropriate mechanism by which to deal with the maternal-foetal conflict issue.110  
In other words, despite the position of the National Consent Policy on treatment in pregnancy, 
the pregnancy exception contained in the Act may have wider ramifications than the legislature 
intended. Now, this research turns to examining the jurisprudence on compelled obstetric 
interventions in Ireland to theorise how this balancing of interests may play out in future cases. 
Ireland: Medical Treatment in Pregnancy 
Natasha Perie was 15 weeks pregnant when she died on December 3rd 2014, having sustained 
a head injury some days previously.111 Prior to establishing that Ms Perie had suffered brain 
stem death, she was put on a life support system. During the period between December 8th and 
17th, she received somatic care, in that her body was being maintained with the aid of multiple 
interventions and medications.112 It was the stated intention of the hospital to continue 
treatment for the duration of the pregnancy. There is consensus within the international medical 
community as to when somatic support in pregnancy should be continued, however, as 
Mulligan notes, these are very limited circumstances that were absent in the case of Ms 
Perie.113After a tracheostomy was performed on December 17th, Ms Perie’s father applied to 
the High Court for an order to cease all further treatment. It was the view of the Court that 
Article 40.3.3 was engaged as it was viewed to extend beyond the sphere of abortion.114 The 
Court, however, was satisfied in the circumstances of the case – namely the unanimous 
agreement of all of the medical experts that the foetus had no prospect of survival – that 
cessation of treatment was appropriate.  
What is noteworthy about the judgment and completely at odds with other cases involving the 
withdrawal of treatment was that Ms Perie’s best interests were not discussed. Although Kearns 
P refers to dignity and autonomy in the course of his judgment, his ruling appears to be based 
solely on the prospect of survival of the unborn: 
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where the deceased woman was not known to object’; Andrea Mulligan, ‘Maternal Brain Death and Legal Protection of the Foetus in Ireland 
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This does not mean that the court discounts or disregards the mother’s right to retain in 
death her dignity with proper respect for her autonomy (...) Such an approach has been 
the hallmark of civilised societies from the dawn of time. It is a deeply ingrained part 
of our humanity and may be seen as necessary both for those who have died and also 
for the sake of those who remain living and who must go on. The court therefore is 
unimpressed with any suggestion that considerations of the dignity of the mother are 
not engaged once she has passed away. 
 
However, when the mother who dies is bearing an unborn child at the time of her death, 
the rights of that child, who is living, and whose interests are not necessarily inimical 
to those just expressed, must prevail over the feelings of grief and respect for a mother 
who is no longer living.115 
 
As Mulligan opines: ‘it seems that because NP was dead, and because the rights of the foetus 
were not necessarily inimical to those of NP, no such balance [of rights] was necessary’.116  In 
this regard, the judgment presents a very confusing picture; on the one hand, the learned judge 
talks of rights or interests in respect of dignity and autonomy, but does not mention best 
interests. On the other hand, there is no further discussion of how these rights or interests are 
to be protected or vindicated or why they should give way to those of the foetus. The issue, it 
is contended, is that either Ms Perie had no rights or interests because she was already dead, or 
she had rights and interests that ought to have been balanced against those of the foetus to 
arrive at the decision. 
Furthermore, the accuracy of the description of foetus’ rights as ‘not necessarily inimical’ is 
worth questioning. Given that it was accepted by the court that Ms Perie had a right to retain 
her dignity with proper respect for her autonomy, then surely the interests of the foetus could 
be considered inimical to these. Merely stating that the rights of the foetus must prevail over 
respect for the mother without analysis of why this ought to be the case or without identifying 
the conflict being resolved seems to leave a chasm where analysis should be. Fiona de Londras 
argues ‘what mattered in coming to the conclusion that the care could be withdrawn in PP was 
the Court’s determination of what was in the best interests of the fetus in order to achieve its 
live birth’.117 Arguably, there is something at odds about a case failing to really focus on the 
person to whom the treatment was being administered; it was as though Ms Perie was virtually 
irrelevant to the situation. One could certainly argue that the best interests of Ms Perie should 
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have formed an integral part of the decision and that consequently the matter ought to have 
been assessed in line with previous case law.118  
Mulligan, however, opines:  
Because NP was deceased and the ‘treatment’ of the foetus was futile, the Court 
approached the decision as a withdrawal of treatment case. The test established in the 
withdrawal of treatment cases is based on best interests. The decision does not involve 
a balancing of the rights of the woman and the rights of the foetus as would apply in 
the usual circumstances of pregnancy.119  
Arguably, however, this contention does not explain why the best interests of the foetus were 
the only consideration. This failure to discuss Ms Perie’s best interests is also particularly 
strange given the cases cited in the judgment, all of which focused on the best interests of the 
individual when deciding if withdrawal of treatment was appropriate.120 For example, the 
learned judge quotes a passage from the English judgment in Re A (A Minor);121  
It would be wholly contrary to the interests of A., as they may now be, for his body to 
be subjected to the continuing indignity to which it was currently subject. Moreover it 
would be quite unfair to the nursing and medical staff of the hospital, who are finding 
it increasingly distressing to be caring for a dead child.122 
In this decision, Johnson J considers the interests of the child to be the paramount concern, 
clearly expressing that to continue life-sustaining treatment would be to subject him to 
‘continuing indignity’.123 Yet in applying this judgment, Kearns P states:  
At present the artificial measures which maintain the bodily functions of the mother in 
this case also maintain the unborn child. However, the question which must be 
addressed is whether even if such measures are continued there is a realistic prospect 
that the child will be born alive.124 
Perhaps this failure to consider what was in the best interests of Ms Perie partly stems from the 
position adopted by her counsel. He argued that the court ‘should infer what NP's wishes were 
in relation to this pregnancy and strive to have the unborn delivered as a testament to her and 
as a sibling to her other children’.125 Critically, he acknowledged that ‘she had an interest in 
dying with dignity and minimal suffering’, however because of ‘what had occurred, a death 
without indignity was not possible and thus greater weight should be given to the continuance 
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of the pregnancy than striving to achieve the lost opportunity of a dignified death’.126 One must 
question why counsel for Ms Perie, as distinct from counsel for the foetus, would opine that 
the chance for a dignified death was lost but would then go on to propose continuing the 
treatment acknowledged to be the cause of the indignity. One could certainly contend that 
although the past indignity may have been unavoidable,127 that gives scant reason to prolong 
and indeed intensify the indignity into the future. Furthermore, the position adopted by her 
counsel is at odds with the position of her family, in other words, those who knew her best 
while she was alive, which also raises questions. 
In the aftermath of PP, it seemed entirely plausible to suggest that women could be compelled 
to undergo treatment against their wishes in order to protect the right to life of the foetus. As 
de Londras argued, the combination of Article 40.3.3 – the right to life of the foetus takes 
precedence over a woman’s health, autonomy, and bodily integrity – and the judgment in PP 
that a foetus also has a ‘best interest’ in being born alive ‘may pervade medical decision-
making throughout a pregnancy’.128 Accordingly, it was possible that PP had opened the door 
to the best interests of the unborn in being born alive demanding that the woman be treated to 
vindicate that right. This contention, however, is not without its opponents. 129 
With that in mind, the decision in HSE v B some two years later may be a little surprising.130 
Twomey J considered an application to compel a pregnant woman to undergo an ‘elective’ 
Caesarean section.131 Ms B was pregnant with her fourth child and sought a vaginal delivery 
(VBAC), despite having delivered her other children via Caesarean. She was advised of the 
considerably elevated risks associated with VBAC – uterine rupture, death and increased risk 
of harm to the foetus – given her circumstances. Fully aware, Ms B still wished to proceed with 
a VBAC on the understanding that an emergency Caesarean section would likely be needed 
after VBAC had been attempted. She expressed willingness to consent to the emergency 
Caesarean section when the need arose, however, Ms B’s obstetrician was unwilling to 
facilitate a VBAC and the consensus appeared to be that no other hospital in Ireland was 
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available or willing to facilitate her labour either. This view of vaginal birth as a kind of 
‘procedure of choice’ is hugely problematic and must be addressed, albeit it more briefly than 
would be liked. Irrespective of the view of this obstetrician or any other towards facilitating 
Ms B’s labour, it was going to occur anyway, assuming there was no intervention to prevent it 
starting. This is markedly different to a consensual procedure that is performed on a woman at 
her request. 
The Court was of the view that it was a step too far to order Ms B to undergo a Caesarean 
section in the interest of the foetus. Citing ‘the PKU case’, Twomey J stated that ‘the right of 
the Courts to intervene in a parent’s decision in relation to an unborn child could not be any 
greater than the Court’s right to intervene in relation to born children’.132 The learned judge 
then applied the test articulated in the PKU case, namely was the case at hand of a sufficiently 
exceptional nature so as to permit the Court to intervene on behalf of the child?133 In this 
instance, the Court found that the case was not of an exceptional nature and the authorisation 
of a procedure, which if done without consent, would ordinarily be ‘a gross violation of [Ms 
B’s] right to bodily integrity, her right to self-determination, her right to privacy and her right 
to dignity’ was unjustified.134 It was the opinion of Twomey J, that the increased risk of harm 
or death at which the foetus would be placed, did not warrant the Court to effectively authorise 
Ms B ‘to have her uterus opened against her will, something which would constitute a grievous 
assault’.135 
There are several points to be made in relation to this judgment. First, there is virtually no 
guidance on how future cases of this nature should be approached. In this instance, the legal 
position is simply that the increased risk of harm or death to the foetus is not so ‘exceptional’ 
to warrant intervention. While this may well be an unavoidable feature of the nature of the case 
– an ex tempore hearing at the time, as opposed to a subsequent review – it still leaves 
uncertainty as to the circumstances in which state intervention in private healthcare decisions 
is justified. Consequently, it leaves pregnant women in doubt as to the strength of their refusal. 
Second, there may be scope for the HSE to apply for permission to perform emergency 
Caesarean sections without the consent of the patient; B dealt with an elective Caesarean 
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section, where the woman was willing to consent to an emergency Caesarean section if the 
attempted VBAC warranted intervention. Arguably, this provided a substantial safety net for 
the Court when vindicating her right to refuse, as the risk of death to the foetus, though not 
quantified in the case, does appear to have been quite low. Perhaps, this situation is likely to 
be viewed vastly differently to an instance of a woman refusing an emergency Caesarean 
section, where the risk to the life of the foetus is considerably higher. Third, the characterisation 
of a Caesarean section as highly invasive and an action which would amount to ‘grievous 
assault’ in other circumstances by Twomey J, though not inaccurate, may leave the door open 
for pregnant women to be compelled to undergo other less physically invasive procedures, for 
example blood transfusions, hormonal induction or augmentation of labour.136  
Fourth, PP was neither referred to, nor distinguished. This seems strange given that it was one 
of the most recent preceding cases to consider medical treatment in the interests of the foetus. 
It is interesting to note the discordance between this judgment and PP; this case approached 
the matter from the perspective of the interests and rights of the pregnant woman and parent, 
whereas as outlined, the earlier case almost completely ignored Ms Perie’s interests and 
determined that treatment ought not to be continued on the basis of its effectiveness at 
facilitating a live birth. While the factual scenarios in these two cases are vastly different, one 
cannot but be confused as to what the criteria are for assessing if the pregnant woman ought to 
be treated against her wishes, whether contemporaneously expressed or stated in advance. 
Instead of anything akin to certainty, we now have ‘two parallel lines of authority rather than 
a coherent body of precedent’.137 It is unclear which risks to the foetus, and consequently which 
refusals, constitute an ‘exceptional’ case, thereby permitting State intervention in private 
medical decision-making. It is unclear which ones do not. Perhaps the key difference was that 
Ms B expressed her refusal, whereas Ms Perie did not. Though the law of consent does not 
condone a position of ‘well you didn’t say no, therefore you mean yes’, the absence of a 
decision on Ms Perie’s part may have provided room for the court to infer a lack of opposition 
to being treated.  
It remains uncertain what grounds, if any, the Court will consider sufficient to overturn an 
otherwise valid advance directive, where the refusal of treatment will have a deleterious effect 
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on the foetus. Perhaps, as Mulligan argues, it will depend on whether the woman is alive or 
deceased at the time that the advance directive is intended to have effect: 
 
The decision in PP suggests that the analysis is quite different where she is deceased. 
Rather than apply a balancing test, the High Court would likely follow PP in 
subordinating the interests of the deceased woman to those of the foetus. That said, it 
should be noted that the Court in PP specifically found that it was possible to prefer the 
interests of the foetus where those interests where 'not necessarily inimical' to the 
interests of NP. This could be used to support the argument that where an advance 
directive refuses the maintenance of somatic support, the decision in PP is not 
binding.138  
Were she alive, perhaps intervention of a similar nature with the goal of continuing her life 
would be seen as too great an invasion for too long a time. Perhaps not. As a result, it is argued 
that this ambiguity is far from ideal and urgent clarification is required in order for medical 
professionals to be clear on their responsibilities and women to be confident that their advance 
refusals will be honoured, ensuring that they have the same rights as any other person in respect 
of their bodies and bodily integrity by the law. 
England and Wales 
England and Wales has quite soundly rejected any idea that competent pregnant women do not 
enjoy the same right to refuse medical treatment as any other competent patient, however, it 
took some time for this view to be reached and the position was not always as clear as it is now. 
The case of Re T was discussed in Chapter 4 in the context of Lord Donaldson’s robust 
vindication of the right of the competent adult to refuse treatment.139 Speaking obiter, however, 
the learned judge identified a possible exception to that right: 
An adult patient who (…) suffers from no mental incapacity has an absolute right to 
choose whether to consent to medical treatment (…) The only possible qualification is 
a case in which the choice may lead to the death of a viable foetus. That is not this case 
and, if and when it arises, the courts will be faced with a novel problem of considerable 
legal and ethical complexity.140 
A mere matter of months later, such a question of ‘considerable legal and ethical complexity’ 
arose; Re S concerned a woman refusing a Caesarean section against medical advice.141 Ms S, 
with the support of her husband, persisted with the refusal, which was motivated by her ‘quite 
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sincere’ religious beliefs.142 The surgeon responsible for her care stated that the Caesarean 
section was the only means of preventing both her death and the death of the foetus. Citing the 
American case of Angela Carder, the learned judge ordered that the ‘[Caesarean] section and 
any necessary consequential treatment (…) in the vital interests of the patient and her unborn 
child’ were lawful despite the patient’s competent refusal.143 His reliance on Re AC is 
questionable in view of the critical difference between the two cases; in Re AC it was unclear 
if Angela Carder had capacity to refuse treatment, as the matter was never adjudicated at 
trial.144 It was, however, clear that an order was being sought to override a competent refusal 
in Re S.145 The decision of Sir Stephen Brown P was roundly criticised from a legal and ethical 
standpoint in both academic literature and subsequent case law.146 As Butler-Sloss LJ stated in 
relation to Re S and other cases where attempts were made to protect the rights of a foetus: 
It is a decision the correctness of which we must now call in doubt. That is not to say 
that the ethical dilemma does not remain. None the less, as has so often been said, this 
is not a court of morals.147 
The learned judge was unequivocal in relation to the right to refuse: 
A competent woman who has the capacity to decide may, for religious reasons, other 
reasons, for rational or irrational reasons or for no reason at all, choose not to have 
medical intervention, even though the consequence may be the death or serious 
handicap of the child she bears, or her own death. In that event the courts do not have 
the jurisdiction to declare medical intervention lawful and the question of her own best 
interests objectively considered, does not arise.148 
The capacity dimension of Re MB was discussed in Chapter 3, however, it is interesting to note 
the specific reference made to ‘irrational reasons’ in view of the facts of the case. One could 
certainly question what characterises a phobia, if not irrationality. As discussed, however, it 
did appear that MB wanted the procedure and had consented to it, she just could not consent to 
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the insertion of a needle or the administration of gas to facilitate its insertion.149 Thus, the court 
viewed the irrationality of the decision as an indication of incompetence.150  
The learned judge was also clear on the duties of the medical professionals in respect of the 
pregnant woman:  
If therefore the competent mother refuses to have the medical intervention, the doctors 
may not lawfully do more than attempt to persuade her. If that persuasion is 
unsuccessful, there are no further steps towards medical intervention to be taken (…) 
The mother may indeed later regret the outcome, but the alternative would be an 
unwarranted invasion of the right of the woman to make the decision (...) The only 
situation in which it is lawful for the doctors to intervene is if it is believed that the adult 
patient lacks the capacity to decide.151 
Not only was it found that a competent pregnant woman has the right to refuse, but it was stated 
that the court does not have ‘the jurisdiction to take into account the interests of the unborn 
child at risk from the refusal of a competent mother to consent to medical intervention’ and 
critically that ‘the foetus up to the moment of birth does not have any separate interests capable 
of being taken into account’ when the court is considering compelling the performance of a 
procedure without consent.152 Although Re MB can be distinguished from Re S for the same 
reason that Re AC can, namely that Ms MB was found to lack capacity, the court made a clear 
statement as to the lack of relevance of Re S. 
St. George’s NHS Trust v S appeared to clarify, in no uncertain terms, any outstanding 
uncertainty regarding the right of a competent pregnant woman to refuse medical 
intervention.153 Judge LJ questioned how a forced invasion of a competent adult’s body against 
her will for even ‘the most laudable of motives’ be permitted without ‘irremediably damaging 
the principle of self-determination’.154 He went on:  
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When human life is at stake the pressure to provide an affirmative answer authorising 
unwanted medical intervention is very powerful. Nevertheless, the autonomy of each 
individual requires continuing protection even, perhaps particularly, when the motive 
for interfering with it is readily understandable (…)155 
In stark contrast to Re S, Judge LJ stated the robust right to refuse medical treatment that is 
enjoyed by a competent pregnant woman: 
[W]hile pregnancy increases the personal responsibilities of a woman it does not 
diminish her entitlement to decide whether or not to undergo medical treatment. 
Although human, and protected by the law in a number of different ways (…) an unborn 
child is not a separate person from its mother. Its need for medical assistance does not 
prevail over her rights. She is entitled not to be forced to submit to an invasion of her 
body against her will, whether her own life or that of her unborn child depends on it. 
Her right is not reduced or diminished merely because her decision to exercise it may 
appear morally repugnant. The declaration in this case involved the removal of the baby 
from within the body of her mother under physical compulsion. Unless lawfully 
justified this constituted an infringement of the mother’s autonomy. Of themselves the 
perceived needs of the foetus did not provide the necessary justification.156 
Therefore, the position in England and Wales can be summarised as where the woman is 
competent, her decision will stand and where she is incompetent, treatment may be 
administered in her best interests, but not in the interests of the foetus. As we know from the 
previous chapters that best interests extend beyond mere health, the likely positive outcome for 
the foetus would be viewed as forming part of the best interests of the woman.157 Many of the 
earlier Caesarean section cases feature late-in-the-day and emergency hearings, which arguably 
had the effect of disadvantaging already vulnerable women.158 This aspect of compelled 
treatment cases was tackled by the Court of Protection and guidance has been given to NHS 
Trusts regarding women suffering from a psychiatric condition who lack or may lack 
capacity;159 this includes an obligation on the Trust to bring court applications ‘at the earliest 
opportunity’ and ‘no later than 4 weeks before the expected date of delivery’ except in genuine 
emergency situations.160 
In the absence of case law or an amendment to the MCA 2005 to the contrary, the jurisprudence 
indicates that once an advance directive is lawfully drafted and valid and applicable at the 
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relevant point in time, then it should stand irrespective of whether the woman is pregnant and 
irrespective of the risk posed to the foetus by the refusal. Indeed, as far back as 1993, the Law 
Commission was of the opinion that no ‘greater restriction should be imposed upon any 
anticipatory decision of a pregnant woman’.161 Arguably, the only potential caveat to this is 
contained in the Code of Practice accompanying the MCA 2005; when deciding the 
applicability of advance directives, ‘healthcare professionals must consider (…) whether there 
have been changes in the patient’s personal life (for example, the person is pregnant, and this 
was not anticipated when they made the advance decision) that might affect the validity of the 
advance decision’.162 It remains to be seen if this section may result in an otherwise valid 
advance decision being considered inapplicable. 
New York 
As discussed in the previous chapters, a competent adult in the United States has a 
constitutional right to refuse medical treatment.163 Furthermore, there was an assertion in 
Chapter 3 that New York has one of the longest traditions of supporting the right of a competent 
adult to make decisions regarding her medical care, albeit tempered by its use of the 
professional standard to information disclosure. In view of that, the jurisprudence pertaining to 
the competent refusal of medical treatment by pregnant women may seem surprising.164 
Despite its size, there is a dearth of case law in the United States, certainly at state appellate 
level, pertaining to pregnant women seeking to refuse medical treatment. Rather, much of the 
case law is at county court level or equivalent, leading to significant discrepancies in how the 
law treats such women, even within states.165 One could attribute this lack of case law in the 
US to a number of things; practically, it could be because of the cost of appealing a county 
court or mid-level appellate decision or because the women in question find it difficult to find 
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legal representation.166 If a woman has lost at county and appellate court, she may not have the 
resources to mount another legal challenge at state level. It could also be attributed to hospitals 
utilising methods other than court applications to attain the required consent to medical 
procedures, such as threatening women with (unrelated) criminal charges or with Child 
Protective Services, which could result in them losing custody of their children in addition to 
the foetus, once born.167 
In 2018, a mid-level appellate court in New York heard the case of Rinat Dray. It found in 
favour of a hospital, in which she had been subjected to a Caesarean section without her consent 
and critically, in the absence of a court order. Perhaps even more surprising was that her 
capacity to refuse treatment was never in doubt.168 The facts of the case were as follows; Ms 
Dray was pregnant with her third child and wanted to attempt VBAC after two previous 
Caesarean sections. She had found an obstetrician willing to facilitate this, however, when she 
presented at the hospital in labour, this doctor was unavailable.169 The doctor treating her, Dr 
Gorelik, advised her immediately to have a Caesarean section and when she declined, he 
accepted that surgery might not yet be necessary and allowed labour to continue.170 After a 
consultation with the Head of Obstetrics – Dr Ducey – and the hospital’s General Counsel, it 
was decided that the hospital would not apply for a court order in view of the time that it would 
take to get one and that Dr Ducey would dispense with Ms Dray’s consent and perform the 
Caesarean section.171 
In the Supreme Court of King’s County, Ms Dray alleged inter alia negligence, medical 
malpractice, lack of informed consent and violations of New York Public Health Law and the 
New York Codes, Rules and Regulations. Specifically, in relation to pregnant women and 
medical treatment, Jacobson J held: 
New York Appellate Courts have not specifically held that medical providers can never 
override a pregnant woman’s refusal to proceed with a C-section. New York court’s 
[sic] have held that the state cannot intervene to require life saving medical care over a 
competent adult’s refusal of care ( …) In doing so, however, the Court of Appeals noted 
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that when an ‘individual’s conduct threatens injury to others, the State’s interest is 
manifest and the State can generally be expected to intervene’…While a fetus is not a 
legally recognized person until there is a live birth (…) the State recognizes an interest 
in the protection of a viable fetus by retaining the crimes of abortion (…) The court thus 
finds that the state interest in the well being of a viable fetus is sufficient to override a 
mother’s object to medical treatment, at least where this is a viable full term fetus and 
the intervention itself presents no serious risk to the mother’s well being (…) This court 
thus rejects the plaintiff’s assertion that she has an absolute right to reject medical care 
necessary to protect her viable fetus.172 
Two matters of concern emerged from this judgment; first, the passage from Jacobson J is 
unambivalent regarding the right of a pregnant woman to refuse medical treatment where the 
foetus is ‘full term’. There is quite a stark contrast with jurisprudence from Ireland – HSE v B 
– and England and Wales – St. George’s Healthcare v S – where forced Caesarean sections 
were described in much more serious terms than procedures merely posing ‘no serious risk to 
the mother’s well being’.173 On the first count, it is argued that New York has ‘gotten it wrong’. 
Second, in relation to the disagreement between Ms Dray’s medical expert and the hospital 
staff, the learned judge stated that although Dr Lyerly’s findings demonstrated factual issues 
as to whether the foetus was at risk, they ‘fail[ed] to show, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff 
was not placing the fetus at risk’ by refusing. It is difficult to see how this is anything but an 
onerous burden to put on the pregnant woman; the basis for the performance of the Caesarean 
section without consent was the risk to the foetus, this fact is in doubt owing to the evidence 
from the plaintiff’s medical expert, however, the court has ruled that the plaintiff must prove, 
as a matter of law, that she is not endangering the foetus with her conduct. Critically, if the 
danger to the foetus is in doubt, then the basis for dispensing with consent is also in doubt. 
Furthermore, it is highly unusual for the individual to have to prove the absence of a negative 
where there is no law requiring positive action; the onus is on the state to prove that an 
individual was driving dangerously, not on the individual to prove that they were not. Once 
again, New York has ‘gotten it wrong’.  
From a technical perspective, it is understandable that Ms Dray’s case failed; all of the informed 
consent cause of action and much of the negligence and malpractice causes of action were 
grounded battery, however Ms Dray could not pursue a case for battery, as she was outside of 
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the one-year statute of limitations in New York State.174 On the matter of alleged violations of 
patients’ rights contained in Public Health Law § 2803-c and 10 NYCRR 405.7, the Appellate 
Court overruled the judgment in the court of first instance and found:175 
(i) ‘[N]o private right of action arising from an alleged violation of [10 NYCRR 405.7] 
has been recognized’.176 
(ii) Public Health Law § 2803-c was not intended to apply to hospitals. 
One critical point needs to be made in relation to the Dray case; in Fosmire v Nicoleau, which 
will be discussed in more detail in the following paragraphs, Mollen J of the Appellate Court 
stated:  
[G]iven the important and serious nature of the rights involved in cases such as this 
[ordering a blood transfusion], the court should forego taking any action on applications 
to administer medical treatment against the will of the patient until the patient and/or 
his or her legal representatives have been notified thereof and given an opportunity to 
be heard.177  
It seems counterintuitive that the courts should be obliged to meet this high standard, but not a 
hospital. Furthermore, it is submitted that it is contrary to the general purpose of the law that a 
hospital would be capable of circumventing the kind of rigour and scrutiny – and perhaps, due 
process – required where a patient is to be treated without consent, by simply not applying for 
a court order and relying on ‘hospital policy’.178 This failure on the part of the hospital in Dray 
was not addressed by the appellate court and excused in the first hearing, with Jacobsen J 
describing getting a court order as merely ‘preferable’.179 
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Pre-Dray, case law in New York suggested no more of an inclination to vindicate the right of 
pregnant women to refuse medical treatment. In a series of County Supreme Court decisions, 
medical treatment was ordered despite the competent refusal of the woman. In the 1985 case 
of Crouse-Irving Memorial Hosp. v Paddock, Hayes J ordered that a competent pregnant 
Jehovah’s Witness be transfused against her wishes.180 Quite controversially, the learned judge 
ordered the transfusion as he considered Ms Paddock to have ‘put the hospital and her doctors 
in an untenable position’ as she was willing to undergo surgery but not corrective action (a 
blood transfusion) should a likely complication arise.181 He opined that once ‘a patient puts her 
doctor in charge of a surgical procedure, she necessarily makes him responsible for the conduct 
of the operation’ and he extended that to stabilising her with a blood transfusion, if 
necessary.182 Accordingly, the autonomy and religious beliefs of the pregnant woman were 
‘subordinated not only to the welfare of the foetus but also to the ethical integrity of the medical 
profession’, which was found ‘to continue to justify transfusion even after the foetus had been 
delivered’.183  
In effect, the learned judge appeared to view that the transfusion as part of the Caesarean 
section, the latter could not be performed without the ability to perform the former. Two points 
can be made in relation to this judgment; first, a complete lack of justification was given for 
why the blood transfusions ordered should be administered for as long as was ‘medically 
indicated to stabilize her condition’, including in the post-operative period.184 As the surgery 
was a Caesarean section, there would be no danger to the life or health of the foetus in the post-
operative period; the only risk would be to Ms Paddock. It is difficult to see any grounds for 
the intervention if the baby were to be born at this point. If one looks at the wording of the 
judgment, it can be argued that the reasoning did not appear to actually focus on the patient, 
despite the inclusion of a heading entitled ‘Blood Transfusions to Safeguard the Mother’s 
Welfare’. 185 Instead, the primary focus of this portion of the judgment appeared to be on the 
position in which the medical staff were being put. Second, there is scant detail on the wellbeing 
of the foetus and the detriment to health, if any, that would be caused by a failure to transfuse. 
Instead the opening of the judgment refers to doctor having applied to the court for 
‘authorization to administer blood transfusions as necessary to safeguard Ms Paddock's life’;186 
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furthermore the portion of the judgment entitled ‘Blood Transfusions to Safeguard the Baby’s 
Life and Health’ appears to approach the decision as though Mr and Ms Paddock are refusing 
a blood transfusion on behalf of their (born) child.187 One could argue that this judgment is of 
limited value for several reasons; the first is the level of the court, which heard the case. Second, 
as Halliday points out, the American Medical Association issued guidance in 1990 stating that 
judicial intervention in medical decision-making in pregnancy will almost always be 
inappropriate.188 As such, the ethical integrity of the medical profession would be a 
questionable ground upon which to override the right of a competent woman to refuse 
treatment.  
Some three months later, the Queen’s County Supreme Court ordered that a Jehovah’s Witness 
who was 18 weeks pregnant be transfused against her wishes.189 The learned judge expressed 
the State’s ‘highly significant interest in protecting the life of a mid-term fetus, which 
outweighs the patient's right to refuse a blood transfusion on religious grounds’.190 This view 
on the protection that should be conferred on a ‘mid-term’ foetus can be sharply contrasted 
with Klein, which was decided by Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New 
York some 4 years later.191 Ms Klein had been involved in a car accident, which resulted in 
brain damage. She had been in a coma since the accident and was, at the time of the case, 17 
weeks pregnant. Her husband sought to be appointed her guardian, as did a man named John 
Short, who was a stranger to the family. A second man, John Broderick, sought to be appointed 
guardian of the foetus. As was stated in the judgment, the ‘ultimate purpose of these 
applications is to either authorize or enjoin the termination of Ms Klein's pregnancy’, as both 
Mr Short and Mr Broderick were pro-life activists.192 Justices Mollen, Mangano, Thompson, 
Bracken and Brown all concurred: 
The State has no compelling interest in the protection of the fetus prior to viability, 
since the mother’s constitutional right to privacy, which includes the right to terminate 
her pregnancy, is paramount at that stage. Accordingly, Broderick’s application is 
totally without merit.193 
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It is important to note the inclusion of the phrase ‘prior to viability’ in the judgment, which 
may invite a logical inference to be drawn; prior to 24 weeks, intervention by the New York 
courts may be seen as inappropriate but from 24 weeks it may be seen as justified.194 The 
importance placed on viability, which largely stems from the approach of the Supreme Court 
of the United States in Roe v Wade, will be discussed in more detail later in this section when 
compelled intervention in other states is being considered and again in the context of advance 
directives in pregnancy.195 It is questionable whether the Court of Appeals of New York would 
have the same or a markedly different view on the matter; first, it is worth remembering that 
Klein was the decision of an intermediate appellate court and concerned abortion, as distinct 
from refusal of medical treatment. With that said, it is worth also noting the origin of the 
reference to viability and the connection to the interest of the state, namely the interpretation 
of a US Supreme Court decision.196 Finally, as will be demonstrated in the coming paragraphs, 
there is also lack of clarity in other states, thus New York may have persuasive authority 
coming from both sides. 
In Fosmire v Nicoleau, the Supreme Court of Suffolk County ordered Ms Nicoleau be 
transfused against her competent wishes, an order, which the Appellate Court vacated. 
Although Fosmire concerned a post-partum woman, it is relevant as one of the few appellate 
decisions in New York, which considers the balancing of rights question. In his judgment, 
Mollen J upheld the right of a competent adult to refuse medical treatment on religious grounds, 
which is qualified by compelling State interests, namely the preservation of life, the prevention 
of suicide, the protection of innocent third parties and the maintenance of the ethical integrity 
of the medical profession.197 As Fosmire concerned a post-partum woman, there were no 
competing foetal interests to consider; instead, the argument advanced by the hospital in the 
Court of Appeals case was that Ms Nicoleau should be transfused in the interest of her minor 
child. Wachtler CJ affirmed the right of an individual to refuse medical treatment, despite 
having children: 
[T]he patient’s right to decide the course of his or her own medical treatment was not 
conditioned on the patient being without minor children or dependents (…) Similarly, 
when the Legislature codified the common-law rule it imposed no such restriction (…) 
And the hospital can point to no law or regulation which requires a parent to submit to 
medical treatment to preserve the parent’s life for the benefit of a minor child or other 
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dependent. If, as the hospital urges, the State has an interest in intervening under these 
circumstances, it has never expressed it.198 
 
He expanded further to note that the State does not prohibit parents from engaging in dangerous 
activities in light of the risk to their lives and the related risk that it could leave their children 
without parents. Indeed, were this the case, there would have to be regulations preventing single 
parents and both parents in a couple from holding hazardous jobs for example police, army, 
fire brigade. The learned judge stated that the policy of New York ‘is to permit all competent 
adults to make their own personal health care decisions without interference from the State’;199 
this is certainly worth bearing in mind should a case involving a pregnant woman arise in the 
future. 
 
What is key to take away from Fosmire is that the highest court in New York State has not yet 
had to adjudicate a case ‘solely by balancing the common-law right against opposing State 
interests’, which would likely be the case were a woman to refuse a blood transfusion or 
Caesarean section.200 Speaking obiter, Mollen J in the Appellate Court in Fosmire, opined that 
where a pregnant woman refuses medical treatment and risks the life of the foetus, the interest 
of the state in protecting the health and welfare of the child would take precedence.201 The 
Court of Appeals declined to specifically address the remark, instead generally upholding the 
right of competent adults to refuse.  
Were the justices of the Court of Appeals of the State of New York to look to other states within 
the US for guidance, they encounter a complete lack of coherence countrywide and even within 
states. The only common thread appears to be the primary arguments advanced by those 
seeking a court order to treat; the state has an interest in protecting a foetus and the foetus itself 
has interests or rights.202 The learned justices would find some judgments of equivalent courts 
that compel treatment and others that uphold the right to refuse. Cases such as Jefferson in 
Georgia and Anderson in New Jersey mandated treatment.203 In Jefferson, although Hill J stated 
that the ‘power of a court to order a competent adult to submit to surgery is exceedingly limited’ 
and furthermore that ‘until this unique case arose, [he] would have thought such power to be 
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nonexistent’, the court weighed the right of the mother to practice her religion and to refuse 
surgery, against the right of the foetus to live and found the latter to be paramount.204 Smith J 
opined that although such an intrusion into the private life and medical decision-making of an 
individual was extraordinary, the ‘state’s compelling interest in preserving the life of this fetus 
is beyond dispute’.205 Scott argues that these cases are ‘dubious precendents’ in view of their 
age and the general advancements in the rights of patients in the intervening years.206 
Furthermore, specifically in relation to Anderson, Halliday argues that as the case was pre-Roe, 
its reasoning is no longer sound.207 Be that as it may, however, they are decisions of the highest 
courts in those states, which have yet to be overturned, but perhaps their persuasiveness as 
authorities may no longer be as strong.  
Conversely, cases such as AC in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and Baby Boy Doe 
in the Appellate Court of Illinois – applying a ruling of the Supreme Court of Illinois – ruled 
against compelling pregnant women to undergo Caesarean sections.208 Angela Carder had 
terminal cancer and uncertain capacity. There was evidence that, while conscious, she had 
stated that she did not want a Caesarean section, however, the court granted an order permitting 
the hospital to perform the procedure in the interest of the foetus. The surgery was only likely 
to benefit the foetus and posed a danger to Ms Carder as a result of her condition. The Court 
of Appeal hearing the matter en banc found that the role of the court of first instance in such 
cases was to determine if a competent decision had been made, and if so, the wishes of the 
decision maker would ‘control in virtually all cases’.209 Critically, Terry J stated that the court 
did not exclude ‘the possibility that a conflicting state interest may be so compelling that the 
patient’s wishes must yield’ but anticipated such cases as ‘extremely rare and truly 
exceptional’.210 He then went further to clarify that Angela Carder’s case, was not such a 
case.211 The learned judge also emphasised that ‘it would be an extraordinary case indeed in 
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which a court might ever be justified in overriding the patient’s wishes and authorizing a major 
surgical procedure such as a caesarean section’ and expanded further to state that ‘some may 
doubt that there could ever be a situation extraordinary or compelling enough to justify a 
massive intrusion into a person’s body, such as a caesarean section, against that person’s 
will’.212  
In Baby Boy Doe, DiVito J opens with a clear statement on the rights of the competent pregnant 
woman: 
This case asks whether an Illinois court can balance whatever rights a fetus may have 
against the rights of a competent woman to refuse medical advice to obtain a cesarean 
section (…) Following the lead of the Illinois Supreme Court in Stallman (…) we hold 
that no such balancing should be employed, and that a woman’s competent choice to 
refuse medical treatment as invasive as a cesarean section during pregnancy must be 
honored, even in circumstances where the choice may be harmful to her fetus.213 
Furthermore, he states: 
Appreciating the fact that the circumstances in which each individual woman brings 
forth life are as varied as the circumstances of each woman’s life, the court strongly 
suggested that there can be no consistent and objective legal standard by which to judge 
a woman’s actions during pregnancy (...) a woman’s right to refuse invasive medical 
treatment, derived from her rights to privacy, bodily integrity, and religious liberty, is 
not diminished during pregnancy.214 
Accordingly, the court upheld the right of the woman to refuse the intervention. It is worth 
bearing in mind that DiVito J did distinguish blood transfusions from Caesarean sections, 
describing the former as ‘a relatively non-invasive and risk-free procedure’ and the latter as a 
‘massively invasive, risky, and painful’ procedure. 215 This did leave the door open to courts 
and hospitals treating the two interventions differently in the future, however, the matter was 
settled by Fetus Brown, wherein it was held: 
[I]n this case balancing the mother’s right to refuse medical treatment against the State’s 
substantial interest in the viable fetus, we hold that the State may not override a pregnant 
woman’s competent treatment decision, including refusal of recommended invasive 
medical procedures, to potentially save the life of the viable fetus.216 
The path that the highest court in New York will take when it is confronted with a pregnant 
woman refusing medical treatment remains uncertain. On the one hand, its highest court has 
stated the intent of New York law as permitting all competent adults to refuse treatment and 
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made no attempt to exclude pregnant women. It also stated, however, that this right was not 
absolute and ‘in some circumstances may have to yield to superior interests of the State’.217 As 
is evident, one of the compelling state interests which justifies state intervention in healthcare 
decisions, is the protection of innocent third parties. While, as Margo Kaplan argues ‘the 
protection of third parties has only been applied in very limited circumstances’ by the United 
States courts, as a viable foetus could be considered a ‘third party’, the court may conclude that 
intervention is justified.218 Particularly, given that jurisprudence from outside New York is 
conflicting. Thus, there are two issues; first, if a foetus – either viable or pre-viability – can be 
considered a ‘third party’ and second if the viability of the foetus is relevant to it being 
considered a third party. There appears to be divergence across the United States on both points. 
As DiVito J stated in Baby Boy Doe: 
[T]he third interest—the protection of third parties—is also irrelevant here. The ‘third 
parties’ referred to in this context are the family members, particularly the children, of 
the person refusing treatment.219 
This kind of distinction between children and foetuses has been seen in some cases concerning 
the prosecution of women for harm to the foetus through drug use or other behaviour.220 
Sometimes, however, the distinction is blurred by the law as is evidenced by some mid-level 
appellate court decisions in New York. In Hughson, the court acknowledged that as a child is 
not legally competent to give consent to treatment, the parent must give consent on her 
behalf.221 Weinstein J then extended that to the foetus, commenting that ‘[p]erforce, a fetus or 
infant in utero is also unable to give legal consent, much less (…) any consent at all’, therefore 
consent is sought from the pregnant woman on its behalf. Such reasoning may open the door 
for treatment to be compelled in the interest of the foetus, given that the state can override a 
decision of a parent to refuse medical treatment on behalf of a minor.222 Erin Davenport, 
however, argues that the woman’s right to refuse stems from her right to privacy through 
informed consent, as well as bodily integrity; thus, it outweighs the state’s four countervailing 
interests, including protection of third parties – potentially the viable foetus – and negates the 
need for a balancing exercise.223 As should be evident from the cases discussed in this section, 
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however, the courts do not necessarily agree with this assertion and balancing exercises are 
often conducted. Furthermore, in a decision of the Family Court in Re Unborn Child it was 
held that a definitively recognised legitimate state interest is the protection of the foetus, as 
well as protection of the woman’s health.224 Furthermore, it was held that ‘[s]ince the common 
law (…) protects the fetus from negligent acts of a third party, then surely it may be found to 
encompass protection of the fetus from intentional acts by its mother, which acts could cause 
the child to begin life in an impaired condition’.225 Freudlich J clarified that this was not a case 
where the constitutional right to privacy of the woman was engaged, as it concerned the use of 
illegal drugs;226 however, as may be recalled from Chapter 4, the refusal of medical treatment 
in New York is not grounded in a privacy right as far as the Court of Appeal is concerned.227 
Moreover, as outlined in Chapter 3, the statutory right of a pregnant woman to consent to 
treatment is limited to prenatal care.228 
In cases including Klein and the King’s County judgment in Dray, it appears that the viability 
of the foetus was considered decisive in whether the state could intervene on its behalf.229 In 
fact, Kaplan argues that ‘every post-Roe reported opinion compelling the medical treatment of 
a pregnant woman for the benefit of the fetus has relied on Roe in its argument that the state’s 
interest in fetal life outweighs the mother’s right to refuse treatment’, even extending to 
situations involving pre-viability foetuses.230 The reliance on Roe in this context has been 
criticised; Davenport, for example, argues that such applications misinterpret the judgment as 
Roe ‘allows states to prohibit abortions after viability, but (…) does not mention anything about 
compelling treatment “to promote fetal health”’.231 
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A further dynamic that may affect the judgment of the Court of Appeals of New York is best 
practice within the medical community. It is worth noting that both the American Medical 
Association (AMA) and the ACOG advise against physicians seeking legal remedies where a 
competent pregnant woman refuses intervention. The AMA Policy states: 
Judicial intervention is inappropriate when a woman has made an informed refusal of a 
medical treatment designed to benefit her fetus. If an exceptional circumstance could be 
found in which a medical treatment poses an insignificant or no health risk to the woman, 
entails a minimal invasion of her bodily integrity, and would clearly prevent substantial 
and irreversible harm to her fetus, it might be appropriate for a physician to seek judicial 
intervention. However, the fundamental principle against compelled medical procedures 
should control in all cases which do not present such exceptional circumstances.232 
Clearly, a Caesarean section would not fulfil the criteria of ‘insignificant or no health risk’ or 
‘minimal invasion of her bodily integrity’. Arguably, nor would a blood transfusion. 
Furthermore, the burden of proof of clearly preventing substantial and irreversible harm to the 
foetus is very high. The ACOG Policy states: 
Pregnancy is not an exception to the principle that a decisionally capable patient has 
the right to refuse treatment, even treatment needed to maintain life. Therefore, a 
decisionally capable pregnant woman’s decision to refuse recommended (…) 
interventions should be respected.233 
On the matter of court ordered intervention, the ACOG is quite clear: 
The College opposes the use of coerced medical interventions for pregnant women, 
including the use of the courts to mandate medical interventions for unwilling patients 
(…) [and] strongly discourages medical institutions from pursuing court-ordered 
interventions or taking action against obstetrician–gynecologists who refuse to perform 
them.234 
Thus, the strong message from both the AMA and the ACOG is that in pregnancy, physicians 
should be guided by the general principle that competent adults have the right to refuse 
intervention.235 Only the AMA discusses an exception for a minor intervention that will yield 
significant benefit to the foetus. In any event, it remains to be seen what the Court of Appeals 
in New York will do when faced with a decision of this nature but can be said with conviction 
that the lower courts have dismally failed to protect the right of pregnant women to refuse 
medical treatment. 
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United States: Advance Directives in Pregnancy 
As discussed in Chapter 5, New York statute does not provide for advance directives, rather 
there is a legislative preference for other mechanisms. Accordingly, there can be no statutory 
exclusion on the basis of pregnancy, because there is no advance directive statute. Whether a 
pregnancy exclusion would exist at common law is largely subsumed within the discussion of 
contemporaneous refusal in pregnancy. At present, there appears to be no legislative 
prohibition on a hospital honouring the contents of a MOLST or DNR order if the patient is 
pregnant, however, to consider the relationship between advance directives and pregnancy, it 
is beneficial to look to other states for insight into how the law manages this matter. As outlined 
previously, Ireland is not alone in legislating to limit the effect of an advance directive in 
pregnancy. In fact, the majority of US states limit or expressly nullify advance directives in 
pregnancy. In states such as Alabama,236 Missouri,237 Texas,238 Washington239 and 
Wisconsin,240 any advance directive refusing life-sustaining treatment is rendered invalid once 
the directive-maker is pregnant. Colorado invalidates the advance directives only if the foetus 
has reached viability.241 States such as Arkansas242 and Iowa243 permit the advance directive 
to be overridden if it is possible that the foetus could be born alive with continued 
administration of treatment; Delaware244 and Rhode Island245, if live birth is probable. No 
explanation of the meaning of probable is given;246 thus one can legitimately question if 
probable refers to ‘on the balance of probabilities’ or if it would require ‘clear and convincing 
evidence’. States such as North Dakota,247 Pennsylvania248 and South Dakota249 will continue 
treatment unless there is a reasonable degree of medical certainty that it will not result in a live 
birth. Interestingly, they also balance this against the health and wellbeing of the woman, in 
that they do not require that medical professionals persist with treatment if the required 
professionals conclude that prolongation of life would cause physical harm or severe pain to 
the woman, or prolong severe pain that could not be alleviated by medication.250 The slim 
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progressiveness demonstrated by at least considering the woman in all of this is somewhat 
tempered by the fact that the legislation only focuses on her health and not on her clearly-
expressed prior wishes.251 Several states such as California, North Carolina, Maine and the 
District of Columbia do not reference pregnancy in their advance directive legislation and states 
such as New Jersey252 and Vermont253 allow the directive-maker to indicate what effect, if any, 
she would want the advance decision to have in pregnancy.  
Minnesota approaches the matter in a similar fashion to New Jersey and Vermont, however 
goes further to provide that it is assumed that treatment should be continued if the patient is 
pregnant and there is ‘in reasonable medical judgment (…) a real possibility’ that the foetus 
could be born alive, subject to two exceptions:254 first, where the woman has indicated the 
effect that her pregnancy should have health care decisions made on her behalf.255 Second, 
where there is ‘clear and convincing evidence that the patient’s wishes, while competent, were 
to the contrary’.256 Thus, Minnesota law leaves room for the patient to specify how pregnancy 
should affect her advance directive, as New Jersey and Vermont do, but also leaves room for 
the advance directive to be honoured if ‘clear and convincing evidence’ can be presented that 
the patient would not want treatment to be continued. Arguably, if a state legislator is going to 
insist on addressing pregnancy in its advance directive legislation, this is one of the better ways 
to go about it. In summary, if one were looking for an example of consistent legal approach 
across the United States, it certainly would not be found in the laws relating to advance 
decisions and pregnancy. 
At this juncture, the appropriateness of such exceptions for pregnant women must be called 
into question and indeed, so too, must their constitutionality. First, issues of constitutionality 
are raised when one considers that certain states mandate physicians to determine that a female 
patient of childbearing age is not pregnant before withholding or terminating life-sustaining 
treatment.257 Were this obligation to make such a determination to require the physician to 
administer a pregnancy test to the (presumably incompetent) woman, as some commentators 
contend it does,258 then arguably such an obligation would seem to run contrary to the right to 
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privacy, which has been establish in a variety of US Supreme Court decisions.259 Assuming 
consent to a pregnancy test is sought from another individual on behalf of the pregnant woman, 
then the ability of that person to refuse is virtually non-existent as the law obliges that a 
determination that there is no pregnancy be made.260  
It also seems inconsistent that in many US states, incompetent pregnant women have fewer 
constitutional – and perhaps common law – rights than if they were competent and pregnant or 
competent and opt to terminate the pregnancy.261 First, assuming that it is a legitimate aim of 
the law to prevent harm to a third party and to view a foetus as correctly coming within that 
protection (or within another basis for state protection), if legislation then invalidates all 
advance directives in pregnancy – irrespective of the stage of development of the foetus or its 
likelihood of being born alive – then such legislation will not necessarily achieve this aim. If 
the foetus cannot be born alive, then the question that must be asked is what, if anything, are 
such laws protecting? Moreover, one must question precisely what ‘harm’ is being prevented. 
Thus, as Halliday argues: 
In seeking to protect its interest in potential life, the state fails to seek a balance between 
that interest and its interest in recognising and respecting the woman’s precedent 
autonomy.262 
Second, guaranteed by the 14th amendment to the United States Constitution, an individual has 
constitutional rights to privacy and liberty, although qualified, which extend to the right to 
make medical decisions; this is in addition to a common law right to refuse, which stems from 
the doctrine of informed consent.263 The right to privacy has been extended to the right of a 
woman to choose to have an abortion.264 In Roe v Wade, the right to privacy outweighed 
legitimate state interest in protecting the foetus, an interest which became ‘compelling’ at 
viability.265 Accordingly, post-Roe, it was questionable if states that disregarded all advance 
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directives in pregnancy were not breaching the constitutional right to privacy of the individuals. 
Commentators such as Elizabeth Benton also argued that statutes – such as in Arkansas and 
Rhode Island – ‘that suspend[ed] the will if the fetus could develop to the point of live birth 
with continued maintenance of the woman’s body also violate[d] Roe’s viability rule because 
cases obviously will arise in which a nonviable fetus could develop to the point of live birth 
with enough time’.266 Whether or not one agrees that the state should have an interest in 
protecting foetal life after viability has been attained is somewhat irrelevant in the context of 
the logic of her argument. 
Roe was subsequently clarified by the two further Supreme Court decisions, namely Webster267 
and Casey.268 In Webster, the court held that state interest in protecting the foetus was broader 
than the judgment in Roe had indicated and accordingly, held that it was not confined to 
viability: 
 [W]e do not see why the State’s interest in protecting potential human life should come 
into existence only at the point of viability, and that there should therefore be a rigid 
line allowing state regulation after viability but prohibiting it before viability.269 
In Casey, it was held: 
Before viability, Roe and subsequent cases treat all governmental attempts to influence 
a woman’s decision on behalf of the potential life within her as unwarranted. This 
treatment is, in our judgment, incompatible with the recognition that there is a 
substantial state interest in potential life throughout pregnancy (…) 
The very notion that the State has a substantial interest in potential life leads to the 
conclusion that not all regulations must be deemed unwarranted. Not all burdens on the 
right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy will be undue. In our view, the undue 
burden standard is the appropriate means of reconciling the State’s interest with the 
woman's constitutionally protected liberty.270 
Thus, Casey can be summarised as holding that a woman has the right to obtain an abortion 
without state interference before viability and that the state has the right to restrict abortions 
after viability unless the woman’s health was in danger. Critically, for the purpose of compelled 
medical treatment and advance directives, that the state has legitimate interests in protecting 
both the life of the foetus and the health of the woman. Thus, there is certainly an argument 
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that restrictions or complete nullification of advance directives in pregnancy are incompatible 
with the Constitution, however, attempts to attain judicial determinations of unconstitutionality 
in state courts have generally been frustrated.271 Timothy Burch, referring to the Casey standard 
of ‘undue burden’ asserts: 
There can be no doubt that, just as a prior directive statute with a pregnancy clause 
denying enforcement of a directive in the case of an incompetent woman with a pre-
viable fetus is an ‘undue burden’ on her right to abortion, it is an ‘undue burden’ on her 
right to forego medical treatment.272 
This seems intuitive; if a woman separately has the right to terminate pregnancy and the right 
to refuse medical treatment, then why not the right to refuse treatment, which results in ending 
a pregnancy? Benton, however, argues that pregnancy clauses could be upheld by the Supreme 
Court ‘based on broad state interests in fetal life’ in view of the judgment in Webster 
‘abandon[ing] the trimester approach and expand[ing] the scope of the state’s interest in fetal 
life’.273 In her view, by permitting state intervention during the second trimester, Webster 
enabled ‘[c]ourt approval of increased state-mandated medical intervention at earlier stages 
during pregnancy’.274 Perhaps, then, what will dictate the response of the Supreme Court is 
whether or not withholding or withdrawing treatment is considered to fall within the same 
scope as abortion and private reproductive decision-making. Or as Benton argues, perhaps it 
will rest on how broadly the Supreme Court construes the state’s compelling interest in the life 
of the foetus.275 
Conclusion 
There is no doubt that pregnancy adds an additional layer of complexity – legal and ethical – 
to the refusal of medical treatment. What is evident from the jurisprudence is that, irrespective 
of the legal status of the foetus and the abortion laws in the relevant jurisdictions, judges have 
approached similar fact patterns in very different ways. It is submitted that if a jurisdiction has 
not upheld the general right of a competent pregnant woman to refuse medical treatment, then 
it is unlikely that an advance refusal will be upheld. It is proffered that the opposite may not be 
true.  
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The challenge with Ireland and New York is that it is unclear how the relevant courts regard 
the right of a pregnant woman to refuse treatment. As discussed, two parallel lines of Irish 
authority exist without interaction within the High Court. Accordingly, the situation of the 
pregnant holder of an advance directive in Ireland is unclear. The legislation mandates that the 
High Court take into account the interests of the foetus, presumably to enter into some kind of 
balancing exercise – the rights and interests of the woman versus the rights and interests of the 
foetus – but without any guidance on how the issue should be resolved and with questionable 
precedent to guide. Despite the repeal of the 8th amendment, this provision remains in the 
legislation raising significant questions as to how it will operate, once commenced.  This 
research must be clear: this situation is both inexcusably flawed and untenable. It leaves the 
courts to decide matters on the basis of precedent, which interprets a now-repealed 
constitutional amendment. Given that there are over 6000 Jehovah’s Witnesses in Ireland, one 
could suggest that it is only a matter of time before a case involving a pregnant member of the 
faith arises. This research argues that what the law ought to do is ensure that the valid advance 
directive of a pregnant woman is not overturned on the basis of its effect on the foetus unless 
there is clear evidence that the woman did not want the decision to apply in pregnancy – 
perhaps through omitting pregnancy or specifying that pregnancy is an exception – or that she 
would not have wanted it to, had she considered the refusal in light of pregnancy. Anything 
less than that accords too little respect to the autonomy of the woman, her will and preferences 
and her valid interests in self-determination and bodily integrity. 
In New York, it is questionable whether an advance refusal expressed on behalf of or by the 
pregnant woman would be sufficient to prevent her from being treated against her wishes. As 
is argued in relation to Ireland, this position is patently defective and needs to be addressed so 
that women, physicians and service providers are clear as to the law. The combination of the 
jurisprudence across the United States, the legal lacuna in New York where living wills are 
concerned and the fact that other states restrict the healthcare decisions of pregnant women 
suggests that a refusal could be overridden in the interest of the viable foetus. With that said, 
jurisprudence from other states such as Illinois276 demonstrate a different approach, as does the 
legislation from states such as New Jersey and Vermont; perhaps an interesting choice for New 
Jersey, if one considers it in light of the Anderson case, which was also discussed earlier.277 As 
articulated, the law in Minnesota goes further to consider if, in the absence of a reference to 
 
276 Re Baby Boy Doe 632 NE 2d 326 (Ill 1994). 
277 NJ Rev Stat § 26:2H-56 (2018). Compare with the judgment in Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v Anderson 42 NJ 421 
(1964). 
pregnancy in the advance directive, there is clear and convincing proof that the individual 
would want the treatment withheld or discontinued. Where the case concerns a foetus prior to 
viability, as was the situation in Klein, the approach that would likely be taken by the Court of 
Appeal is still unclear;278 arguably, the grounds for state intervention would be considerably 
weaker where the foetus is pre-viability given the judgment in Roe, however, the effect that the 
subsequent Supreme Court judgments in Webster and Casey would have is still a matter of 
opinion. 
In stark contrast to the preceding paragraphs, when one considers the relevant jurisprudence 
from England and Wales pertaining to pregnant women, there appears to be little indication 
that an otherwise valid advance directive could be disregarded in the interests of the foetus.279 
Arguably, in fact, having a validly executed advance directive in pregnancy may be the best 
way of ensuring that the right of the pregnant woman to refuse a Caesarean section is respected, 
in view of the cases discussed in Chapter 3 and given Graeme Laurie’s contention that there is 
‘precious little evidence of cases in which a pregnant woman’s refusal has been accepted’ in 
practice, irrespective of what should happen in principle.280 In St. George’s Trust v S, Ms S 
expressed her wishes regarding intervention in writing, as well as verbally, in that she 
documented her ‘extreme objection to any medical or surgical intervention’, that such 
intervention was against her clearly articulated wishes and that she would consider such 
intervention to be ‘an assault on [her] person’.281 There was no suggestion at trial that she had 
attempted to draft an advance decision when she wrote down her wishes, however, if the same 
situation arose today and the woman complied with the MCA formalities, then it is questionable 
if the NHS would have any lawful grounds to intervene. If the woman is considered competent 
to refuse at the time – as was the case with Re S and St. George’s Trust v S – then her 
contemporaneous refusal is valid; if she is considered incompetent, then her advance directive 
should be given effect. 
The situation in England and Wales, however, may be different when the treatment being 
refused is a blood transfusion or other less or non-invasive treatment. As established 
previously, though the recent jurisprudence has upheld the right of a competent pregnant 
woman to refuse any medical treatment – thereby including blood transfusions – the Code of 
 
278 145 AD 2d 145 (NY 1989). 
279 See for example guidance from the RCOG: ‘In the case of a woman losing mental capacity after refusing consent to a treatment following 
previous discussion during pregnancy, even if this is at the expense of the fetus, her wishes should be respected in the same way as if she were 
competent’. Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, Obtaining Valid Consent (Clinical Governance Advice No. 6, 2015) 7. 
280 Graeme Laurie, ‘The Autonomy of Others: Reflections on the Rise and Rise of Patient Choice in Contemporary Medical Law’ in Sheila 
McClean (ed) First Do No Harm: Law, Ethics and Healthcare (Ashgate 2006) 143.  
281 [1999] Fam 26, 37. 
Practice specifically states pregnancy as an example of an (unanticipated) change to the 
circumstances of the patient, which may result in the advance decision not being applicable.282 
As a Caesarean section is exclusively an obstetric surgery, it would be obvious to all parties 
that the advance decision was intended to apply in pregnancy. By contrast, blood transfusions 
are not exclusive to pregnancy, though not uncommon given the blood loss involved in labour, 
the likelihood of anaemia in pregnancy and complications such as post-partum haemorrhage. 
Therefore, the applicability of the advance decision to the treatment could be questioned unless 
it was clear that the pregnancy was not an unanticipated change in circumstances. Perhaps the 
best course of action for women in England and Wales who may become pregnant is to specify 
that they intend the advance decision to apply in pregnancy to ensure its applicability, even 
though they are not specifically required to do so by law. Many less invasive or non-invasive 
treatments may be similar to blood transfusions in that the condition that necessitates their 
provision is not exclusive to pregnancy. Furthermore, where the non-invasive or less invasive 
treatment is exclusive (or heavily connected) to pregnancy, the fact that it is non-invasive or 
less invasive may mean that it is unlikely to be included in an advance refusal. For example, 
one could reasonably question how many women would think to write an advance directive 
specifically refusing a membrane sweep or augmentation of labour though many women may 
not want either.  
This strength and importance of a valid advance directive in pregnancy in England and Wales 
is particularly evident when one briefly revisits some of cases from Chapter 3 in which the 
woman was judged incompetent. If one returns to Rochdale NHS v C, the ‘throes of labour with 
all that is involved in terms of pain and emotional stress’ was sufficient to render the woman 
incompetent when combined with her acceptance of ‘the inevitability of her own death’.283 Re 
T and Re MB leave doubt where the competence of a pregnant woman is concerned in light of 
the reference made by Lord Donaldson MR to the ‘effects of shock, severe fatigue, pain or 
drugs being used in their treatment’ as factors that deprive or reduce capacity.284 Women have 
been known to encounter some, if not all, of these in the ordinary course of labour but there is 
no evidence that their competence to consent to the medically advised treatment is routinely 
 
282 Code of Practice, para. 9.43, Healthcare professionals must also consider ‘how long ago the advance decision was made’. See also Samantha 
Halliday, Autonomy and Pregnancy: A Comparative Analysis of Compelled Obstetric Intervention (Routledge 2016) 30 regarding the 
‘temporal and psychological distance’ separating the advance decision from the time that it should be given effect and ‘the asymmetries 
between such decisions will be particularly important where there has been a significant change in circumstances since the drafting of the 
advance directive’ (emphasis added). 
283 Rochdale Healthcare (NHS) Trust v C [1997] 1 FCR 274, 275.  
284 Re T [1993] Fam 95, 113. In Re MB [1997] 2 FLR 426, 437: Butler-Sloss LJ stated that ‘“the 'temporary factors” mentioned by Lord 
Donaldson MR in Re T (confusion, shock, fatigue, pain or drugs) may completely erode capacity but those concerned must be satisfied that 
such factors are operating to such a degree that the ability to decide is absent’ (emphasis added). Arguably, this gives a little more protection 
to the autonomy of the pregnant woman in that the bar is that the ability to decide must be absent, not a merely reduced or compromised. 
called into question.285 The same cannot be said, however, where they seek to go against 
medical advice.286 On this point, Vivienne Harpwood has argued: 
[I]n light of (…) Re T (…) it might be difficult to establish as a fact that a woman who 
had been in labour for many hours and who had received powerful analgesic drugs, was 
capable of giving or refusing consent to a surgical procedure which had not been 
explained to her beforehand.287  
The significant challenge presented by this is that medical advice is opinion, undoubtedly 
highly educated opinion, but still opinion as to the likely outcome in a given situation. Not only 
may it be affected by external factors, but critically, the alleged serious risk to the foetus or 
woman may not materialise, as has occurred in several cases such as that of Laura Pemberton 
in Florida and Amber Marlowe in Pennsylvania.288 This often leads to the (perhaps) mistaken 
conclusion that the doctor was ‘wrong’.289 
 
285 In contrast to the opinion of Butler-Sloss LJ, commentators such as Paul Burcher contend that women in active labour have ‘a very limited 
ability to participate in decision making according to the classical parameters of informed consent’, something which is routinely ‘overlooked’ 
or ‘ignored’ by medical professionals. He does, however, acknowledge that further empirical studies would be helpful, as existing ones are 
scarce. Paul Burcher, ‘The Ulysses Contract in Obstetrics: A Woman’s Choices Before and During Labour’ (2013) 39 J Med Ethics 27. 
286 See Rochdale NHS v C [1997] 1 FCR 274; during the hearing Johnson J noted that Ms C had changed her mind and agreed to the Caesarean 
section, despite him finding her incompetent to refuse it. For criticism of this aspect of the judgment, see Samantha Halliday Autonomy and 
Pregnancy: A Comparative Analysis of Compelled Obstetric Intervention (Routledge 2016) 51. 
287 Vivienne Harpwood, Legal Issues in Obstetrics (Dartmouth 1996) 76.  
288 Taking the case of Laura Pemberton, for example, she successfully gave birth to subsequent children via VBAC after being compelled to 
have a Caesarean section in the interests of the foetus, while she was in labour and attempting a VBAC. See State v Pemberton No. 96-759 
(Cir Ct, Leon County 1996) and Pemberton v Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center 66F Supp 2d 1247 (Fla. 1999). In Re S (Adult: 
Refusal of Treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 671, Ms S had been advised and refused to have a Caesarean section during labour on a previous 
pregnancy; that child was delivered vaginally. Another example is the case of Amber Marlowe; unbeknownst to her, the hospital had been 
granted a court order by a court in Pennsylvania to perform a Caesarean section without her consent. As she was unaware of the court order, 
she went to another hospital and delivered the baby vaginally. Wyoming Valley Health Care Systems, Inc. & Baby Doe v Jane Doe & John 
Doe No. 3-E-2004 (Pa Ct Com Pl 2004). In the Jefferson case, after the court order was granted, Ms Jefferson was rescanned and found not 
to be suffering from the condition that had precipitated the recommendation of a Caesarean section; Samantha Halliday, Autonomy and 
Pregnancy: A Comparative Analysis of Compelled Obstetric Intervention (Routledge 2016) 18. See also Heather Draper discussing a case of 
a woman who successfully delivered vaginally in the time it took to get the court order to compel her to undergo a Caesarean section. Heather 
Draper, ‘Women, Forced Caesareans and Antenatal Responsibilities’ (1996) 22 J Med Ethics 327, 332. 
289 As John Seymour notes: ‘In the field of obstetrics, it is not uncommon for a woman to decline to follow medical advice and to deliver a 
healthy child. Such an outcome is sometimes incorrectly relied on as evidence that the doctor was “wrong” and the patient was “right”. This 
is to misinterpret the outcome. When harm does not eventuate, it is fallacious to assert that no risks existed.’ He argues further: ‘All that a 
competent doctor can do is to identify and explain the risks presented in a particular situation, a properly informed woman may elect to accept 
those risks.’ John Seymour, Childbirth and the Law (Oxford University Press 2000) 208. It is argued that this can be distinguished from a 




For the most part, the Irish legislature introduced a forward-thinking piece of legislation with 
the individual at its heart. That individual is not, however, the pregnant woman assuming that 
the Assisted Decision-Making Capacity Act 2015 remains in its current form. Pregnant women 
will likely be excluded from holding applicable advance directives refusing life-sustaining 
medical treatment purely by virtue of being pregnant women. Indeed, the validity of any 
advance refusal, life-sustaining or otherwise, that would result in harm to the unborn is 
questionable. At a minimum, the advance directives of pregnant women will be the subject of 
a High Court inquiry once the treating professional ‘considers’ it to be harmful to the foetus to 
honour the refusal. While the foetus is certainly worthy of forms of legal protection and entitled 
to remedy where it is damaged by the conduct of another, this research does not support the 
impingement on the interests of the woman in self-determination and bodily integrity that will, 
in all likelihood, occur if this provision remains. Furthermore, as explained in the various 
chapters up to now, to invalidate one’s decision – in this case an advance directive – because 
it is not agreeable or represents the ‘wrong choice’ is to permit no choice at all. The likelihood 
of an otherwise valid advance decision being disregarded in the interests of the foetus, may 
also undermine the general trust of pregnant women with particular beliefs, whether religious 
or otherwise, in the healthcare system. Even if general confidence in maternity services is not 
undermined by such a policy, then the message it gives is still, to some extent, that the value 
of the previously competent woman is tied to her ability to safely deliver this child. In any 
event, those with particularly strong (religious) convictions, such as members of the Jehovah’s 
Witness faith or those opposed to Caesarean sections for various reasons, need to have as much 
confidence seeking help at Irish hospitals as those open to any medical intervention. 
Accordingly, this research has advanced two complimentary points; first, irrespective of any 
ethical duty that we may feel is owed by the woman to her foetus to submit to intervention in 
its interests, this should not translate to a legal duty. The reasons for this were laid out in in this 
research, however, to summarise: ethically, it breaches the most important of principles to force 
treatment upon a (previously) competent woman in the interests of her foetus and reduces her 
to a mere object, the value of which hinges on its ability to birth a child. Legally, it creates an 
unjust exception for pregnant women that no other group within society must tolerate. The 
second point is that respect for an advance directive in pregnancy is actually critical to protect 
the autonomy of pregnant women and their interests in self-determination and bodily integrity. 
As was discussed at length in Chapter 6, pregnant women, particularly those in labour, are 
especially vulnerable to unwanted intervention because of some of the ordinary features of 
labour and the significant power imbalance inherent in the process of childbirth. Together, 
these points can be summarised as: in view of the importance of advance directives in 
pregnancy to protecting the autonomy of the woman, created by the increased likelihood of 
intervention therein, any attempt to limit their effect is not only unjust, but particularly so given 
the increased tendency to intervene during labour. 
The Irish legislature could learn much from the jurisdictions that were considered in the course 
of this research and yet, it is claimed that those jurisdictions, in turn, could learn much from 
Ireland. What this research has discovered is that no framework is without its issues. While 
England and Wales has the most jurisprudence demonstrating respect for and vindication of 
the right of the competent pregnant woman to refuse treatment, advance directives in pregnancy 
are not specifically legislated. Indeed, as discussed previously, pregnancy is one of the potential 
unanticipated circumstances that may result in the validity of the advance decision being 
questioned according to the Code of Practice.1 Furthermore, that statement relates to competent 
pregnant women and the approach of the courts towards the capacity of women in labour may 
be viewed as questionable. Consequently, it is still argued that the best course of action for a 
woman wishing to refuse specific intervention, particularly in labour or following labour, is to 
draft an advance decision to that effect. A specific reference to pregnancy, though not obliged 
by the law, would certainly be desirable. Arguably, a court would find it very difficult not to 
respect the (precedent) autonomy of the woman when faced with the combination of a 
contemporaneous, though potential incompetent decision and an advance decision that has not 
been left open to interpretation. That assumes that such a situation would be sufficiently unclear 
to the hospital and treating physician to even make it to the Court of Protection for a 
determination. Though a very developed system, it can still be asserted that the English 
legislature could learn from the approach taken in Ireland, particularly where best interests 
assessments and effective protection of autonomy are concerned. Ireland has already, very 
clearly, learned from its nearest neighbour given the inspiration provided to the Irish legislation 
by the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the jurisprudence preceding and succeeding it. 
New York – and indeed the greater United States – has presented a confusing picture. On one 
hand, New York has vindicated and upheld the personal rights of the individual in various 
 
1 Code of Practice accompanying the Mental Capacity Act 2005, para. 9.43. 
ways. On the other hand, despite having quite liberal abortion laws, it has become apparent 
during the course of this research that it has failed to uphold the right of a pregnant woman to 
refuse medical treatment. Furthermore, it has failed to legislate to protect the right to refuse 
specifically in relation to pregnant women. Having evaluated the jurisprudence in New York 
and in light of the courts in which healthcare matters are routinely heard, it can be asserted that 
the decision of the court may very well depend on the presiding judge and his interpretation of 
the statute; does the lack of legislation pertaining to pregnant women mean that they should be 
treated the same as everybody else, or that they are not in receipt of specific protection when 
their foetuses may be in danger? Does omission mean they are treated the same, or differently? 
The benefit of New York is that it highlights, to some extent, what could happen in Ireland if 
the entirety of Part 8 of the Assisted Decision-Making Capacity Act 2015 remains 
uncommenced. After all, despite the vast differences between the jurisdictions, there are some 
similarities in how the issue of medical treatment in pregnancy has been treated and its current 
legal position. For example, there is uncertainty as to the right of a pregnant woman to refuse, 
there is a largely untested common law right to decide in advance, the issue of an advance 
directive in pregnancy has not yet been adjudicated and there are constitutional issues at play 
that are very much a matter of interpretation. In that way, New York serves as a sort of 
cautionary tale to Ireland and should offer all of the necessary evidence that legislating clearly 
on such matters is desirable for all parties – women, physicians, courts and facilities. 
Furthermore, the problem is only being pushed out by the refusal of various courts to hear cases 
challenging the constitutionality of pregnancy exceptions contained in state advance directive 
legislation, as occurred in DiNino2 and Gabrynowicz.3 The issue needs to be tackled 
somewhere, whether at a legislative or court level; the former is most desirable, the latter may 
be necessary as long as the former fails to act.  
Throughout this research, a number of key themes were explored. Chapter 2 served as an 
introduction to ethical issues in healthcare and culminated with an explanation of Principlism, 
in addition to an explanation as to why it would be used as the primary ethical framework. 
Then, in each chapter, the ethical analysis was built upon a Principlist framework, with the 
addition of some more detailed analysis on related concepts where necessary, such as the 
degree to which advance directives are a valid and real exercise of autonomy. Chapter 3 
examined the doctrine of informed consent, providing the necessary theoretical basis for the 
 
2 See DiNino v Gorton 684 P 2d 1297 (Wash 1984). 
3 Gabrynowicz v Heitkamp 904 F Supp 1061 (ND 1995). 
right to refuse treatment in advance. It highlighted the considerable differences between how 
the issue of capacity is treated in New York versus England and Wales and Ireland and how 
the law – and the relevant ethical or professional guidelines – in the three jurisdictions views 
information disclosure. It also criticised how the law operates in this area given that its purpose, 
from an ethical perspective, is to protect autonomy. Thus, given that the purpose of the doctrine 
is to protect autonomy, it questioned why the duty to provide information exists within 
negligence and not battery or another more suitable, perhaps human rights based area, wherein 
the interests of the individual in bodily integrity could be more adequately protected. As was 
argued in Chapter 3, though this question is not a primary focus of this research, it was worth 
bearing in mind when intervention in pregnancy and labour was discussed in Chapter 6 in view 
of the intimate nature of the process of childbirth and the significant power imbalance 
associated with it.  
Chapter 4 extended the discussion to an analysis of the right to refuse life-sustaining medical 
intervention. Though certainly not always a clear-cut distinction, the chapter considered the 
position of competent and incompetent individuals to refuse treatment. Where incompetent 
individuals were concerned, the analysis was split further between those who had capacity at 
some point – and where the wishes of the previously competent person may have been 
determinative or persuasive – and those who never did. The tension between protecting and 
respecting the autonomy of the individual on one hand and the focus of English law on ‘best 
interests’ and the application of the ‘clear and convincing’ evidentiary standard to decisions in 
New York on the other, was highlighted to a significant extent. Arguably, there were situations 
in both jurisdictions where the wishes of the individual regarding the continuation of life-
sustaining treatment were not honoured.4 With that said, England and Wales has demonstrated 
growing respect for the wishes and feelings of the individual, albeit in the course of the best 
interests assessment.  
Chapter 5 discussed the development of the advance directive from its root in Luis Kutner’s 
work to its common law recognition in the three jurisdictions to its statutory footing in England 
and Wales and Ireland, once the ADM(C)A 2015 is commenced. This research met challenges 
to the idea of advance directives – and to a lesser extent their operation in practice – head on 
and argued that though undeniably flawed in some ways, advance directives are an effective 
tool for the individual to exercise her autonomy. Perhaps, they may even be the best tool to do 
 
4 For example, Re Westchester County Medical Center [O'Connor] 72 NY 2d 517 (1988) and Re M (Adult Patient)(Minimally Conscious 
State: Withdrawal of Treatment) [2012] 1 All ER 1313.  
so when the other options are considered. This chapter highlighted some key differences 
between Irish and English legislation, including the Irish requirement that any behaviour 
inconsistent to the advance directive be while the individual has capacity in order to be 
determinative, something which is not present in the MCA 2005. The research also compared 
the clarity of the position in England and Wales and Ireland, with the equivocation in New 
York and highlighted the gaps present in its law. 
Finally, Chapter 6 built upon the discussions in the previous chapters to deal with the primary 
research questions. By considering the heavily related issues of compelled intervention in 
pregnancy and ‘pregnancy exclusions’ to advance directive legislation, it proffered a theory as 
to the legal position of a pregnant advance directive holder in each jurisdiction. It was 
highlighted that, although insufficiently clear to some extent, England and Wales appears to 
have the framework most likely to protect the interests in bodily integrity and self-
determination of the pregnant woman. Both New York’s silence and Ireland’s express singling 
out of pregnant women represent a failure to respect the autonomy of the pregnant woman, 
albeit it in different ways. It is essentially left to the courts to decide if the advance directive of 
the pregnant woman ought to be honoured, arguably an undertaking that no judge nor court 
would relish. Still, as highlighted in the course of the chapter, England and Wales does not 
have an unblemished record where compelled intervention in pregnancy is concerned. Though 
largely overruled by more recent jurisprudence, cases were discussed in which treatment was 
compelled irrespective of the capacity of the woman. Furthermore, as discussed previously, it 
could be argued that courts have been a little too willing to make findings of incapacity on 
occasion.  
It appeared to many that the presence of the 8th Amendment in matters outside of abortion had 
recently receded with its repeal. Its reach, which can be seen in the drafting of section 85(6) 
and its continued presence therein may well serve as an indication that merely repealing the 8th 
Amendment has not changed everything in the way people may have expected. As discussed 
during the course of Chapter 6, section 85(6)(a) may provide an important safeguard against a 
woman being bound by an advance decision in a pregnancy that she had neither anticipated, 
nor factored into her healthcare decision-making. It can be asserted that this provision has 
struck the appropriate balance between a legitimate state interest in protecting a foetus and the 
interests of the woman that arise in the context of healthcare decisions. What can be argued is 
the presence of an imbalance between the relevant interests is section 85(6)(b); this research 
contends that it is incumbent upon the legislature to honour the will of the majority of the 
people of Ireland that pregnant women be free from illegitimate interference with their 
healthcare decisions in the reproductive context. Accordingly, it is argued that it is preferable 
for the legislature to remove section 85(6)(b) from the ADM(C)A 2015. 
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Introduction 
Reproductive healthcare has been the subject of considerable public commentary in Ireland in 
recent years. From the controversial handling of the symphysiotomy redress scheme; to the 
publicisation of the appalling abuses perpetrated against women and children in mother and 
baby homes; and the long awaited and hard won process of liberalisation of the laws on 
termination of pregnancy – the mistreatment of women in the context of reproductive health 
care has been very much to the fore of public discourse. As recently as April 2019 a national 
radio talk show devoted two full weeks of programming to women who called in to describe 
their experiences in Irish maternity hospitals, and the national health service, the Health Service 
Executive, issued a public apology stating “The HSE apologises to those women where our 
service has failed to meet their expectations.”i The recurring thread throughout all of these 
controversies has been a fundamental failure to listen to and to believe women: to hear and 




Snapshot of Reproductive Healthcare Services in Ireland 
Ireland is a stable modern democracy considered to have a high standard of living and a young 
and well educated population. There is a system of universal healthcare through which all 
citizens are entitled to access care. However, problems with waiting lists for non-emergency 
treatments and with waiting times to access acute treatment, as well as with access to certain 
treatments and to choice of place, provider, and type of treatment have led to the growth of a 
significant private healthcare industry and a significant proportion of the population purchase 
private health insurance products. 
Reproductive health care and care during pregnancy and childbirth is provided to all pregnant 
people free of charge under the Maternity and Infant Child Scheme.ii For the majority of 
pregnant people what this provides is ante natal care shared between their General 
Practitioner (GP) and an obstetric unit either in a standalone maternity facility or within a larger 
hospital setting; and labour and delivery and post-partum care in the obstetric unit. In some 
areas of the country pregnant people can access midwifery led care either through a midwife-
led unit attached to an obstetric unit; or via community midwifery services either through a 
domiciliary midwife service run from an obstetric unit or by engaging a self-employed 
community midwife. There are also private midwifery services available through independent 
enterprises to access homebirth care where the State supported homebirth service is 
unavailable by reason of geography, scarcity, or the strict exclusion criteria applied. 
The Maternity and Infant Child Scheme provides care to all pregnant people at all stages of 
pregnancy. Gynaecological care is provided under the free public health care system run by the 
Health Service Executive (HSE). Fertility treatments are not provided on the public health care 
system and can only be accessed privately. Until 2018 termination of pregnancy services were 
strictly curtailed and available only in extremely limited circumstances. Following a referendum 
vote to change the Constitution of Ireland, a termination of pregnancy service was introduced 
in January 2019. This is a GP-led service up to 12 weeks’ gestation and a hospital-led service 
thereafter. The service is available on the public health care system. 
There are approximately 67,000 births every year in Ireland. This includes figures for stillbirths 
and ectopic pregnancies. It does not include the figures for miscarriage. The rate of miscarriage 
is internationally accepted to be above 25% of all pregnancies. This indicates the total number 
of pregnancies in Ireland is approximately 95,000 each year. (The Irish Maternity Indicator System 
2015) 
 
There are 19 maternity units in Ireland. Three of these are dedicated tertiary maternity 
hospitals based in Dublin. A further 14 maternity units are located within general hospitals 
throughout the country. There are two midwifery led units, one of which is co-located alongside 
an obstetric unit in a general hospital. Almost all maternity care is obstetric led although usually 
delivered by midwives. There are no independent midwives in Ireland and home birth is 
provided by self-employed community midwives (SECMs) under contract to the to the Health 
Service Executive. Many areas of the country have no state provided or private home birth 
service. A limited homebirth service is also provided by Domino clinics  
There are two full time perinatal psychiatrists one in Dublin and one in Cork. 
While all maternity care is provided free of charge on the public health system, certain 
medications for pregnancy related conditions are not universally freely available. 
The National Maternity Strategy was launched in 2017 and sets out a ten-year vision for 
maternity care in Ireland. Funding for this project has been re-allocated to other related areas, 
which has implications for its development and implementation. 
High levels of understaffing, particularly of midwives has a detrimental impact on the quality of 
care that women receive throughout the maternity services. In comparison with internationally 
accepted standards there also a lack of consultants throughout the service. 
Midwifery received professional recognition in Ireland in 2011. All midwives practising in 
Ireland must have completed a four year BSc in Midwifery or a Higher diploma in Midwifery 
post BSc Nursing and are registered by the Nurses and Midwives Board of Ireland (NMBI).  
The National Perinatal Epidemiology Centre audits clinical data from the maternity services for 
review.  
 
1. Cases of mistreatment and violence against women during 
childbirth 
Please indicate whether in your country there are cases of mistreatment and violence 
against women during reproductive health care, particularly facility-based childbirth. If so, 
please specify what kind of cases and describe your country’s response and any good 
practices, including protection of human rights;  
 
Women's Experiences of Mistreatment and Violence in the Irish Maternity System. 
 
The incidence of reports of disrespectful and abusive treatment in the Irish maternity system 
during labour and childbirth has become increasingly persistent in the last few years. The 
advent of social media has contributed to women sharing and documenting their experiences 
and led to women feeling less isolated and alone and able to speak out and feel understood and 
supported. There is very little recorded data in relation to these reports, partly due to the 
intangible nature of the experiences and partly due to the isolation experienced by women who 
believed they were alone in their experiences and that no-one would believe them. Having not 
being listened to and their concerns dismissed, they were discouraged from complaining or 
articulating their distress. Following the death of a woman and her baby in a maternity unit in 
January 2019, as recently as April 2019, a woman phoned a national radio station to describe 
her own experience of mistreatment and neglect and unsafe conditions during her own recent 
labour and birth. This programme aired on national radio for 75 minutes each day from the 2nd 
to the 10th of April and for these almost 2 weeks it was exclusively dedicated to women 
describing their own experiences of unsafe care, disrespect, abuse and mistreatment in the 
Irish maternity system. Following the initial phone call more than 1000 women contacted the 
programme of which only a small number could be accommodated to tell their stories on the 
national airwaves. The experiences and testimonies of these women are now on record but as 
yet need to be documented and analysed. They cover instances of abuse ranging from verbal 
abuse, humiliation, shaming, neglect, coercion, lack of consent, to intimidation, aggressive and 
threatening behaviour, the withholding of pain medication, practice of unsafe, outdated, non-
evidence-based procedures, dismissal of their concerns, restraint and emotionally abusive 
behaviours such as emotional blackmail and ‘gaslighting’. In addition, they reported vindictive 
remarks and abuse, being treated with lack of dignity and respect, being exposed in public, not 
being informed of what was happening and not being asked or consulted about decisions which 
directly affected their labours and births. Most seriously, they were frequently not listened to, - 
their concerns and experiential knowledge of when something was wrong was ignored and 
dismissed, often resulting in adverse outcomes for themselves or their babies which they felt 
could have been avoided. Their input and experience in their own labour and birth experiences 
was dismissed and ignored and their valuable information about their own and their babies’ 
health was not listened to, in some cases leading to tragic outcomes. They frequently reported 
feeing silenced. When they followed up with complaints, it was almost universally the case that 
crucial aspects of the events which had occurred were not documented.  Many women 
reported being frightened and in shock and describe their labours and birth as extremely 
traumatic experiences. Many continue to experienced post-traumatic stress disorder which 
they attribute to the events surrounding labour and birth and the mistreatment they received 
in childbirth. Women also consider that experiences of fear, isolation and helplessness they felt 
during labour contributed in no small measure to the high levels of postnatal depression and 
anxiety they subsequently have experienced. Women have been left with life-changing injuries 
as a result of not being listened to and further silenced when records are lost and incomplete 
and events denied.  
Silence can act as a tool of oppression. Women felt unable to speak of their experiences for fear 
of judgement, manipulated out of guilt to feel they have no right to complain when they should 
be grateful that they have a healthy baby, even though their mental, physical and emotional 
health may have been so badly damaged that they are barely able to function and yet they 
continue to put a brave face on it and look after their babies and families. Furthermore, 
psychological supports for perinatal mental health are almost non-existent and state 
counselling services very limited and difficult to access in many parts of the country. This may 
be slowly improving but voluntary and charitable organisations often attempt to fill the gap, 
which is a far from satisfactory situation.  
 
The innumerable instances of obstetric violence which women describe are systemic and often 
deeply embedded as part of the institutionalised culture which historically has demonstrated a 
misogyny which has manifested in many scandals of gender-based cruelty and violence since 
the foundation of the State. These include, among others, the practice of Symphysiotomy which 
continued until the early 1990s and for which many victims have still not received redress and 
the Neary scandal, where hysterectomies were performed on women, many after their first 
child, for no medically indicated reason and without their knowledge or consent.   
 
The experiences of obstetric violence women have reported go back as far as sixty years. They 
cover the entire spectrum of disrespect, abuse and violence which goes unacknowledged and 
for which no individual or institution can be held accountable for. The experiences women 
describe demonstrate a consistent attitude of disrespect emanating through all areas of 
maternity care. This disrespect manifests as verbal abuse, cruelty, lack of awareness and an 
absence of motivation to change on many levels. The lack of understanding of the process of 
consent and how it should be applied in maternity situations is also very evident. 
Women describe the lack of compassionate care and disrespect as being a major contributing 
factor in these traumatic experiences. Very often, they state that it is not the actual events of 
the birth which cause them distress and trauma but, rather, how they are treated. What might 
appear to be a traumatic birth to a professional – one which is complicated or suddenly 
changes, may not be experienced or perceived as excessively traumatic or difficult for the 
women if she receives supportive care. Whereas, what might seem to be a relatively 
straightforward birth may be a cause of severe distress with consequent implications for her 
physical or mental health if she has experienced disrespectful, neglectful and abusive care. 
Health professionals should be aware of the impact their presence and care has, not only on 
the immediate welfare of the woman and her baby, but also of the far reaching consequences it 
can have on her well-being and that of her family and in effect on the wider community. In the 
midst of the most traumatic experience, a woman will often speak of one specific person who 
showed her even a moment of kindness and care. A maternity system needs to be developed 
where disrespect will not be tolerated, where there are robust mechanisms for ensuring 
respect and communication are respectful and compassionate at all times, and where feedback 
both positive and negative is used to improve the system for all. 
A culture that supports everyone involved in maternity care should be developed and nurtured, 
recognising the more intangible outcomes as well as the measurable outcomes – putting the 
woman at the centre of her care and supporting the health professionals in providing such care.   
 
 
While obstetric violence is generally considered to be abuse and violence towards women 
during labour and childbirth, it also pervades the maternity system in other ways. There are 
very many caring compassionate and conscientious professionals within the maternity system 
in Ireland striving to provide woman-centred, safe, evidence-based, respectful maternity care. 
However, the environment in which they seek to provide this care is often itself the cause of 
trauma and distress to these caring professionals. They are overworked, working in an 
understaffed, highly stressful environment. It was recently reported that three midwives were 
caring for thirty one women and their babies at a major maternity unit (Irish Times 29 March 2019), 
and similar instances have been reported elsewhere, often with recently qualified midwives 
feeling overwhelmed. They often in turn experience distress and trauma when they continually 
witness the treatment that women are subjected to on such a frequent basis and feel 
powerless to provide the care they entered the profession intending to provide. They feel guilty 
and overwhelmed and unsupported. Bullying at all levels within the maternity system has been 
reported. The effects of all this neglect on the maternity system and the lack of funding and 
resourcing and management issues can be seen in the large numbers of midwives that are 
leaving due to burnout and stress. Student midwives, in particular, leave either before 
completing their studies or as soon they have completed their studies, reporting the working 
conditions and unsafe environment as being a major factor in their decision. In the face of such 
inhospitable and difficult working conditions, such professionals still mange to provide care 
with kindness and respect, clearly demonstrating that there is no excuse for disrespectful or 
abusive care under any circumstances – either towards the women and babies they care for, or 





Please specify if full and informed consent is administered for any type of reproductive 
health care and if these include childbirth care;  
Irish law provides that full and informed consent must be provided for any medical procedure it 
is proposed to perform on a competent patient. This is provided for both in case law precedent 
in the civil law of tortsiii and also at statute in the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 
1997.iv Ireland has also ratified the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms and adopted its provisions into domestic law in the ECHR Act 2003, thereby also 
adopting the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence on the rights to dignity and privacy 
and their consequential applications to the right to give and to withhold consent to a medical 
procedure.  
All of the professional bodies of the medical professions in Ireland provide in their codes of 
professional conduct that consent must be sought and received for medical procedures.v The 
HSE’s National Consent Policy 2017vi reiterates this position. In relation to reproductive 
healthcare specifically, the National Consent Policy in § 7.7.1 ‘Refusal of treatment in 
pregnancy’ still retains on paper a provision that significantly limits the scope of pregnant 
people to refuse consent to treatment that may impact on the unborn child. The provision in 
question vii curtailed a pregnant woman’s ability to refuse a proposed medical treatment if a 
health care practitioner believed that not accepting the treatment would pose a risk to the life 
of her unborn foetus, and provided that the appropriate forum for mediating any disputes that 
might arise between a woman and her health care providers in this context would be the High 
Court. This provision was necessary in the National Consent Policy because of the constitutional 
protection of the right to life of the unborn child provided for in Article 40.3.3 of the 
Constitution of Ireland 1937. In the wake of the referendum decision in May 2018 to repeal 
Article 40.3.3, § 7.7.1 of the National Consent Policy is no longer necessary and is considered 
defunct. However, certain pieces of legislation remain on the statute books that were drafted 
prior to repeal and necessarily made similar provision for the curtailment of the maternal right 
to give or to refuse consent to medical treatment during pregnancy. The Assisted Decision 
Making (Capacity) Act 2015 is one such example. This legislation, which has been enacted but 
not fully commenced, deals with the introduction of advance healthcare directives to Irish law. 
In its treatment of the right to make advance care directives regarding medical treatment in the 
event of a possible future loss of capacity, the 2015 Act in section 85 (6) provides that any 
treatment specified in an advance healthcare directive can only be administered to an 
incapacitated pregnant person if it does not negatively affect the right to life of the unborn, and 
that an application must be made to the High Court in the event of any uncertainty. It will be 
necessary for the Irish government now to reconsider the provisions of section 85 (6) in the 
light of repeal of Art. 40.3.3, as to commence this provision unamended now would breach the 
legislature’s obligation not to knowingly enact unconstitutional legislation. 
 
Women's Experiences of Consent 
Women frequently report procedures which have been carried out without their consent. Some 
examples are described below. 
The practice of Membrane Sweeps (also known as Stretch and Sweep) Is often performed 
without women's knowledge or consent, often under the guise of vaginal exams. There Is no 
evidence that this procedure is effective In Inducing labour. A membrane sweep Is frequently 
presented to women as an alternative to other forms of Induction which may be avoided If they 
accept it, leaving them feeling they are in a position where they must accept it to avoid the 
alternative. This does not satisfy the criteria for informed consent 
Artificial rupture of membranes (ARM/AROM) is routinely performed as standard procedure 
during Active Management of Labour (AML), usually without explanation or consent being 
sought and presented as an Inevitable part of inducing or moving on labour (see Hamilton v 
HSE).  
Use of Admission CTG: This Is routinely insisted on at admission and women are intimidated 
Into accepting it as refusal can often lead to further pressure or fear of further consequences or 
lack of support as labour progresses. The Institute of Obstetricans and Gynaecologists 
recommendations for admission CTG state 'The current evidence base dos not support the use 
of the admission CTG In low risk pregnancies and Is, therefore, not recommended as a 
routine.'(Institute of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, Intrapartum Fetal Heart Rate 
Monitoring, June 2012:9). These guidelines are frequently not adhered to.   
For continuous CTG monitoring in labour, the Institute of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists 
recommendations for low-risk women are: 'For a woman who Is healthy and has an 
uncomplicated pregnancy (low risk), Intermittent ausculation should be offered and 
recommended In labour using either a Doppler ultrasound or a Pinard Stethoscope.' (Institute 
of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, Intrapartum Fetal Heart Rate Monitoring, June 2012:9). 
There are many other examples during labour and childbirth care in the Irish Maternity system 
where consent Is not considered or sought for procedures. An example of this Is the routine use 
of syntocinon to induce or augment a labour which Is not progressing according to the 
standardised timeframe used In the Active Management of Labour model - which originated In 
Ireland and is used throughout the maternity units.  
Women have a natural expectation that the healthcare professionals that attend them in labour 
and childbirth are fully cognisant of the most up-to-date guidelines and best international 
practice standards and will therefore generally comply with what is suggested. Women want 
the best for themselves and their families at such an important time. That this Is always 
uppermost  for women during pregnancy and birth is illustrated by the fact that antenatal care 
never needs to be incentivised. Globally, women will endure hardship, discomfort, lengthy 
queues and other obstacles to avail of antenatal care. They have a right to expect that 
comprehensive and accurate information is given to them by their health professional in order 
to make the informed decisions that are right for themselves and their family. Withholding this 
information is denying women this right to fully informed decision making. 
The factors that are necessary for fully Informed consent are frequently not present in the 
interactions and attitudes of many within the system when caring for women. These include 
ensuring that full Information is provided, in a way that is clear and understandable for the 
pregnant person; that both the benefits and the risks of a procedure are clearly explained; that 
the option for declining or refusing is given without intimidation, and that the power dynamic is 
recognized and accounted for. Additional training should be provided to healthcare 
professionals on a regular basis in order to ensure that best practice with regard to facilitating 
informed consent at every stage of labour and childbirth for the pregnant person and to effect 
change within the culture at the institutional as well as at the individual level.      
 
3. Accountability mechanism 
Please specify whether there are accountability mechanisms in place within the health 
facilities to ensure redress for victims of mistreatment and violence, including filing 
complaints, financial compensation, acknowledgement of wrongdoing and guarantees of 
non-repetition. Please indicate whether the ombudsperson is mandated to address such 
human rights violations; 
The accountability systems within the health facilities and the National Health Service 
Executive are experienced as being inadequate in addressing the complaints of those who 
experience mistreatment in any form.  
Under the Data Protection Act (2018) and The Freedom of Information Amendment Act 
(2003), medical records must be provided to service users of a public body. Under Section 9 
of the Data Protection Act, there is also a facility to have these notes amended where the 
service user disputes them and this must be recorded, even in the event of the provider 
disputing the fact. In reality, there are often delays in providing the notes, notes are often 
incomplete and/or inaccurate and it can be a lengthy and obstructive process to acquire 
them. In cases which go to court, it often takes many months and high costs in legal fees to 
secure them through the courts.  
Many hospitals have a complaints procedure, which generally consists of a written 
complaint which must be responded to within a specified timeframe. This can be followed 
up with a meeting if the service user wishes. However, there is no mechanism in place to 
ensure guarantees of non-repetition. Frequently, service users report that the meeting 
appears to have been held in an attempt to prevent the complainant taking further legal 
action. More recently, as a result of awareness and advocacy, these meetings appear to be 
a more genuine attempt to recognise the woman’s distress and concerns, although fall far 
short of acknowledge the failings in care or ensuring change in practices. There is currently 
no mechanism in place to monitor or implement changes. 
People may also complain to the Health Service Executive, although once again, there are 
no mechanisms for further action to be taken in implementing changes. 
The only facility for redress or financial compensation is through the judicial system. As this 
is a lengthy and costly process, people generally only take this option when financial 
support is necessary to support and care for a child gravely injured at birth due to failings in 
care.  
It is proposed that a Mandatory Open Disclosure Policy for the Health Service will be in 
place by legislation by the end of 2019, although this is not certain. However, it will provide 
for a statutory duty of candour on individual healthcare professionals and organisations. It 
does not directly address implementation of changes. 
At present, when all other avenues of complaint have been followed, complaints can be made 
to the Ombudsman’s Office where they will be investigated. Women are advised of this option 
but it seems to be seldom utilised. 
In the case of professional fitness to practice, complaints may be made to the professional 
bodies. In the case of doctors, this is the Irish Medical Board, who will address the complaint 
and apply sanctions. The Nursing and Midwifery Board of Ireland address complaints and 
professional standards regarding midwives and nurses.   
 
Excepting in the case where a complaint goes to court, when women make a complaint about 
the standards of care they receive, they are generally attempting to achieve two objectives – 1. 
An acknowledgement, recognition, and where possible an apology for the mistreatment and 
lack of care; and 2. An assurance that changes will be put in place to ensure that it is not 
repeated and that other women and families do not have to go through a similar experience.     
 
4. National policies v WHO guidelines and standards 
Does your health systems have policies that guide health responses to VAW and are these in 
line with WHO guidelines and standards on this issue, see: 1 | 2  
 
Active Management of Labour is still practised widely in Ireland, where it originated. Policies to 
change this in line with the latest WHO guidelines are not in evidence. 
Continuity of carer, in line with the WHO guidelines is not available to women in maternity 
units throughout Ireland and due to the structure of the maternity system and the current staff 
shortages is unlikely to be implemented in the near future. 
There are very many issues which need to be addressed to bring the policies of the Irish 
Maternity system in line with the WHO guidelines and standards. 
Aspects such as clear communication by maternity staff, mobility in labour and position of 
choice, respect and dignity and the avoidance of unnecessary medical intervention if mother 
and baby are in good condition, along with the forced hastening of labour are issues which 
need to be addressed. 
Other issues such as respectful communication and provision of evidence-based care are also of 
great importance. 
 


















i https://www.thejournal.ie/childbirth-joe-duffy-4585612-Apr2019/  
ii https://www.hse.ie/eng/services/list/3/maternity/combinedcare.html 
iii In Re a Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No. 2) [1996] 2 IR 79 
iv http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1997/act/26/enacted/en/html  
v In the context of reproductive healthcare, see the Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics for Registered 
Medical Practitioners (Medical Council, 2018) available at https://medicalcouncil.ie/News-and-
Publications/Reports/Guide-to-Professional-Conduct-and-Ethics-8th-Edition-2016-.pdf; Code of Professional 




vii The full text of § 7.7.1 reads as follows: “The consent of a pregnant woman is required for all health and social 
care interventions. However, because of the constitutional provisions on the right to life of the “unborn”, there is 
significant legal uncertainty regarding the extent of a pregnant woman's right to refuse treatment in circumstances 
in which the refusal would put the life of a viable foetus at serious risk. In such circumstances, legal advice should 
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